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Keynote: The Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, 
and Acquisition 
The Honorable Sean J. Stackley—assumed the duties of assistant secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN [RDA]) following his confirmation by the Senate in 
July 2008. As the Navy’s acquisition executive, Stackley is responsible for the research, 
development, and acquisition of Navy and Marine Corps platforms and warfare systems, which 
includes oversight of more than 100,000 people and an annual budget in excess of $50 billion. 
Prior to his appointment to ASN (RDA), Stackley served as a professional staff member of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee. During his tenure with the Committee, he was responsible for overseeing 
Navy and Marine Corps programs, U.S. Transportation Command matters, and related policy for the 
Seapower Subcommittee. He also advised on Navy and Marine Corps operations and maintenance, 
science and technology, and acquisition policy. 
Stackley began his career as a Navy surface warfare officer, serving in engineering and combat 
systems assignments aboard USS John Young (DD 973). Upon completing his warfare qualifications, 
he was designated as an engineering duty officer and served in a series of industrial, fleet, program 
office, and headquarters assignments in ship design and construction, maintenance, logistics, and 
acquisition policy. 
From 2001 to 2005, Stackley served as the Navy’s LPD 17 program manager, with responsibility for 
all aspects of procurement for this major ship program. Having served earlier in his career as 
production officer for the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and project naval architect overseeing 
structural design for the Canadian Patrol Frigate, HMCS Halifax (FFH 330), he had the unique 
experience of having performed a principal role in the design, construction, test, and delivery of three 
first-of-class warships. 
Stackley was commissioned and graduated with distinction from the United States Naval Academy in 
1979, with a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering. He holds the degrees of Ocean 
Engineer and Master of Science, mechanical engineering, from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Stackley earned certification as a professional engineer, Commonwealth of Virginia, in 
1994. 
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Plenary Panel: Reducing Lifecycle Sustainment 
Costs 
Thursday, May 14, 2015 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m. Chair: The Honorable David J. Berteau, Assistant Secretary of Defense Logistics and Materiel Readiness 
Panelists: 
Scott DiLisio, Director, Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics Division, Chief 
of Naval Operations 
Richard Burke, Director, Operations Analysis & Procurement Planning 
Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE) 
Daniel A. Fri, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Logistics 
and Product Support, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition 
 
The Honorable David J. Berteau—is the assistant secretary of defense for logistics and materiel 
readiness, responsible for ensuring world class military logistics support to the men and women of the 
United States Armed Forces. He manages logistics policy and processes to provide superior, cost-
effective, joint logistics support to the warfighter. He oversees the management of $170 billion in 
Department of Defense logistics operations. 
Prior to this role, Berteau served as senior vice president and director of the National Security 
Program on Industry and Resources at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington, DC. His research and analysis covered national security plans, policies, programs, 
budgets, and resources; defense management, contracting, logistics, and acquisition; and national 
security economics and industrial base issues. Berteau has been an adjunct professor at Georgetown 
University and at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, a director of the Procurement 
Round Table, and an associate at the Robert S. Strauss Center at the University of Texas. He 
remains a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. 
Before he joined CSIS full time in 2008, he served as a CSIS non-resident senior associate for seven 
years. In addition, he was director of national defense and homeland security for Clark & Weinstock, 
director of Syracuse University's National Security Studies Program and a professor of practice at the 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, and senior vice president at Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC). Previously, he served 12 years at senior levels in the U.S. Defense 
Department under four defense secretaries, including four years as principal deputy assistant 
secretary of defense for production and logistics. 
Berteau graduated with a BA from Tulane University in 1971 and received his master's degree in 
1981 from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas. 
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Panel 12. Management and Resource Allocation of 
Software Intensive Systems Development and 
Sustainment 
Thursday, May 14, 2015 
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
Chair: Captain Kurt Rothenhaus, USN, Commanding Officer, SPAWAR 
Systems Center Pacific 
Achieving Better Buying Power Through Acquisition of Open Architecture 
Software Systems for Web-Based and Mobile Devices 
Walt Scacchi, University of California–Irvine 
Thomas Alspaugh, University of California–Irvine  
DoD Software-Intenstive Systems Development: A Hit and Miss Process 
Brad Naegle, NPS 
Investing in Software Sustainment 
Robert Ferguson, Software Engineering Institute  
Captain Kurt Rothenhaus, USN—is a native of New York City and received his commission upon 
graduating from the University of South Carolina. He holds a Master of Science degree in computer 
science and a PhD in software engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School; he transferred into 
the Engineering Duty Officer community in 2003. 
Capt Rothenhaus’ operational assignments include USS Fife (DD-991), USS O’Brien (DD-975), 
Destroyer Squadron 15, and Combat Systems/C5I officer on USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75). 
Additionally, he served in Baghdad, Iraq, developing counter-insurgency and reconstruction systems 
to the Army Corps of Engineers in 2006. 
His acquisition assignments include serving as project manager for Space and Naval Warfare System 
Center Pacific, assistant program manager for Maritime Domain Awareness in PMW-120, Pacific 
Fleet CVN modernization manager in PMW-750, Future Command and Control assistant program 
manager in PMW-150, assistant program manager for the Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise 
System network program in PMW-160, and deputy program manager for communications and GPS in 
PMW/A-170. 
He has been recognized with the A. Bryan Laswell National Defense Industrial Association Award in 
2007 for technology innovation and a 2008 Navy & Marine Corps Leadership Award while serving 
aboard CVN-75. 
His personal awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, Joint and Navy Commendation Medal, 
Navy Achievement medals, and various service and campaign awards.
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Achieving Better Buying Power Through Acquisition of 
Open Architecture Software Systems for Web-Based and 
Mobile Devices1 
Walt Scacchi—is senior research scientist and research faculty member at the Institute for Software 
Research, University of California, Irvine. He received a PhD in information and computer science 
from UC Irvine in 1981. From 1981–1998, he was on the faculty at the University of Southern 
California. In 1999, he joined the Institute for Software Research at UC Irvine. He has published more 
than 150 research papers, and has directed more than 65 externally funded research projects. In 
2011, he served as co-chair for the 33rd International Conference on Software Engineering—Practice 
Track, and in 2012, he served as general co-chair of the 8th IFIP International Conference on Open 
Source Systems. [wscacchi@ics.uci.edu] 
Thomas Alspaugh—is a project scientist at the Institute for Software Research, University of 
California, Irvine. His research interests are in software engineering, requirements, and licensing. 
Before completing his PhD, he worked as a software developer, team lead, and manager in industry, 
and as a computer scientist at the Naval Research Laboratory on the Software Cost Reduction, or A-
7, project. [alspaugh@ics.uci.edu] 
Abstract 
Many people within large enterprises rely on up to four Web-based or mobile devices for their 
daily work routines—personal computer, tablet, and personal and work-specific smartphones. 
Our research is directed at identifying, tracking, and analyzing software component costs and 
cost reduction opportunities within the acquisition life cycle of open architecture (OA) systems 
for such Web-based and mobile devices. These systems are subject to different intellectual 
property license and cybersecurity requirements. Our research goal is to create a new 
approach to address challenges in the acquisition of software systems for Web-based or 
mobile devices used within academic, business, or government enterprises. Acquisition 
personnel in such enterprises will increasingly be called on to review and approve choices 
between functionally similar open source software (OSS) components, and commercially 
priced closed source software (CSS) components, to be used in the design, implementation, 
deployment, and evolution of secure OA systems. We seek to make this a simpler, more 
transparent, and more tractable process. Finally, this acquisition research supports and 
advances a public purpose by investigating acquisition challenges arising from the adoption 
and deployment of secure OA software systems for Web-based or mobile devices. 
Overview 
The Department of Defense (DoD), other government agencies, and most large-
scale business enterprises continually seek new ways to improve the functional capabilities 
of their software-intensive systems with lower acquisition costs. The acquisition of open 
architecture (OA) systems that can adapt and evolve through replacement of functionally 
similar software components is an innovation that can lead to lower cost systems with more 
powerful functional capabilities. OA system acquisition, development, and deployment are 
1 This report was supported by the Acquisition Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. No endorsement, review, or approval implied. This paper reflects the views and 
opinions of the authors, and not necessarily the views or positions of any other persons, group, 
enterprise, or government agency. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 4 - 
                                            
 
 
thus seen as an approach to realizing Better Buying Power (BPP) goals for lowering system 
costs, achieving technical excellence, enabling innovation, and advancing the acquisition 
workforce.  
Our research identifies and analyzes how new software component technologies like 
apps and widgets for Web-based and/or mobile devices, along with their intellectual property 
(IP) license and cybersecurity requirements interact to drive down (or drive up) total system 
costs across the system acquisition life cycle. The availability of such new scientific 
knowledge and technological practices can give rise to more effective expenditures of public 
funds and improve the effectiveness of future software-intensive systems used in 
government and industry. Thus, a goal of this presentation is to explore new ways and 
means for achieving cost-sensitive acquisition of OA software systems, as well as identifying 
factors that can further decrease or increase the costs of such systems at this time. 
We begin by briefly reviewing to identify a set of recent trends in the development of 
OA software systems that intend to develop more capable OA systems. These trends 
include the transition to adoption of small-form factor software components as distinct 
applications (standalone and plug-in “apps”) and widgets that exploit modern Web 
capabilities. We then turn to examine some key goals of the BBP 3.0 initiative (Kendall, 
2014) that direct attention to adoption of OA system development practices that affect 
acquisition practices. Next, we identify a new set of emerging challenges to achieving BBP 
through OA software systems. We then identify three new practices to realize the cost-
effective acquisition of OA software systems. 
Recent Trends Affecting Better Buying Power Through OA Systems 
We find there are four broad trends that mediate the cost-effectiveness and buying 
power of emerging OA system acquisition efforts. These include (a) the move towards 
shared, multi-party acquisition and agile development of new OA systems across compatible 
software ecosystems; (b) exploitation of new software component technologies compatible 
with Web and mobile devices; (c) growing diversity of cybersecurity challenges to address 
during system development; and (d) new software development business models for 
app/widget development and deployment. Each is examined in turn. 
A. Multi-Party Acquisition and Development System Ecosystems 
Many in the defense community seek to embrace the acquisition and development of 
agile command and control (C2) and related enterprise systems (Agre et al., 2014; George, 
Bowers, et al., 2014; George et al., 2013; Guertin & Womble, 2012; Reed et al., 2012; 
Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012b, 2013c, 2014a). Such systems are envisioned to arise from the 
assembly and integration of system elements (application components, widgets, content 
servers, networking elements, etc.) within a software ecosystem of multiple producers, 
integrators, and consumers who may supply or share the results of their efforts. The 
assembly and integration of system elements produces “assembled capabilities for C2 
systems” (AC-C2). Our purpose is to identify how our approach to the design of secure OA 
systems can be aligned with this emerging vision for agile C2 system development and 
adaptive deployment. We also focus on design of OA system capability involving office 
productivity and social media components (Agre et al., 2014) that increasingly may be 
configured within a secure AC-C2 (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011, 2012b, 2013b). 
The design and development of agile C2 systems follows from two sets of principals: 
one set addressing guidelines/tenets for multi-party engineering (MPE) of C2 system 
components; the other set addressing attributes of agile and adaptive ecosystems (AAE) for 
producing AC-C2s or C2 system elements (Reed et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2014; Scacchi & 
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Alspaugh, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). To help understand what we mean by a software 
ecosystem, we use Figure 1 to represent where different parties are located across a 
generic software supply networks or multi-party relationships that emerge to enable the 
software producers to develop and release products that are assembled and integrated by 
system integrators for delivery to end-user organizations, via online storefronts (George, 
Bowers, et al., 2014; George, Galdorisi, et al., 2014; George et al., 2013). 
As noted, OA system components can include software applications (apps) and 
widgets. Widgets are lightweight, single-purpose web-enabled applications that users can 
configure to their specific needs (Agre et al., 2014; Gizzi, 2011; George et al., 2013; Scacchi 
& Alspaugh, 2013b). Widgets can provide summary information or a limited view into a 
larger application that can be used alongside related widgets to provide an integrated view, 
as required by users. 
The lower part of Figure 1 also identifies where elements of shared agreements like 
IP licenses or cybersecurity requirements enter into the ecosystem, and how the assembly 
of components into a configured system or subsystem architecture by system integrators 
effectively (and perhaps unintentionally) determines which IP license or cybersecurity 
obligations and rights get propagated to consumer or end-user organizations. Agreement 
terms and conditions acceptable to consumer/end-user organizations flow back to the 
integrators. This helps reveal where and how shared agreements will mix, match, mashup, 
or encounter semantic mismatches at the system architecture level, which is one reason 
why we use (and advocate) explicit OA system models. 
Overall, a move towards MPE and AAE substantiates a path towards decentralized 
OA system development, integration, and deployment (DoD, 2012; Gizzi, 2011). 
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 Figure 1. A Generic Software Ecosystem Supply Network (Upper Part), Along 
With a Sample Elaboration of Producers, Software Component 
Applications, and Licenses for OA System Components They Employ 
(Lower Part)  
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012a) 
This decentralization will engender acquisition and development of heterogeneously-
licensed systems (HLS), whereby different software components (apps, widgets) will be 
subject to different IP licenses (Alspaugh et al., 2012; Alspaugh et al., 2010), as well as to 
different cybersecurity requirements (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2014; Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). This implies that such components, their IP 
licenses, and cybersecurity requirements will be subject to ongoing evolution across a 
diversity of methods, shown in Figure 2 (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012a, 2013b). These will 
create a new generation of challenges for the acquisition workforce, in terms of training, new 
work and contract management practices, and need for automated assistance to track and 
manage oversight of policy compliance (e.g., for alignment with BPP and cybersecurity 
assessment). Without automated assistance, it appears that the acquisition workforce will be 
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overwhelmed with technical details that interact with acquisition, development, and/or 
system integration contracts and software component IP licenses and cybersecurity 
requirements. Otherwise, these conditions suggest that acquisition management practices 
can complicate acquisition (George, Bowers, et al., 2014), and thus potentially mitigate the 
benefits of BBP that can arise from MPE and AAE for C2 systems. 
 
 Figure 2. The Kinds of Common Evolutionary Changes That Arise During OA 
Software Component Development, Deployment, and Sustained Usage 
Moving Towards Shared Development of Apps and Widgets as OA System 
Components 
Future OA systems for agile C2 may be configured by system integrators, end-user 
organizations, or warfighters in the field. This would be accomplished through access to 
online repositories of software apps or user-interface widgets. The Ozone Widget 
Framework (OWF) is a government open source software (GOSS) effort that is central to 
such agile OA system development. The OZONE family of products includes the OWF and 
the OZONE Marketplace, the marketplace being an online repository whose operation is 
similar in kind to the online app stores by Apple and Google (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013b). 
These products are built to fit the needs of human centered fusion activities in network-
centric warfare environments. The OZONE family of products is designed as a presentation 
layer toolkit that can be rapidly deployed in a variety of mission contexts ranging from 
strategic planning to enable the creation of a real-time common operational picture and 
situation awareness applications. Figure 3 displays examples of OWF-based widgets 
operating in a Web browser, while Figure 4 shows OWF widgets deployed for use on a 
mobile device. 
Growing Diversity of Challenges in Cybersecurity 
New types of software components like apps and widgets must be developed, 
deployed, and sustained in ways compatible with existing cybersecurity requirements. They 
must also be later adapted to accommodate emerging cybersecurity requirements that are 
not yet apparent. For example, there is growing interest in accommodating not just mobility, 
but also “Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) capabilities. 
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 Figure 3. OWF Widgets Running Within a Web Browser 
 
 Figure 4. OWF Widgets Running on a Mobile Device 
BYOD suggests that end-users and warfighters are bringing their own mobile 
devices with them into the field to support their missions. However, BYOD clearly 
exacerbates the technical challenges of cybersecurity assurance, often in ways that cannot 
be readily anticipated, as when independently developed components co-evolve in conflict 
to one another (Weir, 2014). Nonetheless, acquisition policy necessitates that cybersecurity 
vulnerability and exposures be addressed (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2015). But at 
present, it is unclear what new kinds of requirements these new OA system components 
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bring to the acquisition workforce. For example, a move to adopt mobile apps and/or mobile 
widgets means these OA system components must pass through an application security 
process for “vetting” these components. 
Vetting entails establishing what cybersecurity requirements are to be verified, how 
they are to be validated, as well as where, when, and by whom these activities should be 
performed. One approach is to assume the vetting can be performed by a centralized 
authority, such as by the operator of the Ozone Marketplace. But it is not clear that there will 
ever be only one such authority.  
Instead, if we foresee multiple marketplaces, which are already appearing both in 
GOSS and industrial online settings, then the acquisition workforce will be challenged in 
how best to determine which cybersecurity requirements must be addressed, validated, and 
compliance certified, as well as by whom and how often. Consider the example, seen in 
Figure 5, of a widget for “emergency response incident command system,” developed for 
the Department of Homeland Security (Rockwell, 2015). How do its components (possibly 
GOSS) compare or interoperate with widgets/AC-C2 from DoD agencies or program offices 
concerned with C2 system interoperability or AC-C2? 
 
 Figure 5. AC-C2 Style Widget From the Next-Generation Incident Response 
System for DHS 
A move to widgets also presents new kinds of cybersecurity challenges when two or 
more widgets are configured together with one or more apps to create a mashup that 
provides an agile system capability. This situation refers to the technical challenges of inter-
widget communication. Such component–component communication can be technically 
realized in different ways, such as via ad hoc, “open standards,” or publish–subscribe 
messaging interfaces, as well as whether point-to-point or as configured through a dynamic 
processing mashup (Chudnovsky et al., 2013; Endres-Niggemeyer, 2013a). While OA 
systems may rely on “open standards”–style widget interfaces and communications patterns 
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may be used, widget communication/interface standards/interfaces are still very new 
technologies and techniques. Thus, it is unclear which will survive and be widely adopted 
(Endres-Niggemeyer, 2013b).  
Similarly, knowledge about the proper usage of widget components is unclear, and 
thus is not yet ready for compliance assessment within current acquisition practices. The 
technical challenge is further complicated when apps/widgets are acquired from different 
online marketplaces. Different marketplaces may rely on different schemes for specification 
and interchange of shared data semantics between autonomously developed components. 
This in turn hinges on the expertise of OA system integrators, end-users, or warfighters to 
recognize how, where, and when the semantics of technical data interchange arise and to 
what consequences via component–component API alignments (to avoid mismatches), data 
type representations, data formats (e.g., “CSV” vs. .xls vs. XML), data naming conventions 
(for resource discovery vs. data modeling ontology), data range value limits, exceptional 
values, data-flow control signals, and so forth. These are still new technical problems that 
are yet to be readily resolved or to have development/usage guides. 
New Business Models for OA Software Component Development and Use 
New business models imply differentiated IP licenses and contracting practices. 
Given our discussion up to this point, along with reference to our recent acquisition research 
studies (Alspaugh et al., 2012; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011, 2012b, 2013b), this means 
different obligations and rights will be transferred from component producers to system 
integrators and end-user organizations. Some licenses are “buy and pay now,” while others 
are “free now, pay later, based on usage,” others are “many organizations (e.g., PEOs) will 
share purchase costs,” and so forth. 
Acquisitions of new kinds of OA system components allow for new business models. 
These include new models for software component producers, system integrators, and end-
user organizations. For example, new software and OA system development business 
models for software app/widget development and deployment include (in no particular order) 
the following: (1) franchising, (2) enterprise licensing, (3) metered usage, (4) advertising 
supported, (5) subscription, (6) free component, (7) paid service/support fees, (8) federation 
reciprocity for shared development, (9) collaborative buying, (10) donation, (11) sponsored 
development, (12) free/open source software (e.g., Government OSS [GOSS]), and others 
(D. Hanf, personal communication, July 2013). Further, this list is not exhaustive; instead, it 
is only representative.  
In contrast, for end-user organizations involved in agile development of OA system 
components, or an integrated system capability, there is a need to develop and codify their 
own business models regarding OA software component development or system 
integration. These business models are constituted through “shared agreements” that allow 
for sharing the cost of component or integrated capability development and cybersecurity 
assurance vetting across multiple parties (e.g., multiple program offices). However, these 
shared agreements are also a core part of emerging MPE/AAE development practices. 
These agreements must convey how OA component development or system integration 
costs and security assurance will be shared, as well as how they will be sustained in the 
presence of interacting software component development, deployment, and evolution 
processes and practices (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a). Shared agreements denote the 
obligations the participating organizations are willing to accept, in order to realize the 
provided rights they need. So shared agreements can be expressed and assessed in the 
same manner, and with the same analysis tools and techniques, as IP licenses and 
cybersecurity requirements (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013b, 2013c). 
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Software acquisition costs easily become difficult to predict/manage given the 
diversity of business models, IP licenses, and implied software component cybersecurity 
assessment. Development/usage cost sharing agreements can further complicate 
determination of development cost, costs shares across organizations, and system costs 
over time as business models, component licenses, and cybersecurity assessment 
requirements evolve (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012a, 2013a). 
What kind of expertise do we expect the acquisition workforce to need in order to 
make adoption of “component-based system capabilities” (including for mobile devices) 
agile, adaptive, and practical across different commercial/governmental software 
marketplaces/ecosystems? What kinds of acquisition guidance is needed for articulating and 
streamlining Shared Agreements between multiple organizations participating in shared OA 
component development and cybersecurity assurance? What kinds of acquisition 
management practices and analysis tools are needed for the acquisition workforce to ensure 
cost savings and BBP in such settings? Addressing these questions is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but these questions require follow-on acquisition research to resolve and answer. 
Better Buying Power 3.0 Goals 
Better Buying Power (http://bbp.dau.mil/) is part of the DoD’s initiative that sees 
continuous improvement as the best approach to improving the performance of the defense 
acquisition enterprise. BBP 3.0 (Kendall, 2014) identifies eight areas of focus that group a 
larger set of itemized initiatives that offer the potential to restore affordability and realize 
technical excellence in defense procurement and improve defense industry productivity. 
One of the eight areas focuses on promoting or increasing competition, and this area 
includes an initiative to utilize modular open system architectures to stimulate innovation 
(Kendall, 2014). Technical innovations are constrained by two categories of Intellectual 
Property (IP) rights available to the government: (a) technical data (TD; e.g., product design 
data, computer databases, computer software documentation) and (b) computer software 
(CS; e.g., source code, executable code, design details, processes, and related materials). 
These rights are realized through IP licenses provided by system product or service 
providers (e.g., software producers) to the government customer, so long as the customer 
fulfills the obligations stipulated in the license agreement (e.g., to indicate how many 
software users are authorized to use the licensed product or service according to a fee 
paid).  
As already noted, our acquisition research has focused on issues addressing OA 
systems and IP licenses since 2008 (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008), as well as forward to the 
acquisition of secure OA systems for command and control (C2) and enterprise information 
systems (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011, 2012b, 2013b), where security requirements can be 
expressed in a manner similar to IP obligations and rights. Therefore, here we turn to 
identify how a sample of different goals of BBP 3.0 initiatives interact or relate to the trends 
and challenges examined so far in this paper. The BBP goals are highlighted, and then 
followed by a brief examination. 
• Promote effective competition—One central purpose for acquiring OA 
systems is to increase the likelihood of creating and maintaining competitive 
environments among system producers who can provide software 
components that can be replaced by similar offerings by other component 
producers. We demonstrate how this can work when system architectures 
are explicitly modeled, and their software components and interconnections 
are similarly specified in an open manner (Alspaugh et al., 2012; Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2012a). Such openness also supports improved technology search 
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and outreach, but enables retrieval of compatible OA system components 
from online (software app) storefronts. 
• Use Modular Open Systems Architecture to stimulate innovation—Open 
system architectures that can accommodate common components from 
alternative producers requires that the components utilize standardized 
interfaces, whether in the form of open Application Program Interfaces (APIs), 
standard data exchange protocols, and standard data representations, 
formats, and meta-data, as well as utilization of open source software (OSS) 
components (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). But as also noted earlier, app and 
widget components at present have a plethora of standardized interfaces, 
and it is unclear which will survive, be sustained, be widely adopted 
(inside/outside of the DoD), and be evolved (Endres-Niggemeyer, 2013b). 
• Increase small business participation and opportunities—One way to 
increase competition in the realm of OA systems is to identify where smaller 
scale software applications (apps) or widgets can be utilized, which might be 
produced by innovative small businesses or startup ventures which dominate 
much of the online markets for Web-based or mobile device apps/widgets. 
Small businesses may further be advantaged by their utilization of shared 
OSS infrastructure components, platforms, or remote services, since large 
commercial contractors may not see sufficient profit margins to develop 
proprietary alternatives. So OA systems that accommodate OSS components 
that can integrate custom apps/widgets into innovative system capabilities 
(AC-C2), may then realize new opportunities for DoD customers. Other small 
business opportunities may similarly arise for such ventures that focus on 
emerging cybersecurity assessment or tool development services. 
• Improve our leaders’ ability to understand and mitigate technical risk—In 
looking forward, there is potential interest in seeing the BPP initiative evolve 
to also address risk as an implicit cost driver. This might allow for innovative 
ways and means to reduce emerging risks through accelerated or “look 
ahead” system acquisition and development approaches that emphasize 
increased reliance on rapid prototyping. 
• Increase the use of prototyping and experimentation—The rapid development 
of Web-based or mobile app mashups might be performed by appropriately 
trained end-users or warfighters (Agre et al., 2014; Endres-Niggemeyer, 
2013a). A move towards OA systems for Web-based and mobile devices that 
rely on apps/widgets retrieved from online marketplaces—apps composed 
through interpretive software program “scripting” and mashup techniques—is 
a clear example of this (Endres-Niggemeyer, 2013a; George et al., 2013; 
Guertin & Womble, 2012; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a). Thus, it is not 
surprising to find such emerging techniques being investigated and assessed 
for possible production of new C2 capabilities (George, Bowers, et al., 2014; 
George et al., 2013; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013b). 
• Achieve dominant capabilities through innovation and technical excellence—
An overall summary of the current BBP initiative is focusing attention on how 
to make acquisition more agile, more innovative, and to develop a new 
generation acquisition workforce that can enact acquisition processes that 
are technically excellent—thin and flexible when needed, yet robust and cost-
effective, while also being amenable to continuous improvement. This is 
indeed a real challenge to fulfill, and beyond the scope of what current 
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acquisition practices are likely to achieve without targeted investment in 
acquisition improvement research. To be clear, one just needs to consider 
emerging opportunities (and potential asymmetric cybersecurity threats) that 
arise through the desire to develop next-generation AC-C2 that are to be 
composed from apps/widgets that can operate on Web-based/mobile 
devices. What are the best processes or practices for acquiring, developing, 
and sustaining deployed systems that are to be built using these new 
software technologies (e.g., apps/widgets for mobile devices)? How should 
these processes and practices be adapted to accommodate personal devices 
(e.g., Apple iPhones/iPads, Android phones/tablets, Blackberry 10 phones) 
that individual warfighters, joint force troops, or contracted service providers 
bring with them into the battlespace? How must acquisition processes be 
best adapted to accommodate and rely on software supply chains that arise 
around consumer-oriented app marketplaces as possible ways/means for 
doing more (e.g., rapidly prototyping warfighter composable C2 app/widget 
mashups [George et al., 2013]) without more (e.g., warfighters who bring their 
own mobile computing devices for use in C2 contexts; Agre et al., 2014; 
George, Bowers, et al., 2014)? Once again, these are critical questions to 
address and resolve through new acquisition research and supporting 
technology development. 
Emerging Challenges in Achieving BBP Through OA Software Systems for 
Web-Based and Mobile Devices 
The business models and IP licenses for software components are tightly coupled: 
Software component licenses codify component producer business models. Said more 
simply, licenses codify business models. So different software business models imply 
different software license obligations and rights, and different license types reflect different 
possible business models. Licenses are generally recognized as contracts regarding IP 
expressed through terms and conditions that specify obligations and rights stipulated by the 
component’s producer to enable/constrain what can be done with the component by its 
integrator or end-users. Understanding and assuring software IP obligations and rights is 
routinely a task for acquisition offices, and thus a task to be competently performed by the 
acquisition workforce. 
Obligations (like purchase costs/fees paid, or to ensure access to open source 
software code modifications) denote conditions, events, or actions imposed by a software 
producer (the licensor) that must be fulfilled by the software integrator/customer enterprise 
(the licensee) in order to realize the rights identified in the licenses (right to use, right to 
distribute copies, no right to distribute modified copies, etc.). Note that software system 
integrators play a role in shaping the obligations and rights imposed on customer 
enterprises based on choices they make in how software component-based systems are 
designed, built, and deployed. So where system integration occurs and who does it matters, 
as does whether customer enterprises that acquire systems have policies that determine 
which software licenses (or business models) they will accept.  
Similarly, we note that “cybersecurity requirements” can also be expressed and 
analyzed in terms of obligations and rights (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011, 2012b). This 
suggests that the problems and solutions to software component IP license management 
will be similar in kind or form to those for cybersecurity assurance. Below, we just focus 
attention on software IP obligations and rights, though the same consequences may apply 
to the cybersecurity of OA systems and components. 
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There are many unstated consequences that can arise when software licenses are 
not well understood. Here are some examples we have seen within the DoD context: 
• Acquisition program managers/staff (including in-house legal counsel) may 
not understand how software licenses affect OA system design, and vice-
versa. Component-based system design can determine which software 
licenses will fit, or which can fit if the system design is altered to encapsulate 
desirable software components with somewhat problematic license 
obligations or rights (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a). 
• Software license obligations and rights propagate through system 
development life cycle activities in ways not well understood by system 
developers, integrators, end-users, or acquisition managers. We have 
investigated and described many examples of this in a recent paper that 
shows how license constraints are mediated by software system design, 
build-integration, deployment, post-deployment support tools and activities. 
• Different acquisition programs within the DoD and other government 
agencies may independently reinterpret software component licenses. This 
realizes enterprise-wide inefficiencies, as well as increases avoidable costs. It 
appears to be technically possible to codify software component licenses by 
type or producer, especially with regards to performative obligations and 
operational rights that program offices or customer organizations seek. The 
license modeling techniques we have investigated demonstrate the potential, 
practicality, and scalability of such possibility (Alspaugh et al., 2012; Scacchi 
& Alspaugh, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b). However, it may be most efficient and 
most effective for the DoD to have common legal interpretations for different 
licenses (or different business models). Such interpretations could be 
common, if produced by a central legal authority (e.g., Office of General 
Counsel). Alternatively, it may also be possible for the DoD and other 
government agencies to provide an open framework or (acquisition) policy 
guidance whose purpose is to encourage software producers to not only 
provide software licenses in current narrative forms, but also to provide them 
in computer processable forms (using domain-specific languages) amenable 
to automated license analysis. Once again, this is a form of guidance and 
training we can provide, but it is not one that we can impose on anyone. We 
believe it is in the best interest of the DoD and other government agencies to 
employ software licenses that are both human readable and formally 
processable though automated means, at least in terms of software license 
obligation and right determinations.  
• Failures to understand software license obligation and rights propagation can 
reduce DoD buying power, increase software life cycle costs, and reduce 
competition. Guidance from the OUSD for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics recommends programmatic adoption of different BBP 3.0 initiatives 
grouped into eight focus areas of relevance as methods for innovation, 
continuous improvements, and doing more without spending more. Acquiring 
licensed software components is a cost-generating activity, whose costs/fees 
can be reduced while acquiring ever more agile and adaptive software 
components and open architecture component-based systems. However, 
software license non-compliance or worse, infringement, on the part of the 
DoD will generate costs, cause program delays, as well as reduce agility and 
adaptation, all of which can be avoided. Such situations can and must be 
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avoided through acquisition and development practices with little/no 
additional cost to affect. Such practices can be codified within open source 
business processes or open source computational business process models 
that can be shared, customized to specific program needs, redistributed, and 
archived (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013b). 
• Software producers often provide idiosyncratic licenses that generally 
conform to common business models and common license types. This seems 
mainly to arise from efforts by software producers to protect or update their 
business models in ways that improve their financial yield or protect/lock-in 
their customer base. This in turn generates demand for time, attention, and 
effort from legal counsel that support acquisition programs, while also 
reducing the effectiveness and timeliness of program acquisition efforts. The 
DoD and other government agencies may be able to explicitly specify in 
advance what kinds of generic software license obligations they will accept 
and what kinds of generic software rights they seek, through their own explicit 
business models. Such specifications can be codified and provided to 
software producers in open source manner through software license 
acquisition policies. Software producers might then separate license terms 
and conditions that do and do not address current license acquisition policies, 
in order to streamline licensing design and analysis practices for the mutual 
benefit of software producers, integrators, and customers.  
• Software producers generally provide software licenses that are assumed to 
legally dominate in systems composed of components from different software 
producers or integrators. We refer to software systems (or systems of 
systems) composed from components (e.g., apps, widgets) subject to 
different licenses as “heterogeneously-licensed systems” (HLS; Alspaugh et 
al., 2010; Alspaugh et al., 2012). Popular Web browsers that are compatible 
with widgets, apps, or plug-in components (e.g., Google Chrome, Mozilla 
Firefox, Apple Safari) are subject to dozens of component licenses. Popular 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software components also sometimes 
encompass components subject to multiple licenses. In both situations, the 
component producer asserts overall component license obligations and rights 
in ways that are compatible with the licenses included therein (or so we 
hope). But when we deploy components that are composed into complex 
system architectures, or employ components that support on-demand 
download and implicit integration of smaller components (widgets, plug-ins, 
scripts, etc.) from online stores, then analysis of license obligation and rights 
propagation or encapsulation matters. Such technical details can readily 
overwhelm program acquisition managers and legal staff, thereby reducing 
the agility and adaptation of component-based system development/ 
deployment. Provision of automated license analysis capabilities within 
software license management systems should be able to overcome this 
situation. 
• Given the challenges of HLS, it is unclear what kinds of trade-offs can/should 
software system integrators or program acquisition staff make in order to 
maximize overall system development agility and evolutionary adaptation 
address. This situation is not unique to the DoD, but is in fact widespread. 
However, as the DoD and other government agencies move to embrace agile 
and adaptive component-based software systems to realize new, more timely 
system capabilities at a lower cost compared to legacy approaches, then 
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there is a need to provide guidance for how to identify and manage such 
trade-offs. Failure to recognize the challenges of analyzing and managing 
HLS systems translates into opportunities lost while avoidable costs increase. 
We can and should do better than this. But this will require that resources be 
allocated to identify, articulate, train, and iteratively refine best practices 
about how, where, when, and why these trade-offs arise. Such knowledge 
should therefore be captured, codified, shared, accessed, updated, and 
redistributed in an open source manner. 
• Software IP license and cybersecurity obligations and rights must be tracked, 
accounted, and managed. A move to component-based open architecture 
systems increases organizational overhead for managing software licenses. 
This overhead can be reduced, or better transformed into productive, value-
adding business practices, through the use of automated software obligations 
and rights management systems (SORMS). While SORMS exist and are 
routinely used by software component producers (to keep track of who has a 
licensed copy of their software products), SORMS do not exist at this time for 
software system integrators or customer enterprises.  
• The DoD and other government agencies would financially and 
administratively benefit from engaging the development and deployment of 
an open source automated SORMS. This may represent the lowest cost 
means for simplifying license analysis while maximizing the benefits of agile 
and adaptive component-based software systems acquisition within the DoD 
and other government agencies. SORMS can help to better DoD software 
buying power. Similarly, an open source SORMS would also be of value to 
smaller or startup software producers who may best be able to create 
innovative and agile software components (widgets) in cost-competitive ways. 
Last, an open source SORMS intended for software integrator/customer 
enterprises would be of value to large, established DoD software producers, 
as a medium through which larger-scale software component acquisitions 
(e.g., components acquired for standardized deployment throughout an 
enterprise) can be negotiated and simplified. 
• How best to cultivate and sustain DoD online storefronts and software 
ecosystem. The acquisition of development of some DoD Web/mobile 
widgets may be strongly influenced by commercially available apps that are 
not secure, nor DoD information assured. Warfighters and others are often 
drawn to the best available technologies, including apps found in commercial 
online stores. Who decides whether apps in these conditions should be 
migrated, secured, and assured to meet DoD requirements? Alternatively, 
allowing such apps to be used as widgets for rapid prototyping new DoD AC-
C2 may represent a promising new direction to stimulate innovation. 
Subsequently, this entails the needs to better understand possible 
commercial–DoD online storefront interactions and interdependencies, as 
well as articulating the needs of DoD agency/program office–specific 
storefronts. Next, we expect to see redundant app offerings across multiple 
storefronts, including challenges of identifying common apps of different 
versions or variants across storefronts and user devices (e.g., is Google 
Maps the same version across all platforms in use; is Apple Maps equivalent 
to Google Maps; is Google Earth compatible with NASA World Wind?). How 
best to determine when redundancy is good/bad for such apps/widgets is 
unclear and under-explored at this time. Last, as noted, software component 
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apps/widget licenses and business models across the DoD Software App 
Ecosystem are very diverse with unclear/unknown interactions and 
interdependencies. Business models are codified in Web/mobile app IP 
licenses (e.g., conferring right to use or EULAs) and cybersecurity 
requirements. Again, much remains here to investigate and resolve to best 
enable BBP 3.0 initiatives realized with Web-based and mobile software. 
Finally, as suggested along the way, all of these consequences can be both 
anticipated and mitigated through action and careful investment that best enable BBP 3.0 
compatible solutions. 
New Practices to Realize Cost-Effective Acquisition of OA Software Systems 
for Web-Based and Mobile Devices 
The trends and concerns identified above point to substantial challenges in 
identifying what can be done to both realize cost-effective BBP for Web-based and mobile 
device software apps, and to do so in ways that enable and empower the acquisition 
workforce in the years ahead. Technology, better buying practices, new business models, 
and new cybersecurity requirements all point to the need for future research and 
development of new acquisition support technologies, work processes, and guidance 
practices. The goal is to make sure that acquisition time and effort does not become the 
main cost and the main risk factor going forward on the path to agile OA Web-based or 
mobile compatible C2 system development, deployment, and sustaining system evolution. 
At this point, we see at least three key areas of opportunity for future acquisition 
research and development. First, we need to research and develop worked examples of 
well-formed OA system architectures that are appropriate for C2 system capabilities, and 
that accommodate Web-based apps, widgets, and mobile devices. Such OA system 
architectures should specify representative and standardized component interfaces. The 
examples should also include carefully specified shared agreements that account for 
different IP licenses and diverse business models of software producers, system integrators, 
and multiple end-user organizations who must collectively act in ways that enable agile 
development and adaptive evolution of demonstrable C2 system capabilities. 
Second, we need robust open source models of application security processes and 
reusable cybersecurity requirements that account for exigencies in heterogeneous 
app/widget software ecosystems, account for software evolution dynamics, formation and 
continuous improvement of automation-compatible shared agreements, and more. These 
models should account for description of current process practices, prescription of required 
verification and validation activities and outcome (deliverable documents or online artifacts), 
and proscription of what tools/techniques to use, by whom, when, where, and how. 
Third, we need precise domain specific languages (DSLs) for specifying, and 
automated analysis tools for continuously assessing and continuously improving, 
cybersecurity and IP license requirements for dynamically evolving Web/mobile C2 system-
based capabilities. The DSLs needed must be able to specify and operationalize the shared 
agreements between different DoD organizations, government agencies, and commercial 
enterprises involved in producing, integrating, or evolving component-based OA C2 system 
capabilities. 
Overall, what we call for is similar in kind to what we have already produced and 
applied in other software development domains, using then current technologies (Jensen & 
Scacchi, 2005; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). What we now call for is a reinvention and 
repurposing of these concepts, but in contemporary forms scaled and secured in ways that 
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best meet the needs of the DoD program offices, acquisition program managers, and others 
in the acquisition workforce to best support BBP 3.0 initiatives for Web-based and mobile 
device software components (widgets, apps, plug-ins). 
Conclusions 
The DoD, other government agencies, and most large-scale business enterprises 
continually seek new ways to improve the functional capabilities of their software-intensive 
systems. The acquisition of OA systems that can adapt and evolve through replacement of 
functionally similar software component applications (apps) and widgets is an innovation 
that can lead to lower cost systems through more agile system development and adaptive 
system evolution. Our research identifies and analyzes how new software component apps 
and widgets, their IP license and cybersecurity requirements, and new software business 
models can interact to drive down (or drive up) total system costs across the system 
acquisition life cycle. The availability of such new scientific knowledge and technological 
practices can give rise to more effective expenditures of public funds and improve the 
effectiveness of future software-intensive systems used in government and industry.  
Our study reported in this paper also identifies a new set of technical risks that can 
dilute the cost-effectiveness of Better Buying Power efforts. It similarly suggests that current 
acquisition practices aligned with BBP can also give rise to acquisition management 
activities that can dominate and overwhelm the costs of OA system development. This 
adverse condition can arise through app/widget vetting, new software business models, 
opaque and/or underspecified acquisition management processes, and the evolving 
interactions of new software development and deployment techniques. Unless proactive 
investment in acquisition research and development can give rise to worked examples, open 
source models, and new acquisition management system technologies, the likelihood of 
acquisition management dominating agile development and adaptive deployment of 
component-based OA C2 system capabilities. 
Overall, this paper serves to help describe and detail how Web-based and mobile 
device software component technologies, IP licenses, security requirements, business 
models, and adaptive system evolution interact. It also highlights what policies, practices, or 
technologies within the DoD and other government agencies can simplify or exacerbate OA 
system cost arising at different points in the acquisition life cycle. Our common goal is to 
increase the ways, means, and beneficial consequences of the transition to the cost-
effective acquisition of Web-based and mobile device OA software systems whose 
acquisition, development, deployment, and ongoing evolution are agile and adaptive. 
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Introduction 
From remotely piloted aircraft and smart bombs to autonomous vehicles and 
advanced fighter jets, software is crucial to the success of today’s weapon 
systems. Focusing solely on developing and maintaining military hardware is 
no longer an option. With shrinking defense budgets and increasingly 
complex systems, the defense industry and services must fight to deliver on 
this ambitious objective, the military must drastically transform its approach to 
software. New organizational structures, operating models, and tools will be 
essential to modernizing and sustaining the U.S. weapon systems. (Hagen, 
Hurt, & Sorenson, 2013, p. 31) 
Although the Department of Defense (DoD) has developed some very successful 
software-intensive systems, such as the Aegis, Tomahawk Missile, and F/A-18 Hornet, we 
continue to struggle with successfully developing like systems. The software development in 
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) continues to be problematic. The GAO (2012) stated that  
JSF software development is one of the largest and most complex projects in 
DoD history, providing essential capability, but software has grown in size 
and complexity, and is taking longer to complete than expected. Developing, 
testing, and integrating software, mission systems, and logistics systems are 
critical for demonstrating the operational effectiveness and suitability of a fully 
integrated, capable aircraft and pose significant technical risks moving 
forward. (p. 7) 
The report went on to state, “This program [JSF] has modified the software 
development and integration schedule several times, in each instance lengthening the time 
needed to complete work” (GAO, 2012, p. 11). The results of the software development 
problems have contributed to a two-year delay and increased costs of about one billion 
dollars. 
When software-intensive systems encounter developmental problems, it is easy to 
see the symptoms: schedule overruns, acquisition cost overruns, systems delivered with 
less capability than desired, and unaffordable software sustainment costs. The actual 
causes of the visible symptoms are often much more difficult to determine.  
Cost and schedule overruns in software development are often the result of poor 
initial software size estimates and unforeseen software redesign. In the case of the JSF,  
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The lines of code necessary for the JSF’s capabilities have now grown to 
over 24 million—9.5 million on board the aircraft. By comparison, JSF has 
about 3 times more on-board software lines of code than the F-22A Raptor 
and 6 times more than the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. This has added work 
and increased the overall complexity of the effort. The software on-board the 
aircraft and needed for operations has grown 37 percent since the critical 
design review in 2005 … almost half of the on-board software has yet to 
complete integration and test—typically the most challenging phase of 
software development. (GAO, 2012, p. 11) 
The report goes on to state that typical software size growth in DoD systems 
development ranges from 30% to 100%.  
JSF design changes were originally supposed to taper off and be completed by 
January 2014. Actual design changes through September 2011 failed to taper off and 
continue at a significantly high rate. The projections in the GAO (2012) report indicated that 
the revised design change projections will continue, and actually grow in number, until 
January 2019 (p. 16). Given this level of redesign, the software and system complexity 
growth are likely to continue.  
The DoD Software-Intensive System Development Problem and Research 
Technique 
Problem 
From a systems management perspective, the overarching problem is that the DoD 
Acquisition Management System produces both successful and unsuccessful software-
intensive systems. The management oversight, structure, and discipline offered do not 
produce repeatable success in complex, software-intensive systems development. 
Primary Research Question 
The problem previously identified drives this primary research question: Why does 
the DoD Acquisition Management System produce both successful and unsuccessful 
software-intensive systems? 
Secondary Research Questions 
I analyze the DoD software-intensive system development challenge by addressing 
these secondary research questions: 
• Does the DoD acquisition environment provide opportunity for variable results 
in software-intensive system development? 
• How does the software engineering environment impact DoD software 
intensive system development? 
• Is the DoD requirements development and communication process sufficient 
for potential software developers? 
• How is the software-intensive system architecture developed to ensure 
warfighter capabilities are designed and prioritized? 
DoD Acquisition Environment 
At the top level, there are the three primary decision support systems used within the 
DoD, and the interaction within these systems significantly decides the acquisition of 
products or services (DoD, 2013b). The three systems are the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS), which provides the acquisition requirements documents; 
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the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), which provides the processes to develop and 
acquire the needed products to fulfill the requirement; and the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, which is the funding resource management. 
Software-intensive systems are most impacted by the JCIDS and the DAS Decision 
Support Systems, and the PPBE process has no particularly unique impact on software 
intensive systems development. This research, therefore, focuses on elements of the JCIDS 
and DAS systems. 
Requirements Generation 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was designed to 
assess capability requirements and associated capability gaps and risks (CJCS, 2012, p. A-
1). Capability gaps may be identified in one or more of the following areas: Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership Policy and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and 
Policy (DOTMLPF-P). Materiel-related capability gaps become the basis for the 
requirements process that drives the acquisition community to develop and acquire 
platforms designed to bridge all or part of the identified gap. JCIDS is designed to be an 
iterative process, beginning with a validated Initial capabilities Document (ICD), triggering 
the acquisition community to begin an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) on candidate systems 
that potentially address the capability need. The Capabilities Design Document (CDD) 
refines and adds necessary detail to support the technical design of the system sought. The 
final document in the series is the Capabilities Production Document (CPD), which further 
refines the user requirements and adds detail supporting the production planning for the 
system. Although JCIDS is designed to refine well-defined requirements, there is clearly an 
opportunity for requirements creep with this iterative user requirements process.  
After the user community completes each JCIDS iteration, the 
program/project/product manager (PM) or materiel developer is prompted into action. As 
stated, the ICD prompts an AoA identifying the possible systems that could be procured or 
developed to meet the capability need. The CDD is a key document in the requirements 
generation cycle and is the user community’s primary input for the PM’s development of the 
performance specification for the Request for Proposal (RFP). The CPD is the user’s key 
document for driving production decisions, and the PM’s production strategy is significantly 
influenced by the CPD. 
One of the PM’s most critical functions is developing the performance specification 
for inclusion in the RFP. This requires the PM team to translate the user-stated needs from 
capabilities-based language to performance-based language that is used to drive the design 
efforts of potential system developers, usually contractors. This is critical because the RFP 
is the basis for the potential contractors’ proposals containing the estimated cost, schedule, 
and technical performance they plan to achieve. The submitted proposals are evaluated and 
compared during the labor-intensive source selection process, resulting in a contract award 
based on proposal merit. If the performance specification is incomplete, vaguely stated, or 
misunderstood, then the source selection process and contract award is based on incorrect 
proposals and the effort is significantly wasted.  
The selected contractor accepts the terms of the contract based on the assumptions 
and estimates contained in the proposal. To develop the proposal, the contractor translates 
the PM’s performance specification into a basic detailed specification so that the scope of 
work can be estimated for the proposed cost and schedule. Correcting these performance 
specification deficiencies later puts the government at a significant disadvantage, as the 
contract has been awarded and necessary changes to the contract are negotiated without 
competition. Changes, additions, or even clarifications to the performance specification after 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 24 - 
contract award are likely to impact the terms of the contract, resulting in a negative impact to 
the cost, schedule, or performance of the desired system. 
The Defense Acquisition System 
The DoD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management System is 
the framework for control and management of DoD systems development, based on the 
SEP. The model features development phases that define activities, and milestones that 
serve as control and decision points. These phases and milestones are established very 
early in the development cycle using the information available during early Materiel Solution 
Analysis (MSA), which is obviously very limited. Overwhelmingly, the PM responsible for 
establishing this strategy is not the individual responsible for executing it. Funding 
requirements, including amount, type, and period of execution, are established in the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), submission and a congressionally-approved 
funding profile is established for the entire acquisition strategy within the PPBE process. At 
this point, the schedule becomes very rigid as Congress must approve significant changes 
to the funding profile, including when the funding is to be executed. Although there are 
obviously known and unknown risks associated with an acquisition strategy formulated this 
early, there is no provision for a management reserve of funding to address these risks. 
The Interim DoD Instruction 5000.02, dated November 26, 2013, shows alternate 
versions of the DAS phases and milestones (see Figure 3) that attempt to address the 
impact that software imparts on the development process. The interim instruction depicts the 
following variants of the model: Defense Unique Software Intensive Program; Incrementally 
Fielded Software Intensive Program; Hybrid Program A (Hardware dominant); and Hybrid 
Program B (Software Dominant) models (DoD, 2013b, pp. 10–14). The new models indicate 
an understanding that software impacts the system development process differently than 
typical hardware systems do. As these are all newly developed, their impact on future 
development is unknown. 
Performance Specifications and the Work Breakdown Structure 
Since the implementation of acquisition reform in the nineties, detailed specifications 
have been replaced with performance specifications in order to leverage the considerable 
experience and expertise available in the defense contractor base. In most hardware-centric 
engineering disciplines, the expertise that the DoD seeks to leverage includes a mature 
engineering environment in which materials, standards, tools, techniques, and processes 
are widely accepted and implemented by industry leaders. This engineering maturity helps 
to account for derived and implied requirements not explicitly stated in the performance 
specification. Three levels of the work breakdown structure (WBS) may provide sufficient 
detail for vendors to develop a desired system in a mature engineering environment, such 
as the automotive field. For example, an automotive design that provides for easy 
replacement of wear-out items such as tires, filters, belts, and batteries obviously provides 
sustainability performance that is absolutely required. Most performance specifications do 
not explicitly address this capability as they would be automatically considered by any 
competent provider within the mature automotive engineering environment.  
The Department of Defense Handbook: Work Breakdown Structures for Defense 
Materiel Items (MIL-HDBK-881A), recommends a minimum of three levels be developed 
before handoff to a contractor (DoD, 2005). If a program is expected to be high cost or high 
risk, it is critical to define the system at a lower level of the WBS (DoD, 2005, p. 3). Complex 
weapon systems are nearly always high cost, and the complex software development that 
these systems require almost always means that the development effort is high risk as well. 
The WBS and performance specification must, consequently, be significantly more 
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developed to provide the software engineer enough information and insight to accurately 
estimate the level of effort needed—cost and schedule—and to actually produce the 
capabilities needed by the warfighter. Contracts resulting from proposals that are based on 
underdeveloped, vague, or missing requirements typically result in catastrophic cost and 
schedule growth as the true demands of the software development effort are discovered 
only after contract award. 
Technology Readiness Assessment and Risk Management 
Another important management aspect is addressing the readiness of the key 
technologies for successful development and deployment. A Technology Readiness 
Assessment (TRA) is required for most Major DoD Acquisition Programs (MDAPs; DoD, 
2011, p. 1-1) The purpose for conducting a TRA is to address the risk of attempting to 
develop a system with a key technology that is too immature to successfully deploy the 
system when needed by the warfighter. To benchmark the assessment, Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRLs) have been developed in a nine-level model, with a goal of 
ensuring that a system’s key technologies achieve at least a TRL level 6 to reduce risk to an 
acceptable level. 
There are software TRLs established, and level 6 is defined as “Module and/or 
subsystem validation in a relevant end-to-end environment.” The level 6 description 
specifies the “level at which the engineering feasibility of a software technology is 
demonstrated. This level extends the laboratory prototype implementations on full-scale 
realistic problems in which the software technology is partially integrated with existing 
hardware/software systems” (Blanchette, Albert, & Garcia-Miller, 2010, p. 35). 
The software TRL level 6 description presents several problems in performing the 
TRA on a software-intensive system. Weapon system software is typically engineered from 
scratch with few reused elements, which means that there is very little-to-nothing on which 
to perform the assessment. There will likely be software developed for similar systems that 
would meet the level 6 description, but assessing like-software built for another system will 
not significantly reduce the software technology risk of the proposed system. For example, 
the F-35 is built by the same manufacturer as the F-22, and they are both high-performance 
military aircraft with different but overlapping missions. Yet the F-35 is experiencing more 
software development problems than its predecessor and already has three times more 
software than the F-22 (Hagen et al., 2013, p. 26). 
Software TRLs do not appear to be providing the same type readiness indicator as 
hardware-related TRLs, leaving software technology risks substantially unknown. In a 2010 
U.S. Army workshop report from the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), the participants 
noted that “though marginally useful, these efforts have only confirmed for the participants 
the futility of continuing to base [technology] readiness decisions for software aspects of 
systems on the DoD software TRLs” (Blanchette et al., 2010, p. 2). The software TRLs 
clearly do not seem to be effective at reducing risk for the TRA. 
To help with early risk management in lieu of effective software TRLs, a software 
developer maturity assessment is mandated for most software-intensive systems, through 
attaining level 3 in the SEI’s Capability Maturity Model Integrated (CMMI), or equivalent, 
assessment methodology (DoD, 2013a, p. 92) The concept recognizes that the software 
build is a product of the process, and more mature organizations—those with successful 
past performance, demonstrated engineering discipline, stable development staffs, and 
effective management structures—reduce system development risk. 
SEI also has the Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model® (SA-CMM), which 
is designed to evaluate the maturity of software acquiring organizations such as the DoD’s 
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software-intensive system PM offices (Cooper & Fisher, 2002). The SA-CMM is also a five-
level model, similar to the CMMI. The DoD currently has no requirement for PM offices to 
undergo an evaluation or achieve any SA-CMM level, but the maturity of the team 
responsible for communicating the system requirements and managing the development 
has an impact on risk. 
Findings Summary 
In summary, the DoD acquisition environment features a requirements flow-down 
process that involves user-stated capabilities-based requirements translated to 
performance-based requirements, then translated to the detailed design specifications. This 
requirements translation process is the basis for the resource-intensive source selection and 
binding contracting processes, which are critical for accurate cost and schedule estimates. 
Although DoD acquisition is based on the event-driven SEP, the schedule becomes rigid 
very early in the process when time-specific funding is attached. The subsequent system 
PMs are charged with managing the cost, schedule, and performance set by the initial PM 
with no funding provided for managing the associated risk. To reduce risk, PMs are directed 
to perform TRAs early in the process, with a goal of achieving at least TRL 6 on key 
technologies. Software TRLs do not appear to be effective, and software developer maturity 
assessments are conducted to help reduce system development risk. The latest Interim DoD 
Instruction 5000.02 (DoD, 2013a) depicts newer phases and milestone models that attempt 
to address the differences that software development causes in the management of the 
DAS. 
DoD Acquisition Environment Analysis 
Does the DoD acquisition environment provide opportunity for variable results in 
software-intensive system development? 
The DoD acquisition environment appears to remain vulnerable to significant 
variability when developing software-intensive systems, similar to the problems currently 
plaguing the F-35 JSF program. Although the new phases and milestones models address 
the software component development, other critical management functions remain 
unchanged. Requirements generation, performance specification development, RFP, source 
selection, and contracting processes have yet to adapt to the unique challenges presented 
when managing software-intensive system development. Early program risk management 
assesses key technology readiness, but the software TRLs are ineffective for predicting 
software development risk. Evaluating the software developer’s maturity helps reduce some 
risk but fails to include the critical DoD entities in any maturity assessment. 
Early risk management through the TRA and achieving a desired TRL is ineffective 
for the software component. Assessing the contractor (software developer) maturity through 
CMMI or equivalent evaluation appears to be effective in reducing the developer risk but 
does not address the DoD acquisition community maturity. As the software developer is 
significantly dependent on the government’s ability to effectively generate and clearly 
communicate a comprehensive set of requirements, quality attributes, and critical design 
elements, assessing just the developer’s maturity addresses only part of the risk. 
Software Engineering Environment 
Software Engineering  
The software engineering environment is not mature, especially when compared to 
hardware-centric engineering environments. Dr. Philippe Kruchten (2005) of the University 
of British Columbia remarked, “We haven’t found the fundamental laws of software that 
would play the role that the fundamental laws of physics play for other engineering 
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disciplines” (p. 17). Software engineering is significantly unbounded because there are no 
physical laws that help define environments. There is significant evidence for software 
engineering immaturity, and it is nearly impossible to find widely accepted, industry-wide 
development standards, protocols, architectures, or formats. There is no dominant 
programming language, design and development process, standard architectures, or 
software engineering tools, which means that reusable modules and components rapidly 
become obsolete. All of these combine to make it nearly impossible to institute a widely 
accepted software reuse repository. Without significant software architecture and code 
reuse in developing software-intensive weapon systems, each development process 
essentially starts from scratch. This fact is one of the main reasons that the TRA and the 
software TRLs are ineffective in predicting software development risk (Naegle & Petross, 
2007). 
The software engineering state-of-the-practice currently is wholly dependent on the 
requirements that are passed to the software development team. From the requirements, a 
software architecture is designed, and the requirements “flow down” through that 
architecture to the individual modules and computer software units that are to be 
constructed. The software build focuses on the requirements that flowed down to that level 
and the integration required for functionality. The standards, protocols, formats, languages, 
and tools used for the build will likely be unique to the contractor developing the software, 
and will most certainly not be universally accepted or recognized across the software 
industry. 
The software architectural design is the basis for all of the current and future system 
performance that the system will achieve, and the current state-of-the-practice in software 
engineering has each project design a unique architecture. Like hardware, the software 
design will significantly impact system attributes that are important to the warfighter, 
including maintainability, upgradability, interoperability, reliability, safety, and security. Most 
hardware-oriented engineering environments address these critical areas through widely 
accepted industry standards. 
Findings Summary 
With software, virtually all of the performance and quality attributes developed come 
directly from the requirements received, and the immature software engineering 
environment will likely not compensate for any desired performance, such as system 
sustainability, that is not clearly specified in a requirement. Unlike hardware-oriented 
engineering environments, where the widely accepted industry standards will be employed 
whether or not they are specified, with software, you get what you specify and very little 
else. 
The software architectural designs suffer from the immature engineering 
environment as well. Each software design is unique and driven by the requirements 
received with no industry-standard architectures available. All current and future system 
attributes impacted by the architecture must be communicated to the software design staff 
to ensure they are considered in the design process. 
Software Engineering Environment Analysis 
How does the software engineering environment impact DoD software-intensive 
system development? 
As illustrated in the previous section, the lack of software engineering maturity 
impacts both requirements development and design of the architecture. To compensate for 
the relative immaturity of the software engineering environment, the DoD must conduct 
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significantly more in-depth requirements analysis and provide potential software developers 
detailed performance specifications in all areas of software performance and sustainability. 
This is a significantly different mind-set than the hardware-dominated systems acquisition of 
the past. 
In addition to the performance requirements, software architectures must be similarly 
shaped to include system attributes expected by the warfighter. Many DoD user 
representatives and acquisition professionals have grown accustomed to the engineering 
maturity levels offered by the hardware-oriented systems that dominated past acquisitions. 
Providing the system requirements in the same fashion may not drive the architecture for 
needed attributes. As demonstrated by the F-35 JSF redesign problems, changing software 
architectures during the development cycle will likely be costly in terms of schedule and 
funding. 
DoD Acquisition Environment: Impact on Software Development and Quality 
Attributes 
DoD Requirements Generation Process 
The DoD requirements generation process was described earlier as part of the DoD 
acquisition environment and consists of three major processes: user-generated 
requirements in the form of capability needs using the JCIDS; PM-generated requirements 
in the form of performance specifications; and finally, contractor-generated detailed 
specifications, developed generally in that order. Two major requirements language 
interpretations are required to get from the warfighters’ needs to the system built to meet 
those needs, leaving significant opportunity for misinterpretation, omission, and 
misunderstanding of weakly articulated and vaguely stated language. To do this effectively, 
the PM must accurately interpret user capability language (for example, warfighter requires 
the capability to … in all mission environments) and translate that into performance 
language (for example, system shall achieve xxx performance … in these specific 
conditions). The contractor then translates the performance language into the system build-
details that meet or exceed the performance specified. 
The importance of system software requirements development to the potential 
success of software-intensive systems development cannot be overstated. Underdeveloped, 
vaguely articulated, ill-defined software requirements elicitation has been linked to poor cost 
and schedule estimations, resulting in disastrous cost and schedule overruns such as what 
the F-35 JSF is currently experiencing. In addition, the resulting products have been lacking 
important functionality, are unreliable, and have been costly and difficult to effectively 
sustain (Naegle, 2006). 
Systems Engineering Process 
Using the SEP approach, the explicit user capabilities requirements specified in the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) provides the input for 
system requirements analyses. These analyses are intended to illuminate all system-stated, 
-derived, and -implied requirements and quality attributes necessary to achieve the 
capabilities needed by the warfighter. The WBS is a methodology for defining ever-
increasing levels of performance specificity using the SEP to guide the development of each 
successive layer (DoD, 2005, pp. 1–5). 
Just as it supports hardware development, the Systems Engineering Process 
(SEP) is essential in the development of software design. In software 
development, good quality and predictable results are paramount goals in 
creating the specified warfighter capabilities within cost and schedule 
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constraints. To accomplish those goals, we examine the methods, tools and 
processes the software developer uses in building the software with the intent 
of attaining a product that provides all of the necessary functionality and is 
supportable, efficient, reliable and easy to upgrade. (Naegle & Petross, 2007, 
pp. 14, 15) 
Software Engineering Maturity Impact on Requirements Generation 
The immature software engineering environment, discussed earlier, can be 
compensated for only by a requirements generation system that does not leave any gaps in 
performance or quality attributes needed. Having all of the requirements clearly 
communicated is critical, but the software engineer must also understand the requirements 
in context. Both essential and enhancing features are communicated to the system and 
software developers as requirements and, as such, appear to have equal weight. The critical 
difference between “essential” and “enhancing” may not be clear to the software 
development team, which may result in a poorly performing and possibly dangerous design. 
The distinction needs to be made clear, but there is no definitive method for identifying 
requirements as system “essential” or “enhancing.” 
System Operational Context 
To gain some insight into the operational environments that the system is expected 
to operate within, the DoD provides an Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile 
(OMS/MP). The OMS/MP provides some basic insight into the operational profile, threat 
profile, environmental profile, and the terrain/sea state/undersea/air environment profile, 
which adds some context to the requirements, but is not usually scenario based. It typically 
lacks sustainability activities, interoperability profiles, system life-cycle profiles, planned or 
anticipated upgrades, or operation in stressful, degraded, or emergency situations. There is 
no prioritization of the operational modes or configurations, nor identification of critical and 
non-critical systems.  
The software development team would likely continue to be missing important 
information that it needs to adequately design the software and to predict the funding and 
schedule resources necessary to build the software the warfighter expects. 
The OMS/MP documents do not typically provide any information regarding system 
life-cycle changes such as pre-planned product improvement (P3I) programs, planned 
upgrades and technology refreshments, future interoperability requirements, or plans for 
future integration into tactical and logistical networks. These life-cycle events, while known 
or anticipated, are not effectively communicated to potential developers for inclusion in the 
proposal process and are often omitted from the software system design.  
Impact on Software and Quality Attributes Analysis 
Is the DoD requirements development and communication process sufficient for 
potential software developers? 
The DoD requirements generation process that was purposefully designed to garner 
the maximum contractor innovation and flexibility appears to provide too little information for 
the software developer to adequately predict the resources necessary to develop the system 
software. It is clear that the current state of the software engineering environment is mostly 
incapable of compensating for missing, vaguely stated, or weakly articulated requirements. 
At the same time, the current DoD requirements generation system provides ample 
opportunity to inadvertently omit requirements and to provide vaguely stated or weakly 
articulated requirements through the capabilities-oriented JCIDS documents and the 
performance-based specifications derived from them.  
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Without fully understanding the requirements in a detailed operational context, the 
software design and development effort and resources remain significantly unknown. The 
typical OMS/MP provides some operational context to the requirements, but is not 
sufficiently detailed to provide the design drivers needed by the software engineers. 
Developing a proposal with this limited information will likely result in a significantly 
underestimated software development effort. After contract award, more operational details 
are typically provided through program and design reviews, and the cost and schedule for 
the software effort are likely to inflate significantly to accommodate the new understanding 
of the requirement in a non-competitive environment. 
The lack of operational context typically provided by the government during the RFP 
process appears to have significant negative impacts on the software design for reliability 
and maintainability. The OMS/MP documents’ lack of information regarding significant 
planned and anticipated life-cycle changes, system sustainment activities and burden, and 
operations under unusual conditions will likely mean that the system software design will not 
easily accommodate known changes. There is no prioritization of the operational modes or 
configurations that would impact system design considerations. This information would also 
help differentiate critical systems from enhancing (non-critical) systems, providing a priority 
in the software design effort. 
Software-Intensive System Architecture Development Analysis 
How is the software-intensive system architecture developed to ensure 
warfighter capabilities are designed and prioritized? 
The DoD system architectural process, with all of its tools, techniques, and discipline, 
appears to be ineffective in driving repeatable, successful software designs. Within the SEP, 
there are three DoD processes that drive the system architecture: the requirements 
generations system, the WBS, and the OMS/MP. 
There appears to be significant opportunity to omit requirements, or to provide vague 
or weakly articulated requirements through the translation process from the user capability-
based requirements, to the PM’s performance specification, and finally to the contractor’s 
detailed specification. This problem is exacerbated by the immature software engineering 
environment described earlier, which is solely focused on requirements as provided. 
The process of developing the WBS appears to be similarly flawed in effectively 
communicating the functional architecture to a sufficient level for the software developers. 
The overarching philosophy for both requirements generation and the WBS, in order to 
garner the maximum flexibility and innovation, is purposely not to be specific. Due to the 
immature engineering environment, the software components need significantly more 
specificity than the hardware counterparts to produce realism in the cost and schedule 
provided in the contractor’s proposal. 
The operational context information that the government provides appears to be 
insufficient for the potential software developers to have an understanding of the 
requirements within the context of the operational environment, constraints, and life-cycle 
events of the proposed system. The OMS/MP typically provides only a vague understanding 
of the operational environment and significantly more information is required to design and 
build the system actually needed by the warfighter. This additional information is likely to be 
added in program and design reviews conducted after the contract is awarded, so resulting 
changes impacting the software development can cause significant increases in the cost 
and schedule, all negotiated without the advantages of a competitive environment. 
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Conclusions 
The DoD acquisition process provides the environment for both successful and 
unsuccessful software-intensive systems development. Specific elements of the DoD 
acquisition process that contribute to the variable environment include the following: 
• The DoD Requirements Generation Process. The translation process from 
JCIDS capabilities-based language to the RFP/contract performance-based 
language, and finally to the specification-based detailed language creates 
ample opportunity for misinterpreted requirements to be communicated. This 
process was designed to garner innovation from mature engineering fields 
that leverage widely accepted materials, processes, and standards—
attributes that the software engineering field does not yet have. 
• Communicating Operational Context. The Operational Mode Summary/ 
Mission Profile (OMS/MP) provides some insight into a system’s intended 
operational context but provides far too little information for the complex 
software design process. This lack of detail, again, cannot be compensated 
by the immature software engineering environment and so impacts software-
intensive systems more than hardware-centric ones. 
• Failure to Compensate for the Immature Software Engineering 
Environment. As demonstrated by the first two bullets, one of the major 
differences between successful and unsuccessful software-intensive systems 
development is recognizing and compensating for the immature software 
environment. The DoD Acquisition System policies, guidelines, and controls 
do not provide a framework to ensure that essential software attributes are 
sufficiently revealed and effectively communicated to the contractors that will 
design and build the software systems. 
• The DoD Acquisition System  
o The DAS is designed to leverage industry innovation by providing 
performance specifications that are designed to allow mature 
industrial engineering environments to develop the best-value 
technologies that meet the performance specifications. This is 
effective when the engineering environments are mature and can offer 
viable, mature technology alternatives that are considered industry 
standard. There are insufficient DAS processes for recognizing and 
compensating for immature engineering environments, such as exists 
in the software field. 
o The schedule and funding profile are initially set by the first system 
PM, and the program depends significantly on how well the 
requirements generation process accurately identified the bulk of the 
requirements. Once funding is linked to milestones, the program cost 
and schedule become very rigid, which exacerbates problems with 
software-intensive system developments that have late requirements 
creep due to insufficient understanding of the effort in the proposal 
preparation.  
o Software Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are ineffective in 
reducing risks associated with the system software development. 
Because there are few reusable software components, limited 
industry-wide standards for architecture and supportability, and rapidly 
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emerging languages, protocols and tools, the software TRLs, based 
on past efforts, are not reliable predictors of software readiness. 
o Software development significantly adds to the system development 
risk. The DAS is designed to reduce development risk, but cannot 
eliminate all associated risks. Some risk is accepted with the 
expectation that the PM team will effectively manage those risks, yet 
there is no funding management reserve provided to do so. Any risk 
management mitigation effort that involves funding has the 
opportunity to create a cascade of management actions resulting from 
funding reductions in other planned and necessary activities. 
Recommendations 
General 
As part of this research, I searched for tools, techniques, and procedures that would 
address the software-intensive system development problems and integrate well with the 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) while supporting the Systems Engineering Process 
(SEP). The tools, techniques, and procedures recommended in this section are not 
particularly new and many programs may have used some, most, or all of these in the 
development of their systems. The major recommendation is that DoD formalize and 
institute the use of these tools, techniques, and procedures (or similar ones) for the 
development of software-intensive systems. There would almost certainly be a benefit when 
applied to hardware-centric system development, too, and certainly there would be no 
detriment in using them for all complex system development. 
One of the findings of this research was the lack of a PM management reserve fund 
to address accepted development risks, but a significant policy and political change would 
be required to provide a management reserve in program funding. I believe this course of 
action to be unlikely, but the implementation of the recommendations would significantly 
reduce software-intensive system developmental volatility and risk, and reduce the need for 
the management reserve. 
Each of the tools, techniques, and procedures are valuable in assisting the systems 
development process, but when used together, provide a synergistic effect to the vital front-
end analyses that directly impact the shortcomings revealed in this research. Implementing 
these tools does not require any major adjustments to the DAS or the SEP, and in fact 
become major enablers for both. 
Tools, Techniques, and Processes 
The following tools, techniques, and processes are briefly described in this section: 
• The Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Quality Attribute Workshop 
(QAW) 
• The Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability, Reliability, & Safety and 
Security (MUIRS) analytic technique 
• The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology (ATAMsm) 
• The Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
• Software Management Readiness Levels (MgtRL) 
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Quality Attribute Workshop  
The QAW is primarily a method for more fully developing system software 
requirements and is intended to provide stakeholders’ input about their needs and 
expectations from the software (Barbacci et al., 2003, p. 1). As the system requirements are 
developed, software quality attributes are identified and become the basis for designing the 
software architecture.  
The SEI’s QAW is implemented before the software architecture has been created 
and is intended to provide stakeholder input about the needs and expectations from the 
software (Naegle, 2007). The QAW process provides a vehicle for keeping the combat 
developer and user community involved in the DoD acquisition process, which is a key goal 
of that process. In addition, the QAW includes scenario-building processes that are essential 
for the software developer to design the software system architecture (Barbacci et al., 2003, 
pp. 9–11). These scenarios will continue to be developed and prioritized after contract 
award to provide context to the quality attribute identified for the system.  
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Area Addressed  
The QAW process is primarily designed to more fully develop system software 
requirements so that the government RFP is clearer to potential contractors. In turn, the 
resulting proposals should be more accurate and realistic, reducing requirements and 
project scope creep. 
Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability/Interfaces, Reliability, and 
Safety/Security Analytic Technique 
The MUIRS analytic technique is designed to provide a framework for better 
understanding of essential supportability and safety/security aspects that the warfighter 
needs and expects but often doesn’t communicate clearly with the capabilities-based JCIDS 
documents. This analytic technique helps compensate for the immature software 
engineering environment as the MUIRS analysis illuminates the derived and implied 
requirements that the immature environment cannot.  
Much of the software supportability and safety/security performance that typically 
lacks consideration and is not routinely addressed in the software engineering environment 
can be captured through development and analysis of the MUIRS elements. Analyzing the 
warfighter requirements in a QAW framework for performance in each MUIRS area will help 
stakeholders identify software quality attributes that need to be communicated to potential 
software contractors (Naegle, 2006, pp. 17–24). 
The MUIRS analysis assists the QAW process by focusing on those elements that 
are too often typically overlooked during the requirements generation process. The QAW 
and MUIRS analysis are critical to the software design process, discussed in the next 
section.  
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Area Addressed  
MUIRS primarily addresses the immature software engineering environment as it 
provides an analytic approach for critical sustainment and safety/security attributes often 
missing, weakly articulated, or vaguely stated in the requirements produced. With its 
capabilities and performance-based requirements processes, the DoD significantly depends 
on mature engineering environments to fill the gaps left from the requirements generation 
and communication processes, but the software engineering environment is unable to do so. 
The MUIRS analysis is also an enabler for the QAW and ATAMsm architectural processes 
discussed next. 
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Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodologysm 
The SEI’s ATAMSM is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate design 
decisions based on the quality attribute requirements of the system being developed. The 
methodology is a process for determining whether the quality attributes are achievable by 
the architecture as it has been conceived before enormous resources have been committed 
to that design. One of the main goals is to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade 
off against each other (Kazman, Kleim, & Clements, 2000, p. 1).  
Within the SEP, the ATAM provides the critical Requirements Loop process, tracing 
each requirement or quality attribute to corresponding functions reflected in the software 
architectural design. Whether ATAM or another analysis technique is used, this critical SEP 
process must be performed to ensure that functional- or object-oriented designs meet all 
stated, derived, and implied warfighter requirements. In complex systems development such 
as weapon systems, half or more than half of the total software development effort is 
expended in the architectural design process. Therefore, the DoD PMs must ensure that the 
design is addressing requirements in context and that the resulting architecture has a high 
probability of producing the specified warfighters’ capabilities described in the JCIDS 
documents. 
The ATAM focuses on quality attribute requirements, so it is critical to have precise 
characterizations for each. To characterize a quality attribute, the following questions must 
be answered: 
• What are the stimuli to which the architecture must respond? 
• What is the measurable or observable manifestation of the quality attribute by 
which its achievement is judged? 
• What are the key architectural decisions that impact achieving the attribute 
requirement? (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 5) 
The ATAM is designed to elicit the data and information needed to adequately 
address the three previous questions. These questions, focused on requirements and 
quality attributes, are user-centric, and so the ATAM scenarios must be constructed by the 
user community (Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25). The methodology keys on scenario 
development in three main areas: 
• Use Case Scenarios. As the name suggests, these scenarios describe how 
the system will be used and sustained in the harshest environments 
envisioned. It includes all interoperability requirements and duty cycles as 
well. 
• Growth Scenarios. Growth scenarios focus on known and anticipated 
system change requirements over the intended life cycle. These scenarios 
include upgrades and technology refreshments planned; interoperability 
requirements, such as inclusion in future warfighting networks; changes in 
sustainment concepts, and other system changes expected to occur over 
time. 
• Exploratory Scenarios. Exploratory scenarios focus on operations in 
unusual or stressful situations. These address user expectations when the 
system is degraded or operated beyond normal limitations due to emergency 
created by combat environments. These scenarios include Failure Modes 
and Effects Criticality Analyses (FMECA) to identify the essential functions 
that must not fail. As important to the software engineers, FMECA also 
identifies those enhancing functions that should not preclude the system from 
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functioning when that enhancing function is degraded or non-operational. The 
software engineers need that information to properly design the software.  
Test cases are developed out of the scenarios, which firmly link the test program with 
the user requirements in the context of the scenarios. This methodology also helps to 
ensure that there are verification events for software and sustainment requirements, which 
are too often missing from the testing program. 
As shown in Figure 1, the ATAM is an integrating function for many of the tools and 
techniques discussed here. It is designed to be an iterative process and would be most 
effective when started in early concept development, then continued through contract 
award, prototyping, and into the design review process. 
 
 Figure 1. Quality Attribution Workshop and Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology Integration Into Software Life-Cycle Management 
(Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25) 
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Areas Addressed 
The ATAM process addresses four primary problem areas: 
• The scenario development provides much more operational context than the 
typical OMS/MP provides. This level of detail helps to compensate for the 
immature software engineering environment and is critical for the proper 
design of the software architecture.  
• The ATAM serves as a very effective software design metric function. With 
the software development team using 50% or more of the available resources 
for requirements analysis and software design before the Preliminary Design 
Review (PDR), it is critical to have an effective software design metrics 
function. Traditional software design metrics focus on the design complexity 
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and do not address whether the design is adequate or not. ATAM directly 
links the user requirements to the system architectural design. 
• As the testing program is developed from the scenarios, it becomes difficult to 
omit any critical testing event. In addition, the software developer 
understands the tests or verification events that must be passed for user 
acceptance. 
• By integrating the MUIRS analyses into the ATAM scenario development, 
sustainability and safety/security aspects cannot easily be omitted from the 
system design. As the testing plan flows from the scenarios, the MUIRS 
design elements will have corresponding test or verification events identified 
in the test plan. 
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
As the title indicates, this analysis methodology is designed to identify system failure 
modes and those failures’ effects on the system, and ascertain the relative criticality of that 
type of failure. Blanchard (2004) described FMECA as follows: 
Given a description, both in functional and physical terms, the designer needs 
to be able to evaluate a system relative to possible failures, the anticipated 
modes and expected frequency of failure, their causes, their consequences 
and impact(s) on the system overall, and areas where preventative measures 
can be initiated to preclude such failures in the future. (p. 275) 
He went on to state, “The FMECA is an excellent design tool, and it can be applied in 
the development or assessment of any product or process” (Blanchard, 2004, p. 276). 
Including FMECA scenarios with the software systems and subsystems provides 
architectural design cues to software engineers. These scenarios provide analysis for 
designing redundant systems for mission-critical elements, provide “safe mode” operations 
for survivability- and safety-related systems, and drive the software engineer to conduct 
“what if” analyses with a superior understanding of failure-mode scenarios.  
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Areas Addressed 
The primary problem areas addressed by FMECA include requirements clarification 
and prioritization, and helping to ensure a sound software architecture design. This analysis 
also ensures that the most critical software systems are designed with the requisite reliability 
and will continue to function in degraded modes.  
As previously stated, one of the main functions of performing FMECA is to identify 
those software functions that are not critical, and to ensure that failures or anomalies in 
those non-critical functions do not preclude or negatively affect system capabilities. Today’s 
systems typically have numerous enhancing functions that improve performance but are not 
critical, and the software developers have no way to discern the difference between a critical 
system and an enhancing one without employing FMECA. 
Integrating the Recommended Tools, Techniques, and Processes into the Defense 
Acquisition System 
The tools, techniques, and processes were specifically selected for both their ability 
to address software-intensive systems development problems and their ability to integrate 
with the DAS. They are all SEP enablers designed to improve the critical DAS front-end 
processes, which are primarily the government’s responsibility. 
Figure 2 shows the processes applied at the latest possible developmental time to be 
effective. The earlier these tools, techniques, and processes occur, the more effective they 
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become. This representation also does not show the iterative cycles of QAW and ATAM or 
their overlapping nature. 
 
 Figure 2. Quality Attribution Workshop and Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology Integration Into Software Life Cycle Management 
(Naegle & Petross, 2007) 
As depicted in Figure 2, the QAW and ATAM are designed to address critical 
requirements and design front-end processes, where the government is primarily 
responsible for the process. The blue arrow shows how the warfighters and user community 
are continuously involved throughout the process, and are active participants in the QAW 
and ATAM processes. This is distinctly different than the traditional DAS where there is little 
formal user interaction between preparation of the JCIDS documents and the prototype 
limited user tests (LUT)/early user test and evaluation (EUT&E). 
The user communities have a very significant role in driving the QAW and ATAM 
processes, which requires more user resources to support the system development. This 
user investment in the DAS is becoming more critical with the development of more 
software-intensive and complex systems of all kinds. This investment is absolutely 
necessary to avoid government to contractor misunderstanding of the system requirements 
and warfighter expectations, and would significantly reduce the cost and schedule delays 
associated with user dissatisfaction, user-test failure, and unnecessary system redesign. 
Program Management Risk Reduction 
These tools, techniques, and processes will not, of themselves, produce or 
guarantee anything. “An architecture analysis method, any architecture analysis method, is 
a garbage-in-garbage-out process. The ATAM is no different. It crucially relies on the active 
and willing participation of the stakeholders” (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 63). All of the tools and 
techniques described and recommended in this research are dependent on the team of 
professional stakeholders conscientiously performing their critical function in the 
development of the software-intensive system. 
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To effectively implement the recommended tools, techniques, and processes, the 
program management team must be professional, disciplined in their application of the SEP, 
and skilled in integrating the tools into the DAS. In a word used by the SEI, the team must 
be mature. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) mandates certain 
education and training levels for the professional workforce performing at various levels. The 
DoD invests significant resources in both education and training to help ensure the 
acquisition workforce competencies and comply with the DAWIA. 
The DoD also evaluates the maturity of potential software developers by requiring an 
evaluation using SEI’s Capability Maturity Model–Integrated (CMMI; or equivalent) for most 
software-intensive system acquisitions. The CMMI is a five-level model, and the software 
developer organization under evaluation must achieve at least a level three by an 
independent evaluation team to be eligible to be awarded the DoD contract.  
As mentioned previously, the DoD does not currently require the PM offices 
managing software-intensive systems to achieve any maturity level on the Software 
Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM). The team effort between the government 
and the software developer strongly suggests that both the PM office and the software 
developer would reduce developmental risk by demonstrating an appropriate level of 
maturity. 
Due in large part to the immature software engineering environment, each major 
DoD software design and build tends to be unique. That means that the software 
development in complex systems will act the same way as integrating a new technology 
would, and the resulting program risk is very high. The software TRLs have little meaning in 
this type of environment, so risk management is highly dependent on the government and 
software development teams’ abilities to manage the system software development as a 
new technology with a low TRL. 
A significant portion of the risk management is focused on the government and 
software development teams. As the software TRLs are mostly ineffective, I would 
recommend the further development of software Management Readiness Levels (MgtRLs) 
to mitigate the risks. Part of the management risk reduction is already in place with the 
DAWIA requirements and the software developer maturity levels that must be achieved.  
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Abstract 
In many government weapon systems, sustaining software depends heavily on organic 
engineering efforts. This is different from hardware sustainment (the more traditional form of 
sustainment), which often depends heavily on the supply chain and service providers and 
much less on engineering capability. Because of this shift, a larger portion of sustainment 
funding needs to be allocated to improving the sustainment infrastructure within government 
sustainment organizations. This includes the engineering processes, tools, and skills of 
engineering staff. Failure to recognize this need in a timely fashion has the potential to 
increase sustainment costs and, at the same time, degrade system performance. 
The decisions and processes are complex because various stakeholders make decisions at 
different times, yet these decisions are interrelated, impact one another, and create 
constraints on the ability of the sustainment organization to fulfill its mission. To deal with the 
complexity of the decision-making process, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) 
developed a simulation model for analyzing the effects of changes in demand for software 
sustainment and the corresponding funding decisions. The model allows decision-makers to 
analyze multiple allocation strategies in response to changes from mission command and 
budget authorities. The model has been tested and calibrated using historical data and is now 
in operational use by the Process Resource Team at the Naval Air Weapons Station China 
Lake. 
Introduction 
The ideas for this model were developed in response to real-world events. One DoD 
program charged with sustaining a 20+ year old aircraft system asked the SEI how it could 
justify the capital investment necessary to update its test and support systems and the 
supply chain. Some of the parts were past end-of-life, making them difficult to source, and 
the radar—a major technology component—had been updated without updating the test 
equipment. The situation was placing a major strain on the organization. Engineers had to 
spend significant work time on eBay buying parts. Radar testing costs escalated significantly 
because of the new steps required: 
1 Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon University. No warranty. This Carnegie Mellon University and 
Software Engineering Institute material is furnished on an “as-is” basis. Carnegie Mellon University 
makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied, as to any matter including, but not 
limited to, warranty of fitness for purpose or merchantability, exclusivity, or results obtained from use 
of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to 
freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. This material has been approved for 
public release and unlimited distribution. DM-0002313. 
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1. Remove an airplane from operations.  
2. Disassemble the radar to put it in the lab. 
3. Calibrate the radar in the lab setting. 
4. Complete testing. 
5. Reassemble the aircraft with the radar. 
6. Recalibrate the radar to the airplane. 
Repercussions of this problem will continue even after the equipment becomes 
available and a new source of parts is established. Both physical plant and process changes 
will be required to reestablish the level of productivity the organization had when its 
infrastructure matched the technology requirements of the aircraft systems being sustained.  
This type of situation occurs with some frequency and can be summarized as 
follows: 
• An organic sustainment organization with valuable facilities and skills is 
already in place. 
• A new technology makes parts obsolete and leads to new engineering design 
work.  
• The sustainment organization needs to upgrade both skills and facilities to 
meet the demand.  
• While waiting for these changes to be completed, the sustainer’s efficiency is 
compromised, and “mission capable availability” is diminished.  
• Until process and tools stabilize, quality often suffers. 
Part of the problem for the sustainers is the familiar “color of money” problem; by 
law, specific funding sources must be applied to specific uses. Funding for product 
modernization is supplied by the acquisition budget and arrives via the program office. 
Funding for developing organic sustainment capability typically comes from the life-cycle 
command function. Delays in funding to update facilities and processes will eventually cause 
problems in mission performance. Detecting this situation is nearly impossible using 
spreadsheet analysis alone.  
At least five distinct stakeholders are present in sustainment work: 
1. Actual operators, who represent the mission-use viewpoint 
2. Strategic planners, who review threats to the existing system and 
opportunities for new system capability based on changes in technology 
3. Sustaining engineers, who must address requests for new capabilities as well 
as addressing the effects of external changes to existing subsystems (e.g., 
software changes to sensors or communications.)  
4. The sustainers’ management team, which must invest in facilities and 
organizational capabilities and retain talent with product domain knowledge 
5. The program office, which is responsible for the flow of funds and for 
promoting the program to all stakeholders 
All of the stakeholders have their own definitions of value or utility. Each also has a 
different timeframe for decisions; hence, each stakeholder may perceive any of the others 
as delaying the response. The dynamic is one of constant change since technology may 
change and new threats arise at any time. Figure 1 shows the interaction of the 
stakeholders and the potential for various gaps in the desired performance. 
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 Figure 1. Stakeholders and Gaps 
Rationale for a Simulation 
Sustainment is part of a dynamic and changing system. Different forces are stronger 
at different times, and there are time delays between decisions and outcomes that hide 
valuable information from decision-makers. Any thought of perfect decisions point toward an 
unattainable ideal. The purpose of the simulation model is to increase the likelihood of better 
decisions by forecasting several potential futures and examining the consequences. Even if 
the decision is not optimal at the start, the simulation indicates ways to make course 
corrections in a more timely fashion.  
Simulations use scenarios of input and change to make these forecasts. Each 
scenario assumes a possible future budget allocation and a future set of demands on both 
the mission and the sustainer. The simulation then provides a graphical picture of future 
performance and potential gaps in that performance. In many cases, the simulation will 
show how a decision that appears sensible at first actually generates a significant 
performance gap within just a few months. Since some decision cycles are often two years 
or more, the gap may be one that cannot be overcome in a shorter timeframe than the next 
decision cycle. This information may be useful in persuading stakeholders (funders) to make 
different decisions about funding. 
The Simulation Tool and Model 
The model uses the systems dynamics method described in Peter Senge’s (2006) 
book The Fifth Discipline. The SEI’s simulation was developed using Vensim and systems 
dynamics methods (Ventana Systems, n.d.). This type of simulation uses a “stock and flow” 
model common to systems dynamics (Figure 2). 
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 Figure 2. Stock and Flow Model  
An epidemic is a good example because the nonlinear behavior and external 
interactions can create a future dangerous situation. The boxes indicate “stocks” that can be 
supplied or drained by “flows,” represented by double arrows. Stocks may also be initialized. 
The double triangle is a valve that controls the rate of the flow. The source of a single arrow 
is a measure. The target is a calculation or control of a valve. If the source of the arrow 
shows an increasing/decreasing value, the sign +/- implies that the target of the arrow has 
the same/opposite impact as the measure of the source. In the diagram, an increase in the 
susceptible population creates an increasing number of contacts. Similarly, if the duration of 
the infection grows, the recovery rate decreases (the “-”). 
The full simulation for sustainment is quite large and can be seen in the SEI 
publication, A Dynamic Model of Sustainment Investment (Sheard et al., 2015). A smaller 
piece showing how technology demands interact with mission performance appears in 
Figure 3. 
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 Figure 3. Mission and Strategy Portion of the Simulation Model 
The Vensim user interface (presented in Figure 4) provides a customizable control 
panel with charts and slider bars. The charts show the performance graph of individual 
variables. The slider bars are a simple control panel for testing different inputs or input 
equations that drive the simulation. The charts can be selected from any number of 
available variables in the model. Additional scenarios can be developed to show how 
actions taken later affect results. 
This interface allows decision-makers to use slider bars to set different funding 
allocation strategies and changes in demand and immediately see the effects of different 
actions. 
 
 Figure 4. Vensim User Control Interface 
 
Legend and Interpretation
In Vensim the +/- signs are replaced by “S”=+ and 
“O”=-.
The red colored arrows simply represent a reinforcing 
loop called the “Bandwagon Effect”.  This effect 
simply means that a series of successful missions will 
increase the demand for future deployments and an 
expansion of mission goals. The demand then 
generates requests for new capabilities. In turn the 
additional capabilities result in greater expectations 
of mission performance.
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Calibration  
Calibrating a simulation is always challenging. A model must be simpler than a real-
world situation since modeling complete reality is far too expensive and time consuming. 
Each simplification involves some abstraction from reality, resulting in some redefinition of 
data. Sometimes an approximation or proxy must be used if real data is not available. 
The most common way to calibrate the model is to begin by establishing an 
equilibrium: When the equilibrium is established, each stock and flow appears constant. This 
approach works because equilibrium can usually be established by manipulating a smaller 
subset of the variables and formulas. 
A total of 26 flows and 19 stocks are defined in the SEI model. Actual calibration was 
performed with approximately half the total number of flows and just five of the stocks. The 
equilibrium values have to be reconciled with data observations of the real system. Two 
particular assumptions show the complexity of the abstraction: 
• Enhancement Requests: Every enhancement request was counted as 
having the same size and effect on the developers. This is clearly inadequate 
for the longer term viability of the model. Requests come in different sizes—
some are big and complicated, and some are much smaller and easier. For 
improved accuracy, the requests are considered as a set of sizes from very 
small (VS) to very large (VL). 
• Staff Capabilities: It was also necessary to connect process capability and 
organizational capacity. We chose the simple formula:  
       Sustainment capacity = A* (number of capabilities) * (number of staff), 
where A is some numeric value that helps to achieve equilibrium when 
calibrating. This formulation suggests that staff capabilities are closely related 
to process capabilities, which has been observed in many studies. 
Proceeding this way, we determined that a capability change could be based 
on training days, since process changes had to be supported by training 
days. The stable solution at this time is about 45 days per staff, or about 
9,000 total capacity across an organization of 200 people. Capacity is 
diminished by staff members leaving or reductions in total staff. Improving 
capacity requires both staff and training employed together. 
It is possible that neither of these assumptions will be valid after further study, but the 
simulation behavior appears acceptable in current use. 
Developing Scenarios 
Typically, the simulation should imitate real performance and should break where the 
system would break. Testing the simulation must include running scenarios of change and 
correlating the changed behavior of the model to the organization’s behavior. A scenario can 
be described using the elements in Table 1. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 46 - 
Table 1. Scenario Example 
 
Additional scenarios can be tested simply by changing any of the first three 
elements. For example, adding test equipment represents a potential response. Operating 
during wartime is a new environment. Finally, an example of a new stimulus would be an 
enemy’s new capability to detect a stealth aircraft. Similar scenarios may be generated by 
any input, whether from customer demand, operational performance, or sustainment 
performance. Each new scenario may have different effects on the various outcomes in 
terms of productivity, customer satisfaction, and the ability to perform missions. 
Results 
Four distinct scenarios were tested during the research. The results of the 
“Sequestration” scenario are described in this section. 
In sequestration, the stimulus was a 20% cut in funding. The initial response was to 
cut 100% of the training budget. The outcome for that particular response was a steady 
decline in productivity for as long as sequestration lasted. An alternate response was also 
considered: maintain training and increase investment in process improvement. The 
alternate response demonstrated a short-term, six-month loss in productivity but showed 
higher levels of productivity within 12–18 months. Obviously, there are practical limits to 
improving productivity, but the model assumes that the capital investment is wisely spent. 
Figure 4 also illustrates the possibility of considering alternatives based on changing 
assumptions about either the baseline or the stimulus event (represented by the box labeled 
“Alternate Baselines”). 
The other three scenarios we investigated, which are described in the larger paper, 
were 
• Gating the demand: The sustainment organization chooses to deny a number 
of requests because it does not have the capacity to fulfil them all. What will it 
do to sustainment performance and to the mission performance assessment?  
• New threat, no budget: An opponent develops a technology that could 
compromise mission performance. The system is upgraded, but there may 
not be money for training and tooling. How long does it takes for mission 
performance to decline and by how much? 
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• Underfunding sustainment investment: Underfunding occurs when the 
sustainers are made responsible for the support of a new technology, but 
there is no budgetary provision to support tooling, process changes, and staff 
training. Will this affect mission readiness, and how long will it be before the 
results are observed? 
These initial scenarios are not completely independent. “New Threat” proved to be very 
similar to “Underfunding.” The advantage of documenting the scenario carefully is the ease 
with which different scenarios can be tested. 
Outcomes and Future Work  
The Process Resource Team and the Naval Air Weapons Lab worked with the SEI 
on this model. Their confidence in the model was sufficient enough for them to purchase 
Vensim and to seek a longer term relationship with the SEI to study and improve the model. 
Several kinds of improvement to model are possible. The most obvious is to improve 
calibration, which will require some additional data. In particular, concepts associated with 
mission capability, mission performance, and demands for new capability need more precise 
definitions and better measurement data. Another abstraction that should be reconsidered 
would address potential trades between process capability and individual capability. The 
initial model assumes these are the same measure. 
The Naval Air Weapons Lab plans to extend the use of the model to other programs 
within NAVAIR. The future practicality of the simulation model depends on both our ability to 
calibrate the model to the system of interest and whether the scenarios tested represent 
actual experience. In any case, the simulation will almost certainly help the organization 
develop better long-range plans and improve cost and schedule risk mitigation.  
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Abstract 
Existing research on defense products contracting shows a marked focus on large and high-
profile programs that qualify as Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). In an effort to 
fill a gap in the literature of product contracting, CSIS has launched this study—an analysis of 
trends in DoD products contracting covering all contracting types, key components accounts, 
and categories of products. 
Looking at the period from 1990–2014, this report presents initial results and focuses on 
three notable questions: How have rates of effective competition differed between different 
categories of products throughout the period? How have the industrial bases for different 
categories of products changed since 1990? And how did sequestration and its aftermath 
affect DoD products contracting? Additionally, this report identifies notable data quality issues 
with both the Federal Procurement Data System and DD350 data to aid future research.  
The main findings of this initial inquiry are threefold: first, that “Last Supper” industry 
consolidation has affected the vendor size mix and levels of competition in the defense 
products industrial base to this day; second, that sequestration has had profound effects on 
what products the DoD buys; and third, that contracting trends vary significantly for the 
various DoD components and categories of products. 
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Introduction1 
For almost a decade, the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has analyzed and reported on trends in federal 
contracting in general, and Department of Defense (DoD) contracting specifically. While 
initially focused on services contracting as well as the overall trends of DoD contracting, 
CSIS has in recent years sought to drill down deeper into this data with regard to the DoD’s 
key components, and for the different varieties of goods and services that the DoD contracts 
for. Past CSIS work for the Naval Postgraduate School has focused on trends in DoD 
services contracting; in this report, the study team shifts its focus to DoD products 
contracting. 
The existing literature on defense products contracting tends to focus on large, high-
profile and high-cost programs that qualify as Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs). This focus, however, does not capture the full range of products that the DoD 
contracts for. In an effort to fill a gap in the literature, CSIS has undertaken a comprehensive 
analysis of trends in DoD products contracting for the DoD and its key components: the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and “Other DoD,” which comprises 
all remaining contracting entities not captured by the first four categories.  
In order to facilitate analysis of the differences in contracting trends between different 
types of products, CSIS has created a taxonomy of the universe of DoD products2, using 
U.S. government Product and Service Codes (PSCs) to separate DoD products into 10 
product categories: Aircraft, Clothing & Subsistence, Electronics & Communications, 
Engines & Power Plants, Fuels, Ground Vehicles, Launchers & Munitions, Missiles & Space, 
Ships, and “Other.”3  
This report presents interim findings from this analysis. Though the overall research 
effort will delve deeply into the product categories that are not typically associated with 
MDAPs, this initial paper will focus primarily (but not exclusively) on the more prominent 
product categories, as the study team attempts to validate the overall research methodology 
and better understand the particular issues involved with the less prominent categories of 
defense products.  
This paper focuses on three areas related to both historical and recent trends in 
defense products: 
1 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) does not take specific policy positions; 
accordingly, all views expressed in this presentation should be understood to be solely those of the 
author(s). 
2 Though the CSIS DoD products taxonomy does not necessarily align with the taxonomy developed 
within the DoD, CSIS does have the capability to cross-walk between the two. 
3 The five product categories that are not mostly comprised of platforms and programs related to 
MDAPs (Clothing & Subsistence, Electronics & Communications, Fuels, Launchers & Munitions, and 
“Other”) accounted for 42% of DoD products contracts in 2014, though those categories do include 
some MDAPs. Using the FPDS system equipment code field, over 60% of contract obligations are not 
associated with an MDAP in 2014, but that field is not filled in consistently. Though neither of these 
methods can provide a precise figure for the share of products contract obligations associated with 
MDAPs, it is safe to say that a significant share of defense products contract obligations, perhaps as 
much as half, are not associated with MDAPs. 
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• Historical trends in competition for DoD products 
• Changes in the industrial base for DoD products  
• The impact of sequestration and its aftermath on DoD products contracting 
overall, by component, and by product category 
Methodology 
To provide greater historical context to recent trends, CSIS has integrated fiscal year 
(FY)1990–1999 contracting data into its analysis for this study. All data from FY2000–2014 
is drawn from the publicly-available Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) through the 
USASpending.gov portal. Due to a lack of pre-2000 data available through 
USASpending.gov and how unwieldy it is to get the full range of relevant study variables for 
the entire department using the FPDS.gov web tool, CSIS is using archival DD350 data for 
the 1990–1999 period.4 The adoption of archival DD350 data for the period 1990–1999 
poses challenges of which we are aware and have worked diligently to mitigate and 
standardize. 
This report relies on the methodology that the study team has established and 
refined for analysis of federal contracting data over the course of the last decade.5 For this 
study in particular, there are a few key differences and updates: 
• All dollar figures are in constant 2014 dollars, using the latest OMB deflators. 
• In FY2013, the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) stopped reporting most 
of its contract obligations (approximately $5 billion) into FPDS. Because this 
creates a significant data discrepancy that distorts trend analysis, CSIS has 
excluded DeCA from the data set throughout the period.  
• For analysis of the industrial base, the composition of the “Big 6” defense 
vendors has changed—BAE Systems, which has declined as a DoD vendor 
in recent years, has been replaced by United Technologies for all years in the 
data set. 
Notable Limitations and Gaps in Pre-2000 Contract Data 
Use of archival DD350 data for the 1990–1999 period carries some cost in data 
quality, as there are notable differences in coding schema and granularity between the 
DD350s and the modern FPDS architecture. The following are the most notable issues: 
• DD350 data for FY1990–FY1999 reflect pre-FY2004 reporting thresholds, 
which did not require the DoD to report more than summary information on 
contracts below $25,000. 
• FY1990 has a significant percentage of data left blank or otherwise 
unclassifiable, mostly in the fields used for competition, pricing mechanism, 
and vehicle. 
4 Past CSIS work has at times included 1990–1999 data extracted from the FPDS.gov web tool, but 
that approach did not allow for examining vendor size or examining more than one variable at a time. 
5 See http://csis.org/program/methodology for the complete methodology. 
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• FY1994 data had a serious data issue wherein nearly all Army contracts were 
improperly classified under other components. CSIS has been able to 
partially correct this issue, and is continuing to seek a full solution, but Army 
contract obligations for 1994 remain understated. 
• The DD350 does not include the “Statutory Exemption to Fair Opportunity” 
field, which CSIS uses for greater precision on levels of competition for 
Indefinite Delivery Vehicle (IDV) contracts. 
• Prior to FY1997, DD350 data did not reliably differentiate between numbers 
of offers greater than two (such that most contracts receiving two or more 
offers had “2” listed under number of offers). As such, pre-1997 competition 
data has reduced granularity in terms of number of offers. 
Attempts to use data from FPDS.gov to address these issues have been hampered 
by a more serious data gap: For 1990–1994, the total DoD contract obligations in FPDS are 
approximately $20 billion per year lower than in the data contained in the DD350s, 
representing about a sixth of total DoD contract obligations for those years. Upon further 
investigation, the study team found that a number of large contracts in the DD350 data set 
are either completely missing from FPDS or have vastly lower obligation levels associated 
with them. CSIS is currently engaged with policy makers inside the DoD to raise awareness 
of this issue, identify the source of the data gap, and work toward a solution. 
Though these are serious data quality issues, the CSIS nonetheless believes the 
overall quality and reliability of the data set is more than sufficient to perform meaningful 
trend analysis. 
Historical Trends  
Competition for Defense Products 
In a recent short paper, the study team noted that competition rates for products, 
services, and R&D for the DoD overall were remarkably consistent from 2008–2014 (Ellman, 
2014). During that period, around one-third of contract obligations were awarded after 
effective competition.6 With the integration of pre-2000 data into the CSIS federal 
contracting database, the study team can now extend this analysis back to 1991.7 This 
historical data gives us new insight into the Post–Cold War drawdown, a period that gives 
important context to the present drawdown. This comparison is particularly valuable 
because it can help illuminate the effects of sequestration, which was not a factor in the 
1990s. 
From 1991 to 1998, the rate of effective competition for DoD products contracts 
fluctuated between 38% and 42% in all but one year (36% in 1995). The data shows a slow 
but steady decline in effective competition rates after 1996, which coincides with the Last 
Supper industry consolidation that removed a number of major competitors from the defense 
market via mergers and acquisitions.  
6 CSIS defines effective competition as a competitively solicited award that received two or more 
offers, which is similar to the DoD’s definition of effective competition. 
7 Data from 1990 are excluded here because nearly 36% of obligations in that year are “unlabeled” for 
competition. 
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The rate of effective competition fell from 40% in 1996 to 33% in 2004, before 
surging to 40% in 2005. From 2007 on, effective competition rates hovered between 33% 
and 37%. 
The rate of effective competition for overall DoD products does not tell the whole 
story because there are significant differences between the different product categories. 
Figure 1 puts these differences into context by comparing 2014 competition rates for each 
product category to their overall average competition rate from 1991–2014. 
 
Note. Data in this figure comes from the FPDS, CSIS analysis. 
 Figure 1. 1991–2014 Effective Competition Rates vs. 2014 Effective Competition 
Rates for Defense Products by Product Category 
For overall DoD products, the 2014 effective competition rate is right in line with the 
rate of effective competition for the entire period, reinforcing the point that the rate of 
competition for products has been overall quite stable over time. For Aircraft, Missiles & 
Space (M&S), Ground Vehicles, Electronics & Communications (E&C), and Fuels, the 2014 
rates of competition are within a few percentage points of their historical averages. Rates of 
effective competition in 2014 for Engines & Power Plants (E&PP), Launchers & Munitions 
(L&M), Clothing & Subsistence (C&S), and “Other” are notably above their historical 
averages, while the effective competition rate for Ships is well below the historical average. 
However, historical averages can only provide so much visibility into trends, and 
effective competition rates within product categories have been quite volatile from year to 
year; given the relatively “small” size of the various products categories, it is unsurprising 
that one or two big contracts (or a group of smaller ones) can cause big shifts in effective 
competition rates. Still, looking at effective competition rates over the period in question can 
provide greater insight into long-term trends. 
Platforms and Complex Systems: Aircraft, Ground Vehicles, Ships, and Missiles & Space 
For this analysis, the study team has focused on trends in the rates of effective 
competition for the four platform-focused product categories: Aircraft, Ground Vehicles, 
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Ships, and Missiles & Space. Figure 2 shows effective competition rates for those four 
product categories between 1991 and 2014.8  
 
Note. Data in this figure comes from the FPDS, CSIS analysis. 
 Figure 2. Rate of Effective Competition for Aircraft, Ground Vehicles, Ships, and 
Missiles & Space, 1991–2014 
Aircraft 
The effective competition rate for Aircraft has consistently been among the lowest, if 
not the lowest, among the product categories, owing both to the length and complexity of the 
programs and the limited number of vendors able to effectively compete at the development 
stage. Interestingly, even after the Last Supper–inspired flurry of mergers and acquisitions in 
the mid-1990s radically changed the landscape of the Aircraft industrial base, the rate of 
effective competition was largely stable in the low-to-mid 20s until 2003, when the rate fell to 
14%. One possible explanation for the delayed effect is the amount of time it takes for new 
major Aircraft programs to start up: Large programs like the F-22 and F-35 were just starting 
to ramp up in the early 2000s. After 2003, the rate of effective competition for Aircraft has 
never exceeded 13%, hovering between 10 and 12% in most years, about one-third the rate 
for overall DoD products.  
Missiles & Space 
Similar to Aircraft, the consistently low rates of effective competition for M&S are 
reflective of highly complex programs with a limited industrial base. The rate of effective 
competition for M&S peaked at 36% in 1992, but dropped off steadily (with a couple of 
plateaus) afterwards, to a low of 11% in 2000. The rate spiked up briefly to between 19% 
8 Data for 1990 is excluded due to data quality issues. See the Methodology section for further 
discussion. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 55 - 
                                            
 
 
and 22% from 2002–2005, primarily due to increased Air Force contract obligations for 
“space vehicles,” but has dropped off since, and did not exceed 12% in any year from 2007–
2013. In 2014, the rate of effective competition doubled, from 7% in 2013 (the lowest rate in 
the period) to 14%. 
Ground Vehicles 
The available industrial base able to compete for most ground vehicle programs is 
significantly broader than that for the two previous categories, so it is not surprising that the 
rate of effective competition for ground vehicles has usually been somewhat higher. That 
rate was extremely volatile in the 1990s, rising as high as 44% in 1995, and then falling back 
to 17% in 1999 and 2000. That volatility continued into the early 2000s, with effective 
competition rates rising to 41% in 2001, and then fluctuating between the mid-to-high 30s 
and the high teens over the next four years. Between 2006 and 2012, however, effective 
competition rates have hovered in the low-to-mid 30% range, in part as a result of the highly 
competitive MRAP contracts in the mid-to-late 2000s. The effective competition rate for 
Ground Vehicles fell from 34% in 2012 to 25% in 2013, but rose back to 29% in 2014. 
Ships 
Considering the size and complexity of the platforms involved, the high rates of 
effective competition for Ships in the 1990s—as high as 91% in 1992, and over 60% in all 
but one year between 1991 and 2000—is somewhat surprising. The private shipyard 
consolidation in the late 1990s and early 2000s had a major impact on that rate, as the rate 
of effective competition never exceeded 50% after 2002, only exceeded 30% in one year 
after 2005, and remained below 20% from 2006 through 2009. Since 2009, however, the 
rate of effective competition has increased, remaining above 25% in every year and rising to 
32% in 2013. This is likely the result of deliberate decisions to split the procurement of 
certain high-cost platforms, such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Aegis-class 
destroyers, between two competing shipyards. 
Changes in the Defense Products Industrial Base, 1990–2014 
In addition to tracking trends on the customer side of defense contracts, CSIS also 
tracks trends on the vendor side of the equation. In particular, the study team has built up 
the capability to track contract obligations by size of vendor. In order to facilitate this 
analysis, vendors are divided into four size categories: Small, Medium, Large, and the Big 6. 
Any organization designated as small by the FPDS database—according to the criteria 
established by the federal government—was categorized as such unless the vendor was a 
known subsidiary of a larger entity. Vendors with annual revenue of more than $3 billion, 
including from nonfederal sources, are classified as large. The Big 6, broken out from 
“large,” consists of the six largest defense firms in recent years (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and United Technologies 
Corporation9).10 And any contractor that qualifies as neither small nor large is classified as 
“medium.” 
9 United Technologies replaces BAE in the Big 6 in this report and going forward because BAE has 
fallen off in recent years as DoD purchases of ground vehicles have slowed. 
10 While Northrop Grumman, United Technologies, Raytheon, and General Dynamics were all 
consistently among the top defense products vendors before the Last Supper industry consolidation, 
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The shares of DoD products contract obligations awarded to each size category 
(plus the share marked as “Unlabeled” due to data quality issues) are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Note. Data in this figure comes from the FPDS, CSIS analysis. 
 Figure 3. Share of Defense Products Contract Obligations by Size of Vendor 
The share of overall defense products contract obligations awarded to small vendors 
has been extremely stable throughout the period observed. Small vendors accounted for 
between 10% and 11% of products contract obligations in every year from 1991–2001, rose 
steadily to 15% by 2005, and gradually fell back to 11% from 2011–2013. The 14% share 
awarded to small vendors in 2014 is the highest since 2005. 
The share of products contract obligations awarded to medium vendors hovered in 
the mid-to-high 20s in the early 1990s, peaking at 30% in 1995. That rate sharply declined in 
1996, to 23%, and declined steadily for the rest of the decade; this is likely the result of the 
mergers and acquisitions coming out of the Last Supper. The share awarded to medium 
vendors never exceeded 19% after 2001, and has hovered in the mid-teens for most of the 
2000s and 2010s, falling to an all-time low of 14% in 2014. 
Boeing was not consistently in the top echelon of vendors until the merger with McDonnell Douglas 
(which had consistently been a top products vendor), and “Lockheed Martin” did not exist until the 
merger of Lockheed and Martin Marietta. For this analysis, both Lockheed and Martin Marietta are 
classified as “Large” in the years before they merged, rather than as Big 6, and Boeing is considered 
part of the Big 6 despite being a smaller player in the defense market than McDonnell Douglas before 
the merger. CSIS will consult with experts in the coming months to get a better understanding of the 
pre-Last Supper defense industrial base in order to determine if there is a better way to track contract 
obligations going to the largest defense firms in those years. 
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The shares of products contract obligations awarded to large and Big 6 vendors 
showed the biggest changes from the Last Supper industry consolidation of the mid-to-late 
1990s. The share awarded to the Big 6 vendors nearly tripled between 1993 and 1999, 
rising from 15% to 44%; the merged Lockheed Martin accounted for 11% of the overall 1999 
DoD products market. Meanwhile, the share awarded to large vendors fell by more than half 
over the same period, from 44% in 1993 to 21% in 1999. The difference in the magnitude of 
the changes is explained by the fact that some medium vendors were also involved in the 
flurry of mergers and acquisitions, shifting some products obligations to the Big 6.  
In the 2000s, that trend began to reverse somewhat, with obligations to large 
vendors rising from 22% in 2001 to 35% in 2008, while the Big 6 share of DoD products 
contract obligations fell from 44% to 35% over that same period. Since 2008, the trend has 
shifted again, with the share going to the Big 6 rising steadily (to 43% in 2014), while the 
share going to large vendors declined to 30% by 2014. This change happened despite the 
countervailing trend of divestments, including Northrop Grumman’s divestment of its 
shipbuilding business into Huntington Ingalls Industries. 
As with the other areas of analysis in this report, looking at overall trends for vendor 
size does not tell the whole story—the industrial bases serving the different product 
categories are vastly different. The following sections will look at select product categories 
that have seen interesting trends within their respective industrial bases. 
Aircraft 
The effect of the Last Supper industry consolidation was particularly pronounced for 
Aircraft. In 1995, 68% of contract obligations for Aircraft went to large vendors, while only 
21% went to the Big 6. By 1999, large vendors accounted for only 11% of Aircraft contract 
obligations, while the Big 6 accounted for 79%. Since 1999, over 70% of Aircraft contract 
obligations have been awarded to the Big 6 in all but two years (66% in 2010, and 69% in 
2011). 
Clothing & Subsistence 
There has been a notable shift in the industrial base for C&S over the 1990–2014 
period. In the early-to-mid 1990s, small and medium vendors dominated the C&S market, 
with small vendors capturing over 40% of C&S contract obligations in most years, and 
medium vendors accounting for as much as 56%. After 1995, however, large vendors 
captured increasing shares of C&S contract obligations, rising from 4% in 1995 to 33% in 
2002, with the majority of the increase drawn away from medium vendors, which fell to 35% 
by 2002.  
In the years since, the share of C&S obligations awarded to large vendors continued 
to rise to 50% in 2009, drawing mostly from small vendors, which declined as a share of 
C&S obligations from 32% in 2002 to 20% in 2009, and have never exceeded 20% since.  
Electronics & Communications 
The Last Supper industry consolidation had a profound effect on the E&C industrial 
base, with the share of contract obligations going to the Big 6 rising from 11% in 1993 to 
36% in 1999, drawing roughly equally from medium and large vendors, though large 
vendors recovered some of their share of the E&C market from the Big 6 in the early-to-mid 
2000s. The most interesting trend in recent years has been the consistent growth in E&C 
contract obligations to small vendors: From 17% in 1999, the share awarded to small 
vendors has grown steadily through the intervening years, to a high of 29% in 2014, the 
highest share of any size category and over double the rate for overall defense products. 
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This growth has apparently come at the expense of the Big 6, which saw its share of E&C 
contract obligations decline from 36% in 1999 to 24% in 2014.  
Launchers & Munitions 
As with E&C, the industry consolidation in the wake of the Last Supper led to 
significant changes in the L&M industrial base. Between 1996 and 1997, L&M contract 
obligations to the Big 6 rose from 13% in 1996 to 45% in 2007, drawing roughly equally from 
medium and large vendors. In the mid-2000s, there was a notable surge in contract 
obligations to small vendors, whose share of L&M contract obligations rose from 9% in 2002 
to 20% in 2007. That increase was short lived, however, and the share awarded to small 
businesses has declined steadily since, back to 9% in 2013 and 2014. 
Missiles and Space 
As with several other categories, M&S saw a post–Last Supper shift in contract 
obligations from medium and large vendors to the Big 6. Available data suggests that 
throughout the 1990–2014 period, the share of M&S contract obligations awarded to small 
vendors never exceeded 3%, by far the lowest share for small vendors of any product 
category. Similarly, while medium vendors accounted for shares in the mid-teens to low 20% 
range from 1990–1995, medium vendors have not been a significant factor in M&S 
contracting since 1999. Between 2000 and 2014, the share of M&S contract obligations 
awarded to medium vendors has only exceeded 4% in two years (6% in 2002, and 5% in 
2014). 
The Impact of Sequestration on Defense Product Contracts 
This section will examine the impact of sequestration, and its aftermath, on DoD 
contract obligations for products overall, and for those DoD components and product 
categories that showed notable trends. In order to examine the sources of changes in 
obligations levels, the study team has done further analysis to examine the specific PSCs 
and system equipment codes (which identify the program a contract is associated with) 
which show notable changes in obligations levels from year to year.  
Trends in Overall Defense Contract Obligations Under Sequestration 
Even in the context of a sharp downturn in defense contract obligations since 2008, 
the decline in the last two years, as the DoD has had to live under sequestration and its 
aftermath, has been significant. Overall defense contract obligations have declined by 31% 
since 2008, from $409 billion to $283 billion, but nearly two-thirds of that decline (65%) took 
place in 2013 and 2014. Overall defense contract obligations declined by 15% in 2013, and 
fell a further 9% in 2014. The latter decline was particularly notable because of the 
perception that the decline in 2013 was heavily driven by work being delayed and pushed 
back into FY2014 in the midst of the uncertainty surrounding sequestration. This perception 
led many to believe that 2014 would see, if not an increase, then a stabilizing of overall 
defense contract obligations; instead, 2014 saw another sharp decline. 
In the FY2013 edition of CSIS’ series of reports on DoD contract trends (Berteau et 
al., 2014), the study team noted that the dramatic decline of overall DoD contract obligations 
in 2013 was not evenly distributed among the major DoD components: The Army (-21%), Air 
Force (-22%), and DLA (-23%) all declined more rapidly than did overall DoD contracts, 
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while the Navy (-2%) and “Other DoD11” (-8%) were relatively spared. Similarly, in 2014, the 
Army (-14%) declined notably more steeply than did the overall DoD, while “Other DoD” (-
5%) declined more slowly than overall, Air Force contract obligations remained steady (0%), 
and the Navy (-11%) and DLA (-7%) declined at rates comparable to overall DoD. 
In 2013, as overall defense contract obligations declined by 15%, defense products 
contract obligations declined roughly in parallel (-14%). In 2014, as overall defense contract 
obligations declined by 9%, defense products contract obligations again declined by 14%. 
Since their peak in 2008, defense products contract obligations have declined by 37%—the 
declines in 2013 and 2014 have accounted for 60% of that total decline. 
Defense Products Contract Obligations Within Major DoD Components (After 
Sequestration) 
 
Note. Data in this figure comes from the FPDS, CSIS analysis. 
 Figure 4. Defense Products Contract Obligations by Component, 2008–2014 
As with overall DoD contracts, the declines in defense products contract obligations 
were not evenly distributed among the major DoD components, as seen in Figure 4. 
Army 
Army products contract obligations, which peaked in 2008, have declined by two-
thirds since then.  
11 The decline in “Other DoD” cited here is notably lower than was discussed in the aforementioned 
CSIS report due to the study team’s removal of DeCA data from the sample. This change was made 
in response to DeCA stopping reporting of most of its contract data into FPDS in 2013. See the 
Methodology and Data Issues section for further discussion. 
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In 2013, Army products contract obligations declined by 27%, twice the rate of 
overall DoD products. There were numerous drivers of this sharp decline, including a nearly 
$800 million decline in contract obligations related to the CH-47D helicopter, an over $1 
billion decline related to the Tactical UAV program, a $1.7 billion decline in obligations for 
“rotary wing aircraft,” a $1.3 billion decline in contract obligations for “combat assault and 
tactical vehicles,” and a $500 million decline in contract obligations for “land mines.” At the 
same time, the Army did see significant increases in contract obligations for certain 
programs and types of products, including a $900 million increase in contract obligations 
related to the CH-47F helicopter,12 a $1.3 billion increase for the Longbow Apache Block III, 
largely for “airframe structural components,” and a nearly $600 million increase in contract 
obligations for “wheeled trucks and truck tractors.” 
In 2014, Army products contract obligations declined by a further 15%, but this 
decline was roughly in line with the decline in overall DoD products. Significant declines 
were seen in all three cases noted above that saw significant increases in 2013: the CH-47F 
helicopter (-$700 million), Longbow Apache Block III (-$1.5 billion, to less than $20 million), 
and “wheeled trucks and truck tractors” (-$700 million). These declines were 
counterbalanced by significant increases in some programs and product types, including 
$700 million for the AH-64A Apache and $1.1 billion for the Scout helicopter program (from 
$42 million in 2013). 
This analysis shows the significant degree of volatility in contracts for Army rotary 
aircraft programs, with obligations spiking and dropping off dramatically over the course of 
just two years.  
Navy 
Navy products contract obligations have been relatively preserved in the current 
budgetary downturn—as overall DoD products contract obligations declined by 37% 
between 2008 and 2014, Navy products only declined by 17%.  
In 2013, as overall products contract obligations declined by 14%, Navy products 
contract obligations actually increased by 9%. The main driver of this increase was a nearly 
$8 billion increase related to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but there were numerous other 
significant increases, including $2 billion related to the Patriot missile program, nearly $1 
billion for both nuclear reactors and unspecified “combat ships and landing vessels,”13 an 
$800 million increase related to the CVN-68 aircraft carrier,14 $700 million related to the 
DDG-51 destroyer program, and $800 million for the H-1 helicopter upgrade program. Navy 
products also saw programs and types of products with significant declines in 2013, 
12 The concurrent decline in obligations coded as related to the CH-47D and increase in obligations 
coded as related to the CH-47F may reflect a coding change, rather than a real change in contracting 
activity. The study team suspects that some CH-47F contract obligations were improperly coded as 
related to the CH-47D prior to 2013. 
13 This report uses “unspecified” to refer to contracts that are not associated with a system equipment 
code in cases where the study team believes that a significant share of the obligations are related to 
an MDAP. 
14 The study team believes these obligations labeled as related to the older Nimitz-class aircraft 
carriers, which are coded under the PSC for “Combat Ships & Landing Vessels,” may be mislabeled 
obligations tied to the newer Ford-class aircraft carrier program. 
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including a $3 billion decline related to the P-8 Poseidon aircraft/MMA, a decline of $2 billion 
related to the America-class amphibious assault ship, $1 billion for unspecified “combat 
assault and tactical vehicles,” and over $600 million for “miscellaneous vessels.” 
In 2014, Navy products contract obligations saw a marked drop after the notable 
increase in 2013, declining by 17%, slightly more steeply than overall DoD products. Again, 
the main driver of the year-to-year change was in the F-35 program, which declined by over 
$8 billion to below the 2012 obligations level. Other programs and product types also saw 
significant drops in contract obligations, including a $700 million decline in the E-2C/E-2D 
Advanced Hawkeye program, a $500 million decline for the H-1 helicopter upgrade program, 
and a $1.4 billion decline in the LPD-17 amphibious transport dock program. Even with the 
steep decline, some Navy programs saw significant increases, including a $600 million 
increase related to the Ford-class aircraft carrier program and a $3 billion increase in the 
SSN-774 Virginia-class submarine program. 
Overall, while there has been significant fluctuation in the contract obligations going 
to individual programs and product types, Navy obligations for products have been relatively 
steady once the volatility in the F-35 program is accounted for. For the most part, the Navy 
has been able to preserve funding for its key platforms despite the budgetary constraints 
imposed by sequestration in 2013 and its aftermath in 2014. 
Air Force 
Air Force products contract obligations declined somewhat more slowly than did 
overall DoD products during the current budget downturn—27% for the Air Force between 
2008 and 2014, versus 37% for overall DoD products.  
Air Force contract obligations were higher in 2012 than they had been since 2007, 
but declined by 28% between 2012 and 2013, double the rate of overall DoD products. The 
main driver of the decline was a $3.4 billion drop in obligations related to the C-17A 
transport aircraft program,15 as well as a $3 billion decline in obligations for unspecified 
“aircraft, fixed wing.”16 The most significant increase in Air Force contract obligations in 2013 
was a $900 million increase in contract obligations related to the Shillelagh anti-tank missile, 
a 1970s Army program. CSIS believes this anomaly is due to the Air Force re-using system 
equipment codes, which are used in FPDS to tie contract obligations to a particular program. 
The money associated with the Shillelagh missile in FPDS is otherwise classified as 
“aircraft, fixed wing,” and CSIS is seeking an updated system-equipment codebook. 
In 2014, Air Force products contract obligations declined by only 9%, versus 14% for 
overall DoD products. Three programs saw particularly significant increases in contract 
obligations in 2014: obligations related to the C130-J transport aircraft increased by $900 
million, the JASSM cruise missile program saw a $450 million increase, and the NAVSTAR 
GPS satellite program saw a $350 million increase. Three Air Force programs or product 
15 There was also a nearly $2.3 billion decline in Air Force products contract obligations related to the 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, but that decline was due to a coding change, 
with space launches related to the program being reclassified as a service, rather than a product. 
16 Due to poor data labeling, FPDS shows almost no Air Force contract obligations associated with 
the F-35 program. The study team believes that the majority of unspecified “aircraft, fixed wing” 
obligations are related to the F-35 program. 
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types saw declines of approximately $400 million each: the AMRAAM missile program, 
“miscellaneous aircraft accessories and components,” and “electronic countermeasure and 
quick reaction equipment.” Notably, contract obligations for “airframe structural components” 
related to the A-10 Warthog close-air support aircraft fell by over $200 million to just $13 
million in 2014, though this may be due to the timing of contracts, since a similar obligations 
level was seen in 2012 (after obligations levels near $200 million in 2010 and 2011). 
Overall, the study team is wary of reading too much into the trends beneath the 
surface of Air Force products contract obligations in recent years, due to the significant data 
labeling issues. CSIS urges Air Force policy makers to promote greater clarity in the use of 
system equipment codes among those responsible for entering data into FPDS. 
Defense Products Contract Obligations by Type of Product17  
As described in the methodology, CSIS has sorted the range of products for which 
DoD contracts into 10 categories in order to facilitate analysis of how contracting trends 
differ across differing types of products. Figure 5 shows how these 10 categories of DoD 
products have fared during the current budgetary downturn and in the wake of 
sequestration. 
 
Note. Data in this figure comes from the FPDS, CSIS analysis. 
 Figure 5. Defense Products Contract Obligations by Product Category, 2008–2014 
17 In order to avoid repetition, the specific dollar changes to programs/specific product types 
mentioned in the “By Component” section above will not be repeated in this section, except where 
changes in cross-component totals differ significantly from the changes discussed above. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 63 - 
                                            
 
 
The following sections will look more deeply into trends for six of these product 
categories to determine the specific programs and product types that experienced significant 
changes in obligations levels under sequestration and its aftermath.  
Aircraft18 
As overall DoD contract obligations declined by 37% since 2008, contract obligations 
for Aircraft have fallen at half that rate (-18%). 
In 2013, despite the steep drop in overall DoD products under sequestration, 
contract obligations for Aircraft fell by only 2%, one-seventh the rate of overall DoD. As 
discussed in the component-specific discussions above, 2013 saw a near-tripling of 
obligations related to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, along with major increases related to the 
CH-47F helicopter, E-2C/E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, H-1 helicopter upgrade program, and 
Longbow Apache Block III. There were also sharp declines in obligations related to the C-
17A transport aircraft, P-8 Poseidon aircraft/MMA, and Tactical UAV. Additionally, there was 
an approximately $800 million decline in obligations relating to the V-22 Osprey across the 
services, a $2.9 billion decline in unspecified “aircraft, fixed wing” (primarily in the Air Force, 
and believed to be mostly unspecified F-35 contracts), and a $1.7 billion decline in 
unspecified “aircraft, rotary wing” (primarily in the Army). 
In 2014, Aircraft contract obligations (-29%) declined at over twice the rate of overall 
DoD products, the largest decline of any product category in 2014. This decline was largely 
driven by the huge drop in F-35 contracts discussed in the Navy section above, which 
appears to be primarily an issue of contract timing. There were also significant declines in 
that same pool of Air Force unspecified “aircraft, fixed wing” contracts, as well as with 
contracts related to the CH-47F helicopter, E-2C/E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, H-1 helicopter 
upgrade, and Longbow Apache Block III, all of which saw significant increases in 2013. 
There were, however, some programs that saw significant increases in obligations in 2014, 
including the AH-64A Apache helicopter, C130-J transport aircraft, and the Army’s Scout 
helicopter. 
Overall, the spike in Navy contracts for F-35s in 2013 obscured significant declines in 
numerous other Aircraft programs, and many of the other programs that saw significant 
increases in contract obligations in 2013 declined heavily in 2014. Data labeling is a 
significant issue in this category, as over $5.6 billion in contract obligations for rotary and 
fixed-wing in 2014 aircraft (representing one-seventh of total Aircraft contract obligations) 
are not properly classified under their parent programs.  
Electronics & Communications 
Contract obligations for Electronics & Communications (E&C) declined at the same 
rate (-37%) as overall DoD products between 2008 and 2014.  
In 2013, E&C contract obligations (-15%) declined roughly in parallel with overall 
DoD products. The largest decline was in the unhelpfully vague category of “miscellaneous 
communications equipment,” which fell by $700 million. There were also declines of 
between $200 and $300 million in obligations in a variety of product types. 
18 This category includes the only PSC for unmanned systems, called “Drones.” PSCs do not provide 
any further visibility into what type of unmanned system a particular contract is for; CSIS urges policy 
makers to break out the catch-all “Drones” code to provide more data granularity. 
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In 2014, E&C contract obligations fell by only 4%, less than a third of the rate of 
overall DoD products. No category within E&C saw a change of more than $250 million. 
No particular product type (other than the catch-all “miscellaneous” category) saw a 
particularly noteworthy change in either year since 2012, though obligations for “electronic 
countermeasure & quick reaction equipment” have declined by nearly $700 million since 
2012, and obligations for “night vision equipment have declined by nearly $400 million in the 
same period. It is notable that Army contract obligations for E&C have fallen significantly 
more steeply (-28% in 2013, and -11% in 2014) than for the rest of the DoD. On the whole, 
however, E&C contracts have weathered sequestration and its aftermath relatively well. 
Engines & Power Plants 
Between 2008 and 2014, contract obligations for Engines & Power Plants (E&PP; -
11%) declined at less than a third of the rate of overall DoD products.  
In 2013, as overall DoD products contract obligations declined sharply, obligations 
for E&PP actually increased by 4%, making E&PP the only category to see an increase 
under sequestration. Though there was a $500 million decline in contract obligations for 
unspecified “gas turbines & jet engines – aircraft,” that was offset by a $1.1 billion increase 
in contract obligations for “nuclear reactors.” 
Obligations for E&PP continued to be relatively preserved in 2014, declining by only 
3%, less than a quarter of the rate of overall DoD products. There was a nearly $500 million 
increase in E&PP contract obligations related to the F-35 program, which is somewhat 
interesting because of how it lagged the spike in obligations for the actual planes in 2013. 
The study team believes that E&PP obligations related to the F-35 have only in 2014 started 
to be properly labeled as such, as F-35 obligations never exceeded $100 million prior to 
2014. 
Overall, E&PP contract obligations have been remarkably stable during 
sequestration and its aftermath, which is likely a function of how major E&PP contracts are 
tied to large, prominent platforms that previous CSIS analysis found were largely protected 
under sequestration (Berteau et al., 2014). 
Ground Vehicles 
Between 2008 and 2014, contract obligations for Ground Vehicles declined by a 
remarkable 87%. Even accounting for the fact that 2008 represented a nearly 50% spike in 
obligations (related to MRAP purchases) compared to 2007 and 2009, obligations have 
dropped by around 80% from 2007 and 2009 levels.  
In 2013, contract obligations for ground vehicles declined by 41%, the largest fall for 
any product category under sequestration. The major drivers of this decline were a $1.8 
billion decline in unspecified obligations for “combat assault & tactical vehicles” (primarily 
within the Marines), a $500 million decline in obligations for unspecified “combat assault & 
tactical vehicles – wheeled” (primarily within the Army), and a $400 million decline in 
obligations related to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.  
In 2014, by contrast, Ground Vehicles contract obligations (-16%) only declined 
slightly faster than did overall DoD products. The Army saw further reductions in obligations 
for unspecified “combat assault and tactical vehicles – wheeled” (-$400 million), while 
obligations for “trucks and truck tractors – wheeled” fell by $700 million. Obligations for 
unspecified “combat assault & tactical vehicles” increased by nearly $500 million, but 
whereas the large decline for this product type in 2013 was for the Marines, the increase 
was primarily in the Army. 
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DoD contract obligations for Ground Vehicles have cratered since their peak in 2008, 
and are lower in 2014 than they have been since 1999, right as the Army was beginning its 
ill-fated Future Combat Systems program that was intended to provide replacements for its 
aging fleet of ground vehicles. The inability of the Army since then to get a new ground 
vehicle program into full production, as well as the end of major combat operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, are the main drivers of this precipitous decline.  
Missiles & Space 
Contract obligations for Missiles & Space (M&S) declined by 18% between 2008 and 
2014, less than half the rate of overall DoD products.  
In both 2013 and 2014, contract obligations for M&S declined by 15%, roughly in 
parallel with the decline in overall DoD products. The decline in 2013 was almost entirely the 
result of a data coding change: $2.3 billion in obligations for space launches under the EELV 
program were reclassified as services rather than products. By contrast, 2014 saw what 
appear to be real, significant changes: a $2 billion decline in obligations for MDA Support for 
“guided missiles,” a $400 million decline related to the AMRAAM missile program, and 
notable increases in obligations related to the JASSM cruise missile program and the 
NAVSTAR GPS satellite program. 
Ships 
During the 2008–2014 budget downturn, as overall DoD products contract 
obligations declined by 37%, obligations for Ships actually increased by 37%, making Ships 
the only category to see an increase over this period.  
In 2013, contract obligations for Ships declined by 10%, somewhat more slowly than 
for overall DoD products. As discussed in the Navy section earlier, there were notable 
increases in obligations related to the CVN-68 aircraft carrier, DDG-51 destroyer, and 
unspecified “combat ships and landing vessels,” along with significant declines in obligations 
related to the Ford-class aircraft carrier and the America-class amphibious assault ship. 
As overall DoD products contract obligations declined by 14% in 2014, contract 
obligations for Ships actually increased by 7%; Ships was the only product category to see 
an increase in obligations in the year after sequestration. Obligations related to the Ford-
class aircraft carrier and the SSN-74 Virginia-class submarine both nearly doubled in 2014. 
The relative preservation of contract obligations for Ships in 2013, and the growth in 
2014, is likely the result of a new policy development and a couple of existing factors. First, 
the “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific” has put a focus on the importance of sea platforms to 
future U.S. strategic interests and goals. Secondly, many of the major Ships programs are 
long-term production contracts, and a number are under multi-year procurement 
agreements; cutting or delaying funding for these programs would likely lead to greater 
costs over the long term.  
Final Thoughts  
This report presents only a fraction of the data compiled for this study; the final report 
coming out of this research effort will examine a broader set of contract characteristics, go 
into greater depth on some of the trends identified here, and focus more deeply on the non-
MDAP-centric product categories. This report represents what the study team believes to be 
among the most notable and immediately relevant findings. The following are the key 
takeaways from this analysis: 
• The overall rate of effective competition for products seems to have been 
largely unaffected both by the post–Cold War drawdown of the 1990s and the 
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current drawdown plus sequestration. There is a logic to the assumption that 
rates of competition would increase as the same pool of vendors fought for a 
declining pool of contract dollars, but that assumption has not been borne out 
in the data. By contrast, there have been notable declines in competition 
rates for MDAP-heavy product categories, such as Aircraft and Missiles & 
Space, particularly in the years after the Last Supper industry consolidation. 
• The current downturn has seen the relative preservation of contract 
obligations going to the Big 6 defense vendors, despite the divestment of 
Northrop Grumman’s large shipbuilding unit into Huntington Ingalls Industries. 
This is likely a reflection of the preservation of the largest, most high-profile 
programs as budgets declined; these programs are disproportionately 
contracted to the Big 6. 
• Sequestration has had an enormous impact on defense products contracting, 
even in the context of the overall decline since the peak in 2008. Overall 
defense products contract obligations have declined by 37% since 2008, but 
three-fifths of that decline occurred in just 2013 and 2014. 
• Cuts in obligations were not evenly distributed among the major DoD 
components and product categories in 2013 and 2014. Many of the 
components and product categories that saw the most significant declines in 
2013 were relatively preserved in 2014, and vice versa. This also applies to 
specific programs—many programs that saw major increases or cuts in 
obligations in 2013 saw significant reversals in 2014. 
Data quality, both in current data and the pre-2000 data, remains a significant barrier 
to some areas of analysis. The major outstanding data quality issues include the following: 
• The grouping of all unmanned systems contracts into a single PSC for 
“Drones” does not provide sufficient data granularity for an increasingly 
important segment of the DoD products portfolio.  
• Data labeling issues within the Air Force, which show almost no obligations 
associated with the F-35 and the reuse of old codes for new projects, as 
shown by nearly $1.5 billion associated with a 1970s Army anti-tank missile 
program, are reason for concern and skepticism about the reliability of the 
valuable system equipment code field.  
• The huge amount of contracts apparently either missing from or significantly 
undervalued in FPDS between 1990 and 1994 are a significant bar to any 
analysis trying to use FPDS data to examine the previous budget drawdown 
of the 1990s; this is a vexing issue that negatively impacts the researcher’s 
ability to distill out policy recommendations for policy makers.  
Going forward, the study team will continue to work to find solutions to existing data 
quality issues, and to highlight those issues to policy makers where solutions are not 
possible on our end. CSIS will also continue to dig deeper into the wide range of data 
available on contract and vendor characteristics in the DoD products contracting market to 
identify key trends and possible lessons learned. 
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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquires billions of dollars of supplies and services every 
year. In fiscal year (FY) 2013, the DoD obligated over $258 billion for military-unique weapon 
systems as well as commercial supplies and services. An integral part of the DoD’s contract 
management process is the source selection phase when offerors’ proposals are evaluated 
and the contract award decision is made. A critical aspect of the source selection phase is 
the evaluation of contractor past performance information as part of the overall proposal 
evaluation process. The DoD uses the Past Performance Information Retrieval System 
(PPIRS), which consists of contractor report cards extracted from the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). In this research, we examine the 
value of CPARS report card narratives for service contracts as they relate to their associated 
objective scores. Our primary focus in this research is to examine if the CPARS report card 
written narrative section provides value to the contractor performance evaluation process. 
Our data analysis includes sentiment and statistical analysis, as well as interviews with 
government agency contracting professionals. Using CPARS data, narrative analyses, and 
interviews, we answer the following research questions: (1) To what degree are government 
contracting professionals submitting to CPARS contractor performance narratives in 
accordance with the guidelines provided in the CPARS user’s manual? (2) What is the added 
value of the contractor performance narratives beyond the value of the objective scores for 
performance? (3) What is the statistical relationship between the sentiment contained in the 
narratives and the objective scores for contractor evaluations? The research revealed that 
there are a variety of opportunities to improve the contracting process specifically related to 
the narrative portion of past performance assessment reports. 
Introduction 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the poor management of 
service contracts has undermined the government’s ability to obtain a good value for the 
money spent and has contributed to the GAO’s decision to designate management of 
services contracts as a high-risk area for the Department of Defense (DoD; GAO, 2013b). In 
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fact, as stressed in a recent memorandum for acquisition professionals by the under 
secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics (US[AT&L]), improving the 
efficiency of acquisition of products and services is of utmost importance to the DoD (USD 
[AT&L], 2010. More specifically, in a later memorandum, the USD (AT&L) focused on 
“improving tradecraft in services acquisition” (USD [AT&L], 2010, p. 5) by strengthening and 
improving the services contracting process. An important part of the services acquisition 
process is the evaluation of contractor past performance information using the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS).  
The CPARS report is initiated by DoD contracting officers during the contract 
closeout phase of the contract management process for documenting contractor 
performance information on the completed contract. It is also used by DoD contracting 
officers during the source selection phase as part of the evaluation of contractor proposals. 
The CPARS report contains contractor performance information using objective scores in 
five categories: Quality, Schedule, Cost Control, Business Relations, and Management of 
Key Personnel. In addition to these five objective categories, the CPARS reports also 
provide a subjective narrative section where the contracting officer provides a descriptive 
narrative of the contractor’s performance. 
Although the use of contractor past performance information is an important aspect 
of the DoD contract management process, the GAO has identified many process 
deficiencies in the documentation and management of CPARS reports. GAO reports have 
shown that DoD agencies do not always complete the required contractor past performance 
reports (GAO, 2007, 2009b, 2013a, 2014). The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) required the DoD to “develop a strategy to ensure that evaluations in past 
performance databases used for making source selection decisions are complete, timely, 
and accurate” (GAO, 2014, p. 4). Additionally, the 2013 NDAA required a “government-wide 
strategy to ensure that timely, accurate, and complete information on contractor 
performance is included in past performance databases used by executive agencies for 
making source selection decisions” (GAO, 2014, p. 1).  
Subsequently, the DoD increased focus on training and education for contracting 
officers, which resulted in an increase in contractor performance assessments being 
completed and submitted. In 2013, the GAO noted significant gains in CPARS completion 
rates: 56% of required reports were completed in 2011 while 74% were completed in 2013. 
However, according to the same GAO report, over half of the CPARS reports were 
submitted late. More importantly, many CPARS reports contain narratives that are either 
insufficiently detailed or are in conflict with their associated objective scores. Late reports 
lacking sufficient accurate information provide less-than-optimal information to the 
contracting professionals that rely on these report cards for source selection and contract 
administration purposes (GAO, 2013a).  
The purpose of this research is to determine the value of the CPARS narratives in 
services acquisition by comparing the relationships between the subjective narratives and 
the associated objective scores. Our analysis allows us to suggest improvements to the 
CPARS management process, thus leading to greater and more effective utilization of the 
CPARS reports in services acquisition. 
Research Methodology 
This research examines the value of CPARS report card narratives for service 
contracts as they relate to their associated objective scores. Our primary focus in this 
research is to examine if the CPARS report card written narrative section provides value to 
the contractor performance evaluation process. Our data analysis includes sentiment and 
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statistical analysis, as well as interviews with government agency contracting professionals. 
Using CPARS data collected by graduate students, Wilhite, Stover, and Hart (2013), and 
narrative analyses and interviews conducted by graduate students Black, Henley, and Clute 
(2014), we answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the added value of the contractor performance narratives beyond the 
value of the objective scores for performance? 
2. What is the statistical relationship between the sentiment contained in the 
narratives and the objective scores for contractor evaluations? 
3. To what degree do the interview findings contradict, support, or enhance the 
findings for our research questions? 
Literature Review 
Federal procurement policy requires that agencies collect information regarding a 
contractor’s performance under previously awarded contracts for all contracts over $100,000 
and make that information available for use in future contract award decisions (Nash et al., 
2007). The collection of contractor performance information occurs during the contract 
closeout phase using the DoD CPARS (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
The CPARS assessment data reflects the contractor’s performance in specific areas 
including quality, schedule, cost control, business relations, management of key personnel, 
and utilization of small business. The “Quality” rating assesses the contractor’s qualitative 
performance and compares it to the requirements stated in the contract. The “Schedule” 
rating assesses the contractor’s ability to meet schedules outlined in the contract such as 
milestones, task orders, delivery schedules, and administrative requirements. The “Cost 
Control” rating assesses the contractor’s ability to forecast, manage, and control the costs 
associated with performing contracted services. The “Business Relations” rating assesses 
the contractor’s ability to coordinate its business activities such as cooperate behavior, 
customer satisfaction, management, and attitude towards customers. The “Management of 
Key Personnel” rating assesses the contractor’s ability to maintain qualified individuals in 
key positions as outlined in the contract. The “Utilization of Small Business” rating assesses 
the contractor’s ability to integrate small businesses in the execution of the contract (Wilhite 
et al., 2013). 
The CPARS assessment rates the contractor in these areas using the rating scales 
Exceptional, Very Good, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory. It should be noted that 
the contractor is allowed to review the CPARS assessment and provide comments back to 
the government assessing official prior to the government finalizing the CPARS report.  
During the source selection phase of government negotiated procurement, contractor 
performance information is used in evaluating offerors and in making a contract award 
decision (Rendon & Snider, 2008). In this phase, the government agency accesses the 
contractor performance information through the DoD Past Performance Information 
Retrieval System Report Cards (PPIRS-RC) database. During source selection in the 
evaluation of offeror’s proposals, the government agency uses the contractor past 
performance information to determine if the offeror meets the required standards of 
responsibility as stated in the federal procurement policy, and, depending on the basis of the 
award stipulated in the solicitation, uses the contractor’s past performance ratings to justify 
an award to a higher-priced offeror.  
The contractor performance information reported in CPARS and accessible through 
PPIRS provides outcome-based data that can be used to identify successful contracts. The 
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successful contracts determined by using contractor performance information have been 
used in our previous research to identify the contract variables that lead to contract success. 
In 2014, with the assistance of our graduate students (Wilhite et al., 2013), we 
accessed the past performance database to collect contractor performance ratings on 715 
completed Army services contracts to determine if the contracts were successful or not 
successful. Using statistical analysis, we investigated whether certain contracting variables 
such as type of service, contract dollar value, level of competition, and contract type affected 
the success of the contract. The detailed results of our analysis are presented in Rendon, 
Apte, & Dixon (2014). Our research findings concluded that the S type services (Utilities and 
Housekeeping) had the highest failure rate of all the product service codes analyzed. We 
also found that contracts with a dollar value from $50 million to $1 billion had the highest 
failure rate of all the contract categories. We found that contracts competed competitively 
had the highest failure rate when compared to the other two forms of competition available. 
Furthermore, we found that contracts structured as a combination contract had the highest 
failure rate when compared to the other five types of available contracts. Finally, the results 
of our significance testing showed that Contractual Amounts and Contract Type were our 
only statistically significant variables (Wilhite et al., 2013). 
Our past research using CPARS data identified some interesting areas worthy of 
further exploration. These areas include analyzing the narrative portion of the CPARS 
ratings to determine alignment with the objective ratings, as well as the value added, not 
only in the narrative portions, but also in the usefulness of the CPARS as a contractor 
assessment tool. This is the focus of our current research project.  
Research Design 
Our research examines the value of the CPARS report card narratives for service 
contracts as they relate to their associated objective scores. The primary focus in this 
research is examining if the CPARS report card written narrative section provides value to 
the contractor performance evaluation process. Our data analysis included a sentiment 
analysis and statistical analysis, as well as interviews with government agency contracting 
professionals.  
With the assistance of our most recent MBA thesis students (Black, Henley, and 
Clute), we performed a sentiment analysis of the 715 Army service contract CPARS report 
card narratives accessed in our previous research (Rendon et al., 2014). Our students used 
the CPARS Quality Checklist as a basis for developing the criteria for the categories and 
values for the sentiment analysis (CPARS Best Practices, CPAR Quality Checklist, n.d.). In 
the sentiment analysis, the student researchers scored each narrative along the dimensions 
of quality, robustness, compliance with directions in the CPARS Quality Checklist, and its 
value and content compared to its related objective scores from the CPARS report cards. 
Independent researchers’ scores were compared across a small sample to ensure inter-
rater reliability.  
We conducted a statistical analysis of the relationship between the sentiment 
analysis scores and their associated objective rating scores. This analysis investigated 
correlating relationships between the sentiment scores and the objective rating scores for 
the same CPARS report. Our purpose was to explore the relationships between the 
sentiment scores and the objective rating scores to reveal the extent of the value of the 
narratives. 
Our students (Black et al., 2014) also conducted interviews with contracting 
professionals from two DoD contracting agencies. These interviews focused on the 
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agencies’ use of CPARS and other sources of contractor past performance information and 
agencies’ value of the CPARS narratives compared to the objective rating scores. 
Findings and Analysis 
In this section, we present an analysis of our findings. The primary purpose of this 
research was to determine the value of the CPARS narratives in services acquisition by 
comparing the relationships between the subjective narratives and the objective scores. We 
first present the findings of the sentiment and statistical analysis by focusing on each of the 
criteria used in the analysis. 
1. Do the narratives address all performance areas assessed? Overall, the 
narratives address all performance areas assessed ~82% of the time. This is 
less problematic with unsuccessful contracts at ~95% than with successful 
contracts at ~81%. The difference in the proportion of times that the narrative 
addresses all performance areas assessed in successful and unsuccessful 
contracts is statistically significant (p < .05; Black et al., 2014, p. 41). 
2. Are narratives based on objective data? Overall, the narratives are based on 
objective data ~77% of the time. However, in unsuccessful contracts, the 
narratives are based on objective data 100% of the time. This is significantly 
different from the ~77% in successful contracts (p < .01; Black et al., 2014, p. 
41). 
3. Are narratives free of statements to avoid? Overall, the narratives are free of 
statements to avoid ~97% of the time. This is slightly more problematic with 
unsuccessful contracts at ~86% than with successful contracts at ~97% (p < 
.01; Black et al., 2014, p. 41).  
4. Are narratives robust and comprehensive? Overall, the narratives are robust 
and comprehensive ~63% of the time. This is less problematic with 
unsuccessful contracts at ~91% than with successful contracts at ~62% (p < 
.01; Black et al., 2014, p. 41). 
5. Could a layman understand the description of the work performed? Overall, 
the narratives are written so that a contracting layman should understand the 
work performed ~64% of the time. This is less problematic with unsuccessful 
contracts at ~82% than it is with successful contracts at ~64% (p < .05; Black 
et al., 2014, p. 41). 
6. Is the narrative beneficial above and beyond objective scores? Using a Chi 
Square Test, we determined that there was a difference between successful 
and unsuccessful contracts in whether the narratives were beneficial above 
and beyond the objective scores. Unsuccessful contracts tended to have 
more beneficial CPARS report card narratives than successful contracts 
(Black et al., p. 42). Overall, the narrative provides an unsatisfactory amount 
of beneficial data to the user ~12% of the time. However, there were no 
unsuccessful contracts that provided an unsatisfactory amount of beneficial 
data. The narrative provides a marginal amount of beneficial data ~22% of 
the time. There were no unsuccessful contracts that provided a marginal 
amount of beneficial data. The narrative provides a satisfactory amount of 
beneficial data ~28% of the time. The narrative provides a very good amount 
of beneficial data ~21% of the time. The narrative provides an exceptional 
amount of beneficial data ~18% of the time. This is much more likely to occur 
with unsuccessful contracts than with successful contracts at ~17% (Black et 
al., 2014, p. 42). 
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7. Do the narratives correlate to the objective scores assigned? Using the Chi 
Square Test, we determined that there was not a difference between 
successful and unsuccessful contracts in whether the narrative correlates to 
the objective scores assigned. Overall, the narrative sentiment is 
contradictory to more than one of the objective scores assigned ~2% of the 
time. The narrative sentiment is contradictory to one of the objective scores 
assigned ~6% of the time. The narrative sentiment is satisfactory in 
describing accurately why the objective scores are assigned as they are 
~28% of the time. The narrative sentiment is very successful in describing 
accurately why the objective scores are assigned as they are ~40% of the 
time. The narrative sentiment is exceptionally successful in describing 
accurately why the objective scores are assigned as they are ~24% of the 
time (Black et al., 2014, p. 42). Figure 1 summarizes the results of the 
statistical analysis. 
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 Figure 1. Results of Statistical Database Analysis 
(Black et al., 2014) 
As previously discussed, our students also conducted interviews with contracting 
professionals from two DoD contracting agencies (Black et al., 2014). These interviews 
focused on the agencies’ use of CPARS and other sources of contractor past performance 
information as well as these agencies’ value of the CPARS narratives compared to the 
objective rating scores in the source selection process. The findings of these interviews are 
summarized as follows: 
1. CPARS is still often not reliable, robust, or comprehensive enough. This 
results in source selection officials not placing a significant amount of weight 
on the past performance evaluation criteria (Black et al., 2014, p. 44).  
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2. Unsuccessful contracts tend to have more reliable, robust, and 
comprehensive past performance information available in their 
CPARS/PPIRS reports (Black et al., 2014, p. 45).  
3. The appropriate amount of weight that should be assigned to the past 
performance evaluation criteria in making a source selection decision should 
be correlated to the source, availability, quality, and relevancy of the past 
performance information (Black et al., 2014, p. 45). 
4. The information found in PPIRS sometimes contains information in the 
narrative that is either contradictory or does not quite match up with the 
objective scores. When the objective scores and narrative sentiment in 
PPIRS is mismatched, contracting professionals tend to give more weight to 
the narrative versus the objective scores (Black et al., 2014, p. 46). 
5. Contracting professionals are not always applying due diligence in identifying 
the appropriate contractor entity (e.g., CAGE Code or DUNS number) in the 
CPARS reports. This is resulting in contractor past performance information 
not being fully accessible in PPIRS (Black et al., 2014, p. 46). 
6. There is a lack of reliable, robust, and comprehensive amount of past 
performance information available in PPIRS. This results in source selection 
officials soliciting contractors for references or asking contractors to fill out a 
past performance questionnaire (Black et al., 2014, p. 47).  
7. The results of the interviews also identified recommendations for improving 
the quality of CPARS reports, incorporating data analytics tools into the 
PPIRS database, enhancing the monitoring of Contracting Officer 
Representative (COR) workload, improving acquisition workforce training on 
developing CPARS narratives, and improving the disclosure of CPARS 
program office audit results (Black et al., 2014, pp. 48–49). 
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summary 
The DoD acquires billions of dollars of supplies and services every year. In FY 2013, 
the DoD obligated over $258 billion for military-unique weapon systems as well as 
commercial supplies and services (USA Spending, 2013). An integral part of the DoD’s 
contract management process is the source selection phase when offerors’ proposals are 
evaluated and the contract award decision is made. A critical aspect of the source selection 
phase is the evaluation of contractor past performance information as part of the overall 
proposal evaluation process. The DoD uses the Past Performance Information Retrieval 
Systems (PPIRS), which consists of contractor report cards extracted from the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). Although the use of contractor past 
performance information is an important aspect of the DoD contract management process, 
the GAO has identified many process deficiencies in the documentation and management of 
CPARS reports. GAO reports have shown that DoD agencies do not always complete the 
required contractor past performance reports (GAO, 2007, 2009b, 2013a, 2014). More 
importantly, many CPARS reports contain narratives that are either insufficiently detailed or 
conflict with their associated objective scores. Late reports lacking sufficient accurate 
information provide less-than-optimal information to the contracting professionals that rely 
on these report cards for source selection decisions.  
The purpose of this research was to determine the value of the CPARS narratives in 
services acquisition by comparing the relationships between the subjective narratives and 
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the objective scores. Our primary focus in this research was examining if the CPARS report 
card written narrative section provides value to the contractor performance evaluation 
process. Our data analysis included sentiment and statistical analysis, as well as interviews 
with government agency contracting professionals.  
Conclusions 
Using CPARS data collected by graduate students Hart, Stover, and Wilhite, (2013), 
and narrative analyses and interviews conducted by graduate students Black, Henley, and 
Clute (2014), we answered the following research questions: 
1. What is the added value of the contractor performance narratives beyond the 
value of the objective scores for performance? Contracting professionals are 
doing a better job at providing beneficial CPARS data in the narrative when 
the contract is unsuccessful versus when it is successful. Only 38.6% of the 
observed CPARS narratives, whether successful or unsuccessful, provided a 
very good or exceptional amount of beneficial data above and beyond what 
could be gleaned from looking over the objective scores assigned (Black et 
al., 2014, p. 51). 
2. What is the statistical relationship between the sentiment contained in the 
narratives and the objective scores for contractor evaluations? Contracting 
professionals are developing CPARS narratives that contradict at least one of 
the objective scores assigned ~8.3% of the time. Contracting professionals 
were slightly better at matching the narrative sentiment to the objective 
scores in unsuccessful contracts (~81.8% scoring either very good or 
exceptional) than in successful contracts (~63.2% scoring either very good or 
exceptional; Black et al., 2014, p. 51).  
3. To what degree do the interview findings contradict, support, or enhance the 
findings for our research questions? The results of the interviews found that 
the CPARS database is still often not reliable, robust, or comprehensive 
enough. We also found that unsuccessful contracts tend to have more 
reliable, robust, and comprehensive past performance information available 
in their CPARS/PPIRS reports. Additionally, the appropriate amount of weight 
that should be assigned to the past performance evaluation criteria in making 
a source selection decision should be correlated to the source, availability, 
quality, and relevancy of the past performance information. Our interviewees 
also stated that the information found in the PPIRS database sometimes 
contains information in the narrative that is either contradictory or does not 
quite match up with the objective scores. We also found that contracting 
professionals are not always applying due diligence in identifying the 
appropriate contractor entity in the CPARS reports, which is resulting in a 
lack of reliable, robust, and comprehensive amount of past performance 
information available in PPIRS. Finally, the interview results also identified 
recommendations for improving the quality of CPARS reports, incorporating 
data analytics tools into the PPIRS database, enhancing the monitoring of 
COR workload, improving acquisition workforce training on developing 
CPARS narratives, and improving the disclosure of CPARS program office 
audit results (Black et al., 2014, pp. 44–49). 
Recommendations 
Based on our conclusions, we identified the following five recommendations: 
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Recommendation 1: Training. Training should be implemented for all services 
acquisition members that interact with the CPARS and PPIRS databases. Training should 
focus on developing comprehensive narratives ensuring that acquisition team members can 
fully understand the work performed, address all performance areas assessed in their 
objective scores, and ensure the narratives are based on objective data (Black et al., 2014, 
pp. 54–55).  
Recommendation 2: Process Improvement. The DoD needs to improve the quality 
of past performance report submissions in CPARS and PPIRS, improving the source, 
availability, quality, relevancy, and accuracy of the past performance information. This will 
allow acquisition teams to assign higher weights to past performance evaluation criteria in 
source selection decisions (Black et al., 2014, pp. 54–55). 
Recommendation 3: Data Analytics. Additional data analysis tools should be 
incorporated into the CPARS and PPIRS database to better assist contracting professionals 
in identifying past performance trends for a particular contractor or specific type of service 
(Black et al., 2014, pp. 54–55).  
Recommendation 4: Customer Feedback. The CPARS process should include 
customer feedback on contractor performance. Currently, only the acquisition team provides 
input to the CPARS report card. Customer input into CPARS will encourage the submission 
of more accurate and robust CPARS report cards (Black et al., 2014, pp. 54–55). 
Recommendation 5: COR Manning Levels. Contracting Officer Representative 
(COR) manning levels should be reviewed throughout the DoD to ensure that organizations 
have sufficiently filled COR billets to manage the CPARS process (Black et al., 2014, pp. 
54–55). 
References 
Apte, A., Apte, U., & Rendon, R. (2008). Managing the services supply chain in the 
Department of Defense: An empirical study of current management practices (Technical 
Report NPS-AM-08-137). Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition 
Research Program website: http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Apte, A., Apte, U., & Rendon, R. (2009). Managing the services supply chain in the 
Department of Defense: Empirical study of the current management practices in the 
Army (Technical Report NPS-AM-09-136). Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, 
Acquisition Research Program website: http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Apte, U., Apte, A., & Rendon, R. (2010). Services supply chain in the Department of 
Defense: A comparison and analysis of management practices in Army, Navy, and Air 
Force (Technical Report NPS-CM-10-161). Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, 
Acquisition Research Program website: http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Apte, U., Ferrer, G., Lewis, I., & Rendon, R. (2006). Managing the service supply chain in 
the US Department of Defense: Opportunities and challenges (Technical Report NPS-
AM-06-032). Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program 
website: http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Apte, U., & Rendon, R. (2007). Managing the service supply chain in the US Department of 
Defense: Implications for the program management infrastructure (Technical Report 
NPS-PM-07-126). Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research 
Program website: http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 79 - 
Black, S., Henley, J., & Clute, M. (2014). Determining the value of Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) narratives for the acquisition process. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Cleland, D. I. (1986). Project stakeholder management. Project Management Journal, 17(4), 
36–44. 
CPAR quality checklist. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://www.cpars.gov/cparsfiles/pdfs/CPARSQualityChecklist.pdf  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57–74. 
El-Gohary, N. M., Osman, H., & El-Diraby, T. E. (2006). Stakeholder management for public 
private partnerships. International Journal of Project Management, 24, 595–604. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2012). 
Fitzsimmons, J. A., & Fitzsimmons, M. J. (2006). Service management: Operations, 
strategy, and information technology (5th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston, MA: 
Pitman. 
GAO. (2002). Best practices: Taking a strategic approach could improve DoD’s acquisition 
of services (GAO-02-230). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2007). Federal contracting: Use of contractor performance information (GAO-07-
1111T). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2009a). Defense acquisitions: Actions needed to ensure value for service contracts 
(GAO-09-643T). Washington, DC: Author.  
GAO. (2009b). Federal contractors: Better performance information needed to support 
agency contract award decisions (GAO-09-374). Washington, DC: Author.  
GAO. (2013a). Contractor performance: DOD actions to improve the reporting of past 
performance information (GAO-13-589). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2013b). High risk: An update (GAO-13-283). Washington, DC: Author.  
GAO. (2014). Contractor performance: Actions taken to improve reporting of past 
performance information (GAO-14-707). Washington, DC: Author. 
Hagan, P., Spede, J., & Sutton, T. (2012). Defining and measuring the success of services 
contracts in the United States Navy (Technical Report NPS-CM-12-201). Retrieved from 
Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program website: 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Lee, L., & Dobler, D. W. (1971). Purchasing and materials management: Text and cases. 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.  
Luo, Y. (2002). Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures. 
Strategic Management Journal, 23(10), 903–919. 
Moe, T. M. (1984). The new economics of organization. American Journal of Political 
Science, 739–777. 
Nash, R., Schooner S., O’Brien-DeBakey, K., & Edwards, V. (2007). The government 
contracts reference book: A comprehensive guide to the language of procurement (3rd 
ed.). Riverwoods, IL: CCH. 
Rendon, R. G. (2010). Assessment of Army Contracting Command’s contract management 
processes (Technical Report NPS-CM-10-154). Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate 
School, Acquisition Research Program website: http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 80 - 
Rendon, R. G., Apte, U., & Dixon M. (2014). Services supply chain in the Department of 
Defense: Drivers of success in services acquisition (Technical Report NPS-CM-14-001). 
Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program website: 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net  
Rendon, R. G., & Snider, K. F. (Eds.). (2008). Management of defense acquisition projects. 
Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 
Seifert, A. J., & Ermoshkin, I. K. (2010). Analysis of Government Accountability Office and 
Department of Defense Inspector General reports and commercial sources on service 
contracts (MBA Professional Report). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). (2010, 
June 28). Better buying power: Mandate for restoring affordability in defense spending 
[Memorandum for acquisition professionals]. Washington, DC: Author. 
USA Spending. (n.d.). Retrieved November 1, 2013, from http://www.usaspending.gov/  
Wilhite, T., Stover, A., & Hart, J. (2013). Management levers that drive services contracting 
success (MBA thesis). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual 
relations. The Journal of Law and Economics, 22(3), 233–261. 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 81 - 
Panel 14. Factors Influencing Achievement of 
Affordable Defense Systems in a Constrained 
Budget Environment 
Thursday, May 14, 2015 
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
Chair: Gary Bliss, Director, Performance Assessments and Root Cause 
Analyses (PARCA), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) 
Analytical Tools for Affordability Analysis 
David Tate, Institute for Defense Analyses  
A Dynamic Procurement Model for Assessing Competitive Options in the 
Context of Defense Acquisition 
Jennifer Lamping Lewis and Christopher Guo, RAND Corporation 
Government Contractors and Sticky SGA Costs  
Stephen Hansen, NPS 
Gary Bliss—is the director, Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA), in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. PARCA carries out performance 
assessments of Major Defense Acquisitions Programs (MDAPs) and conducts root cause analyses 
for MDAPs with Nunn-McCurdy breach status or when requested by senior Department of Defense 
(DoD) officials. 
Bliss previously held the position of deputy director, Enterprise Information and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Studies in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). His responsibilities included oversight of the five OSD-funded 
Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, the OSD's university research program, as 
well as review and development of innovations to overhaul the AT&L enterprise management 
systems. 
Earlier in his career, Bliss served 13 years as the director of Office of the Director, Program Analysis 
& Evaluation Weapon System Cost Analysis Division (WSCAD). WSCAD's 10 staff members 
constitute one of the two offices dedicated to OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) 
functions, and are responsible for the preparation of independent development and procurement cost 
estimates for major systems that range from munitions (e.g., tactical missiles) through platforms (e.g., 
helicopters, submarines, fighter aircraft, tanks, etc.). As such, Bliss has been a key player in the 
DoD's most important system decisions by the services, OSD, and Congress. 
Generally recognized in both industry and government as a leading authority on the economics of 
defense procurement, Bliss has an established track record in institutional reform and enterprise 
reengineering. He is an experienced lecturer, often speaking to varied audiences on such topics as 
management information system governance and reengineering, manufacturing enterprise 
reengineering, and acquisition institutional reform. Owing to this expertise, Bliss has been hosted by 
the governments of Australia, Taiwan, Japan, and the United Kingdom to lecture their staffs on 
matters of defense acquisition. 
Bliss has a BA in mathematics and economics (highest honors in economics) from College of William 
and Mary. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 82 - 
Analytical Tools for Affordability Analysis 
David Tate—joined the research staff of the Cost Analysis and Research Division at the Institute for 
Defense Analyses in 2000. Since then, he has worked on a wide variety of resource analysis and 
quantitative modeling projects related to national security. These include an independent cost 
estimate of Future Combat Systems development costs, investigation of apparent inequities in 
Veterans’ Disability Benefit adjudications, and modeling and optimization of resource-constrained 
acquisition portfolios. Dr. Tate holds bachelor’s degrees in philosophy and mathematical sciences 
from the Johns Hopkins University, and MS and PhD degrees in operations research from Cornell 
University. [dtate@ida.org] 
Abstract 
Beginning with the Better Buying Power initiatives, the military components have been 
required to perform full life-cycle portfolio-level affordability analyses with respect to major 
defense acquisition programs at key milestones. Prior to this, there was no formal 
requirement to reconcile program acquisition baselines with resource forecasts beyond the 
five years of the Future Years Defense Program. This paper discusses the analytical 
challenges associated with Affordability Analysis and describes methods and tools that the 
Institute for Defense Analyses is developing to address these challenges. 
Introduction 
What Is Affordability? 
Affordability means conducting a program at a cost constrained by the maximum 
resources the Department can allocate for that capability. Many of our programs 
flunk this basic test from their inception. 
—Honorable Ashton B. Carter (2010), Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) 
Affordability policy is about establishing the dollar amount the Component is willing to 
spend on the desired capability in the context of all other fiscal demands over the 
long term. 
—Chad J. Ohlandt (2013) 
Over the last two decades, the Department of Defense (DoD) has spent a historically 
unprecedented amount of money on acquisition programs that, in the end, did not deliver 
the warfighting capability they had been intended to provide. For example, the Army 
Acquisition Review commissioned by the Secretary of the Army and published in 2011 
estimated that  
every year since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1B annually on 
programs that were ultimately cancelled. Since 2004, [35%–42%] per year of 
Army [Development, Testing, and Evaluation] funding has been lost to 
cancelled programs. (Decker & Wagner, 2011) 
The Army is scarcely unique in this regard. All military components have seen 
significant program cancellations with little or nothing to show for the billions spent. In 
addition to cancellations, many other programs have been severely truncated or 
restructured, providing far less national security capability than had been envisioned. 
While some programs have been canceled for technical reasons, or because the 
threat they were intended to counter went away, others have been canceled or curtailed 
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simply because there was not enough money available to pay for everything. Affordability 
simply means having enough resources to be able to finish the programs you start. 
What Is Affordability Analysis? 
At the Milestone A Review [the DoD Component will] present an affordability analysis 
and proposed affordability goals based on the resources that are projected to be 
available to the DoD Component in the portfolio(s) or mission area(s) associated with 
the program under consideration. The analysis will be supported by a quantitative 
assessment of all of the programs in the prospective program’s portfolio or mission 
area that demonstrates the ability of the Component’s estimated budgets to fund the 
new program over its planned life cycle. 
—DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System (USD[AT&L], 2015) 
Affordability analysis is a DoD Component leadership responsibility that should 
involve the Component’s programming, resource planning, requirements, 
intelligence, and acquisition communities. The Department has a long history of 
starting programs that proved to be unaffordable. The result of this practice has been 
costly program cancelations and dramatic reductions in inventory objectives. Thus, 
the purpose of Affordability Analysis is to avoid starting or continuing programs that 
cannot be produced and supported within reasonable expectations for future 
budgets. 
—DoDI 5000.02 (USD[AT&L], 2015, Enclosure 8) 
Beginning with the Better Buying Power (BBP) memorandum and directive of 2010, 
and continuing through BBP 2.0, BBP 3.0, and the newly revised DoDI 5000.02, Operation 
of the Defense Acquisition System, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has 
defined and implemented a series of new requirements for the military components to 
address affordability issues at the inception of new programs and at every subsequent 
milestone (DoD, n.d.)1. The required Affordability Analysis should be performed at the 
portfolio level, over a planning horizon of decades. The guidance is explicit: the 
responsibility for Affordability Analysis lies with the component leadership, not with the 
program. Only the component leadership has the necessary understanding of component 
priorities, risk tolerance, and resource forecasts to support the required analysis, and only 
the component leadership has the authority to stretch, truncate, or cancel some programs in 
order to make room for others. 
What Tools Do Affordability Analysts Need? 
Predictive Costing—“What If?” 
The first fundamental requirement for Affordability Analysis is the ability to consider 
hypothetical alternative futures in which the current plans cannot be executed. Current law 
requires that planned acquisition costs must fit within forecast budgets through the five-year 
1 Better Buying Power (BBP) 1.0 was introduced in 2010 as part of the DoD’s Efficiency Initiative. The 
stated objective was to deliver warfighting capabilities needed within the constraints of a declining 
defense budget by achieving better buying power for the warfighters and taxpayer. 
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Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), but not in the “outyears” after that. This leads to the 
phenomenon known as “the bow wave,” in which the total planned costs of all acquisition 
programs exceed reasonable budget projections in the years immediately beyond the 
FYDP. Each new President’s Budget imposes fiscal reality on one additional year, pushing 
the excess off into the future. The new Affordability Analysis requirement extends the 
constraints of the FYDP out to a 30-year planning horizon, eliminating the bow wave. The 
top line budget assumptions for each component are provided by OSD. 
To meet this requirement, component programmers need to be able to understand 
how annual program costs would change under hypothetical alternative schedules. As we 
shall see below, this is not an easy task. 
Consistency Checking 
Another important requirement for Affordability Analysis is the ability to assess the 
consistency between various affordability submissions. The new guidance requires 
Affordability Analyses to support milestone decisions for specific programs. These generally 
provide considerable detail about the program in question, some detail about other 
programs in the same acquisition portfolio, and minimal detail about other portfolios. 
Decision-makers need to be able to recognize whether new Affordability Analyses are 
consistent with past submissions by other programs and portfolios. They need to be able to 
distinguish updated information (e.g., new cost estimates or quantity requirements) from 
inconsistent assumptions. They also need to be able to understand the implications of 
reconciling inconsistent submissions using the most authoritative available data for all 
programs. 
Risk Modeling 
Because all Affordability Analyses are uncertain, it is essential for decision-makers 
(both within the components and in the oversight community) to understand the potential 
implications of that uncertainty. One important tool in this regard is sensitivity analysis—the 
ability to see the overall consequences of changing specific assumptions or forecasts. For 
affordability, it will be important to understand sensitivity to cost estimating assumptions, 
sensitivity to budget forecasts, and sensitivity to future needs for not-yet-defined systems. 
More generally, “affordability” is not a yes/no question. It makes much more sense to 
think of the probability that a given portfolio of programs can be acquired within a given 
budget, even though both program cost estimates and budget forecasts are subject to 
unknown errors. An ideal tool for Affordability Analysis will support probabilistic modeling of 
individual program outcomes, portfolio contents, and budget forecasts. 
Visualization 
Finally, it is important for any Affordability Analysis support tool to provide outputs 
that are informative and understandable. Numerical reporting is important, but data 
visualization can greatly enhance the utility of any analytical tool. In particular, dynamic 
visualizations that highlight the patterns of change that occur as budgets grow tighter (or 
portfolio contents grow) would be very useful. To support this requirement, it will be 
necessary for the tool to be able to perform its “What if?” computations in near-real time. 
What Are the Analytical Challenges of Affordability Analysis? 
Why is Affordability Analysis hard? Setting aside the political challenges of 
competing interests within a given military component, it might not be obvious that there are 
also substantive technical challenges in figuring out whether or not a set of proposed 
programs is affordable. In this section, we discuss three necessary enablers for effective 
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Affordability Analysis and the technical challenges associated with each. All three of these 
challenges arise directly from the nature of program cost estimates. 
Any Affordability Analysis must begin with cost estimates for the various programs in 
the relevant portfolio. These estimates generally take the form of annual quantity and cost 
forecasts that reflect the program offices’ planned (or proposed) development and fielding 
schedules. If the sum of these forecasts fits within the predicted available budget for the 
portfolio, then the portfolio would seem to be affordable. But what if it does not fit? And what 
about the possibility that the budget forecast or the cost estimate (or both) might turn out to 
have been overly optimistic? To address those concerns, we need to be able to predict the 
annual costs for production schedules other than the planned schedule—and that turns out 
to be rather tricky. 
Estimating the Annual Costs of Hypothetical Schedules 
The problem is easy to state: “The program says that the planned schedule of lot 
quantities would result in these estimates of annual lot costs. How much would each lot cost 
if we bought them according to this alternative schedule of procurement quantities instead?” 
The DoD has detailed records of cost and schedule for hundreds of acquisition programs, 
going back decades. Given that wealth of data, why is it hard to figure out how schedule 
affects cost? There are several important analytical obstacles. 
Obstacle #1: Cause Versus Effect 
Consider three procurement programs: A, B, and C. Program A is doing fine, but due 
to overall budget reductions, its production schedule is going to be stretched, which will 
increase unit costs. Program B has just announced significant cost growth—not caused by a 
schedule change—that has made its planned production schedule too expensive, given 
other priorities in the portfolio. Program C has been experiencing integration issues—its 
electronics are going to require a new design that uses a more expensive subcomponent, 
which will have to be retrofitted into existing units. This means both a cost increase (due to 
the new component) and a schedule slip (to accommodate the new design and the rework).  
For all of these programs, unit cost went up and average production rate went down. 
Causally, though, we have three distinct cases: 
• For Program A, schedule stretch caused cost growth. 
• For Program B, cost growth caused schedule stretch. 
• For Program C, technical issues caused both cost and schedule growth. 
Although we are trying to understand only the first of those mechanisms, we cannot 
tell just by looking at historical numbers which case was in effect—or whether it was some 
mix of all of them—for a given program. We need a way to isolate the Program A effect from 
the others. 
Obstacle #2: Not All Costs React the Same Way to Schedule Changes 
Since 2006, Selected Acquisition Reports have broken out cost forecasts into 
subcategories: end-item recurring flyaway costs, non–end-item recurring flyaway costs, 
nonrecurring costs, and two categories of support costs. This is very helpful, because we do 
not expect all of those costs to react identically to a change in production schedule. End-
item recurring costs should be most directly affected, while nonrecurring costs and non-
spares support might not be affected at all. Any econometric model of how schedule affects 
cost should take advantage of these different cost categories and treat them separately 
when they are known. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 86 - 
Obstacle #3: Limited Relevant Data 
Even if we have multiple historical cost estimates for Program A, those past 
estimates might not tell us anything about the relationship today between Program A’s 
production schedule and lot costs. Since those past estimates were developed, Program A 
may have changed in any number of ways—new designs, revised cost estimates, 
requirements changes, technology insertions, planned product improvements, new 
contracts, new demands from the field, and so forth.  
Unless we could somehow correct for all of the program changes other than 
schedule, those past forecasts do not tell us what the estimated cost would be today for that 
previous planned schedule. More generally, we seldom get to see multiple proposed 
schedules (and their associated costs) for the same exact program. Since we are trying to 
figure out how cost varies as schedule varies, this is a major limitation. 
Obstacle #4: Rate Effects and Learning Curves 
The cost of producing one unit of a product depends on the production rate. For one 
thing, at lower production rates, the indirect costs (overhead) of the producer and the fixed 
costs of production get amortized over fewer units, so that each unit bears a higher 
proportion of those costs. In addition, there can be logistical issues related to supply chains 
and staffing that make it inefficient to produce at low rates. We will discuss the mechanisms 
of rate effects below; for the moment it suffices to note that they exist. As a result, the cost of 
a unit depends on how many other units you make in the same year. 
In addition, even at constant production rates, unit costs are generally not constant 
over the production life of a program. In particular, most procurement programs exhibit 
learning curves, in which the marginal cost of successive units decreases as a function of 
cumulative production. As a result, the cost of a given unit depends not only on how many 
other units you make in that year, but which units (cumulative) they are. In the standard 
model, the cost of the nth unit produced is predicted to be 𝑇𝑇1𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽, where 𝑇𝑇1 is a notional first 
unit cost and 𝛽𝛽 is a parameter that describes how quickly unit costs decline with cumulative 
production (Lee, 1997). This formulation is often expressed in terms of the learning “slope,” 
𝑆𝑆 = 2𝛽𝛽, where unit cost decreases by a factor of 𝑆𝑆 every time cumulative production 
doubles. 
Shifting units of planned production from one year to another thus changes both the 
production rates in those years and the portion of the learning curve that falls in those years, 
resulting in nonlinear changes in annual costs. 
Mechanisms and Models for Schedule Effects 
There are several competing theories about how and why unit costs change when 
schedules change. These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, which makes it 
even trickier to figure out how to combine them into a coherent model. 
Fixed Costs and Sticky Costs 
As noted above, most of the indirect costs and some of the direct costs of producing 
a weapon system are incurred per unit time, rather than per unit produced. For example, the 
costs associated with running the program office do not depend much on the current 
production rate, or on how many units have been produced so far. Similarly, the indirect 
costs associated with contractor overhead are only a little bit sensitive to production rates. 
What’s more, overhead rates tend to be “sticky”—they don’t generally adjust instantaneously 
to changes in work level. A useful model of how cost depends on schedule should be able to 
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distinguish rate-insensitive costs from rate-sensitive costs, and estimate how sticky the fixed 
costs are. 
Learning and Forgetting 
It is not uncommon for unit production costs to follow a standard learning curve for 
most of the life of a program, but then start to climb upward again toward the end of the 
program. To account for this, C. Lanier Benkard (2000) suggested that producers improve in 
efficiency by gaining “experience” making units (learning), but that this experience 
depreciates at a constant rate (forgetting). Thus, early in production (when cumulative 
quantity is doubling frequently), or at high production rates (when more experience is being 
gained per unit time), learning behavior dominates. Late in the production run, or at low 
production rates, the gains from learning are visibly offset by forgetting. 
We investigated this model, and found that it fits many historical programs quite well. 
It can also be improved by combining it with a fixed cost model, so that indirect and rate-
insensitive costs are modeled separately, while rate-sensitive costs are modeled by a 
combination of learning and forgetting. 
Regulatory Lag 
Finally, William Rogerson (1994) has proposed that the interaction between unit cost 
reduction and production rate can be understood by looking at the incentives inherent in 
how procurement contracts are awarded. In general, a new fixed-price procurement contract 
is awarded for each annual lot, with a negotiated unit price based on the contractor’s 
demonstrated historical costs. A contractor who invests in management or tooling changes 
that reduce production costs will only realize extra profits from that investment until a new 
price is negotiated—typically two or three years later. 
At high production rates, contractors have more incentive to invest in reducing 
production costs, because they will realize extra profits on many units during the two- to 
three-year “regulatory lag” period before the price is renegotiated downward to reflect the 
lower production costs. As a result, more potential cost-reducing investments will be cost-
effective for them, given the need to make back the initial investment costs through higher 
profits. 
Conversely, at lower production rates, contractors have less incentive to reduce 
costs, as well as fewer available cost-reduction alternatives that would provide the 
necessary return on investment. If this theory is correct, we should expect to see less 
learning at low production rates, and more learning at higher production rates. This is very 
different from the standard learning model, which assumes that the learning curve slope is 
an intrinsic characteristic of the system being produced and does not vary with rate.  
It is possible to formulate an econometric model based on Rogerson’s (1994) 
framework, assuming a profit-maximizing contractor with a notional pool of cost-reducing 
investment options. We can also combine this model with a fixed-cost model, as we did with 
the learning-and-forgetting model. In theory, we could add forgetting to this model as well, 
but there are serious limits to how many model parameters can be estimated from the 
available data. 
Estimating the Impact on Schedules of Hypothetical Budgets 
In order to understand the impact of portfolio budgets on cost and schedule, it is not 
enough to be able to predict the annual costs associated with a given sequence of lot 
quantities. We also need to be able to predict how each program’s production schedule 
might adjust to accommodate a budget that is too tight for each program to execute its 
current individual plan. 
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In a prior research effort (Weber et al., 2003), we used optimization to find minimum-
cost feasible schedules within a given budget, subject to constraints on minimum and 
maximum production rates and latest permitted delivery date. This approach is 
unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, the nonlinear mixed-integer optimization problem is 
quite difficult, requiring industrial-grade optimization tools and considerable time. Second, 
the optimized schedules are generally implausible—they rely on the portfolio manager’s 
ability to make trades among future years in a manner that is often politically impossible. 
They also tend to oscillate between minimum and maximum rates for a given program 
unless additional constraints or penalties are imposed. Finally, they give a very misleading 
view of the consequences of a change in forecast budget, since the bulk of the cost 
difference between the current planned schedule and the revised schedule is due to 
optimization of the current plan, not due to the change in budget. 
For the current effort, we have chosen to use a greedy constructive heuristic to 
model the potential impact of a budget change on production plans within a portfolio. The 
heuristic attempts to maintain the same proportionate cumulative funding by program as in 
the plan, but is constrained by both the budget and the minimum (and maximum) feasible 
production rates of the various programs. The combination of fixed costs and minimum 
sustaining production rates implies that it may not be possible to match the planned relative 
funding levels very closely. This is especially true if some programs are near their minimum 
sustaining rates in the original plan. Those programs cannot be stretched further, so that the 
cost burden of stretching to fit under the budget will be borne disproportionately by the other 
programs. Optionally, the heuristic can also incorporate user-specified program priorities. 
At present, the heuristic simply reports infeasibility if there is insufficient budget to 
produce each program at its minimum sustaining rate. Future versions may suggest quantity 
reductions where needed, based on user-provided priorities among programs and minimum 
useful quantities to field. 
Affordability Risk Analysis 
All of the analytical challenges discussed thus far make the implicit assumption that 
the estimated costs for each program in the portfolio are accurate. History teaches that this 
is not generally true; weapon system acquisition is notorious for cost growth. Without getting 
into the thorny question of what causes cost growth, we can nevertheless ask what 
implications cost growth has for Affordability Analysis. 
If we knew both program costs and future budgets with certainty, affordability would 
be a yes/no question. Budget uncertainty can be handled to some extent through sensitivity 
analysis—how much do costs change as a function of future budget levels, and at what 
point does the portfolio become infeasible unless we reduce quantities or cancel programs? 
There is also a time dependency—one bottleneck year of low budget can render a set of 
programs infeasible, even if the overall funding level over the planning horizon is generally 
high. 
Cost uncertainty is even trickier, because we need to know not only how the costs 
might change, but why they might change. Is the problem higher labor rates than expected? 
Higher fixed costs? Less learning? Faster forgetting? Some combination of all of those? The 
answers to those questions will affect how much further cost growth will be incurred when 
we realign production schedules to fit under the budget. 
Because of the complexity of how cost depends on various econometric parameters 
and on schedule, there is little prospect of an analytical model of affordability risk. Even if we 
were confident that we knew the probability distributions for future budgets and for 
procurement cost growth in each program, that is not enough information to allow us to 
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derive the conditional distribution of resulting costs when all programs are modified to fit 
within a given budget. If we also want to be able to model uncertainty due to new programs 
arriving into the portfolio, the problem is even worse. 
Monte Carlo methods seem like the most promising approach here. If we can 
characterize the cost risk in terms of probability distributions on the parameters of our 
econometric model, we can then simulate the future repeatedly to estimate the probability of 
affordability, the expected unit cost, the probability of a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the expected 
time to deliver the Nth unit, and other measures of interest. We can do this for a fixed 
budget, or we can allow the budget to vary randomly at the same time, including making 
room for future programs. The trick, of course, is deriving plausible probability models for the 
econometric parameters and budgets, based on historical data. 
APASS—The Acquisition Portfolio Affordability Support System 
We are currently developing a software environment for Affordability Analysis for our 
sponsors in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(OSD[AT&L]) Acquisition Resources & Analysis, which we call the Acquisition Portfolio 
Affordability Support System, or APASS. The purpose of APASS is to provide an 
environment for evaluating and tracking the affordability of portfolios over time. APASS 
features are focused on five specific areas of support: tracking, forecasting, risk analysis, 
reporting, and visualization. 
Tracking 
APASS will provide both a “living” operational view and a historical record of portfolio 
affordability and cost and schedule data. This combination will support both current 
decision-making and assessment of historical trends and changes. 
Affordability analyses are generally performed on behalf of individual programs for 
use at milestone reviews. These analyses generally feature detailed cost and schedule 
information for the program under review, aggregated cost and schedule information for 
other programs in that portfolio, and at best top-line summary data for other portfolios. 
APASS will allow managers to remember the information submitted at prior reviews, 
compare that information against the new information, and identify any inconsistencies or 
changes. In particular, APASS will support comparison of data sources with slightly different 
portfolio definitions. APASS will also be able to compare new submissions against routine 
DoD-wide data submissions, such as the annual Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) or 
President’s Budget justification exhibits. 
APASS will also allow analysts to merge multiple submissions into user-defined data 
sets. Authoritative data from multiple sources could thus be combined to create a “single 
integrated affordability picture” across all programs and portfolios. This would let managers 
maintain a living representation of the current best forecast of the acquisition future, with 
which they could explore the implications on that future of alternative budgets, new 
programs, or cost growth. 
Forecasting 
The primary analytical function of APASS is to predict the annual quantities and 
costs for all programs in a portfolio, conditioned on a portfolio budget other than the current 
planned budget. This function relies heavily on both the econometric modeling and the 
schedule adjustment heuristic described above. 
Figure 1 shows an APASS screenshot of a notional current production plan for a set 
of portfolios. FYDP years are shown in darker hues; outyears are lighter shades of the same 
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color. If we drill down into a single portfolio, we can see the individual program plans and the 
projected portfolio budget (Figure 2). The combined plans exceed the projected budget, so 
we invoke the “fit to budget” heuristic to extrapolate how the portfolio might adapt to the 
lower budget. The result is shown in Figure 3. In this example, the total procurement cost for 
the portfolio increases significantly. The percent increase in unit cost is not shared evenly 
across programs; those programs that finish quickly or that are already near their minimum 
production rates will not be as strongly affected as those that have more flexibility to stretch. 
 
 Figure 1. Army Procurement Portfolios 
 
 Figure 2. Portfolio With Budget 
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 Figure 3. Portfolio Adjusted to Fit Within Budget 
This is the fundamental analytical tool in APASS; all other analyses rely on this ability 
to extrapolate costs and schedules in response to different levels of available funding. The 
cost forecasts produced by the econometric models and extrapolation heuristic are not 
“budget quality” cost estimates, but they provide credible extrapolations of the type and 
magnitude of cost and schedule impact that would be implied by alternative scenarios. 
Risk Analysis 
The initial implementation of APASS will focus on sensitivity analysis, particularly 
with respect to changes in budget or portfolio contents. It is particularly important for 
decision-makers to understand how program costs and delivery schedules might change 
under various budget scenarios, or in the event that a new high-priority program is added to 
a portfolio. It will also be possible to use APASS to assess the sensitivity of all programs to 
cost growth in a particular program. 
Future versions of APASS will include Monte Carlo modeling capabilities, to simulate 
the potential consequences of multiple simultaneous sources of uncertainty. The output from 
these simulations would include probability distributions on unit cost and delivery timelines 
for individual programs, as well as correlations among programs within a portfolio. 
Reporting 
The analytical capabilities of APASS will only be useful if they are able to provide 
users with the information they need to support acquisition decisions and oversight. To that 
end, APASS will include both standard and customizable reporting of both cost and 
schedule baselines and derived affordability data. 
Because APASS incorporates data from multiple sources, including speculative 
analyses, its reporting requirements will be somewhat more varied than those of typical 
acquisition data repositories. In particular, APASS will need to be able to merge conflicting 
data sources to produce “best guess” forecasts that draw individual program forecasts (and 
their corresponding econometric parametrizations) from separate sources, using the current 
most authoritative source for each. This merged forecast will typically differ from each of its 
source submissions in some ways. It will therefore be particularly important for APASS to 
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produce reports that highlight the differences between forecasts of the same program(s) 
from different sources. These comparison reports will also be useful for describing the unit 
cost and schedule impacts of various possible future portfolio-level budgets, as extrapolated 
by the schedule adjustment heuristic. 
Visualization 
As a complement to numerical reporting, APASS will also provide graphical 
visualizations of various baseline data and comparisons. To begin with, APASS will be able 
to produce the various graphical formats for presenting Affordability Analysis information 
that are recommended in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, as revised in June 2013. 
APASS will also provide the ability to view animations of the sensitivity of a given portfolio to 
program cost growth, changes in budget level, or introduction of additional programs. 
Coupled animations, showing both the overall “sand chart” of program spending over time 
and an aligned display of the absolute or relative change from the baseline by program, will 
allow analysts to grasp the implications of alternative scenarios much more quickly than 
when using individual graphics or numerical displays. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Program life-cycle affordability is a cornerstone of DoD acquisition planning. 
Ultimately, the goal of Affordability Analysis is to supply decision-makers with the best 
available information and analysis about defense acquisition programs so that they can 
• allocate defense resources efficiently and effectively, both within and across 
programs; 
• consider the full range of cost and schedule alternatives; 
• understand and manage acquisition risk at the program, portfolio, and 
Service level; and 
• avoid the time and money wasted by starting programs that cannot be 
completed. 
Affordability is the measure that allows decision-makers to allocate appropriate 
resources to their future operational requirements. Affordability is not a “yes or no” attribute; 
it is the degree to which uncertain future resources can be expected to permit execution of 
current and future programs. This degree is best characterized in terms of probabilities and 
sensitivity to deviations from current plans. 
The Better Buying Power (BBP) memoranda and the newly-revised DoDI 5000.02, 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, from the OSD have defined and implemented 
new requirements for the military components to address affordability issues at the inception 
of new programs and at every subsequent milestone. This Affordability Analysis is to be 
performed at the portfolio level, over a planning horizon of decades. The responsibility is 
given to component leadership. 
In order to plan their acquisition strategies, the components need to be able to 
assess affordability over a wide range of future scenarios without needing to return to the 
program offices or the component cost estimators for new cost estimates every time a 
different portfolio plan is considered. At the same time, OSD oversight organizations need to 
be able to reconcile current affordability analyses with past analyses, assess the sensitivity 
of current forecasts to potential disruptions, and characterize the level of risk inherent in 
current plans, in order to fulfill their oversight responsibilities with respect to acquisition. 
APASS is being implemented as a tool to support both Affordability Analysis as 
required by current DoD regulations and OSD oversight of affordability planning across the 
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military components. To these ends, APASS will combine econometric modeling of 
procurement costs as a function of schedule, extrapolation of the effects of alternative 
budgets on portfolios of programs, and fusion of data from multiple divergent sources. 
APASS will also provide the reporting and visualizations services necessary to make these 
analytical capabilities practically useful on a day-to-day basis. 
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Government Contractors and Sticky SGA Costs2 
Stephen Hansen—Naval Postgraduate School [schansen@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
Federal contractors must deal with an exceptional amount of paperwork and bureaucracy 
relative to firms that deal only with the private sector. I investigate whether federal 
contractors’ costs have different responses to revenue increases and decreases. I start by 
generating a set of federal focus firms that have a business unit name that incorporates the 
words federal, military, and defense. These firms have built their organizational structure 
around federal contracting. Because extra paperwork costs are likely to be part of the Selling, 
General, and Administrative (SGA) costs, I estimate a model of SGA sticky costs. I find that 
when revenues increase, federal focus firms have greater increases in SGA costs compared 
to controls. This increase is consistent with higher fulfillment costs for federal contracts. 
When revenues decrease, federal focus firms have a much lower decrease in SGA costs 
compared to controls. Federal focus firms have extremely sticky SGA costs. This stickiness is 
consistent with federal focus firms having higher fixed costs in their procurement systems. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently implementing the Better Buying 
Power initiative (DoD, n.d.), which focuses on “the implementation of best practices to 
strengthen the Defense Department’s buying power, improve industry productivity, and 
provide an affordable, value-added military capability to the Warfighter.” An important plank 
of this approach is “Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy” (DoD, n.d.).  
Government contractors have the normal concerns about costs of production/profit 
margin. However, they also must deal with an exceptional amount of paperwork relative to 
non-governmental contracts, and usually must hire specialized staff to generate and 
maintain the required information (Kovacic, 1992). The additional paperwork and extra staff 
clearly qualify as potentially unproductive processes and as bureaucracy. 
My research examines whether these additional costs are sufficiently large to affect 
the firm’s financial statements. If these government-specific costs are real and substantial, 
then they should skew the cost behavior of government contractors relative to private sector 
firms doing comparable work.  
I investigate the effect of these costs on the Income Statement. Income Statements 
have two major cost categories. The Cost of Goods Sold captures the product cost for units 
sold and is obtained from matching the cost of products to the units sold. These costs are 
fairly direct and have comparatively little wiggle room for adjustments. The Selling, General, 
and Administrative (SGA) costs reflect the marketing, administrative, and general overhead 
2 Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government. 
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costs of the organization. These costs contain many allocations and are the likely place 
where any additional government contracting costs are going to show up.3  
My research builds upon prior work that investigates the behavior of SGA costs. A 
classic paper, Andersen, Banker, & Janakiraman (2003), investigated the behavior of SGA 
costs when revenue increased versus revenue decreased. They found that SGA costs are 
sticky in that SGA costs increase more when revenues rise than SGA costs decrease when 
revenues fall. Potential explanations for the stickiness include the existence of SGA fixed 
costs (Balakrishnan, Labro, & Soderstrom, 2010), or that managers are reluctant to reduce 
SGA capacity when they believe that a short run cut in revenues is likely to be reversed in 
the near future (Andersen et al., 2007; Balakrishnan & Gruca, 2008).  
I extend the SGA sticky cost framework to investigate whether firms with significant 
federal contracting have different SGA responses to revenue increases and/or decreases. If 
a firm believes that the expertise in federal procurement practice is a core competency, then 
it will be reluctant to reduce its procurement staff in response to lower revenues. I conjecture 
that federal focus firms will have much stickier costs than will firms in the private sector. 
An important innovation in my paper is the creation of a federal focus sample. Prior 
work has investigated the behavior of federal contractors by assuming that the firms with the 
largest dollar sales to the federal government are most affected by federal contracts (Wang 
& San Miguel, 2012). However, an important problem with this approach is that a very large 
firm like Proctor and Gamble may be one of the most important sellers to the federal 
government, but the federal sales may be a small percentage of Proctor and Gamble’s total 
sales. In addition, Proctor and Gamble may supply generic products such as toothpaste 
which do not require satisfying unique federal requirements (and related paperwork). For 
these reasons, it may not be correct to say that Proctor and Gamble is a federal focus firm. 
My federal focus sample is created in a different fashion. I use Compustat’s Segment 
database to identify firms that have a business segment which contain the words federal, 
government, or military. These federal focus companies believe that federal business is so 
important that they have built their organization structure on this business. Their 
organization structure signals that they have a federal focus. While there is some overlap 
between my list of federal focus companies and the list of firms with the greatest sales to the 
federal government, roughly two thirds of my federal focus firms are not on the list of the 
largest 500 federal dollar contractors. 
Once I generate the federal focus sample, I estimate an SGA sticky cost regression 
where I include interaction terms for federal focus firms. The results show that the control 
firms have mild SGA cost stickiness. Raising revenue by 1% leads to a 0.69% rise in SGA 
costs, while lowering revenues by 1% leads to a 0.63% decline in SGA costs. The main 
analysis compares the federal focus firms to the controls. There are significant differences 
for federal focus firms. Raising revenues by 1% leads to a 0.83% rise in SGA costs, a 20% 
increase over the control firms. Federal focus firms have higher ramp up in SGA costs, 
possibly due to increased paperwork for fulfilling government orders. In the same vein, 
3 While the government has explicit rules about how these costs are presented in their forms, the 
published financial statements follow financial accounting rules known as the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. 
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lowering revenues by 1% leads to a 0.45% drop in SGA costs, a 29% smaller drop than the 
controls. SGA costs for federal focus companies are much stickier than for the control firms. 
This increased stickiness could be due to a reluctance to fire highly trained procurement 
staff or, alternatively, much higher fixed SGA costs. 
Robustness tests suggest that my results are knife edge. Changing the time period 
or the control group leads to insignificant results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The second section discusses 
prior research, followed by a presentation of the sticky cost model. The sample is then 
created and descriptive statistics are calculated. Estimation results follow, and the final 
section contains the conclusion. 
Literature Review 
There has been a fair amount of prior work that has used published financial 
statements to examine various features of acquisition and contracting. Arnold, McNicol, and 
Fasana (2009) investigated the impact of various contract forms on contract performance. 
Berteau, Levy, Ben-Ari, and Moore (2011) used financial statements to analyze the ability of 
government contractors to obtain capital throughout defense booms and busts. Wang and 
San Miguel (2012) investigated whether government contractors are obtaining excessive 
profits. My work complements those prior works by providing an analysis of costs, an 
important component in determining both performance and profits. 
My work investigates the total cost numbers for the organization. The reason is 
straightforward. Prior work has shown that firms have the incentives and capability to shift 
costs from the private sector to the government sector (McGowan & Vendrzyk, 2002; 
Rogerson, 1992). Cost shifting between the firm’s private and public units generates 
canceling positive and negative entries when the total firm costs are calculated. 
Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008) examined sticky costs at the department level in 
hospitals. They found that in downturns, hospital administrators are reluctant to trim costs 
and capacity in core activities directly related to patient care. Administrators first adjust costs 
and capacity in peripheral areas. This research suggests that in a downturn, firms with a 
federal focus may wish to maintain critical government contract-related processes. 
The Sticky Cost Model 
Andersen, Banker, and Janakiraman (ABJ; 2003) performed the seminal analysis of 
SGA cost stickiness. Their model discriminated between periods when revenues increase 
and those when revenues decrease. Costs are sticky when the costs have a greater rise 
when revenues increase than costs fall when revenues decrease. 
Equation 1 provides their basic sticky cost model specification,4 log � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� =  𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼1  log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝛼𝛼2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,      (1) 
4 The ABJ model allows for a cross-section analysis across a wide range of industries, with large 
differences in the size of firm. Prior work (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1981) rejected a linear form in 
favor of the log-log specification. 
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where DecrDum is one for firm i when sales revenues fall from period t-1 to t and is zero 
otherwise. If SGA costs are sticky, then the coefficient a2 should be negative and significant. 
I extend Equation 1 to investigate whether federal focus firms have different SGA 
stickiness than control firms. I create a set of interaction variables which separate out the 
incremental effect of federal focus firms. Specifically, I use a dummy variable FSeg, which is 
one if the firm has a separate government/federal/military segment and is zero otherwise. 
My SGA Sticky Cost model is presented in Equation 2:5 log� 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1  log� 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝛼𝛼2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log� 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� 
+  𝛼𝛼3 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 +  𝛼𝛼4 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� 
                           + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 . (2) 
While I believe that federal focus firms will have different SGA responses than the 
control firms, the direction of these changes is not obvious. If federal focus firms respond 
differently to revenue increases, then coefficient a4 should be significant. If it is significantly 
positive (negative), then SGA costs have greater increases (decreases) than the controls. If 
federal focus firms respond differently to revenue decreases, then the expression (a4 + a5) 
should be significant. If the sum is significantly positive (negative), then federal focus firms 
have less (more) sticky SGA costs than the controls.  
Now that I have presented the model, I turn to the data.  
Sample Creation and Descriptive Statistics 
My sample was created in two steps. I first obtained a set of federal focus firms, then 
generated control firms for these companies. 
Federal Focus Firms 
The critical element in my research is identifying companies with a federal focus. 
Prior research (Wang & San Miguel, 2012) has examined the behavior of companies with 
the greatest dollar value contracts with the federal government. One problem with this 
approach is that a large dollar value may not reflect a federal focus. For instance, Proctor 
and Gamble has significant sales to the government, but its sales tend to be for off-the-shelf 
items such as toothpaste. Proctor and Gamble may not need to deal with issues involving 
government-specific specifications and may have minimal incremental paperwork 
requirements. Because of these issues, I use a different approach to identify federal focus 
firms.  
Financial accounting standards require publicly traded firms to separately report 
information about major business segments. Segment reporting is intended to give 
5 The variable Decrdum is defined in the text. The data for the other variables is drawn from 
Compustat, Fundamental Annual. Revenue is the Compustat variable sale, while SGA is the 
Compustat variable xsga. 
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information to investors and creditors regarding the financial results and position of the most 
important operating units of a company.6 Firms that report a federal segment have identified 
themselves as having a significant line of business related to the federal government.  
Table 1, Panel A describes how I generated my list of federal focus firms. I began 
with all observations on the Compustat Segment database which lists all reported segments 
for all publicly traded companies in the United States. The Compustat Annual Updates–
Segment database is comparatively new and only has data for the last four years, 2010–
2013. I searched the database for segment names that contained the term “Defense,” 
“Military,” “Federal,” “Government,” or “Govt.” This search process identified 39 unique 
parent companies. Each of these companies believes that their Federal/Government/Military 
segment is sufficiently different and important to warrant separate presentation in their 
financial statements. 
6 Accounting Tools, http://www.accountingtools.com/questions-and-answers/what-is-segment-
reporting.html, provides an excellent description of segment reporting on its website: 
 Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), an operating segment engages in  
 business activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses, has discrete  
 financial information available, and whose results are regularly reviewed by the entity’s chief  
 operating decision maker for performance assessment and resource allocation decisions.  
 Follow these rules to determine which segments need to be reported: 
• Aggregate the results of two or more segments if they have similar products, services, 
processes, customers, distribution methods, and regulatory environments. 
• Report a segment if it has at least 10% of the revenues, 10% of the profit or loss, or 10% 
of the combined assets of the entity. 
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Table 1. The Sample Creation 
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I used the parent company identification to draw data from Compustat, Fundamental 
Annual for the years 1993–2012.7 At this stage, there were 517 observations. Later analysis 
trimmed outliers and removed influential observations. The final list of federal focus firms 
contains 269 observations for 35 unique companies. 
My list of 35 federal focus firms and their associated industry, their Naics Sector, is 
provided in Table 2. While the majority of the firms are in manufacturing industries, there is a 
wide divergence of other industries represented, from construction to educational services. 
Table 2. Federal Focus Companies by Naics Sector 
 
As was mentioned previously, my approach to identifying firms with a federal focus 
differs from prior work. For instance, Wang and San Miguel (2012) used Fedspending.org to 
identify 112 publicly traded companies in the 500 companies with the largest dollar values of 
defense contracts awarded in 2008. Comparing their list to Table 2 shows that there are 12 
7 Following ABJ, I use 20 years of data to estimate my models. 
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firms in common. Untabulated results show that the 12 common firms are substantially 
larger than the other 23 firms.8  
Control Sample 
My control sample provides a benchmark to judge the performance of the federal 
focus firms. Table 1, Panel B provides the details. 
The control sample began with the entire set of active and inactive Compustat firms 
for 1993–2012. I deleted foreign firms. I then removed observations missing data or with 
infeasible data (e.g., negative revenues). Next, I dropped observations if Sales decreased, 
but SGA or COGS rose. Following ABJ, I also removed observations if the firm’s SGA costs 
were greater than Revenues. I then deleted all year * industry observations with no federal 
focus observation in that year * industry. 
Prior work has consistently found that sticky costs only show up in the estimation 
results after extensive data cleaning. For instance, ABJ trimmed 1% of all variables and 
threw out all influential regression observations in order to generate results. My sample 
contains a later time period than ABJ and includes the Great Recession. It therefore 
contains many more outliers than ABJ. In order to obtain baseline results with SGA sticky 
costs, I removed the top and bottom 5% of the log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� observations and the top 
(bottom) 0.5% of the 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� observations. Although I trimmed many 
observations, the range of variation in my retained data is comparable to prior work.  
My final data reduction removed all observations that were influential in the SGA 
Sticky Cost regression.9 My final set of controls consists of 39,539 observations over 20 
years for 6,991 firms in nine industries. 
My estimation sample combines the control firms with the federal focus firms. One 
important observation is that there are comparatively few federal focus (269) to control 
observations (39,539). A major concern is that the signal from the small number of federal 
focus observations could be drowned out by the large number of controls. Although this is a 
valid issue, the regression results generate statistically significant, and intuitive, estimates.  
The imbalance between the number of control and federal focus observations may 
explain the knife-edge nature of my results. The federal focus signal is strong only under a 
tightly controlled set of data conditions. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for my sample. Supplemental 
information shows that average total assets are comparable for federal focus and control 
firms (3,972 million versus 3,892 million), but that on average, federal focus firms have more 
employees (16,803 versus 5,556). In addition, federal focus firms have higher revenues, 
higher SGA expense, and greater COGS. These disparities are excellent reasons why 
equations use ratios to control for scale effects.  
8 The 12 firms on both lists have average assets (sales) of 7,786 (8,927), while the 23 other firms in 
my sample have average assets (sales) of 995 (1,434) 
9 Deleting observations for each regression separately generates qualitatively identical results. 
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Table 3, Panel B runs the Wilcoxon non-parametric test for differences between 
variables in the control and federal focus sub-samples. The tests fail to reject that the 
dependent variable, log � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�, and one of the independent variables, log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�, are 
drawn from the same distribution. However, the interaction term, 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�, does show a significant difference between federal focus and 
control observations. This difference has two sources. First, federal focus firms have fewer 
revenue decreases than controls (11.9% versus 19.5%). Second, untabulated results show 
that, conditional on revenues falling, the federal focus firms have a smaller reduction in the 
log revenue ratio (-0.0787 versus -0.190). When revenues fall, federal focus firms are not hit 
as hard as the control firms. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Tests 
 
Now that I have described the data, I turn to the regression analysis.  
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Estimation Results 
Table 4 contains the estimation results for the Selling, General, and Administrative 
(SGA) Sticky Cost model.10 The model uses a a log-log specification, which means that all 
coefficients (except the constants) generate an elasticity. 
Table 4. Sticky Cost Regression, Dependent Variable log[SGAt/SGA(t-1)] 
 
My control sample’s behavior is captured by coefficients a1 and a2. The control 
results demonstrate sticky SGA costs, though the costs are less sticky than in older 
samples.11 Combining the correct coefficients shows that a 1% increase in the revenue ratio 
(a1) leads to a 0.692% increase in the control firms’ SGA, while a 1% decrease (a1+a2) leads 
to a 0.629% decrease in SGA. The SGA costs are 0.063% sticky (a2). I can benchmark the 
magnitude of these effects by evaluating the elasticity at the mean sample values. When 
revenues (average 1,794 million) increase/decrease by 1%, they change by 17.94 million. 
When revenues rise (fall) by 17.94 million, SGA costs (average 332.1 million) increase (fall) 
by 2.30 (2.09) million. At the median combined sample values, SGA costs stick by 0.21 
million, or roughly $210,000.  
10 The model is estimated with fixed industry effects and uses robust standard errors. The VIF scores 
show no significant multicollinearity. 
11 Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) estimate cost stickiness for 20 years, from 1979 to 
1998 for all but the financial services industry. They find (Table 2, Model [I]) a comparable increase in 
SGA costs when revenues rise (0.5459 versus my 0.6922), but a larger decline when costs fall (-
0.1914 to my -0.0628). I conjecture the differences are due to my restriction to a subset of industries 
as well as the different time periods. 
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The impact of a federal focus on the SGA costs is identified through the interaction 
terms. Combining the correct coefficients for federal-focused companies (a1+a3), when the 
revenue ratio rises by 1%, the SGA ratio rises by 0.828%, which is 0.136% more than for 
the controls (a4). When revenues rise, federal focus companies have a .136/.692 = 19.7% 
increase in SGA over the controls. This incremental rise could reflect greater paperwork 
requirements/fulfillment costs for federal focus firms. Combining the correct coefficients 
(a1+a2+a3+a4), when revenues fall by 1%, the SGA ratio for federal focus falls by 0.447%, 
which is 0.182% less than for the controls (a1+a2). When revenues fall, federal focus 
companies have a .182/.629 = 28.9% smaller decrease in SGA costs than control 
companies. The slower fall could reflect greater fixed costs for federal focus companies, in 
particular, greater fixed staff costs in the procurement process. 
The dollar impact for federal focus companies can be evaluated using the mean 
sample values. When revenues rise by 1% (17.94 million), SGA costs rise by 2.75 million for 
federal focus companies versus 2.30 million for the controls—a 0.45 million cost difference. 
When revenues fall by 1% (17.94 million), SGA costs fall by 1.48 million for federal focus 
companies, and by 2.09 million for the controls—a 0.61 million cost difference. The dollar 
value of the federal focus difference is understated since federal focus firms tend to be 
much larger than the control firms.12  
Figure 1 illustrates the qualitative behavior of SGA costs for both the controls and the 
federal focus companies. If a firm is federal focused, then SGA costs rise faster when 
revenue increases, but fall slower when revenue decreases. 
12 If the numbers are evaluated at the median federal focus firm value (SGA 508.75), then a 1% 
revenue increase would cause SGA for controls to rise by 3.522 and federal focus by 4.213, a 
difference of 0.691 million. A 1% revenue decrease would cause SGA for controls to fall by 3.202 
million, and federal focus by 2.273 million, a difference of 0.929 million. 
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 Figure 1. The Change in the SGA Ratio as a Result of Revenue Increases and 
Decreases 
Robustness Checks  
My robustness tests suggest that my results are delicate, are knife-edge. Reducing 
the time period from 20 to 15 (10) years generates qualitatively similar control coefficients, 
but the federal focus coefficients become insignificant. Alternatively, using the median 
industry values as controls leads to all coefficients becoming insignificant.  
Conclusions 
Federal government contractors are qualitatively different than other firms (Kovacic, 
1992). Contractors complain about excessive paperwork requirements, fixed margins, and 
long lead times to obtain contracts. I examine whether these problems are large enough to 
show up in the published financial accounting data. I use the behavior of SGA costs on 
firms’ published Income Statements to address this issue. 
An important innovation in my paper is the creation of a federal focus sample.  
I use Compustat’s Segment database to identify firms that have a business segment 
labeled federal, government, or military. These federal focus companies believe that their 
federal government business is so important that they have built their organization structure 
around it. While there is some overlap between my list of federal focus companies and the 
firms with the greatest sales to the federal government, roughly two thirds of my federal 
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focus firms are not on the list of the largest 500 federal dollar contractors. My sample 
contains a different, and possibly superior, set of companies than offered by prior work. 
Once I generated the federal focus sample, I estimated an SGA sticky cost 
regression where I included interaction terms for federal focus firms. The results show that 
the controls have mild SGA cost stickiness. Raising revenue 1% leads to a 0.70% rise in 
SGA costs, while lowering revenues 1% leads to a 0.63% decline in SGA costs. My main 
results show that there are significant differences for federal-focused firms. Raising 
revenues 1% leads to a 0.82% rise in SGA costs, a 20% increase over the controls. When 
revenues rise, federal-focused firms have a higher ramp up in SGA costs, possibly due to 
increased paperwork for fulfilling government orders. In the same vein, lowering revenues 
1% leads to a 0.45% drop in SGA costs, about 29% below the reduction for the control 
group. SGA costs for federal focus companies are much stickier than for the controls. The 
reluctance to reduce SGA costs is consistent with federal focus firms maintaining their core 
federal procurement process in a downturn. 
Robustness tests suggest that my sample is delicate. Changing the time frame or the 
approach to generating controls leads to no significant results. This delicacy may be due to 
the small number of federal focus observations relative to control observations. 
My paper provides evidence that SGA costs behave differently for government 
contractors. Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom (2004) provided evidence that the 
magnitude of the change matters. They showed that very large changes in costs lead to 
greater responsiveness (less stickiness) than smaller changes, and argued that transaction 
costs will dampen or remove small changes, but not affect larger changes. While similar 
behavior might hold for federal contractors, I cannot investigate this issue. My sample 
contains too few observations to analyze this issue. 
My analysis looks at the behavior of firms which have a federal focus. However, it 
does not investigate one other important aspect of government contracting: the form of the 
contracts. A large body of theoretical literature explores the relationship between optimal 
contracts and information in procurement (Laffont & Tirole, 1986; Rogerson, 1994). For 
instance, cost plus contracts may lead to improved risk sharing, but can lead firms to shift 
costs from commercial to government contracts (Chen & Gunny, 2014; Rogerson, 1992). In 
contrast, fixed price contracts provide no incentives to shift costs, but may lead firms to 
underinvest in fixed assets to support the contract. My SGA sticky cost results are consistent 
with the cost shifting of cost plus contract, but I have no information as to the actual contract 
form. Future work could connect the contract form with my analysis. 
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Abstract 
Program managers and executives in the Department of Defense (DoD) have struggled for 
years to tailor the acquisition framework to promote delivery of information technology (IT) 
capabilities in small, frequent releases—the approach that characterizes Agile development. 
DoD acquisition professionals increasingly recognize the potential of Agile methods, but do 
not know how to apply Agile within the unique and complex defense acquisition environment. 
Several aspects of the defense acquisition process have proven especially challenging in the 
implementation of Agile practices. For example, the lack of knowledge about how to tailor the 
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 process for an Agile development can deter a program from 
considering the use of Agile techniques in the first place. Many DoD IT acquisition programs 
are unfamiliar with the IT Box requirements concept, and thus cannot take advantage of its 
flexibilities to enable Agile development. In addition, long contracting timelines and the 
tendency to lock down Agile requirements in a contract have become barriers to 
implementing the speed and flexibility necessary for successful Agile adoption. This paper 
offers specific acquisition solutions and strategies to address these identified “high barriers” 
to Agile development in DoD. 
Introduction 
Agile software development practices integrate planning, design, development, and 
testing into an iterative lifecycle to deliver software at frequent intervals. Structuring 
programs and processes around small, frequent Agile releases enables responsiveness to 
changes in operations, technologies, and budgets. These frequent iterations effectively 
1 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Case Number 15-0905. The author’s affiliation 
with The MITRE Corporation is provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended to 
convey or imply MITRE's concurrence with, or support for, the positions, opinions or viewpoints 
expressed by the author. 
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measure progress, reduce technical and programmatic risk, and respond to feedback and 
changes more quickly than traditional waterfall methods (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). 
While the commercial sector has broadly adopted Agile development to rapidly and 
dynamically deliver software capability, Agile has just begun to take root in DoD acquisitions 
(Lapham et al., 2010; Northern et al., 2010). A dozen or more DoD IT acquisition programs 
have incorporated Agile concepts and practices. These early adopters, like any new 
venture, have experienced mixed results. Furthermore, despite the early adoption of Agile 
across several DoD IT acquisition programs, the DoD has issued no formal guidance and 
training on DoD Agile practices. Many acquisition professionals see the value and promise 
of Agile, yet struggle to incorporate it effectively in the Defense Acquisition Framework. 
Given that Agile in many ways differs so radically from the DoD’s traditional development 
practices, programs interested in using Agile encounter several challenges and barriers 
within the DoD acquisition system (Broadus, 2013).  
MITRE performed initial research to examine the leading Agile methodologies and 
commercial practices and explore how DoD acquisition structure and processes could be 
tailored to adopt Agile. The resulting Defense Agile Acquisition Guide2 provides acquisition 
professionals guidance and instruction for Agile adoption. Following the release of the guide 
in February 2014, MITRE conducted further research to capture best practices and lessons 
learned from early adopters across the DoD and other federal agencies. The research, 
based on years of experience and collaboration across Agile and IT acquisition 
communities, refined and extended strategies for tailoring each functional area of 
acquisition. This paper focuses specifically on three of the most difficult barriers to 
successful DoD Agile adoption: program structure, requirements, and contracting. The DoD 
can address these barriers by utilizing a proactively tailored Agile acquisition model, 
implementing an IT Box requirements process, and utilizing the flexible contracting 
approaches described in this paper. 
The first half of this paper provides an overview of the Agile development process 
and identifies some of the primary challenges in adapting commercial Agile practices for 
DoD implementations. Next, the paper examines prerequisites for effective adoption of Agile 
practices in the DoD. The remaining sections describe each of the three “high barrier” 
problem areas and offer specific recommendations that the DoD can use today to overcome 
these challenges.  
Background 
Agile Development Overview 
Agile software development emerged in 2001 after 17 industry leaders created the 
Agile Manifesto to design and share better ways to develop software (Agile Manifesto, n.d.). 
Agile prioritizes early and continuous deliveries of working software; adapts easily to 
changing requirements; depends on small, empowered teams; and promotes active user 
involvement during development.  
Agile development can be distilled into four core elements: 
2 A copy of the guidebook can be obtained at http://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-
papers/defense-agile-acquisition-guide-tailoring-dod-it-acquisition-program  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 111 - 
                                            
 
 
• Focusing on small, frequent capability releases  
• Valuing working software over comprehensive documentation  
• Responding rapidly to changes in operations, technology, and budgets 
• Actively involving users throughout the development process to ensure high 
operational value 
The foundation of Agile is a culture of small, dynamic, empowered teams actively 
collaborating with stakeholders throughout product development. Agile development 
requires team members to follow disciplined processes that require training, guidance, and 
openness to change (GAO, 2012). While Agile does impose some rigor, the method does 
not consist of simply following a set of prescribed processes, but instead allows dynamic, 
tailored, and rapidly evolving approaches that suit each organization’s IT environment.  
Various Agile methods (e.g., Scrum, Extreme Programming (XP), Kanban, Test 
Driven Development) have emerged, each with unique processes, terms, and techniques 
(Modigliani & Chang, 2014). These methods focus on the development team and associated 
stakeholders. Agile Acquisition extends Agile development practices beyond the contractor 
development team to the government acquirer, users, and other stakeholders. It requires 
that both agencies and contractors change many acquisition roles, processes, and culture, 
thereby fostering a close government–industry partnership (Balter, 2011; Lapham et al., 
2010). This, in turn, demands investments in time, training, and continuous improvement to 
pay long-term dividends. While both practical experience and research findings strongly 
indicate the value of Agile acquisition for many IT development programs, this approach 
may not be appropriate in all cases (Lapham et al., 2010). Programs should consider Agile 
Acquisition when 
• Users can decompose requirements into small tasks for iterative 
development. 
• The operational environment can support small, frequent capability deliveries. 
• Users can engage throughout development to capture concepts of operations 
(CONOPS) and provide feedback on demonstrated capabilities. 
• Program can use existing infrastructure and focus development on the 
application layer. 
• Industry partners are available with relevant domain expertise in Agile 
practices. 
• Milestone Decision Authority supports Agile development practices and 
tailored processes. 
Agile and the DoD Acquisition Environment 
Despite the success that Agile development has achieved in the private sector, 
commercial implementation of Agile does not directly translate to Agile adoption in the 
federal sector. The barriers to program structure, requirements, and contracting often stem 
from these key differences. First, the government must adhere to a set of rigorous policies, 
statutes, and regulations that do not apply to the same degree to the commercial sector 
(Lapham et al., 2011). Following the rules that govern federal acquisition often involves a 
bureaucratic, laborious, and slow process that greatly influences how effectively the DoD 
can implement Agile. Second, the commercial sector has a different stakeholder 
management process than the government. Private firms are accountable to an internal and 
layered management structure that usually goes no higher than a corporate board of 
directors; the few possible external stakeholders (e.g., labor unions) rarely cause frequent 
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and major disruptions. The government bureaucracy has layers upon layers of stakeholders 
with a high degree of influence that can create frequent and significant disruptions. 
Everything from a change in the political administration to budget sequestration can exert 
significant external influence on a DoD program. Lastly, the bureaucratic layers of 
government make it difficult to empower Agile teams to the same extent as in the private 
sector. The commercial sector has considerable latitude to make adjustments throughout 
the course of the development because companies closely link accountability, authority, and 
responsibilities to push decision-making to the lowest levels. The government’s tiered 
management chain of command makes it difficult for the Agile team to make decisions 
quickly and unilaterally.  
The above comparisons demonstrate the need for the DoD to tailor Agile processes 
to its unique set of policies and laws. Herein lies the fundamental issue with Agile adoption 
in the DoD. The practices, processes, and culture that have made Agile development 
successful in the commercial sector often run counter to the current practices, processes, 
and culture in the long-established defense acquisition enterprise (Broadus, 2013). In many 
ways, the acquisition environment needed to execute Agile development is the opposite of 
the acquisition environment in place today.  
• The small, frequent capability releases that characterize the Agile 
development approach directly contrast with the traditional DoD acquisition 
model designed for a single big-bang waterfall approach (Broadus, 2013). 
Currently, every step in the acquisition system must be extensively 
documented and approved prior to execution. For example, according to 
DoDI 5000.02, a DoD IT acquisition program must meet 34 statutory and 
regulatory documentation requirements prior to entering Milestone A 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2015), whereas Agile emphasizes working 
software over comprehensive documentation (Lapham, 2012).  
• Agile also enables rapid response to changes in operations, technology, and 
budgets. By contrast, the DoD requires budgets, requirements, and 
acquisitions to be planned up front, sometimes several years in advance of 
execution, and changing requirements, budgets, and strategies during the 
execution process is disruptive, time-consuming, and costly (Modigliani & 
Chang, 2014).  
• Lastly, Agile values active involvement of users throughout the development 
process to ensure high operational value, and continuously re-prioritizes the 
ongoing requirements process on the basis of feedback from the user 
community on deployed capabilities. Today’s DoD requirements process is 
static, rigid, and limits active user involvement and feedback during the 
development process (Lapham et al., 2010).  
Given these key differences, the DoD has been ill prepared to adopt Agile 
development practices and in fact Agile implementations so far have not always succeeded. 
Some early DoD adopters attempted what they thought or promoted as “Agile,” yet they did 
not incorporate some of the foundational Agile elements into their structures or strategies. 
This resulted partly from the lack of definition and standardized processes for Agile in the 
federal sector. In some cases, programs implemented a few Agile principles, such as 
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breaking large requirements into smaller increments, but did not integrate users during the 
development process to provide insight or feedback. Other programs structured capability 
releases in a time-boxed manner,3 yet did not understand what to do when releases could 
not be completed in time.  
Adopting only a handful of Agile practices without a broader Agile strategy often fails 
to achieve desired results (GAO, 2012). For example, one DoD early adopter initially 
attempted to implement Agile practices by breaking large requirements into several four-
week sprint cycles. However, the program lacked high-level agreement on what to develop 
in each cycle, and did not have a robust requirements identification and planning process in 
place. Furthermore, the program lacked an organized user community and active user-
participation throughout the development process—a fundamental Agile tenet. As a result, 
the Agile processes quickly degenerated and the program only delivered 10% of its 
objective capability after two years of failed Agile development attempts. The program finally 
retreated to a waterfall-based process. It simply could not execute the Agile strategy without 
the proper environment, foundation, and processes in place. On the other hand, the DoD 
has recorded some significant successes with Agile, such as the Global Combat Support 
System–Joint (GCSS-J) program, which has routinely developed, tested, and fielded new 
functionality and enhanced capabilities in six-month deployments (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015).  
Prerequisites for Agile Adoption  
The Agile model represents such a radical change in the way the DoD conducts 
business that the DoD must actively rethink how programs are managed and structured to 
support Agile (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). This requires restructuring the current acquisition 
environment (i.e., policies, processes, and culture) to enable success.  
As a starting point, the DoD should adopt a common understanding of Agile and 
identify the underlying set of values that describe the purpose and meaning of DoD Agile 
practices. The authors propose the following guiding principles for DoD Agile adoption:  
1. Focus on small, frequent capability releases to users—Smaller releases 
are easier to plan, present lower risks, and are more responsive to changes. 
Projects should focus on delivering working software as the primary objective.  
2. Embrace change—Projects must allow for changes to scope and 
requirements based on operational priorities, user feedback, early 
developments, budgets, technologies, etc. This requires flexible contracts, 
strong collaboration, and rigorous processes. Projects should plan early and 
then adapt based on current conditions.  
3. Establish a partnership between the requirements, acquisition, and 
contractor communities—Projects should foster active collaboration on 
operations, technologies, costs, designs, and solutions. This requires 
committed users who contribute to development, tradeoff discussions, and 
regular demonstrations of capabilities. 
3 A time-box is a fixed time period allocated to each planned activity. For example, within Agile, a 
sprint is often time-boxed to a 4–6 week time period or a release is time-boxed for a 4–6 month time 
frame. 
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4. Rely on small, empowered, high-performing teams to achieve great 
results—Organizing around each release with streamlined processes and 
decisions enables faster deliveries that are more successful.  
5. Leverage a portfolio structure—Individual programs and releases can 
deliver capabilities faster by using portfolio or enterprise strategies, 
processes, architectures, resources, and contracts. 
These tenets align with the recommended set of principles in the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report on Effective Practices and Federal Challenges in 
Applying Agile Methods. They center on the Agile Manifesto themes of small, frequent 
capability releases, a dynamic requirements process that allows for the continuous 
prioritization of requirements, active involvement from the user community throughout the 
development process, and commitment to delivering working software based on a time-
boxed schedule. Some efforts may succeed in implementing only a subset of these themes 
and delivering effective software solutions; however, one could argue that this would not 
constitute a pure Agile development.  
The DoD would benefit from defining and standardizing Agile-based practices to 
ensure a Department-wide consistent and common understanding of what constitutes an 
Agile-based DoD program or project (Lapham et al., 2010). Today, many efforts are 
inaccurately labeled as Agile, leading to misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Agile 
principles. After defining the principles, the DoD needs to provide detailed guidance to the 
acquisition community that describes how to execute the Agile acquisition processes within 
DoD acquisition regulations and laws (Broadus, 2013). This level of detailed process-level 
guidance falls outside the scope of this paper, but the Defense Agile Acquisition Guide 
offers further details on the guidance needed for the DoD to make Agile adoption effective 
and widespread. This paper centers on the aspects of the DoD acquisition process that 
have proven most problematic when implementing Agile development concepts. The 
following sections focus on three of the most difficult barriers for DoD Agile adoptions: 
program structures, requirements, and contracting. 
Structuring an Agile Program 
Structuring a program for Agile development differs significantly from structuring an 
IT program around a traditional development methodology. Traditional waterfall programs 
usually have discrete acquisition phases driven by milestone events to deliver a large 
capability. Agile is more dynamic and requires the program to be structured to support 
multiple, small capability releases (Lapham, 2012).  
Structuring an Agile program in this way represents a fundamental first step in 
developing a strategy for program-level Agile adoption. This activity requires the program to 
make significant adaptations to the traditional DoDI 5000.02 program structures and 
acquisition processes to support Agile development timelines and objectives (Modigliani & 
Chang, 2014). Although the DoDI 5000.02 acquisition policy places heavy emphasis on 
tailoring acquisition models to meet program needs, programs often do not know how to do 
so effectively and receive approval from process owners (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). It 
takes years of experience to truly understand the nuances involved in tailoring an acquisition 
program. Given the radical differences between Agile and a traditional development model, 
programs often view this activity as too complicated and therefore fail even to consider the 
Agile development process for a program. Programs must be designed in such a way that 
they not only meet all the DoDI 5000.02 statutory and regulatory requirements, but are also 
executable and marketable to senior acquisition executives who may be unfamiliar with the 
details of the Agile process. The following sections describe a recommended approach to 
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structuring an Agile DoD program, starting with the process to structure an Agile release and 
building on this concept to develop a fully tailored DoD Agile acquisition program.  
Agile Releases and Potential Program Structures 
When developing an Agile program structure, a program should first decide how to 
structure its releases. The release represents the core element of the program structure, 
guiding how frequently the program delivers capabilities to the warfighters. The length of 
each release depends upon operational, acquisition, and technical factors. As a general 
guideline, most releases should take less than 18 months, with a goal of 6–12 month 
timelines. Program offices should tailor acquisition processes to support these release 
timelines. In some cases, this requires redesigning key acquisition processes around a 6–12 
month release rather than a 5–10 year increment.  
Each release comprises multiple sprints and a final segment for release testing and 
certification. Each sprint, in turn, includes design, development, integration, and test, and 
culminates in demonstration of capabilities to users and other stakeholders. Developers may 
be required to deliver interim code to the government at the end of each sprint or multiple 
sprints. The government can integrate the interim code into its software environment for 
testing and operational assessments. Figure 1 shows a potential 6-month release structure 
with five monthly sprints. 
 
 Figure 1. Potential Six-Month Release Structure 
Figure 2 shows a potential 12-month release structure with seven 6-week sprints. 
Programs must adjust the length of the sprints and releases as conditions warrant. The key 
is to establish consistent, time-boxed releases, ideally small and frequent to allow for 
iterative development that responds easily to changes. 
 
 Figure 2. Potential 12-Month Release Structure  
After determining a release strategy, each effort should tailor its programmatic and 
acquisition processes to effectively enable Agile development practices. Figure 3 illustrates 
one potential structure at a top level. In this approach, requirements, technology, and 
architecture development are continual processes rather than sequential steps in early 
acquisition phases. Each release involves a series of sprints to iteratively develop and test a 
capability, ultimately leading to capability deliveries to the warfighter every six months upon 
approval. Instead of bounding development via a series of increments with Milestones B and 
C at each end, development thus becomes a continual process. Semi-annual reviews with 
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senior leadership and other key stakeholders ensure transparency into the program’s 
progress, plans, and issues. Programs provide additional insight to executives via monthly 
or quarterly reports and other status meetings. 
 
 Figure 3. Potential Agile Structure 
A core theme throughout DoDI 5000.02 is the tailoring of program structures and 
acquisition processes to meet the needs of the individual program. The policy includes 
several acquisition models to consider, such as Model 2 for defense-unique software, Model 
3 for incrementally fielded software, and hybrid Model B for software dominant programs. 
Figure 4 shows a proactively tailored acquisition model based on the three software models 
in DoDI 5000.02. The Defense Agile Acquisition Guide contains more detail about the 
structure and accompanying acquisition processes for DoD Agile adoption. 
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 Figure 4. Tailored Agile Model 
Agile Requirements Process 
The Agile requirements process values flexibility and the ability to reprioritize 
requirements as a continuous activity based on user inputs and lessons learned during the 
development process. In contrast to current acquisition practices, the Agile methodology 
does not force programs to establish their full scope, requirements, and design at the start, 
but assumes that these will change over time.  
At present, the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process 
guides the DoD requirements process. The traditional JCIDS process, based on lengthy and 
labor-intensive efforts to capture and define requirements, prevents agility (Lapham et al., 
2011). The DoD has recognized that this process was particularly inappropriate to IT 
development because of the rapid pace of change in IT compared with the JCIDS 
requirements definition timeline. As a result, the DoD updated the JCIDS by approving an 
“IT Box” to better accommodate the dynamic nature of IT and the shortened timelines 
required to rapidly field IT-enabled operational capabilities (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2010). The IT Box describes the operational performance and life-cycle 
affordability bounds of the program. The boundaries imposed by the “Box” expedite program 
initiation and streamline oversight by reducing return trips to the JROC for change approval.  
However, even with the introduction of the IT Box model to provide more flexibility in 
the requirements process, many programs still struggle with how to apply this model to their 
IT development programs. As programs strive to structure their programs around Agile-
based concepts as described in the previous section, they find it further confounding to 
figure out how to apply the IT Box model to satisfy the JCIDS requirements process. The 
following section contains specific recommendations on how to apply the IT Box concept to 
a DoD Agile development program. 
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Applying the IT Box Model for Agile Development 
In the JCIDS IT Box model, an acquisition program develops an “IS-Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD)” for JROC approval, while the traditional Capability 
Development Documents (CDDs) and Capability Production Documents (CPDs)4 are no 
longer required. Figure 5 illustrates the four sides of the IT Box identified in the IS-ICD.  
 
 Figure 5. IT Box  
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2012) 
As long as programs operate within these four sides of the IT Box, they need not 
return to the JROC for approval or oversight. In lieu of CDDs and CPDs, programs can 
develop Requirements Definition Packages (RDPs) to capture a subset of the IS ICD scope 
and/or Capability Drop (CD) documents for smaller items such as applications (see Figure 
6).5 Most important, the requirements documents are designed for a smaller scope of work 
and approval at a lower level. This flexibility and streamlining of IT requirements enables 
Agile development within a DoD program. Programs should take advantage of this and 
avoid developing a CDD or CPD. Managers can formulate the requirements process for the 
overarching acquisition using the JCIDS IT Box process to build in flexibility from a high-
level operational standpoint. Once an Agile approach has been designed into the program, 
programs must ensure they establish a flexible process for managing requirements from a 
functional capability standpoint (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). 
4 CDDs and CPDs are traditional JCIDS requirements documents that describe the program and 
program increment requirements. 
5 Services and requirements oversight organizations have the flexibility to identify alternative names 
for these documents, along with their scope, content, and approval processes. 
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 Figure 6. Example of Requirements Documentation  
(CJCS, 2012) 
With the IT Box construct in place and the appropriate documentation requirements 
fulfilled, programs can manage the technical requirements in an Agile environment via 
program, release, and sprint backlogs.6 Backlogs could take the form of databases, Excel 
spreadsheets, or Agile development software tools. The product owner, the person 
responsible for requirements, actively manages (grooms) program and release backlogs, 
working with the user community and other stakeholders to identify the greatest level of 
detail for the highest priority requirements. 
Figure 7 shows the relationships among the program, release, and sprint backlogs. 
The program backlog contains all desired functionality and requirements. A release backlog 
typically comprises the highest priority requirements from a program backlog that a team 
can complete within the established timeframe. A sprint then addresses the highest priority 
requirements from the release backlog. Once the development team commits to the scope 
of work for a sprint, that scope is locked. Sprint demonstrations conducted by the contractor 
at the end of a sprint may identify new features or defects that the team would add to the 
release or program backlogs.  
6 A program backlog is the primary source of all requirements/desired functionality for the program. A 
release backlog is a subset of the program backlog listing features intended for the release. A sprint 
backlog is a subset of the release backlog listing the user stories to implement in the sprint. 
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 Figure 7. Program, Release, and Sprint Backlogs 
The product owner, actively collaborating with users and stakeholders, is responsible 
for grooming the backlog to ensure the content and priorities remain current as teams 
receive feedback and learn more from developments and external factors. Users and 
development teams may add requirements to the program or release backlog or shift 
requirements between them. The release and development teams advise the product owner 
on the development impacts of these decisions, while users advise the release team about 
the operational priorities and impacts. To address a specific user story, the program must 
understand dependencies on existing or planned capabilities. Some programs may turn to a 
Change Control Board to make some of the larger backlog grooming decisions. The use of 
this model, combined with the IT Box structure, can help set a DoD Agile acquisition 
program on the right path for implementation (Modigliani & Chang, 2014).  
Contracting for Agile Development 
This section summarizes the difficulties of executing Agile development in the current 
government contracting environment and suggests available options.  
Challenges 
Contracting for Agile development has proven tremendously difficult not only for the 
DoD but also for many other federal agencies. The July 2012 GAO Report on Effective 
Practices and Federal Challenges in Applying Agile Methods cites “Procurement practices 
may not support Agile Projects” as a key challenge area. Contracting for Agile development 
presents a unique challenge to the government not often encountered in the private sector 
because commercial firms often rely on in-house staff to execute the Agile practices, 
whereas the government must obtain Agile development support through a contract 
arrangement.  
This poses several challenges for the government. First, the government contracting 
process emphasizes competition and is guided by a set of policies and laws articulated in 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Government programs cannot simply choose any 
Agile development contractor they like, but must follow a specific set of contracting 
processes and protocols to obtain contracted support in a fair and transparent manner. 
These government contracting laws and regulations have resulted in long contracting 
timelines that in themselves pose significant difficulty for government implementation of 
Agile. A competitive IT contract can take over a year to award. This prevents execution of 
the Agile development process, which relies on short delivery cycles and time-boxed 
schedules (Lapham et al., 2011).  
Next, the government contracting process requires programs to define the contract 
requirements upfront in a Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement (PWS) 
so that a contractor can prepare a technical and cost proposal against the SOW/PWS 
requirements. The government uses the contractor’s proposal to determine the contract 
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scope, schedule, and cost. Herein lies one of the biggest obstacles to Agile implementation. 
One of the key tenets of Agile development is a dynamic requirements process that does 
not lock down requirements. The government therefore confronts the very difficult challenge 
of figuring out how to define requirements in a SOW/PWS to award the development 
contract, without locking down the technical requirements to a point where the contractor 
has no flexibility during the execution of the Agile development process (Balter, 2011).  
Following contract award, successful Agile development depends on the ability to 
reprioritize requirements as program staff “learn” throughout the development process and 
re-scope the effort as needed. Today, however, post-award management of the contract is 
often inconsistent. In some cases, the contractor has minimal oversight and management 
and government–contractor interaction occurs only during infrequent reviews. By contrast, 
Agile requires very close management of the government–contractor relationship, with 
frequent, often daily, interaction between them.  
Lastly, the award of a government contract today often relies on the strength of the 
proposed technical solution. Under Agile, the government and contractor together determine 
the technical solution in the course of executing the Agile development process. Thus, 
contract award should be based on the strength of the development team and the team’s 
experience using Agile practices.  
Solutions 
Given the disparity between traditional contracting practices and the needs of Agile, 
the government has encountered difficulties in contracting for Agile development. However, 
programs should consider the following solutions.  
First, programs must plan contracts well in advance of the proposed Agile 
development. In many cases today, contracting can become the long-lead item in the 
development process if it is not properly considered in the upfront planning process.  
Second, the program must determine if it will use a service or a product contract. A 
service contract is highly recommended because this vehicle would provide the program 
with greater flexibility to modify requirements along the development process (Modigliani & 
Chang, 2014). A service contract is more flexible for Agile efforts than a product contract 
because it describes requirements in terms of the people and time required to execute the 
development process rather than locking down the technical details of the end-product 
deliverable. However, this strategy assumes the program is the lead systems integrator and 
is responsible for overall product rollout and delivery. If the government expects the 
contractor to act as the systems integrator, determine the release schedule, and be 
accountable for overall product delivery, then a product-based contract in which the 
government describes overall delivery outcomes and objectives is more practical. However, 
this scenario would make it difficult for the government to execute a true Agile process, 
because changes to requirements in the course of development, or a change to the delivery 
schedule, will require a contract negotiation that could affect the Agile process. If the 
government does execute a product-based contract, it should pursue an indefinite-delivery, 
indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicle and define product-based task orders based on 
either the release or the sprint level, depending on which level has the best-defined 
technical requirements (e.g., user stories). The program must carefully balance the 
advantages of a service versus a product contract based on a determination of government 
versus contractor responsibilities for the Agile processes.  
Next, the program must determine the type of contract vehicle and strategy. Some 
cases require a separate stand-alone contract; in others, the government could leverage an 
existing contract vehicle. Programs must conduct thorough market research to determine if 
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an existing contract vehicle could meet their needs. When analyzing existing contract 
vehicles, a program must review the contract scope to ensure it can support Agile processes 
and evaluate the capabilities of the contract awardees to determine if they have Agile 
expertise and experience and if the labor categories and rates are compatible with the 
program’s level of complexity (Lapham et al., 2011).  
Lastly, the program should focus on the competition strategy to be used for the initial 
award as well as for follow-on task orders and awards. This will help determine how to 
scope the contract or task order for each contract action. In some cases, the program would 
benefit from bundling a set of releases into a single contract action to minimize the number 
of contract activities during the development process. However, the program should balance 
this against the need to maintain continuous competition throughout the program lifecycle to 
keep rates low and receive the best value for products and services.  
Using a Contract Vehicle to Support Agile Program Structure 
As stated above, a services contract may represent a good strategy for a program 
seeking to acquire the skills and expertise of a developer to participate in a government-led 
Agile team. The program can pursue a separate stand-alone contract for Agile support 
services, or can consider leveraging an existing contract vehicle such as a GSA Schedule to 
acquire Agile support services on a task order basis. This strategy works well for a program 
that will need consistent Agile support to develop a single product, but is not recommended 
when pursuing a product-based contract, because the program would have to define 
requirements too far in the development process to gain the benefits of an Agile process 
(Modigliani & Chang, 2014). As illustrated in Figure 8, such a program would require 
consistent support throughout the development of several release cycles. 
 
 Figure 8. Single-Award Services Contract 
A multiple-award IDIQ contract can allow a program to use several development 
contractors. This strategy would enable the program to maintain continuous competition for 
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future task orders and/or execute parallel development. Under this strategy, the program 
would award IDIQ contracts to two or more qualified vendors to compete on individual task 
orders, as illustrated in Figure 9. The program office would have to work closely with the 
contracting office to streamline contract timelines to enable rapid execution of task orders. 
This could be achieved by using standardized business practices, templates, and 
streamlined selection criteria. Past performance on task orders would become a weighted 
selection criterion for future work, further motivating contractor performance.  
 
 Figure 9. Multiple-Award IDIQ Strategy 
However, this strategy can also complicate integration and require increased 
resources to award and manage multiple contracts and developments (Lapham et al., 
2011). To mitigate the integration risks of using two or more vendors, the government must 
dedicate time and effort to developing a rigorous architecture, interfaces, standards, and 
systems engineering processes. Each vendor should have active representation on the 
systems engineering Integrated Product Team to ensure a common understanding and 
maturation of these systems engineering elements throughout development. To foster 
coordination across vendors, the program should require the use of a common tool suite in 
the Request for Proposals process, and should also identify an initial set of required metrics 
each vendor must collect and report. In accordance with the contract, within the first 90 days 
of contract award, the vendors must submit to the program office an agreed-upon updated 
set of metrics proposed for review and approval.  
If the program has reached a more mature stage of development with clearly defined 
releases, it may be feasible to execute product-based task orders. If requirements are 
dynamic and the program is in the initial stages of executing Agile, it would make more 
sense to use a service task order and compete the task orders for a set of releases.  
Summary 
The focus on iterative development and frequent capability deployments makes Agile 
an attractive option for many DoD IT acquisition programs, especially time-sensitive and 
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mission-critical systems. However, Agile differs so profoundly from traditional development 
practices that the DoD must overcome significant challenges to foster greater Agile 
adoption. The DoD cannot expect individual programs to tailor current acquisition processes 
on their own, because the complexities of the DoDI 5000.02 processes do not lend 
themselves to obvious solutions, let alone solutions that accommodate processes so 
fundamentally different from current DoD practices. Following the guidance offered in this 
paper would better equip programs to tailor the DoDI 5000.02 for Agile execution. As they 
face the next challenge of defining requirements in a way that meets rigorous JCIDS 
standards, programs can use the IT Box model outlined in this paper to enable the speed 
and flexibility required for Agile requirements. Lastly, programs can utilize the contracting 
strategies presented in this paper to acquire development support and utilize flexible 
contract vehicles that support Agile practices.  
This paper has offered potential solutions to these key challenges in order to aid 
programs in laying a foundation for successful Agile implementation. As Agile adoption 
continues to take root and expand across programs, the DoD would benefit from additional 
guidance and training to ensure consistent and pervasive success in Agile IT acquisition. 
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Abstract 
The U.S. Navy has increasingly emphasized dominating the information battlespace as a key 
aspect of its warfighting strategy. As the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance 
states,  
whether characterized as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, networks, 
communications, space, cyber, meteorology, oceanography, or electronic warfare, 
the Navy is inextricably and irreversibly dependent on information. Information 
provides a source of power but can also be an incapacitating weakness if not 
protected. Mastering the information domain is critical to the Navy’s future success. 
(U.S. Navy, 2012, p. 3) 
A key aspect of mastering the information domain is mastering the Navy command and 
control (C2) systems that Navy operators rely on to assemble, organize, interpret, and 
analyze information. In order to agilely respond to a variety of different situations, Navy C2 
systems must be agile themselves. The acquisition of Navy C2 systems has historically 
promoted stove-piped, single-mission systems that cannot react to the needs of today’s 
warfighters. 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific (SSC Pacific) has collaborated with PEO 
C4I to devise and test an alternate acquisition process to address the challenges inherent in 
Navy C2 software acquisition. The new Rapid Integration and Test Environment (RITE) is a 
new lifecycle model of Navy C2 software that places increased emphasis on early and 
frequent software testing, as well as necessary software engineering practices at the source 
code level. RITE is a combination of commercial best-practice software engineering 
standards and processes; community process governance; contractual guidance; automated 
testing and report generation tools; and hosted development, test, and automated distribution 
facilities using a government and industry team agile acquisition model. Through the use of 
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RITE, SSC Pacific and PEO C4I have beta-tested a process that can enable streamlined 
acquisition of Navy C2 software. 
Introduction 
The United States has reached a possible strategic inflection point in which the 
recent international paradigm of the United States as a unipolar world power is shifting to 
one in which a number of near-peer competitors and non-state actors are increasingly 
gaining influence. Ronald O’Rourke, a specialist in naval affairs for the Congressional 
Research Service, has stated, 
World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the 
international security environment is undergoing a shift from the familiar post-
Cold War era of the last 20–25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar 
moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different 
strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power 
competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order 
that has operated since World War II. (O’Rourke, 2014, p. i) 
Since 2013, the United States has seen a shift in the international strategic 
environment that has been focused primarily on three different factors: Russia’s aggression 
in Eastern Europe, China’s growing military modernization and actions in the East and 
South China Seas, and the increasing need to address non-state actions, including 
transnational crime and terrorist groups.  
Russia is aggressively seeking a larger role in East Europe, a role that includes 
pushing for regional integration, as well as intervening militarily when it feels its domestic 
interests are threatened. As the director of National Intelligence, James Clapper (2015) 
stated, “Moscow is pushing for greater regional integration, pressing neighboring states to 
follow the example of Belarus and Kazakhstan and join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic 
Union” (p. 17). Additionally, “in Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to covertly 
use military and paramilitary forces in a neighboring state—a development that raises 
anxieties in states along Russia’s periphery” (Clapper, 2015, p. 18). In fact, “some observers 
trace the beginnings of the argued shift in strategic situations back to 2008” (O’Rourke, 
2014, p. i) when “Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic Georgia 
without provoking a strong cost-imposing response from the United States and its allies” 
(O’Rourke, 2014, p. 4). In relations with its Eastern European neighbors, Russia has been 
using “so-called ‘ambiguous warfare’ tactics” (O’Rourke, 2014, p. 9), where it has supplied 
military support—often including troops—but covertly. Taken in context of Russia’s recent 
actions, “the Ukrainian crisis has profoundly affected Russia’s relations with the West and 
will have far-reaching effects on Russia’s domestic politics, economic development, and 
foreign policy” (Clapper, 2015, p. 17).  
The United States’ rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region has been initiated in large 
part due to China’s growing economic and military might, as well as its actions in the East 
and South China Seas. Clapper (2015) stated, “China will continue to pursue an active 
foreign policy—especially within the Asia Pacific—bolstered by increasing capabilities and 
its firm stance on East and South china Sea territorial disputes with rival claimants” (p. 19). 
In addition to maintaining an active foreign policy, like Russia, “China will probably seek to 
expand its economic role and outreach in the region, pursuing broader acceptance of its 
economic initiatives, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank” (Clapper, 2015, p. 
19). In pursuing its claims in the East and South China Sea, China has focused on a “so-
called ‘salami-slicing’” (O’Rourke, 2014, p. 9) tactic in which it chips away at others’ claims 
to slowly extend its power.  
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As noted in the National Security Strategy, “The threat of catastrophic attacks 
against our homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists” (Obama, 2015, p. 9). 
Moreover, potential terrorist adversaries “are not confined to a distinct country or region. 
Instead, they range from South Asia through the Middle East and into Africa” (Obama, 2015, 
p. 9). As Clapper (2015) stated, “Sunni violent extremists are gaining momentum and the 
number of Sunni violent extremist groups, members, and safe havens is greater than at any 
other point in history” (p. 4), so clearly, the threat is persistent. The DoD will continue to 
need to structure the military forces to address this threat in a variety of ways as terrorist 
attacks continue to evolve.  
This shift in the international strategic environment has led the DoD to seek for new 
ways for the military to continue to support our national interests of 
security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; a 
strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international 
economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for 
universal values at home and around the world; and a rules-based 
international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, 
security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global 
challenges. (Obama, 2015, p. 1)  
The Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Security Strategy outline the 
underpinnings of the defense strategy as it stands today. Based on this strategy, the United 
States will focus on the three following defense missions: 
• Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to 
support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and 
natural disasters. (DoD, 2014, p. v) 
• Build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter 
adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to 
address common security challenges. (DoD, 2014, p. v) 
• Project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy 
terrorist networks, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 
(DoD, 2014, p. v) 
While each of these missions is necessary to preserve the national interests set out 
in the National Security Strategy, achieving all of these, given the shifting international 
strategic environment, is a tall order. To address the evolving security environment, the DoD 
introduced The Defense Innovation Initiative on November 15, 2014 (Hagel, 2014c).  
This Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) has its roots in the offset strategies developed 
by national security professionals in the 1950s and the 1970s to ensure America’s military’s 
superiority. The first of these was President Eisenhower’s New Look in the 1950s, which 
prioritized nuclear deterrence. This was followed in the 1970s by the offset strategy of the 
Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program, which shaped future 
investments in leap-ahead capabilities such as standoff precision strike, stealth aircraft, 
wide-area surveillance, and networked forces. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, explained that these two previous offset 
strategies yielded an impressive set of military capabilities, comprising a “revolution that we 
unleashed on the world in the first Gulf War” (Roulo, 2014). He went on to state that while 
the United States has continued to rely on this set of capabilities in the decades since, 
adversaries have had time and space to respond by building similar capabilities, which has 
spurred focus on the development of a Third Offset Strategy (Roulo, 2014).  
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Defense leaders—including Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert Work—explain that the Third Offset Strategy is being driven by 
the growing risk to America’s continued technological superiority. In particular, Secretary 
Hagel (2014a) has stressed the threat posed by technology proliferation, noting that 
“disruptive technologies and destructive weapons once solely possessed by only advanced 
nations have proliferated widely, and are being sought or acquired by unsophisticated 
militaries and terrorist groups.” He also identified the threat from near-peer competitors 
China and Russia, stating that while the United States has been conducting stability 
operations for the past decade, China and Russia have been heavily investing in military 
modernization programs in order “to blunt our military’s technological edge” (Hagel, 2014b). 
In particular, Secretary Hagel emphasized that “they are … developing anti-ship, anti-air, 
counter-space, cyber, electronic warfare, and special operations capabilities that appear 
designed to counter traditional U.S. military advantages—in particular, our ability to project 
power to any region across the globe by surging aircraft, ships, troops, and supplies” (Hagel, 
2014b). Budgetary constraints facing the DoD have made this threat environment even 
more challenging, limiting the Department’s ability to respond through an increase in the 
size of our military or simply outspending adversaries.  
In response to this challenge to the United States’ technological and military 
superiority, the Third Offset Strategy—as instantiated in the Defense Innovation Initiative—
seeks to put “the competitive advantage firmly in the hands of American power projection 
over the coming decades” (Hagel, 2014c). It will do so through several interrelated areas: a 
technology effort through the Long Range Research and Development Plan, leadership 
development practices, a new approach towards wargaming, operational concepts, and a 
continued focus on more efficient and effective business practices. As Secretary Hagel 
emphasized in assessing the previous two offset strategies, “The critical innovation was to 
apply and combine these new systems and technologies with new strategic operational 
concepts, in ways that enable the American military to avoid matching an adversary “tank-
for-tank or soldier-for-soldier” (Hagel, 2014b).  
A key concept of the DII is the focus on efficient and effective business practices. 
This area builds on a number of efforts the DoD has stood up in the last several years 
focused on streamlining both the oversight structure and business practices of the entire 
department. One central effort of this focus on efficient and effective business practices has 
been Under Secretary Kendall’s series of Better Buying Power strategies designed to reform 
the defense acquisition system to enable more efficient and rapid fielding of DoD 
technologies. On September 19, 2014, Under Secretary Kendall released an interim draft of 
the third instantiation of the Better Buying Power, Better Buying Power 3.0. Kendall (2014) 
noted in the release, 
Better Buying Power (BBP) is based on the principle that continuous 
improvement is the best approach to improving the performance of the 
defense acquisition enterprise. The evolution from BBP 1.0 to BBP 2.0 was 
based on the premise that emphasis would shift as initiatives were put in 
place, experience was accumulated, data was collected and analyzed, and 
conditions changed. BBP 3.0 continues that approach with a shift in 
emphasis toward achieving dominant capabilities through innovation and 
technical excellence. (p. 2) 
BBP 3.0 is a key part of the DoD’s DII, in part because of their common concern that 
the technologies needed by military services are not being provided in a timely and efficient 
manner. The interim draft of BBP 3.0 states,  
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Underpinning BBP 3.0 is the growing concern that the United States’ 
technological superiority over potential adversaries is being threatened today 
in a way that we have not seen for decades. Our military today depends on a 
suite of dominant capabilities that originated in the ’70s and ’80s, has been 
enhanced and upgraded since, but has not fundamentally changed. This 
suite includes precision munitions, wide area surveillance systems, 
networked forces, and stealth technology. (Kendall, 2014, p. 2) 
The concerns noted in the interim draft released in September are exactly aligned to 
the strategic concerns that underpin the DoD’s effort to create a third offset strategy.  
BBP 3.0’s focuses on changing the culture and mindset in the defense acquisition 
community as well as ensuring that there are agile processes that defense acquisition 
experts can use to acquire and deliver cutting-edge capabilities. BBP 3.0 states,  
One of the dominant characteristics of defense acquisition is its scope and 
complexity. There are no simple solutions to all the myriad problems 
acquisition professionals have to solve. There is no short “rule set” that will 
tell us all we need to know. (Kendall, 2014, p. 3) 
This is true in part because the defense acquisition system is used to acquire a large 
variety of technologies. The same acquisition processes are used to acquire technologies 
that range from Navy Aircraft Carriers to command and control software systems, and Army 
tanks to cyber security constructs. Given the fluidity of the current and future security 
environment, there is no reason to expect that the need to acquire this wide variety of 
technologies will change any time soon. In fact, BBP 3.0 states, 
Potential adversaries are modernizing at a significant rate, and they are 
responding rapidly to our development programs and fielded systems. This is 
true of peer, near-peer and even less capable potential adversaries. Our 
technology development and system designs must accommodate this reality. 
We must plan for likely responses to our designs, and we must be watchful 
and responsive ourselves to emerging threats. (Kendall, 2014, p. 4) 
Thus, the DoD acquisition system must be able to accommodate the ability to agilely 
acquire and field a variety of systems.  
The U.S. Navy—as well as the other services—relies upon the defense acquisition 
process to field its crucial command and control systems. While these systems do have a 
variety of “hard” physical components, much of the value of the system is based upon the 
“soft” software components that act as the brains of the systems. The software pieces of C2 
systems—like Naval Integrated Tactical Environmental System–Next Generation (NITES-
NEXT), Maritime Tactical Command and Control (MTC2), and Distributed Common Ground 
Station–Navy (DCGS-N)—are being updated continually in order to address a variety of the 
challenges that command and control systems face today.  
Working with PEO C4I’s PMW-150, SSC Pacific has instituted the Rapid Integration 
and Testing Environment (RITE) to improve software development, testing and fielding. As 
Garcia explained, RITE is one of the strategic objectives that has been implemented “to 
support the Maritime C2 Roadmap” (2010, p. 17). He went on to note that “RITE is changing 
PMW 150’s software development methodology and modernizing the development process” 
(Garcia, 2010, p. 17). Utilizing the RITE will be a key component in enabling C2 software 
capabilities to be deployed more efficiently and effectively to the warfighter.  
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What is RITE?  
RITE is a combination of commercial best-practice software engineering standards 
and processes, community process governance, contractual guidance, automated testing 
and report generation tools, and hosted development, test and automated distribution 
facilities using a government and industry team agile acquisition model. RITE is composed 
of four pillars—contracts, infrastructure, processes, and organization—which work together 
to facilitate the development and distribution of Navy C2 systems.  
RITE was first initiated as a response to PEO challenges in managing, producing, 
and fielding C2 systems. The initial effort focused on finding ways was to improve product 
quality, move to competitive contract strategy, streamline acquisition cycle to meet 
aggressive timelines, and maximize release confidence and integration flexibility. The idea 
was to recognize that there is no silver bullet to solve these problems, but the approach 
should instead start with the most basic item: source code management. The key behind 
right is focus on improving component quality before delivery to decrease the average time 
needed to correct defects. Figure 1 illustrates how the average time needed to correct a 
defect increases based on how far it is from the initial code stage. 
 
 Figure 1. Average Time to Correct Defect 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the closer the defect is identified to the code stage, the less 
time is needed to fix the problem. Together, the four RITE pillars work together to create an 
environment that makes it possible to manage software development as close to the source 
as possible.  
RITE Contracts  
The RITE contract pillar focuses on providing specific language that can be used in 
any contract that encourages a collaborative relationship. The RITE, as implemented by 
SSC Pacific, does not require a special contract vehicle type and, to date, has been 
delivered using existing Cost Plus Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contracts. Overall, CPFF has proven to 
provide the most cost-effective vehicle to support the research and developmental nature of 
the work that SSC Pacific performs. SSC Pacific has found that system engineering, 
software development, and test and integration support requirements are best met when the 
vendor is able to support evolving program requirements and to take advantage of changes 
in technology. SSC Pacific has inserted specific contract language within individual 
contracts/task orders and has tailored selected Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) to ensure that 
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the vendor is contractually obligated to work in close collaboration with SSC Pacific to 
implement the RITE model. 
The objectives of the RITE contract pillars are focused on the five aspects: ask, use, 
receive, verify, and ensure. First, SSC Pacific uses contract language to ask for what the 
project needs, including specifics and requirements. Second, RITE is focused on using 
developers based on performance measures. The idea is to reduce the reliance on a single 
vendor, reduce barriers to entry, and decrease switching costs. RITE uses performance 
measures to ensure that there are increased choices at a competitive price throughout the 
development system. Third, RITE contracts ensure that SSC Pacific receives all of what it 
pays for. To that end, RITE requires that SSC Pacific receives buildable source code only as 
delivers—this includes source code for science and technology projects. Fourth, with RITE, 
SSC Pacific verifies that it receives what was promised through a rigorous software quality 
assurance. Finally, RITE uses enterprise repository contents and buildable source code 
operations to ensure that SSC Pacific can reproduce what it paid for. Integrating all five of 
these aspects into a single contract requires a great deal of planning up front, but pays big 
dividends over the life of the project. 
The key feature in making RITE contracts as effective as they can be is the 
government—contractor relationship that is formed. SSC Pacific engages early to help 
determine the correct contract type. This engagement includes providing assessed risk of 
integration development or adapter software development and mitigating risk using RITE’s 
program comprehensive and coordinated Software Developer’s Kit (SDK). It is also key that 
all parties provide necessary documentation to ensure full and open competition. SSC Strive 
to create documentation consistent with the performance-based contracting approach. SSC 
Pacific will also advocate for the government’s unlimited rights in the technical data and 
software delivered by the contractor. Finally, RITE allows the government to use Multiple-
Award Contracts—creating a truly competitive award environment.  
RITE Processes 
RITE processes include source code analysis tools to provide better cost estimates 
at source code level, internal inspection of code to reveal the state of the system from a 
software engineering level and software complexity, dependencies and coverage, and 
incorporation of automated test tools, able to reduce the time required to run a large number 
of test cases and increase the number of test events completed in less time.  
RITE processes rely upon an iterative “sprint” model of development and delivery. 
Figure 2 illustrates the RITE development model. 
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 Figure 2. RITE Development Model 
As Figure 2 illustrates, each requirement is first broken down into a number of tasks. 
These tasks are then accomplished in a series of “sprints” with each sprint including a full 
iterative cycle of the product. As the iteration detail shows, each of the sprints includes the 
full cycle of examination of detailed requirements, design and analysis, implementation and 
testing, quality assurance and acceptance testing, and software deployment, and finishes up 
with an evaluation of the deployed software and a prioritization of tasks for the next sprint.  
As Figure 3 shows, the sprint model allows for the product to be released in short 
bursts to the customer, rather than waiting for release only at the final Milestone C. 
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 Figure 3. Sprint Model 
The release of C2 software products as the development and demonstration phase 
progresses will get the C2 capability into the warfighter’s operations quickly, as well as 
enabling much shorter testing time, as the problems are found during the product build 
cycle, rather than after it.  
RITE Infrastructure 
RITE infrastructure relies upon a centralized repository to enhance project 
communication and collaboration. The centralized repository creates a framework for 
software distribution (i.e., an application store), documentation library, development areas, 
software testing tools and data, and centralized software configuration management. 
Essentially, RITE creates a Distributed Development Environment (DDE), which is a virtual 
collaborative environment that spans multiple organizations and/or multiple physical 
locations. As Garcia (2010) has described, “in a DDE, project members share ideas, 
information and resources, and actively collaborate to achieve a common goal. The primary 
advantage of DDE is availability of resources and access to software development tools 
from different locations” (p. 17). Figure 4 details the RITE central repository infrastructure. 
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 Figure 4. RITE Central Repository Infrastructure 
As Figure 4 illustrates, the C4ISR developers, each of the testing labs, and the 
operational users are all connected to a central repository where the C2 applications, 
software artifacts, and automation tolls are housed.  
Having a single infrastructure with a central repository greatly aids in the effort to 
maintain configuration management (CM). RITE includes management of configuration 
management and planning. This allows the parties to produce and adjust the CM plan as 
needed as well as ensuring timeliness of the lifecycle. This centralized repository also helps 
in identifying artifacts to be under CM control for functional, allocated, and product 
baselines. Enabling configuration control allows for baseline, change, and release 
management. In addition, various control boards are established to oversee overall CM. The 
central repository also allows for a designated project lead to maintain complete access 
control. The central repository will also store reports on artifacts as to their status in lifecycle, 
release state, configuration, interfaces, and physical environment as well as reports on who 
has accessed the different pieces, when the pieces were accessed and the delivery 
schedule. The final piece of CM in the central repository includes validation that all artifacts 
are held, available, and in proper status as well as the functional configuration audit (FCA) 
which documents whether the system does what it is proclaimed to do.  
RITE Organization 
In order to ensure that RITE is implemented effectively, it must be organized with 
deliberation. The organization managing the product must be a carefully selected team of 
people who all understand their jobs up front, and is organized for success. Figure 5 details 
the ideal organization for a RITE project.  
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 Figure 5. Ideal Organization for RITE Project 
As Figure 5 illustrates, the government ownership of the project and process is a key 
aspect of ensuring that the RITE project is successful. In particular, it is important for the 
project manager, product owner, and at least part of the development team to be 
government employees. The utilization of contractors is a key aspect of RITE, as it is 
unrealistic to expect that the government will be able to supply all the qualified personnel 
needed for the software engineering required by RITE. In addition, contractors can often 
offer other key skills that may not be present in the government workforce. Utilizing a mix of 
government employees and contractors allows for the project to reap the benefits of each 
group’s unique skill set.  
RITE in Action 
SSC Pacific and PMW-150 have already used RITE with a variety of programs. The 
past record of RITE demonstrates that it can provide significant cost and time savings. The 
agile nature of the software development institutionalizes end user input all along the 
development process, and also gets the capability into the end user’s hands much earlier. 
Using this agile process enables quick changes to current C2 programs of record, which has 
the potential to give the Navy an asymmetric C2 advantage over adversaries with outdated 
systems. Finally, the RITE process can—and should—be utilized by the entire DoD as all 
services grapple with the challenge of fielding twenty-first-century technology with a 
twentieth-century acquisition system.  
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Abstract 
Efforts to develop and implement automated test capability within the Department of Defense 
have resulted in the development of a number of tools. Literature from 2007 references use 
of automated testing to reduce the design cycle time of software, and it has been noted as 
one of several key components included as part of the more comprehensive plan for 
transforming the business and technical approaches to become more responsive to Fleet 
readiness requirements with the goal of providing more agile, integrated capabilities for the 
Navy by increasing supportability, standardization, system interoperability, network security, 
and Joint alignment. 
This paper describes efforts to implement software systems automated test capability and an 
analysis of the results of the effort. The paper examines how well the automated test 
capability performed and evaluates the impact on system development time compared to 
systems developed using more traditional methods. In addition, a review of lessons learned 
and recommendations for further enhancements are discussed. 
Overview: The Testing Challenge  
Infinity Is a Big Place 
The common slogan is that testing can demonstrate the presence of errors, but 
cannot guarantee their absence. This is valid in almost all situations. The exception is 
software services, for which the input space is small enough for exhaustive testing. Inputs 
include input parameters, initial states, and data read from files or input data streams. 
Practical limits for exhaustive testing are roughly one 32 bit input, which would require about 
4 billion test cases. If we assume a 4GHz processor that takes 10 clock cycles per 
instruction on the average, that would take 10 seconds times the number of instructions 
1 The views presented is this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views of DoD or its components. 
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needed to execute the service. For a service with a 32 bit input, that takes 1,000 instructions 
per execution—time for exhaustive testing would be about three hours; if the service needs 
a million instructions per execution, time for exhaustive testing becomes about four months. 
For most practical services, the size of the input space far exceeds those estimated 
above, and in many cases, it may be unbounded, or bounded only by the capacity of the 
hardware. Since the size of the input space is exponential in the length of the input, this gets 
ridiculously intractable very fast: For services with just two 32-bit inputs, multiply the 
exhaustive testing time estimates above by 4 billion. Many practical services have much 
larger input spaces than that. Even though real computing hardware consists of finite state 
machines, the number of possible states in our machines is so large that it is not practically 
distinguishable from infinity. 
There Will Be Bugs Left Behind 
A consequence of the above analysis is that essentially all practical software 
systems are delivered with remaining imperfections.  
However, not all faults are created equal: Every fault results in a failure for some 
subset of the input space. Since these spaces are finite, although very large, the failure 
spaces can be measured by the number of points in the failure space, or by the fraction of 
the input space occupied by the failure space. The latter fraction can be interpreted as the 
failure probability or failure rate associated with a given fault. Although the exact numbers 
involved are generally too large to be determined exactly, they can be estimated within 
given error tolerances by statistical sampling methods, and they can be used as a 
conceptual tool for classifying faults according to the associated failure rates. 
The faults with the highest failure rate are those that produce a failure for all possible 
inputs. These are the faults with the highest impact on quality of service, and fortunately 
they are also the easiest to detect, since any single test case will detect all of them 
simultaneously. Faults with lower failure rates are increasingly difficult to detect via black 
box testing.  
At the other extreme are the single-point failures: faults that result in a failure for only 
a single point in the input space, and produce correct results for all other input values. This 
category of failures is statistically invisible in practice, since a number of test cases close to 
exhaustive testing would be required to have an appreciable probability of detecting them in 
the absence of additional information about the fault. 
Critical Bugs Are Must Fix 
Failures are also not created equal: Some failures have more severe consequences 
than others. The critical bugs are those with the most severe consequences. Exposure is a 
combination of failure rate and severity of consequences. Severity of consequences can be 
measured with an abstraction known as “risk,” which can be estimated subjectively as a 
function of severity and failure rate, which can be interpreted as the expected likelihood of 
failure and relative overall cost to the Enterprise. In DoD contexts, severity of consequences 
has additional dimensions that include human injury and loss of life, in addition to financial 
loss. Risk is widely characterized as 
 R[f] (s, fr).        (1) 
MIL-STD-882E (DoD, 2012) recognizes that severities and failure rates for particular 
hazards are rarely known exactly, and provides an approximate method for ranking hazards 
by degree of risk exposure that depend on subjective qualitative assessment of severity and 
failure rates based on informally defined ranges. The standard also provides guidance on 
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the level of authority needed to accept residual risks in each category of risk exposure. The 
practical result of this guidance is that the highest risks must be mitigated by measures that 
reduce the severity, failure rate, or both. This includes fixing the known faults with the 
highest risk exposure. 
The weak point of current practice involves the word “known” in the previous 
sentence—all too often, faults become known only after at least one associated failure has 
occurred, along with associated undesired consequences. We would prefer faults with 
potentially severe consequences to be detected prior to fielding and actual occurrence of 
any failures due to those faults. This can be done by risk-based testing, which is done by 
automated testing whose intensity is determined by a risk analysis (Berzins, 2014). 
Finding Critical Bugs Requires Cheating 
Critical bugs may be statistically invisible. This is often the case for faults that are 
deliberately placed in the code by malicious insiders, such as Easter eggs and back doors. 
Such malicious additions to code are likely to be explicitly designed to produce statistically 
invisible single-point failures (see There Will Be Bugs Left Behind section). Such items are 
likely to be placed in services whose input spaces are much larger than the maximum size 
feasible for exhaustive testing. 
For example, an Easter egg could be placed in a spreadsheet that would only be 
activated if a particular key was entered in a particular cell and all of the other cells were 
empty. Suppose that a cell can hold 10 characters and the spreadsheet can have 100 rows 
and 100 columns (most spreadsheets can accept much more data than this). If the testers 
know that only one cell is non-empty, then the number of possible input states is 10,000 * 280> 1028. The probability of detecting the Easter egg by black box testing using 4 billion 
random test cases (roughly the largest practical amount) is approximately 4 *10−19, which is 
less than the likelihood of winning the grand prize in your favorite lottery twice in a row. 
Without knowing anything about the pattern that triggers the Easter egg, the number of 
possible input states becomes 2800,000 and the probability of detection by intensive black 
box testing would be less than 10−239,990, which is less than the chances of winning the 
grand prize in the lottery every day for the next 1026,650 years, even if we increase the 
number of test cases to the number that could be executed by all the computers in the world 
working for a century. To put that in perspective, the length of the winning streak is about 1026,640 times the age of our universe. This example is intended to illustrate that 
“statistically invisible” means “impossible to detect by black-box testing.” 
Clear box testing can do better than black box testing in such cases, by using 
traditional coverage criteria, such as ensuring that every statement in the program has been 
executed for at least one test case. Running the usual test cases and keeping track of which 
statements have been executed, which can be done via instrumentation capabilities 
optionally provided by many compilers, will expose the rare paths in the code. Difficulties 
associated with covering the remaining statements include finding test inputs that exercise 
particular statements and determining whether remaining statements are in fact unreachable 
code. Although both problems are algorithmically unsolvable in the general case, for the 
kind of code encountered in practice, constraint solvers can succeed in synthesizing suitable 
test inputs for the majority of the cases and for identifying some of the unreachable code. 
The remaining code can be small enough to be singled out for human inspection. 
Software and Hardware Are Never Finished 
Successful systems always have long lists of pending change requests, including 
repairs for discovered faults and requested enhancements to functionality. In the Navy, such 
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changes are typically implemented in technology upgrade cycles that occur every two or 
every four years, depending on the program. Each change has the possibility of introducing 
new bugs into the system, and each new release must therefore be re-tested. This implies 
that tests must be repeated many times during the lifetime of a typical system.  
Improving Affordability by Automated Testing 
In practice, testing accounts for a substantial fraction of the cost of developing each 
new release. An online game called the Massive Multiplayer Online War-game Leveraging 
the Internet (MMOWGLI) was run in two rounds during 2013. This web-based game involves 
large numbers of distributed players who interacted to encourage innovative thinking via 
crowd-sourcing, generate ideas for solving problems, and plan actions that carry out 
identified solutions.  
The second round of the MMOWGLI game addressed the issue of reducing cost 
without reducing system quality or capability. Several of the highest-ranked action plans 
produced by the game included automated testing and retesting as part of the strategy for 
affordably ensuring system quality (Schmidt, 2014). 
Testing Is a Design Requirement 
Hardware Is Designed With Test Points 
Computing hardware, particularly integrated circuits, is designed to include special 
interfaces for testing. The purpose of these interfaces is to provide observability and 
controllability of internal states of the circuit. These are necessary because internal points 
on the chip are physically inaccessible and because the yield of manufacturing processes is 
less than 100%. Uncontrollable variations in manufacturing conditions, such as imperfect 
alignment of lithography masks and imperfect printing and etching due to dust particles in 
the air and working fluids, result in fabricated geometries that deviate from the ideal design. 
Some fraction of these result in chips that do not behave as designed. Successful sales 
depend on rapid acceptance testing that separates the functional chips that can be sold 
from the damaged ones that must be discarded. 
Testing of digital hardware is easier than testing software for many reasons, 
including the following: 
• Uniform state representation. For the purposes of testing, circuit state can be 
usefully represented as fixed-length bit vectors. When the circuit is in testing 
mode, all internal state cells are configured into a long shift register that can 
be sequentially output through the pins for observability and input from the 
pins for controllability. This enables open loop testing, where each test sets 
the internal state to a specified value, executes chosen operations, and then 
the internal state is read out for analysis. This avoids the problem of finding 
input sequences that will drive a possibly faulty circuit into prescribed initial 
test states, reduces time to design test cases, and speeds up the actual 
execution of the tests. In contrast, software states are typically sensitive to 
the meaning of the data, which varies widely between applications. This 
precludes a one-size-fits-all solution to observability and controllability of 
internal states. 
• Known expected outputs. Since hardware tests are looking for deviations 
from the designed behavior, expected outputs can be derived using a uniform 
and conceptually simple process: Simulate the logical design on the test 
inputs, and calculate the expected results. This process is typically 
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completely automated. Since software tests are looking for design faults, 
finding expected outputs is a much harder problem that does not have an 
easy, uniform solution and generally requires human creativity for each new 
application. 
• Effective error models. The processes that introduce manufacturing defects 
are well understood and produce defects that are easy to characterize. The 
most common defects are voids in conductors (manufactured circuits lack 
connections that are present in the design) and bridging between adjacent 
conductors (manufactured circuits have extra connections that are not 
present in the design). The vast majority of hardware faults can be effectively 
detected by test sets that expose all single stuck-at faults, and practical 
algorithms for automatically constructing such test sets are known.  
Software has much more complex failure patterns, and complete test sets for 
detecting such patterns are not algorithmically computable in the general case.2 
Observability and controllability for internal states of software are discussed in the next 
section. 
Architecture Assessment for Testability 
Software architectures can have a great impact on the effort required for system 
testing and the effort required to employ automated testing. Recent efforts by the Technical 
Reference Frameworks Working Group sponsored by ASN RDA have developed a 
structured set of testability levels to help assess these effects, shown in Table 1. 
2 This is a consequence of Rice’s theorem, a well-known undecidability property. 
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Table 1. Testability Levels 
 
Each level incorporates the requirements for all lower levels. The rationale for Table 
1 can be explained as follows: 
1. The externally observable behavior of a system consists of the services it 
provides to other systems. To enable independent testing of the system and 
its components, at a minimum the names of those services, the types of input 
data that each requires, and the types of data that each produces must be 
available to the testing team so that the services can be invoked by 
associated testing procedures. At level 1, this information should be specified 
as part of the system architecture to enable testing at each granularity level. 
2. Although validation testing can be done at level 1, by relying on stakeholder 
review of each test output to judge adequacy of demonstrated behavior, 
verification testing requires level 2. Level 2 requires the architecture to 
include documented requirements for each service that are sufficiently 
precise to enable the testing team to make pass/fail decisions regarding the 
test outputs for each test case and service required at this level. This includes 
precise definitions of the properties of the real world that affect the 
requirements but may not be directly observable by the software. For 
example, a safety requirement in an aircraft control system typically specifies 
a minimum acceptable separation between aircraft. The requirement applies 
to the actual physical separation between the planes, rather than to the data 
visible to the control system software, which may differ because they are 
derived from sensors that can fail or produce inaccurate results. Level 2 may 
require human judgment for pass/fail decisions on test outputs, but those 
judgments can be made by the testing team, without requiring stakeholder 
participation in every test. 
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3. Level 3 includes documentation of all constraints, restrictions, and 
exceptional conditions associated with each service under test, not just the 
expected normal case behavior. This information is needed to check 
robustness of system operation, and can be used as a guideline for designing 
test cases focused on this issue. Level 3 implies complete coverage of the 
requirements, including both what the system is required to do and what it is 
required to avoid doing, regardless of whether inputs are in a “reasonable” 
range. For example, architectures at testability level 3 should include 
requirements on system input that would guard against SQL injection attacks; 
this information would support development of test cases that check what 
system behavior would result from such attacks. 
4. At level 4, all system attributes relevant to checking the requirements are 
observable via standardized interfaces that are part of the architecture. This 
enables the software to be tested without modification by the test team, for 
example, without the need to manually add instrumentation code, and it 
enables test cases and test scripts to be portable across development and 
testing environments. Instrumentation is an issue in modern designs that use 
information hiding and object-oriented structures to limit access to internal 
system states. Access to some of these attributes may be needed for testing 
purposes, although they may not be needed during system operation, and 
their presence during system operation may not always be desirable due to 
the possibility of introducing cyber vulnerabilities. Therefore the testing 
interfaces may be excluded from the fielded version of the system, but they 
must conform to the documented standards whenever they are present. If 
instrumentation code is needed, architectures with testability level 4 include 
clearly documented standards for those testing interfaces. Ideally those 
standards enable automated instrumentation of the code in a repeatable 
manner that does not require human coding effort. 
5. At level 5, all requirements are defined precisely enough so that all pass/fail 
decisions can be made based on defined criteria and measurement methods, 
without any expert human judgment required. Level 5 may still require human 
effort to apply the criteria, but they must be repeatable by anyone following a 
detailed written procedure. 
6. At level 6, all requirements are defined precisely enough so that all pass/fail 
decisions for test cases can be made automatically, by software, firmware, or 
hardware. This implies that execution of test cases and assessment of test 
results can be completely automated at this level. Such automated tests can 
be repeated quickly at minimal cost, although up front setup costs for creating 
the automated decision procedures would be required. Level 6 differs from 
level 5 in that all of the criteria and measurement methods have been defined 
down to the granularity of basic operations that can be automated. Auxiliary 
instrumentation and communication links for physical attributes may be 
needed to support automated tests. For example, information from onboard 
GPS receivers may be needed to test separation between planes for the case 
in 2 above. 
7. At level 7, test inputs can be randomly generated at need, based on 
probability distributions called operational profiles, and all pass/fail decisions 
can be automated. The difference between levels 6 and 7 is that 6 can be 
met via a list of expected outputs for a fixed set of test cases, while 7 requires 
a general pass/fail checking procedure that works for all possible inputs. This 
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level implies that additional test cases can be created without any human 
effort, which makes the marginal cost of additional test cases very small. At 
this level, very large test samples are affordable. This implies very high 
degrees of statistical confidence in system reliability can be achieved relative 
to the system workloads characterized by the operational profile distributions. 
An additional test capability that can be provided at level 6 or 7 is built-in-test (BIT), 
which means that completely automated test capabilities are integrated into the deployed 
system, and can be invoked out in the field. Such capabilities may be used to ensure that all 
systems are functional prior to a mission or to recover from some types of equipment 
failures. If included in the architecture, such capabilities should include procedures for 
remedial action and be targeted at the most frequent expected failures. For example, a well-
designed built-in test should be capable of diagnosing which part has failed, and issue 
instructions regarding what needs replacing and how to do it, or automatically switch to a 
backup system and issue a warning about the degraded status of the system. A very simple 
example of such a built-in test capability is a warning that a battery needs replacement or 
recharging, based on internal sensors. The benefit of including such capabilities is the ability 
to recover from some system failures out in the field, without the cost and delay of returning 
equipment to a home base for repair. 
It is not necessarily useful to require every system service to have automated or 
built-in-test capabilities. Automated testing is generally beneficial only if the tests will be 
repeated often enough so that reduced marginal costs outweigh the extra setup cost of 
developing the automated test capabilities for each requirement. This is illustrated further in 
the following section.  
An additional situation where automated testing is beneficial is in mitigating severe 
system risks, where high statistical confidence in particular system properties is required. 
That generally requires large numbers of randomly chosen test cases, which becomes 
affordable only at testability level 7. For example, guidance in MIL-STD-882-D (DoD, 2000) 
suggests that failure rates for mishaps with catastrophic consequences should not exceed〖10−6, which requires roughly 20 million test cases if the probability of sampling error leading 
to a false positive conclusion must also be no more than 10−6. See Berzins and Dailey 
(2009) for details on determining the number of test cases required to meet given statistical 
confidence levels. 
Experience With Automated Testing 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific’s Command and Intelligence 
Systems Division of the Command and Control Department is the author of a software 
development and acquisition initiative that is gaining momentum across the Navy and DoD. 
This initiative is no new big bang/silver bullet; it simply focuses on lowering the cost and risk 
of government-developed software by demanding closer government control of the baseline, 
focusing testing where needed, and streamlining processes to deliver capability faster by 
relying on agile development methods.  
Historically, DoD software was developed utilizing Waterfall or Spiral development 
methods. A prime contractor would be awarded the contract to go and build applications, 
integrate them, and return once completed, for a major Development Test (DT). This 
process typically lasted anywhere from 12–36 months, and after testing, as much as 48 
months, before a requested capability or version of software was fielded. Often the software 
would be released reliant on hardware that would not be backward supported, causing 
additional issues with the installation and fielding of the applications. The DoD strove to 
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change this process and leverage the agile method to enable delivery of those applications 
faster.  
Agile is a total paradigm shift for programs or development teams. Agile and 
Waterfall differ in many ways. A literature search reveals sources documenting many of the 
differences. Table 2 outlines several of the differences that are most relevant to DoD 
programs. 
Table 2. Agile/Waterfall Compare and Contrast 
 
There are many other differences between the two methods, but the last one in 
Table 2 is intriguing and one to explore. 
In most DoD programs that require software, the applications are built and tested at 
the contractor facility while development occurs. The tests, called Contractor Tests (CTs), 
are typically the contractor’s best guess as to how the products are going to be incorporated 
into a system and used in a workflow to support the user’s needs. When contractors have 
the ability to interact with the end users to get a good feel for the end use workflow, testing 
is better and the products typically work more efficiently, but are still subject to major defects 
based on architectural changes or dependent application modifications that might hamper 
the applications from working correctly.  
From this point, once built and tested in the developers’ facility, the software is sent 
to the Integration Facility. The Rapid Integration and Test Environment (RITE) method infers 
that the Integration is conducted by a government facility or trusted agent, such as a 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). Once the software is 
delivered to Integration, Integration Tests (ITs) are conducted. This process, according to 
the RITE method, is a graduated set of tests that begin with scanning and analysis of the 
source code delivered to the government-managed repository. The RITE Process requires 
source code be analyzed to ensure that it is built with suitable quality,3 as defined by the 
program manager and Integration Team. Source code scanning, a waterfall technique 
adopted for use by agile, and “White Box” type testing of source code is a fundamental 
change to the way that DoD integration activities have conducted tests in the past. The 
ability for DoD entities to now look down to the source code line that is the root cause for the 
defect and point remediation to that specific line of code is very powerful and extremely 
helpful in managing precious taxpayer dollars in the ownership of software intense systems.  
3 Quality measurements are based on industry standards by referencing items such as SQALE, ISO, 
or IEEE documents as determined by the program manager. 
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The Integration Team then takes the software, once scanned and compiled, and 
begins deployment into a system development sandbox. These sandboxes allow the 
components to be “bolted” together and subsequently tested as dependent components, 
providing more of the end system execution environment. Automation testing at this stage is 
conducted based on CT artifacts that have been collected in previous deliveries that go into 
generating the Automation Regression Library. The beauty of this is that as system 
capability and applications mature, so does the automation regression library. Many would 
argue that automation and the development of scripting automated testing procedures is a 
heavy investment for many programs to undergo. It is true that the investment is substantial 
initially, but after the program has the foundation scripts generated, the investment in time is 
minimal to keep them updated delivery to delivery.  
In some programs, our goal for automation was set to cover 65% of our testing via 
Automated Regression Scripts. As we quickly learned, this took approximately six months of 
dedicated, full-time effort for two personnel to script up the 65% of foundation scripts that we 
would utilize for a software intensive program, and then a dedicated 20% of two people’s 
time each month updating the Regression Library. With a productivity factor of 100 hours 
per month for a test engineer for a given Sprint, 20 of those hours would be used to do 
nothing more than update the Regression Library. The payoff is that using these scripts 
allowed a program with a code base of over 6 million SLOC to run over 3,500 test cases in a 
period of less than 10 hours. This same set of test cases was run manually by six test 
engineers 10 hours per day for 20 consecutive days. See Table 3 for a breakdown. 
Table 3. Automation vs. Manual Test Comparison 
 
By reviewing Table 3, one can see the investment in scripting hours over the period 
of six months to get adequate regression suite of test.  
Additional analysis shows that this investment is quickly paid off in two months or 
Sprints of dedicated testing that would have otherwise had to be done manually, and that 
the Return On that Investment (ROI) is 560 hours times the number of months or Sprints 
required after that. This enables the test team to repurpose the 560 hours that would have 
gone to repeat the regression test, adequate time to focus on new functionality or fix defects 
from one delivery to another. The ability to focus assets on new functionality facilitates the 
ability of the testing to cover a greater breadth of system capability and help decrease the 
possibility of major defects being released once the system is delivered. The goal is to 
achieve as close to 100% test coverage as possible. 
On any delivery, the software produced typically satisfies anywhere from 1 to 200 
requirements. This can require a proportional number of test cases to plow through in the 
space of the 30 days allocated to a Sprint. The only foreseeable way to test this new 
developed capability sufficiently, while at the same time ensuring that no previous capability 
has been broken as a result of the newly delivered code, requires dedication of hours from 
the test team, affordable only through automation. GUI Drivers, such as AutoIT, and test 
orchestration platforms, such as Test Complete, enable linking of automation scripts to 
generate predictive test workflows that mimic real world task execution. Testing can be 
planned based on certain requirements or mission components linked together to operate in 
certain environments. Additionally, increasing occurrences of executed instances or 
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increasing frequency of web service calls can generate load to test performance of a 
system.  
One of the fundamental aspects of the RITE process is “focused testing.” Focused 
testing is accomplished in three phases. The first phase uses automated code quality 
analysis tools to scan software for Software Quality defects. These defects are relayed back 
to the developer upon identification for quick remediation. The second phase uses test 
scripts provided by the developer that are the foundation of automated functional testing to 
test services and component functionality build to build. The final phase uses human 
resources to manually test new features and develop automated scripts which will be used 
in future iterations of the focused testing process on successive software builds. Figure 1 
shows the RITE recommended Testing Flow of Software through the Continuous Integration 
process. 
 
 Figure 1. Continuous Integration Process Flow (Anchor A Continues the Process) 
Figure 1 also shows the flow of test-required dependencies as a software component 
evolves through integration. Rigorous testing requires a certain level of graduation from the 
lowest level, source code, to the higher components, and through to the System level. This 
graduated testing helps catch defects sooner, and enables fixes prior to fielding where the 
corresponding costs are much higher. 
See Figure 2 for a sample Defect Fix Cost Chart. Figure 2 shows that as the Product 
Lifecycle progresses, the costs of fixing defects rise. This is typically where DoD programs 
suffer. Programs that subscribe to the RITE process, working from contracts that generate 
certain Quality Requirements for software to be developed and received, would lower the 
rates of defects being produced. In addition, the focused testing element of RITE also helps 
detect early on any defects that could find their way into the delivered source code. Finally, 
the use of an evolving automated regression suite, run repeatedly through the development 
and integration process, helps in decreasing the time spent in the model conducting a formal 
Development Test at the completion of a version release. 
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 Figure 2. Defect Fix Cost 
Conclusions  
Automated testing has an important role to play in achieving affordable systems that 
reliably carry out their missions. This paper discusses automated testing, which primarily 
checks conformance of software behavior relative to system requirements. Other factors, 
such as quality of the requirements and the software architecture, are also relevant to 
system quality, and quality assurance techniques targeting those factors should be 
combined with automated testing for best results.  
As explained in the Architecture Assessment for Testability section of this paper, 
effective automated testing depends on requirements that are both valid (capture the real 
needs of the stakeholders) and sufficiently well-defined to enable computing, whether 
particular test outputs conform to requirements or not. This is a challenge that will stress 
current requirements analysis processes, which typically produce natural language 
statements such as English descriptions of user needs. While such representations are 
needed for communication with people, they are insufficient by themselves for supporting 
automatic generation of test cases and automatic grading of test results. Natural language 
statements need to be augmented with more explicit representations that can support 
calculation of resulting truth values, such as logical assertions or the Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) associated with UML. This will require extra effort in requirements analysis, 
not only for coding requirements into these forms, but also for ensuring that the results are 
valid, and for refining the content of the requirements to provide sufficient definition detail 
and precision to carry out that encoding reliably. That extra effort is part of the initial 
investment needed to enable cost reduction by automated testing. 
Complementary quality assurance processes are needed to ensure the quality of the 
software architecture and the subsystem requirements and specifications associated with 
that architecture. This is essential for affordably achieving reliability of large systems. A post-
mortem analysis of software faults from the Voyager/Galileo programs found that the 
majority of the software faults were due to requirements and specification errors and 
misunderstanding of interfaces to external systems, not coding errors (Lutz, 1993). One of 
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the essential quality attributes for the requirements and specifications associated with a 
software architecture is a degree of consistency sufficient to enable harmonious 
interoperability between the subsystems specified in the architecture, because its absence 
leads to expensive system integration problems. 
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Abstract 
Managing DoD acquisition programs is a complicated process. The turbulence created by 
funding instability makes it even more difficult. To help program offices maintain their overall 
funding execution pace, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) instituted Obligation 
and Expenditure rate goals over two decades ago. Acquisition program managers have found 
it difficult to meet established Obligation and Expenditure rate goals. For the purposes of this 
study (sponsored by Nancy Spruill, director of Acquisition Resources and Analysis, Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and based on 
Defense Acquisition University and OSD subject matter expertise, the authors looked closely 
at potential causal factors that could be interfering with the achievement of these goals. Two 
hundred and twenty-nine DoD personnel responded to a comprehensive survey. The 
respondents were comprised of program office personnel (program managers [PMs], deputy 
PMs, budget and financial managers [FMs], and contracting officers); program executive 
officers (PEOs) and their chief financial officers; and a variety of senior OSD staff including 
Headquarters FM senior staff and Senior Acquisition Executive staff. The respondents were 
asked if they found metrics helpful in better meeting OSD goals as well as the use of any 
process improvements. 
Introduction 
In the months preceding this research effort, Nancy Spruill, director, Acquisition 
Resources and Analysis, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD [AT&L]) solicited support from the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) to help uncover the causal factors that could be interfering with the 
attainment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD’s) Obligation and Expenditure 
rate goals. To learn more about the intervening obstacles, DAU, along with assistance from 
the OSD, developed a comprehensive survey that queried experienced and high-level 
Department of Defense (DoD) personnel involved in a weapon program’s decision chain. 
What we learned from the subsequent analysis confirmed several previous suspicions. The 
data also indicated the prevalence of more underlining perception variances among many of 
the factors that could be undermining program execution itself. 
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Research Methodology  
Two hundred and twenty-nine DoD personnel responded to this survey. The 
respondents were comprised of program office personnel (program managers, deputy 
program managers, budget and financial managers, and contracting officers), program 
executive officers and their chief financial officers (CFOs), and a variety of senior staff at the 
OSD including Headquarter Financial Management (FM) senior staff and Senior Acquisition 
Executive (SAE) staff (Table 1). Because several functional areas saw lower response rates, 
a more detailed analysis of the causal factors was restricted to an aggregate sample size 
given the confidence levels required to draw any inferences or conclusions.  
Table 1. Respondent Demographics 
 
Respondents ranked the impact of 64 factors under nine categories (Figure 1). The 
researchers then assessed the rankings using a top box (TB) three methodology (i.e., the 
percentage of 5, 6, and 7 responses on a Likert-like scale from 1–7). Since the frequency of 
occurrence for some factors could also be contributing to the interference, the researchers 
included an additional selection (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly, etc.) to isolate any potential 
ignition areas. 
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 Figure 1. Factor Categories 
Discussion 
Factor Distribution 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of all 64 factors assessed. Three factors reported an 
impact rating of two standard deviations above the mean (denoted by +2𝜎𝜎); six factors 
reported an impact rating of one standard deviation above the mean (denoted by +1𝜎𝜎); and 
22 factors rose above an average impact rating (denoted by x�). The remaining 33 factors fell 
below the aggregate x�. 
Nineteen of the 22 factors measured for frequency of occurrence resulted in an 
impact rating above 39%. Sometimes, just one occurrence appeared to have a significant 
impact. 
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 Figure 2. Factor Ranking Distribution 
The Causal Factors Rank Ordered 
Table 2 lists the relative ranking of all 64 factors in the context of top box descending 
order to provide a comprehensive view of all factors, although the remaining discussion in 
this paper addresses the factors above x�. Unrealistic Spend Plans (F10), also one of the 
factors assessed, is generally valued as a written forecast of a program’s funding needs and 
establishes Obligation and Expenditure projections. However, spend plans are subjected to 
so many real world eventualities that updating them becomes problematic in sustaining its 
forecasting value. 
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Table 2. Impact Factor Ratings in Aggregate Descending Order 
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Factors and Respondent Groups 
Figure 3 accounts for the 31 factors above the mean and by respondent group seen 
in Table 1. The 31 factors were the only ones further evaluated in this study unless a factor 
shifted above x� after any further delineation (e.g., ACAT levels, military components, 
position, etc.). Unexpectedly, the individual factors showed widespread perception 
disparities among the respondent groups for the factors that fell below +2𝜎𝜎. After analyzing 
the specific individual factors among all the respondent groups, seven of the 31 factors had 
an unusually large 𝜎𝜎. As a result of these conspicuous gaps, we turned to the qualitative 
data. We also watched for any strong correlations (e.g., correlation coefficients (r) > 0.7) to 
better understand the reasons for the differences, as well as the influence of any intervening 
and/or moderating factor couplings. The remaining discussion addresses the 31 impact 
factors in descending order from highest to lowest. 
 
 Figure 3. Impact Factor Ratings Above 𝐱𝐱� in Aggregate Descending Order With 
Respondent Group Low and High Ratings 
The Factors That Ranked Above + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐  
In Figure 3, late release of full obligation/budget authority due to Continuing 
Resolution Authority (F1), Contract Negotiations Delays (F2), and Contract Award Delays 
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(F3) all rose above 2𝜎𝜎, where 67% or more of the respondents claimed they had the highest 
adverse impact of all factors measured. The occurrence of CRA had the most significant 
negative impact to Obligation and Expenditure rates. It also had one of the smallest 
variances (𝜎𝜎) among the respondent groups. Even with the expectation that CRA might 
prevail and the subsequent planning that followed for such a likely event, many PMs pointed 
to an overly conservative and slow internal vetting process posture that created additional 
obstacles in meeting OSD goals. Several PMs recommended the use of some sort of “CRA 
variable” to temporarily offset the consequences of CRA if the required funds were not 
released as originally projected. Next in rank order were contract negotiations and contract 
award delays. The respondents emphasized that the DoD could fix the problem more readily 
since unlike CRA, these factors were under internal control. When asked what could be 
done to reduce the adverse effects of all three factors, the respondents recommended the 
“inclusion of more risk mitigation into contract award planning, more realistic timelines, more 
realistic plans, greater funding stability, reduction in bureaucratic obstacles, more 
synchronized internal processes, and better aligned accounting systems.”  
The Factors That Ranked Above +𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐  
This next line of demarcation (Figure 3, factors F4–F9) included many contracting-
related factors (i.e., Shortage of Contracting Officers [F4], Contractor Proposal Prep Delays 
[F6], RFP Prep Delays [F8], and Source Selection [F9]). Nearly all the factors showed the 
emergence of a more alarming 𝜎𝜎 between the individual respondent groups—as high as 
18% in one case (i.e., Proposal Prep Delays [F6]). For this particular factor, PCOs reported 
the highest impact while PMs ranked it as the lowest. Senior staff cited that Shortage of 
Contracting Officers (F4) created the highest impact, while PCOs reported it had the lowest 
impact. With a 7% 𝜎𝜎, it was the lowest among all six factors in this grouping.  
Given that six of the top nine factors were contract-specific factors that ranked above 
+1𝜎𝜎 (see Figure 3), it came as little surprise to see so many reinforcing comments surface: 
• “Lack of experienced and qualified contract specialists” 
• “Alarmingly low personnel qualified … many unsure/lack guidance and 
experience” 
• Significantly stressed with overtime to complete all contracting actions prior to 
close of fiscal year” 
• “Inadequate training … inordinate number of interns with very low experience 
in all career fields” 
• “Lack of sufficient legal personnel trained in acquisition” 
• “Loss in brain trust and skill to develop complete, clear SOWs using proactive 
contract language” 
• “SOW writing and the teaching of SOW-writing classes is greatly left to 
contractors or support contractors resulting in unclear language” 
The highest frequency of occurrence was also associated with contracting-related 
factors (Figure 3). By far, the aggregate respondents rated Shortage of Contracting Officers 
(F4) as the single highest factor among all 22 factors measured for frequency. Because the 
contracting activity timeline generally has lengthy durations, any disruption appears to have 
an unmistakable impact on contract award. Shortage of Contracting Officers (F4) was seen 
as having the most significant impact. Several respondents said that “multiple contracting 
actions were having compounding consequences.”  
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The two remaining factors above +1𝜎𝜎, Congressional Marks (F5) and OSD Directed 
RMD Adjustment (F7), had very low frequency of occurrences but still reported a very high 
impact, similar to CRA. When combining these with F4, all three appear to be a strong 
antecedent force (or moderating factor) to the already time-consuming chain of contracting 
actions. 
The Factors That Ranked Above 𝒙𝒙�  
This final grouping (Figure 3, factors F10–F31) accounted for the remaining 22 impact 
factors. Perception polarities persisted especially between two respondent groups—senior 
staff outside the program office and PMs inside program offices. For PMs in every case 
except one (i.e., Component Directed POM Adjustment [F17]), the impact factors ranked well 
below x�. In sharp contrast, senior staff in every case except one (i.e., Component Directed 
POM Adjustment [F17]) stated the majority of top 31 factors had the largest impact or close 
to it among all respondent groups. 
Even though the remaining impact factors above x�  are still significant, the 
researchers shifted the focus to the presence of any strong correlations since factor 
couplings could be having a moderating effect and require a closer look.  
The Factors That Correlate  
Table 3 summarizes the strongest and weakest factor correlations for all 
respondents queried. Several strong correlations surfaced for factors above x�. User 
Requirements (F11) and User Priorities (F19) were very strongly correlated. In three specific 
instances, two factors above x�  were very strongly correlated with three factors that fell 
below x�: Key Acquisition Experience (F27) and Inadequate Training (F48); Key Acquisition 
Experience (F27) and Tenure of PM and other Key Positions (F46); and DCMA Administration 
Actions (F36) and DCAA Administration Actions (F22). Three contract-related factors (F4, F8, 
and F9) showed weaker correlations than unexpected. Because a factor had a weak 
correlation does not mean it had any less importance, but any course of action intended to 
mitigate the presence of any impact factor strongly correlated with another should be 
weighed more heavily in any recommended action. For example, the turnover of PMs could 
be part of the experience quotient. 
Table 3. Factor Correlation Couplings 
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Factor Plotting 
The researchers generated a scatter plot diagram (Figure 4) that punctuated how the 
31 factors fluctuated between impact and frequency of occurrence. In some cases, the 
impact of certain factors occurred with low frequencies of occurrence. In other cases, the 
frequency of occurrence compounded the impacts.  
The research data was rebased to a Likert-like scale for plotting the frequency and 
adverse impact response averages. The researchers included Factors F29–F31 in Figure 4 
because they only fall slightly below x�. 
 
 Figure 4. Scatter Plot of Impact Factors With Frequency 
For the relationships that were co-linear (e.g., the most strongly correlated depicted 
in Table 3), the researchers explored whether they also behaved as strong predictors across 
the sample population. After investigating 𝑡𝑡-ratios (used with ACAT level factors) and beta-
weights (used for the sample population), we determined that the relationships were not 
significantly co-linear enough to substantiate causation. Consequently, there was no merit in 
running any further regression that analyzed the factors as predictors. However, the 
researchers conducted another set of tests by modulating certain respondent demographics 
and holding x� constant.  
Factor Plotting—Modulating ACAT Levels 
Figure 5 shows how the factor rankings changed after isolating ACAT levels.  
ACAT I 
Funding and requirements factors (F18, F19, F23, and F26) previously ranked above x� 
dropped below x�, while Contractor Proposal Delays (F6) rose markedly to become the 
highest impact factor. Component Directed POM Adjustment (F17) made a noticeable shift to 
the top nine factors (or one standard deviation above the mean). 
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ACAT II 
Fifteen of the factors previously ranked above x� dropped below x� (leaving only F1, F2, 
F3, and F17). Four of the factors that fell below x� included contracting-related factors (F4, F6, 
F8, and F9).  
ACAT III 
Six of the factors (F16, F18, F19, F21, F23, and F24) previously ranked above x� dropped 
below x�. Shortages of Personnel (F29, F30, F39, and F51) and Redirection of Contractor Efforts 
(F37) became more dominating issues for the respondents. Changes in User Priorities (F19), 
Changes in Stakeholder Requirements (F13), and Funding Loss from Reprograming Actions 
due to Higher Priority Requirements (F26) all moved significantly above x�. 
This more detailed differentiation, as found in the scatter plots, gives additional 
insight into ACAT-specific areas through a more granular view of the factors that would 
benefit from a more focused investigation. In some cases, reducing frequency of occurrence 
or perhaps instituting more early warning metrics could have a marked effect in reducing 
any adverse impacts.  
 
 Figure 5. Factor Ratings ≥ 𝒙𝒙�  by ACAT Level 
Factor Plotting—Modulating Respondent Groups 
Figure 6 shows how the factor rankings changed after isolating the Respondent 
Groups. 
Program Office 
Six factors dropped below x�: Awaiting Reprogramming Action (F18), Changes in User 
Priorities (F19), Program Delays from Prerequisite Events (F21), Unplanned Congressional 
adds to PB Request (F23), Use of Undefinitized Contract Action Delays (F24), and Loss of 
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Funding through Reprogramming Action to higher priority Requirements to PEO Portfolio 
(F26). No factors fell below x�.  
PEO 
Use of Undefinitized Contract Action Delays (F24) fell below x� while four factors rose 
above x�: Shortage of Cost Estimators (F29), Shortage of Business and Finance Management 
Personnel (F30), Component Comptroller withhold (F35), and Insufficiently Planned OCO 
Funding (F50). 
Senior OSD Staff 
Awaiting Reprogramming Action (F18) fell below x� while 13 factors rose above x�. 
For PEO and senior OSD staff, personnel shortages (F29, F30, F20, F40) became more 
dominant, while awaiting reprogramming action (F18) became less dominant for program 
office and senior OSD staff personnel. Of the three grouping in this particular case, nowhere 
were there more factor increases than for senior OSD staff personnel. The rise in factors 
F34, F43, and F59 seemed intuitive since senior staff may see first-hand the longer time it 
takes for programs to react to changes in their plans. However, it was very interesting to see 
what senior OSD staff personnel felt represented the major impediments to meeting the 
OSD’s Obligation and Expenditures rate goals that program office personnel did not, 
especially shortage of personnel and contract-specific factors like F45 and F37. This wide 
perception disparity deserves a more intensive understanding since it could be creating 
false perceptions that could lead to misrepresented positions and even unsubstantiated 
decisions. 
 
 Figure 6. Factor Ratings ≥ 𝒙𝒙�  by Grouped Respondent Position 
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Respondent Comments Regarding the Factors 
The respondents were also asked several open-ended questions about the use of 
metrics they found that helped them better meet OSD goals, as well as any process 
improvements they would recommend. They stated that the metrics that made a difference 
for them included “real-time monitoring, frequent reviews, tight coupling to contractor actions 
and milestones, and realistic spend plans with inch stones.” As for necessary improvements 
to current processes, the respondents recommended the inclusion of a CRA duration 
variable that readjusted expectations, establish more realistic program goals, ensure more 
funding stability, reduce bureaucratic obstacles and streamline more outdated processes, 
forge greater cooperation between government and industry, and synchronize disparate 
accounting systems used in obligation/expenditure reporting. 
The respondents provided a number of qualitative comments that reinforced the 
quantitative data, especially for the factors above ≥ x� that were causing obligation rate 
interference: 
 
 Figure 7. Sampling of Respondent Comments 
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Comparison With a Similar Study 
After this study was completed, the OUSD(AT&L), ODCAPE, and OSD(C) sponsored 
a related effort with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) entitled Implications of DoD 
Funds Execution Policy for Acquisition Program Management (Conley et al., 2014). IDA was 
asked to increase the current understanding of the extent and causes of under-execution 
and suggest changes to improve outcomes. They took a two-fold approach: (1) Examine 
trends in the ability of the DoD to execute appropriated funds, and (2) conduct an in-depth 
investigation into the causes of funds under-execution for selected programs and the effects 
on those programs of associated financial management practices. After drawing insights 
from an in-depth investigation of 25 individual programs during face-to-face interviews, they 
categorized their causal factors along five areas: 
• Contracting issues (i.e., personnel shortages and inexperience, award 
protests, peer reviews of contracting process documentation, and negotiation 
delays) 
• Congressional actions (i.e., additions and reductions to requested funding, 
continuing Resolutions [CRs], and sequestration) 
• Management actions and program events (i.e., changes to requirements, 
contract type, schedule, responses to operational needs, technical and 
testing problems, and slow contractor billing) 
• Policy choices (i.e., use of execution benchmarks and withholding funding by 
services under CRs) 
• Program office personnel shortages and experience levels 
Figure 8 shows how the study results are very similar, although IDA did not measure 
“frequency.” 
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Recommendations 
What next? Based on the research findings of this study, there are a number of 
impact factors above x� ̅ that if sufficiently addressed could help lower the barriers to the 
attainment of the OSD’s Obligation and Expenditure rate goals. Hence, we offer the 
following recommendations: 
• Institute an Obligation and Expenditure baseline adjustment for programs 
affected by any funding delay or limitation (especially CRA), then measure a 
program’s progress to that revised adjustment. 
• More thoroughly review the entire contracting action value chain. Look closely 
at efficiency opportunities along the review and decision cycle continuum, 
especially from the time an RFP is developed to the time a contract is let. Set 
reasonable time thresholds with triggers that afford more proactive measures 
by PMs and confirm productivity.  
• Establish a recurring communication forum among key stakeholders, 
especially PMs and the OSD, to dialogue more frequently and eliminate 
perception gaps that could be creating counterproductive actions and 
misconceptions. 
• Track requirement changes throughout a program’s life and look more 
strategically at the effects on program execution and accompanying 
Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs). Despite ACAT levels, there is an 
obvious ripple effect that is associated with any substantive change in 
program content across a program’s life that should be codified more 
comprehensively. However, there are also issues associated with different 
ACAT levels which must be noted. 
• Review the program review cycle and streamline wherever possible. Checks 
and balances within the DoD’s acquisition community are a vital constituent 
component of program execution, but every review should have a distinctive 
purpose, exit criteria, and associated suspense date that is just as material 
and credible. 
• Build and maintain realistic spend plans, measure against them, account for 
contingencies, and make adjustments with required frequency due to real 
world realities. Collaborate with senior leadership early enough about 
required adjustments to avoid more draconian measures later. 
• Validate the key personnel shortage areas and recognize the time it takes to 
rebuild those experience levels.  
• Nurture experience in key functional areas with strong catalysts such as 
disciplined on-the-job training (OJT) programs, mentoring, and guidance. 
With the recent surge of contracting specialist interns, their progress as a 
group should be measured more carefully. 
• Evaluate the real effects of reprogramming action or realignment of future 
budget decisions before any corrective action is taken. 
• Conduct a wholesale review of the program execution metrics currently in 
place and determine their usefulness and effectiveness. What are they 
actually measuring? Consolidate whenever practical and eliminate the ones 
that have outlived their usefulness. 
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• Encourage innovation and avoid the “bookkeeping process,” as RAND 
Corporation (2009) found in a recent study could be limiting improvements 
championed by PMs. 
Summary 
This research exposed a number of challenges that could easily be mitigated by 
more frequent communication and especially a better appreciation of stakeholder 
management. There are so many stakeholders involved in the acquisition process. No 
stakeholder should be dismissed without a more intensive assessment of their (potential) 
contribution. Sometimes, either their voice is not heard or their concern not appropriately 
considered. Next, having a program management strategy that can help leaders react to 
funding reductions is also critical. A wide variety of financial tools exist that track and predict 
funds execution, but Spend Plans that serve as the common device to convey program 
execution have to be current and agile enough to demonstrate reality and common sense 
for whatever curve balls come their way. Finally, as baby boomers start to retire at a more 
aggressive rate, experience will matter even more. An OJT program that nurtures 
experience and leadership development as well as demands critical thinking is just what the 
acquisition community should expect. 
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Abstract 
In fiscal year 2014, the U.S. federal government obligated over $443 billion in contracts. 
Within the Department of Defense (DoD), over $283 billion were obligated in the execution of 
1.3 million contract actions (USA Spending, 2015). Despite the critical importance of the 
DoD’s contract management function, both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 
the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) have reported problems in achieving successful 
procurement outcomes. The lack of trained personnel, capable processes, and effective 
internal controls result in the DoD having a higher level of vulnerability for procurement fraud 
(Rendon & Rendon, in press). Contracting officers, because of their pivotal position in the 
procurement process and their interface with both government officials and industry, are in a 
unique position to be on the front line for deterring and identifying procurement fraud. 
However, in order to be effective procurement fraud fighters, contracting officers must be 
knowledgeable of both contracting processes and internal controls. The purpose of this 
research was to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge of the DoD’s contract 
management processes and related internal controls. Our research findings indicated 
contracting officers may have a possible knowledge deficiency in the areas of procurement 
internal controls and procurement fraud schemes. Based on the implications of these 
findings, recommendations are made to the assessed agency and the DoD. 
Background 
In fiscal year 2014, the U.S. federal government obligated over $443 billion in 
contracts. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), over $283 billion were obligated in the 
execution of 1.3 million contract actions (USA Spending, 2015). These contract actions were 
for the procurement of weapon systems, supplies, and services. Despite the critical 
importance of the DoD’s contract management function, both the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) and the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) have reported problems in achieving 
successful procurement outcomes. The GAO has identified the lack of trained contracting 
personnel and the use of ill-suited contracting arrangements as some of the problems in 
DoD contract management (GAO, 2013). The DoD IG has identified numerous deficiencies 
in contract management processes as well as weakness in contract management internal 
controls (DoD, 2009, 2014). The lack of trained personnel, capable processes, and effective 
internal controls result in the DoD having a higher level of vulnerability for procurement fraud 
(Rendon & Rendon, in press). Past incidents of procurement fraud can be traced to 
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incompetent personnel, incapable contracting processes, or ineffective internal controls 
(Tan, 2013). Contracting officers, because of their pivotal position in the procurement 
process and their interface with both government officials and industry, are in a unique 
position to be on the front line for deterring and identifying procurement fraud. However, in 
order to be effective procurement fraud fighters, contracting officers must be knowledgeable 
of both contracting processes and internal controls. 
The purpose of this research was to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge of 
the DoD’s contract management processes and related internal controls. Specifically, we 
focus on the following research questions: 
1. What is the contracting workforce’s knowledge level of procurement fraud 
schemes as related to contract management processes, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud scheme categories? 
2. What is the contracting workforce’s perception of procurement fraud as 
related to the contract management processes, internal control components, 
and procurement fraud scheme categories? 
Literature Review 
This section provides a brief literature review that serves as a foundation for our 
empirical study. We review academic journal articles, government reports, and previous 
research studies in the areas of auditability, contract management processes, and internal 
control components.  
Auditability in Public Organizations 
The literature on auditability reflects an organization’s transformation in its 
governance and knowledge management capabilities. Power (2007) states, “Auditability is a 
condition of possibility of all inspection and auditing practices and also a mode of 
organizational transformation” (p. 14). This organizational transformation occurs when data 
collection practices and documentation systems are established, thus allowing organizations 
to be audited. This is distinct from organizations conducting actual audits or inspections. 
Audibility requires organizations to establish and actively manage an institutionally 
acceptable knowledge management system supporting its governance of processes and 
practices (Power, 1996). Organizations’ increased concern for risk management has 
resulted in an accompanying emphasis on auditability of internal controls (Power, 2007).  
Auditability is also reflected in an organization’s governance structure for the 
management of procurement activities. The literature includes research supporting the 
importance of competent personnel (in terms of education, training, and experience) and 
competent organizations (in terms of capable processes) for ensuring the success of 
procurement projects (Frame, 1999) and the need for a renewed emphasis on strong 
internal controls as a response to the increase in procurement fraud incidents (Rollins & 
Lanza, 2005). Finally, the literature also includes past research supporting governance 
structures in public sector agencies and the role procurement projects play in ensuring 
accountability, transparency, compliance, and consistency in delivery, value for money, and 
stakeholder engagement (Crawford & Helm, 2009).  
Contract Management Processes 
A common focus of theoretical research on contract management is the use of an 
agency theory lens (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory, specifically the buyer–seller 
problem, is used to analyze the process of structuring contract agreements between the 
buyer (principal) and the seller (agent) for the performance of a service or the delivery of a 
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product (Eisenhardt, 1989). Because of conflicting goals and asymmetrical information 
between the buyer and the seller, as well as the opportunistic behavior of both parties, 
contracts are used to govern the buyer and seller relationship. Structuring contracts using 
product, exchange, and governance rules allows both parties to align contract goals at the 
lowest cost. Product rules are used to establish product specifications or service 
requirements, and exchange rules specify the parties’ rights and obligations, as well as 
contract period of performance, delivery schedule, and method of contractor payment. 
Governance rules are used to reward and sanction cooperative or defective behavior of both 
parties through the use of performance incentive or penalty clauses (Brown, Potoski, & Van 
Slyke, 2013). 
The structuring of contracts follows the generally-accepted contract management 
phases of procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration, and contract closeout (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
Procurement planning involves the process of identifying which business needs can 
be best met by procuring products or services outside the organization. This process 
involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to procure, how much to 
procure, and when to procure. The solicitation planning process involves preparing the 
documents needed to support the solicitation. This process involves documenting program 
requirements and identifying potential sources. Solicitation is the process of obtaining 
information (proposals) from the sellers on how project needs can be met. The source 
selection process includes evaluating proposals and conducting contract negotiations with 
the seller in an attempt to come to agreement on all aspects of the contract—including cost, 
schedule, performance, terms and conditions, and anything else related to the contracted 
effort. Contract administration is the process of ensuring that each party’s performance 
meets the contractual requirements. The activities involved in contract administration will 
depend on the contract statement of work, contract type, and contract performance period. 
Contract closeout/termination is the process of verifying that all administrative matters are 
concluded on a contract that is otherwise physically complete. A government contract can 
end in one of three ways. First, the contract can be successfully completed, allowed to run 
its full period of performance, and then closed out. Second, the contract can be terminated 
for the convenience of the government. Finally, the contract can be terminated for default. 
Regardless of how the contract ends, all contracts must be closed out. 
These contract management processes will only be as capable and effective as the 
internal controls used by the acquisition agency to manage and oversee those processes. 
The next section provides an overview of internal controls as applied to acquisition 
agencies. 
Internal Controls 
As discussed previously, having capable contracting management processes helps 
organizations become auditable. In addition to capable contracting processes, effective 
internal controls are important in order for organizations to become auditable. 
In 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), composed of the 
AICPA, IIA, FEI, and the AAA, established the Internal Control Integrated Framework, which 
includes five internal control components (COSO, 2013). In May 2013, COSO (2013) 
updated its internal control integrated framework, which now includes 17 principles within 
the five components of internal control. In September 2014, the GAO (2014) updated its 
Standards for Internal Control for the Federal Government (Green Book). The five 
components of the framework are discussed in the following sections (COSO, 2013). 
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Control Environment  
The control environment component of the framework entails the tone at the top. 
Management’s integrity and ethical behavior sets the tone for the organization (COSO, 
2013). A weak control environment can open the door to fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO, 
2006). The effects of waste and abuse can be just as damaging as fraud to any organization 
in terms of loss of dollars, time, and personnel. In the case of government organizations, 
public trust could be compromised and public funds could be lost when the control 
environment is weak. 
Risk Assessment 
The risk assessment component of the framework calls for management to discuss 
what could go wrong within the organization and how to best mitigate any potential risks, 
including fraud risks (COSO, 2013).  
Control Activities 
The control activities component of the framework encompasses all of the control 
procedures that have been determined to be needed to make sure that the organization 
meets its goals and objectives (COSO, 2013). One example of a control activity is 
segregation of duties or separation of duties. No one person should be in charge of all the 
procedures within a process. This could lead to opportunities for unscrupulous people to 
commit fraud. 
Information and Communication 
The information and communication component of the framework includes the 
accounting system and the methods of internal and external communications within an 
organization (COSO, 2013).  
Monitoring Activities 
The monitoring activities component of the framework helps ensure that the controls 
in place are being followed and are meeting the organizational goals set by management 
(COSO, 2013). If any controls need to be updated, changed, removed, or added, 
management can determine the best way to proceed. Monitoring activities is important to 
help ensure a continuous process of planning, implementing, reviewing, and adjusting 
controls. 
The previously discussed internal control components are integral to ensuring 
auditability in the acquisition agency’s procurement and contracting processes. Any material 
weaknesses in the agency’s internal control components can increase its vulnerability to 
procurement fraud. Although there are many different types of procurement fraud incidents, 
the majority of procurement fraud can be categorized in the following procurement fraud 
schemes. 
Procurement Fraud Scheme Categories 
Reducing contract fraud, waste, and abuse should be the goal of any government 
organization, especially the DoD (GAO, 2006). Ineffective internal controls leave 
government organizations vulnerable to contract fraud, waste, and abuse, as shown in the 
many incidents of procurement fraudulent activity within the DoD and the federal 
government (Tan, 2013). While there are numerous kinds of procurement fraud, they can be 
classified into six categories, which include collusion, bid rigging, conflict of interest, and 
billing/cost/pricing schemes, fraudulent purchases, and fraudulent representation. These 
fraud scheme categories are discussed next. 
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Collusion 
Specific types of fraud schemes included within the collusion category of fraud 
schemes are kickbacks, bribery, and deliberate split purchases. Kickbacks involve 
government officials receiving something of value such as money from a contractor for 
personal gain in exchange for providing a favor such as submitting false invoices. Bribery 
involves influencing someone’s judgment in order to obtain favor, such as bribing a 
contracting officer in order to be awarded additional contracts. Split purchases are often 
seen in the government purchase card program where purchases that generally would not 
meet the micro-purchase threshold of $3,000 are deliberately split into two or more 
purchase transactions to circumvent the contracting rules and regulations.  
Bid Rigging 
Bid rigging involves exploitation of the bidding process by falsifying information such 
as price competition, agency needs, and contract specifications with the intent to circumvent 
the standard bidding process. Government bid specifications purposely leaked to favored 
offerors feeds the bid rigging fraud scheme and creates an unfair advantage to others 
seeking government contracts (Wells, 2008).  
Conflict of Interest 
Conflicts of interest create problems for government officials who are in a position to 
make decisions that could be seen as not being in the best interest of the government. For 
example, a contracting officer who is reviewing a contract bid from a company in which he or 
she owns stock would be construed as a major conflict of interest. 
Billing/Cost/Pricing Schemes 
Billing, cost, or pricing type fraud schemes involve a misrepresentation of financial 
information as well as intentionally mischarging. For example, government losses are 
sometimes due to a contract’s labor cost mischarging, such as padding employee timecards 
and charging the government for the extra hours that were not worked by employees. 
Defective pricing, change order abuse, and comingling of contracts are also examples of 
cost and pricing schemes. 
Fraudulent Purchases 
Fraudulent purchases involve purchases made which are beyond the government 
requirements with the intent to defraud the government. An example of fraudulent purchases 
is when a purchase cardholder purchases electronic equipment for personal use or with the 
intent to sell the equipment on e-bay for personal gain.  
Fraudulent Representation 
Fraudulent representation involves falsely and intentionally misrepresenting goods 
and services. Product substitution is an example of fraudulent representation, as it usually 
involves intentionally providing defective or used parts instead of non-defective or new parts 
as required by a contract. The following section discusses the conceptual framework of this 
research. 
Conceptual Framework 
The auditability literature identifies the importance of competent procurement 
personnel, capable contract management processes, and effective procurement internal 
controls. These major facets of auditability are reflected in Figure 1, which presents our 
conceptual framework. 
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 Figure 1. Auditability Triangle  
(Rendon & Rendon, in press) 
Our conceptual model shows that auditability in procurement agencies requires 
organizations to have competent people, capable processes, and effective internal controls. 
The acquisition workforce needs competent people that are educated, trained, and 
experienced in the complexities of government contracting. Past research has shown that 
many participants in the acquisition of services, especially at the installation/base level, are 
not members of the acquisition workforce. Thus, they may not be receiving the required 
education and training needed to perform their acquisition functions (GAO, 2002, 2011).  
Acquisition organizations also need capable contract management processes. 
Process capability is measured in terms of processes that are fully-established, 
institutionalized, mandated, integrated with other organizational processes, periodically 
measured, and continuously improved. Past research using the Contract Management 
Maturity Model (CMMM) has shown that some acquisition organizations have less-than-
capable contracting processes. These contracting processes lack process strength, 
management support, process measurement, and process improvement (Rendon, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011).  
Finally, acquisition organizations also need effective internal controls. Effective 
internal controls refers to the objective of enforcing internal control policies to ensure 
compliance with laws and regulations, monitoring procedures to assess enforcement, and 
reporting material weaknesses. The DoD IG (2009, 2014) reports that many of the 
procurement deficiencies they identified are the result of material internal control 
weaknesses in the procurement processes. Both GAO and DoD IG reports have indicated 
an ever-increasing concern about weak internal controls within the DoD’s acquisition 
agencies. These types of internal control weaknesses increase the government’s risk of 
jeopardizing the value for the public dollars spent on supplies and services (DoD IG, 2009, 
2014).  
The lack of competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal controls 
may be resulting in incidents of procurement fraud within the DoD and throughout the 
defense supply chain (Tan, 2013). Government contracting officers, because of their pivotal 
position interfacing with industry, should be the first line of defense for identifying 
procurement fraud red flags. However, identifying procurement fraud red flags require 
contracting officers to be knowledgeable of procurement internal controls. Thus, the purpose 
of this research is to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge of the DoD’s contract 
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management processes and related internal controls. We conduct our research through the 
use of a web-based assessment tool. Our research methodology is discussed next.  
Research Methodology 
We conducted this research by first developing and testing a web-based assessment 
tool that can be used to assess the contracting officers’ knowledge level of internal controls 
and procurement fraud and to assess their perceptions of procurement fraud within their 
organizations. With the assistance of our MBA student (Chang, 2013), we developed a web-
based assessment tool consisting of 26 knowledge-based questions pertaining to 
contracting processes, internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes. These 
knowledge-based questions were developed using government procurement fraud sources 
such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID, n.d.) and the Office of the 
Inspector General, U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) procurement fraud 
handbook (GSA OIG, 2012). The assessment tool also included 12 organization-based 
items related to the contracting officers’ perceptions of internal controls within their 
organizations. These items were designed to determine if any aspects of the organizations’ 
internal structure, processes, or culture made the organization more susceptible to 
fraudulent activity. These items were also designed to assess the contracting officers’ 
perceptions of their organizations regarding fraud incidents. The organization-based items 
were adopted and modified from the Internal Control Survey developed by the New York 
State Internal Control Association (NYSICA, 2006).  
The survey respondents were contracting officers assigned to the Army Mission 
Installation Contracting Command (MICC). This Army contracting agency is responsible for 
supporting the U.S. Army installations by contracting for office supplies, equipment, support 
services, and minor construction. In 2012, the MICC managed over $6.4 billion in contracts 
using a variety of contract mechanisms, ranging from the government purchase card to 
complex services contracts (Chang, 2013).  
Research Findings 
The assessment tool was deployed in early April 2013 to a total eligible population of 
1350 contract management professionals. The assessment tool was initiated by 146 
respondents, and was completed by 99 respondents, resulting in a response rate of 7% 
(Chang, 2013). 
Analysis of Knowledge Assessment Findings 
The average score on the knowledge portion of the assessment tool was 63% 
correct of the 26 questions. There were minimal differences in average scores between 
civilian and military contract management professionals. However, there were some 
differences in average scores by experience and DAWIA levels. As contracting experience 
and DAWIA level increases, so does the average score on the knowledge assessment. 
Although warranted contracting officers scored higher than non-warranted contracts 
specialists, there is less difference in average scores between non-warranted and warranted 
contract management professionals. 
Each knowledge assessment item was related to contract management processes, 
internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes. Figures 2 through 4 reflect 
the average score based on each of these areas.  
As can be seen in these figures, there is variation in the average knowledge 
assessment score among these three areas. From the perspective of the contract 
management process, assessment knowledge items related to the procurement planning 
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process had the highest average score, compared to items related to contract closeout, 
which had the lowest score. From the perspective of the internal control components, 
assessment knowledge items related to the risk assessment component had the highest 
average score, compared to items related to information and communication, which had the 
lowest score. From the perspective of procurement fraud schemes, assessment knowledge 
items related to bid rigging scheme had the highest average score, compared to items 
related to billing/cost/pricing schemes, which had the lowest score. 
 
 Figure 2. Average Score by Contract Management Process  
(Chang, 2013) 
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 Figure 3. Average Score by Internal Control Component  
(Chang, 2013) 
 
 Figure 4. Average Score by Procurement Fraud Scheme  
(Chang, 2013) 
Analysis of Organization Perception Findings 
The assessment tool also included items related to perceptions of the organization’s 
vulnerability to procurement fraud and perceptions of the organizations’ internal controls. 
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Three of these questions asked about perceptions of the organizations’ vulnerability to 
procurement fraud in terms of contract management process, internal control component, 
and procurement fraud schemes. Figures 5–7 reflect the responses to these items.  
As can be seen in these figures, when asked which contract management process is 
most vulnerable to fraud in their organization, those surveyed selected the procurement 
planning process the most often (20%) and contract closeout was selected the least often 
(0%). Approximately 11% responded that they did not know, and 34% of the respondents 
stated they did not suspect fraud.  
When asked which internal control component is most vulnerable to fraud in their 
organization, the information and communication component was selected the most often 
(13%) and control environment was selected the least often (4%). Approximately 17% 
responded that they did not know, and 38% of the respondents stated they did not suspect 
fraud. 
When asked to which procurement fraud scheme they perceived their organization 
was most susceptible, those surveyed selected conflict of interest the most often (13%), and 
fraudulent representation was selected the least often (0%). Approximately 13% responded 
that they did not know, and 53% of the respondents stated they did not suspect fraud. 
 
 Figure 5. Percent of Responses to Contract Management Phase Item  
(Chang, 2013) 
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 Figure 6. Percent of Responses to Internal Control Component Item  
(Chang, 2013) 
 
 Figure 7. Percent of Responses to Procurement Fraud Scheme Item  
(Chang, 2013) 
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Implications of Findings 
The results of both the knowledge assessment and the organization perception 
assessment have some interesting implications. The average score on the knowledge 
assessment varied by contract management process, internal control component, and 
procurement fraud scheme. The contracting officers’ average score on the knowledge 
assessment (63%) reflects a possible knowledge deficiency in procurement internal controls. 
Using traditional college grading protocol, this score would be converted to a grade of D. 
This finding, along with the average response to the organization perception item, “I have 
adequate knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform my duties” (see appendix, 
Item 6) of 3.9, suggests that perhaps the contracting officers are overly optimistic in self-
assessing their knowledge of procurement fraud schemes.  
Additionally, a significant percentage of the respondents indicated that “I do not 
suspect fraud” in relation to the organization’s contracting processes (34%), internal control 
components (38%), and procurement fraud scheme susceptibility (53%). These findings, 
along with the low scoring knowledge assessment, may indicate that although the majority 
of contracting officers do not suspect fraud in their organizations, they also do not have a 
sufficient working knowledge of procurement fraud. The contracting officers’ limited 
knowledge of procurement fraud and their perception that their organization is not 
susceptible to fraud may reveal that the organization could in fact be vulnerable to some 
form of procurement fraud.  
Recommendations 
The results of the knowledge-based assessment indicated that, although the average 
score was 63%, the contracting officers’ knowledge of contracting processes, internal 
controls, and procurement fraud schemes increased as years of experience and DAWIA 
certification level increases. Recent research shows that the DAWIA required courses for 
contracting certification do not include a mandatory fraud training or awareness course 
(Castillo & Flannigan, 2014). Our first recommendation is for the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) to incorporate coverage of internal controls and procurement fraud 
schemes in the mandatory contracting curriculum. Our final recommendation is to further 
explore the organization’s information and communication internal control component. This 
was the internal control component with the lowest score on the knowledge assessment, as 
well as the component chosen as most vulnerable to procurement fraud in the organization. 
Perhaps this organization should apply additional emphasis—for example, training and 
visibility—in this internal control component. This may increase the workforce’s knowledge 
level of this aspect of their organization’s internal controls and decrease their perception of 
this area of fraud vulnerability.  
Conclusion 
Auditability theory states that an organization must have competent personnel, 
capable processes, and effective internal controls to ensure proper organizational 
governance. The lack of competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal 
controls may result in organizations being more vulnerable to fraud. The purpose of this 
research was to assess DoD contracting officers’ knowledge levels of procurement fraud 
schemes as related to contract management processes, internal control components, and 
procurement fraud scheme categories. Our research findings indicated contracting officers 
may have a possible knowledge deficiency in the area of procurement internal controls. 
Additionally, our findings indicate that perhaps contracting officers are overly optimistic in 
self-assessing their knowledge of procurement fraud schemes. Finally, we also conclude 
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that the contracting officers’ limited knowledge of procurement fraud and their perception 
that their organization is not susceptible to fraud may reveal that the organization could in 
fact be vulnerable to some form of procurement fraud.  
Based on these findings, we recommend that the DAU incorporate coverage of 
internal controls and procurement fraud schemes in the mandatory contracting curriculum. 
We also recommend that the assessed organization apply additional emphasis on its 
information and communication internal control component to increase the workforce’s 
knowledge level of this aspect of their organization’s internal controls and decrease their 
perception of this area’s vulnerability to fraud. 
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Abstract 
On September 10, 2012, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics signed a joint memorandum 
calling for a change in the management of unobligated funds for acquisition programs. The 
memo was an attempt to stop the rush to obligate funds by the end of the current fiscal year 
in order to avoid reduced allocations in the next fiscal year. The memo identified six tenets for 
adoption throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). Included are tenets to reward 
acquisition program managers for returning unobligated funds and not to reduce future year 
program budgets just because current year obligation rates are lower than established 
benchmarks. The 2014 Annual Report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System (OUSD[AT&L], 2014) indicated that the DoD was continuing the effort to change the 
acquisition culture from focusing on obligation rates. This research analyzes financial 
obligation rates for acquisition programs and acquisition program contract awards made in 
the last quarter of the fiscal year to determine if this policy memo has resulted in any change 
in behavior toward year-end spending. Research finds that the policy memo has not yet had 
an effect on behavior and that it has not been incorporated into DoD policy regulations. 
Background 
Unobligated balances are amounts of budget authority available to acquisition 
program managers (PMs) that have not yet been obligated on contracts. Each year, PMs 
must plan for obligating a high percentage of their available budget authority or risk losing 
the unobligated balance to a higher priority program. The process for repurposing budget 
authority from one program to another or from one appropriation account to another is 
termed reprogramming, and is done by the component comptroller and the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller). There are three primary means of reprogramming that could be 
used to repurpose unobligated balances: below threshold, congressional notification letter, 
and prior approval. 
Budget authority is provided to the Department of Defense (DoD) by three annual 
appropriation acts: the Defense Appropriation Act; the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs 
and Other Related Agencies Appropriation Act; and the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriation Act. Once these acts are signed by the President, the DoD can request 
apportionment of the budget authority from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
The OMB usually apportions the annual amount of budget authority for the procurement 
appropriation accounts and either annual or quarterly amounts for Research, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation accounts. However, the president may 
temporarily impound budget authority for programs with technical problems and may request 
rescission of budget authority for programs that have been canceled or changed 
significantly. In addition, the OMB may reduce the apportioned budget authority to pay for a 
program that the Congress authorized, but did not appropriate any budget authority for in 
one of the appropriations acts. For example, each year the Congress authorizes the Small 
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Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, but directs the DoD to fund the SBIR 
program with a general reduction in budget authority from all RDT&E-funded programs. 
In anticipation of the apportionment of budget authority, all PMs are to submit 
obligation and expenditure plans (also termed spending plans) to their component 
comptroller. These plans serve as a month-by-month forecast, through the entire fiscal year, 
of when budget authority will be obligated on contract and when the obligated amounts will 
be liquidated by expenditures made to pay defense contractors. It is important for the PM to 
prepare realistic spending plans. For new start programs, obligation of budget authority 
should not be planned for the first quarter of the fiscal year. Recent history has shown that 
the DoD operates in the first quarter of most fiscal years under stop-gap funding called a 
continuing resolution. Since the annual appropriation bills are still in work, budget authority 
for new starts has not yet been determined or appropriated. Therefore, obligations for new 
starts cannot be made while operating under a continuing resolution. PMs are also 
cautioned not to plan for the obligation of large amounts of budget authority in the fourth 
quarter of the fiscal year. This is because the appropriation acts usually restrict obligations 
in the last two months of the fiscal year to no more than 20% of the appropriated amount. 
The purpose of this constraint is to force planning and avoid rushing into contracts at the 
end of the fiscal year just to show that fund obligations have been made. 
In the March timeframe of each fiscal year, the component comptroller usually 
conducts a mid-year review of the status of obligations and expenditures by program (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 Figure 1. Obligation Availability Timeline for RDT&E Appropriations 
The purpose of this review is to identify programs that have deviated from their 
spending plans and have large unobligated balances of budget authority (i.e., low 
obligations) or large unliquidated obligations (i.e., low expenditures). About two years 
earlier, in the budget formulation process, the PM should have asked for RDT&E funds to 
cover all contractor-incurred costs in the fiscal year. This is in accordance with the 
incremental funding policy that applies to all RDT&E appropriation accounts (OUSD[AT&L], 
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2015). Similarly, the PMs should have requested budgets to fully fund complete, militarily-
useable end items in the fiscal year of contract award for those end items. This is in 
accordance with the full funding policy that applies to all procurement accounts, including 
Ship Building and Conversion, Navy, and to the Military Construction appropriation accounts 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2015). If budget authority is not being placed on contract in the year for 
which it was requested, the comptroller could decide to reprogram some or all of the 
unobligated amounts to a higher priority program. In Pentagon parlance, the under-obligated 
program could become a bill payer for a higher priority program.  
If the PM successfully defends the under-obligated program at the mid-year review, 
the pressure is on to get the majority of the budget authority obligated by September 30, the 
end of the fiscal year. If the funds are not obligated by the end of the first fiscal year of 
availability, then the comptroller has yet another opportunity to reduce the program’s future 
budget request during the Budgeting phase of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution (PPBE) process. During this budget review, which occurs in the August to 
October timeframe, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and OMB analysts test 
the Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) submitted by the components to ensure that each 
program’s budget request is defendable before the Congress. As a result of this PPBE 
process budget review, the analysts will sometimes find that a program is forward financed. 
That is, compared to its needs, the program has too much current and carried-over budget 
authority. If this is the case, the analysts will recommend that the requested future budget be 
reduced accordingly. 
The tensions created by the mid-year and PPBE budget reviews can cause the PM 
to behave in different ways. First, as discussed above, the PM might decide to move quickly 
to get the budget authority on contract, regardless of how bad the business deal that is for 
the taxpayer. Obviously, this behavior is irresponsible, but logical in terms of retaining 
current budget authority and stabilizing future budget requests. Second, the PM might agree 
with the comptroller’s decision to reprogram unobligated funds to a higher priority program, 
provided that a promise is made to replace the budget authority removed with future funds, 
escalated as appropriate to account for future inflation and outlay rates. Finally, the PM 
might decide to fight any action by the comptroller to remove funds by sharply rebutting the 
action. This approach would require that a reclama be prepared, citing operational mission 
and supportability impacts to the user (warfighter) and business impacts that affect the 
execution of the program. If successful with the reclama, the PM has more time in which to 
negotiate a good deal before obligating the budget authority on contract. 
Having observed all of these behaviors over many years, in September 2012, the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Honorable Robert F. Hale, and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Honorable Frank 
Kendall III, signed a joint memorandum (copy in appendix) that outlined six new tenets for 
dealing with unobligated balances during budget reviews: 
1. Taxpayer funds should be obligated and ultimately expended only in the 
taxpayers' interest and if best value is received for the money in support of 
the Warfighter. 
2. While they can be useful indicators, obligation rates slower than established 
benchmarks should not be the determinative measuring stick for program 
execution and must not be regarded as a failure. 
3. Late obligation of funds should not be presumed to imply that the funds are 
not needed or that future budgets should be reduced unless there is other 
evidence to support that conclusion. 
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4. Providing savings to the organization, military service, or DOD component as 
early in the fiscal year as possible should be encouraged and rewarded, 
professionally and visibly. 
5. Savings will not be reallocated at any higher DOD level than necessary to 
fulfill shortfalls in priority requirements. 
6. Managers who release unobligated funds to higher priorities will not 
automatically be penalized in their next year's budget with a lower allocation 
and may be candidates for additional funding to offset prior year reductions. 
(OUSD[AT&L] & OUSD[C], 2012) 
The two under secretaries asked that acquisition and financial managers throughout the 
DoD follow these tenets when reviewing programs not meeting established obligation rates. 
However, as of this writing, the policy memorandum has not been incorporated into any DoD 
regulations (M. Engelking, personal communication, February 5, 2015).1  
Before incorporating these tenets into DoD regulations, data-driven research should 
be conducted to answer three important questions: 
1. What are the recent obligation rates, and how big are unobligated balances in 
the RDT&E and procurement accounts? 
2. What is happening to unobligated balances at the end of obligation 
availability? Are PMs rushing into poor contracts just to prevent funds from 
being taken away, or to prevent reductions to future budgets? 
3. What recent legislation has been introduced and/or enacted by the Congress 
on the subject of unobligated balances and meeting obligation benchmarks? 
The balance of this paper provides data-driven research that answers these 
questions and can be used to guide the implementation of policy guidance on the 
management of unobligated balances. 
Recent Trends in Obligation Rates and Unobligated Balances 
With the rollout of the president’s budget in February of each year, the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) presents a budget briefing for the news media and 
makes available financial summary tables. These tables contain historical and forecasted 
obligation rates for the RDT&E and procurement appropriation accounts. These rates, rolled 
to the DoD level and representing obligations at the end of the first year of obligation 
availability, were extracted and plotted in Figure 2. 
1 Email, dated February 5, 2015, regarding implementation of obligation rates tenets, follows: “Volume 
3, Chapter 8 [DoD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation] was revised and forwarded to the 
Office of Legal Counsel for coordination a few months ago. It was revised by an action officer who 
has since left OUSD(C). I am now responsible for the chapter. I reviewed my predecessor's files 
related to this chapter and did not locate a copy of the memorandum you provided. I also scanned the 
document to see if it addressed this issue. Unfortunately, the revised version does not address it. I 
will request that the chapter be returned to me for revision. It will be scheduled to be published by the 
end of the fiscal year. Thank you for bringing this to our attention. Maryla Engelking, CPA, CGFM, 
MBA, Senior Staff Accountant, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Financial 
Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR), 703-571-1657, maryla.e.engelking.civ@mail.mil.” 
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 Figure 2. DoD Composite Obligation Rates, End of First Year of Obligation 
Availability, for RDT&E and Procurement Appropriations 
(OUSD[C], 2015b)  
From FY 2003 to FY 2012, RDT&E obligation rates held steady at 90%. This 
percentage is in accordance with historical DoD and Service/Component benchmarks for 
RDT&E obligations at the end of the first year of funds availability. However, overall RDT&E 
obligation rates dipped to 85% in FY 2013 and FY 2014. Perhaps this recent dip reflects 
implementation of the joint memo on obligation rate tenets, which was just discussed. 
However, if that were the case, one would expect to see a similar trend in the procurement 
accounts, which is not the case (see discussion that follows).  
From FY 2003 to FY 2007, procurement obligation rates hover between 80% and 
85%. This percentage is in accordance with historical DoD and Service/Component 
benchmarks for procurement obligations at the end of the first year of funds availability. 
However, procurement obligation rates begin to dip below 80% in FY 2008 and get as low 
as 67% and 68% in FY 2013 and FY 2014, respectively.  
The financial summary tables provided with the annual president’s budget rollout 
briefing also contain unobligated balances, brought forward from the previous fiscal year. 
These balances were extracted from the tables and plotted on bar graphs for RDT&E 
(Figure 3) and Procurement (Figure 4). In each figure, the bottom solid bar represents the 
budget authority appropriated in that particular fiscal year. The shaded tip of the bar 
represents the carryover of unobligated budget authority from the previous year. Together, 
the appropriated budget authority and the carryover funds can be considered a rough 
approximation of the total obligation authority available in any particular year. 
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 Figure 4. Unobligated Procurement Appropriation Balances (Carryover) From 
Previous Fiscal Year 
(OUSD[C], 2015b)  
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In the DoD’s four RDT&E accounts, carryover as a percentage of total obligation 
authority has nearly doubled from 8.8% in FY 2003 to 15.9% in FY 2014. In the DoD’s 
procurement accounts, carryover as a percentage of total obligation authority has more than 
doubled from 15% in FY 2003 to 31.6% in FY 2014. Because the increases in unobligated 
balances began at least nine years earlier, the September 2012 joint memo on obligation 
rate tenets did not cause these carryover increases. Analysis of the Service/Component 
unobligated carryover indicates that 
from analyzing the trends in obligation rates and carryover data, the answer 
to the first important question becomes clear. Obligations rates in both the 
RDT&E and procurement accounts are falling, with procurement obligation 
rates falling at further than RDT&E obligation rates. Also, for both RDT&E 
and procurement, carryover balances have more than doubled as a 
percentage of total obligation authority. As will be seen later, lower obligation 
rates and higher carryover amounts make DOD appear to be forward 
financed and expose future budgets to higher risks of reduction during the 
congressional enactment process.  
Disposition of Unobligated Balances 
At the mid-year review, or whenever a higher priority need arises, reprogramming 
provides some flexibility for the DoD to repurpose budget authority. Prior approval 
reprogramming, requiring approval of the Congressional Defense Committees before 
implementation, is used when budget authority changes from one appropriation to another. 
However, below certain dollar and percentage thresholds, budget authority can be moved 
from one RDT&E program element to another or from one procurement line item to another. 
Such below-threshold reprogramming (BTR) can be accomplished by the 
Service/Component and DoD comptrollers and is reported to the Congress quarterly on DD 
1416 Program Reports. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) website contains 
only a few years of data on recent BTR actions. This data is plotted, by the four DoD RDT&E 
accounts, in Figures 5 and 6.  
 
 Figure 5. Number of Below-Threshold Reprogramming Actions, RDT&E 
Appropriation Accounts 
(OUSD[C], 2014) 
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 Figure 6. Total Budget Authority Repurposed by Below-Threshold 
Reprogramming Actions, RDT&E Appropriation Accounts 
(OUSD[C], 2014) 
Figures 5 and 6 reveal that, at least for two years (FY 2011 and FY 2012), the 
number of BTR actions and the budget authority repurposed through BTR actions declined 
in all four of the RDT&E appropriation accounts. One might conclude from this data that the 
policy memo on obligation rate tenets has had an effect. Fewer BTR actions might mean 
that fewer acquisition programs are being tapped as bill payers for higher priorities. 
However, more research is needed into the reasons for the BTR actions and the reason for 
the decline in the number of BTR actions/amounts. Only the 2010 DD 1416 Quarterly 
Reports of Programs identify reason codes associated with the BTR actions. After 2010, the 
codes and hyperlinks to any amplifying information are missing. Help from the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is needed to provide this missing information. 
Contract awards made late in the fiscal year, particularly in the fourth quarter, may 
also be an indicator of the effect of the policy memo on obligation rate tenets. PMs and 
business financial managers (BFMs) are taught not to plan for obligations of funds in the 
fourth quarter of any fiscal year. One reason for this is because the appropriation acts 
usually restrict obligations in the last two months of the fiscal year to no more than 20% of 
the appropriated amount. Another reason for not planning fourth quarter contract awards is 
that program schedules and contract awards often slip. If program schedule slippage does 
occur, it is easy for the comptroller to recommend that contract awards scheduled for the 
fourth quarter be rescheduled into the next fiscal year. 
The Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) has a 
database of 421 large active contracts from Major Defense Acquisition Program and Major 
Automated Information Systems. The award dates of these contracts are plotted in the bar 
chart in Figure 7. 
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 Figure 7. Fourth Quarter Contract Awards Compared to Contracts Awarded in 
Other Quarters 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2015) 
Although PMs and BFMs are taught to avoid scheduling contract awards in the fourth 
quarter of the fiscal year, the data in Figure 5 shows that a number of contract awards are, 
in fact, taking place in the fourth quarter. If unobligated funds can be carried over, because 
obligation benchmarks have been relaxed, perhaps the PMs are attempting to commit those 
funds before the end of the fiscal year when the funds’ period of obligation availability ends. 
Unfortunately, the data provided in the DAMIR data used in Figure 5 does not reveal or 
imply any causal relationship between the fourth quarter contract awards and the policy 
memo on obligation rate tenets. More research into the reason for fourth quarter contract 
awards is needed. 
Recent Legislation on Unobligated Balances and Benchmarks 
The annual Defense Appropriations Act consistently includes this language: “No 
more than 20 percent of the appropriations in this Act which are limited for obligation during 
the current fiscal year shall be obligated during the last 2 months of the fiscal year” 
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015). This language is supposed to preclude a 
rush to award contracts, just to lower unobligated balances at the end of the fiscal year.  
Over the past several years, the Congress has marked down the DoD portion of the 
president’s budget request when large unobligated balances exist. For example, in the DoD 
Appropriations Act for 2015, the Congress cut $1.76 billion out of the request due to 
unobligated balances left over from earlier budget years (Congressional Research Service, 
2015). Enacting the FY 2012 Defense Appropriations Act, the Congress cut $2.66 billion 
from the president’s budget request with the rationale that that unobligated balances could 
be used in lieu of new budget authority. (Congressional Research Service, 2012). Of course, 
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the problem is that new budget authority has longer periods of availability than old 
unobligated funds. What might appear to be a rational reduction in new budget authority is 
really placing a more onerous task on financial managers and contracting officers who must 
now work more quickly to get the old funds obligated on contracts.  
Finally, in the case of recent sequestration cuts, there is a somewhat ironic 
advantage to having large unobligated balances. For example, in FY 2013, sequestration 
cuts to DoD investment accounts resulted in an average 11.2% reduction across old 
unobligated funds. However, the more current FY 2013 budget authority, which has a longer 
period of obligation availability than old funds, was somewhat preserved, suffering an 
average sequestration cut of only 5.2% (Congressional Research Service, 2014). 
Conclusion 
Given the data-driven research just provided, the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
should exercise caution in implementing their joint policy memorandum that outlined 
obligation rate tenets. First, recent trends in obligation rates have shown that by the end of 
the first year of obligation availability, obligation rates for both the RDT&E and the 
procurement appropriations have dropped below historical norms. Second, this drop in 
obligation rates has resulted in the carryover of a greater percentage of funds each budget 
year. Motivated by austere times, the Congress continues to cut the DoD portion of the 
president’s budget request by amounts nearly equal to the carryover amounts. 
Contract awards in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year may indicate that there is still 
a rush to place funds on contract before the end of obligation availability. While some of 
these rushed contract awards may represent a good business deal, some of the fourth 
quarter awards probably waste taxpayer dollars. However, more research is needed into the 
reasons for fourth quarter contract awards. The number of reprogramming actions and 
associated amounts of repurposed budget authority may also be an indicator of behavior 
toward unobligated balances. However, reason codes are missing from recent BTR data, so 
it was not possible in this research effort to link any change in BTR actions or BTR amounts 
to the policy memo on obligation rate tenets. 
Perhaps the Services/Components are following the joint policy memorandum on 
obligation rate tenets even though the policy has not been incorporated into any DoD 
regulation. This may be a causal reason for lower obligation rates and increasing carryover 
amounts in the RDT&E appropriation accounts. But, why did obligation rates dip five years 
earlier in the procurement appropriation accounts? Once again, more research is needed. 
Whether or not there is any linkage between the data revealed by this research and 
the joint policy on obligation rate tenets, the Congressional Defense Committees need to be 
informed of the policy and asked not to decrement RDT&E and procurement accounts 
without first assessing why large unobligated balances exist for some acquisition programs. 
Of course the DoD will have to provide more detail on carryover amounts, perhaps as part of 
budget justification materials, to convince the Congressional Defense Committees that the 
carryover of funds is legitimate and necessary for program success. 
It would be prudent for the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to get the Congress to 
agree with the policy memo on obligation rate tenets before incorporating those tenets into 
DoD regulations. And, it appears that such a dialog has now begun. In response to a 
request from the U.S. Senate for ideas on the subject of Defense Acquisition Reform, the 
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Honorable Frank Kendall III, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, wrote 
For 4 years I have worked to train and encourage our acquisition workforce to 
take time to get good business deals for the Taxpayer by conducting 
appropriate upfront analysis, and by doing the systems engineering and 
planning necessary for successful programs. At the same time our program 
managers live in a world in which they are punished for not obligating the 
funds they control on set schedules. We should have realistic plans to 
execute our budgets, but when a manager has sound reasons to delay 
obligation, that behavior should not be punished. I have worked with the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to provide a more balanced 
approach to how we handle obligation reviews within the Department, and we 
would like to work closely with Congress in striking a similar balance on this 
matter. (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2014, p. 115) 
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Abstract 
The modern warfighter operates in an environment that has dramatically evolved in 
sophistication and interconnectedness over the past half century. With each passing year, the 
infusion of ever more complex technologies and integrated systems places increasing 
burdens on acquisition officers to make decisions regarding potential programs with respect 
to the joint capability portfolio. Furthermore, significant cost overruns in recent acquisition 
programs reveal that, despite efforts since 2010 to ensure the affordability of systems, 
additional work is needed to develop enhanced approaches and methods. This paper 
discusses research that builds on prior work that explored system design tradespaces for 
affordability under uncertainty, extending it to the program and portfolio level. Time-varying 
exogenous factors, such as resource availability, stakeholder needs, or production delays, 
may influence the potential for value contribution by constituent systems over the lifecycle of 
a portfolio, and make an initially attractive design less attractive over time. This paper 
introduces a method to conduct portfolio design for affordability by augmenting Epoch-Era 
Analysis with aspects of Modern Portfolio Theory. The method is demonstrated through the 
design of a carrier strike group portfolio involving the integration of multiple legacy systems 
with the acquisition of new vessels. 
Introduction 
Enabled by the emerging widespread availability of high speed computing, 
computational Tradespace Exploration (TSE) has become a valuable tool. TSE empowers 
system engineers to consider far more potential designs than could be done through prior 
Analysis of Alternatives methods (Ross & Hastings, 2005). A recently developed approach, 
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Epoch-Era Analysis (EEA), enables the conceptual design of systems that are resilient to 
potential changes in context and needs (exogenous uncertainties) over the lifecycle of the 
system. EEA enables quantitative support for the design of particular time-contingent 
system properties such as survivability, flexibility, and affordability (Ross et al., 2010). 
Since the issuance of the 2010 memo Better Buying Power (BBP) and the 
implementation of the Department of Defense (DoD) Efficiency Initiative (Carter, 2010), a 
significant body of research has been generated to support design for affordability, including 
advanced TSE techniques. To this end, EEA was adapted for affordability analysis in naval 
acquisitions by Schaffner et al. (2013) through the introduction of aggregate cost and 
schedule considerations. As system interconnectedness and interdependence continues to 
increase, especially in Navy and DoD operations involving numerous assets, conceptual 
design techniques that consider only the acquisition and operation of individual systems are 
not fully sufficient. Of additional value in this regard is expanding the scope of such 
techniques to support acquisition decisions at the multi-system level; this necessitates 
consideration of two related concepts: systems of systems (SoS) and portfolios.  
A SoS is a dynamic network of constituent systems that exhibit varying levels of 
operational and managerial independence, but operationally interact so as to achieve 
mutually desired, oftentimes emergent, capabilities (Maier, 1999). A portfolio is a construct 
which describes a collection of assets, acquisition programs, and research programs that 
are jointly invested in to exploit qualities of the set, regardless of whether the assets are 
operationalized independently or participate in a SoS. The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) case 
study conveniently illustrates the difference between SoS and portfolio design. The CSG 
portfolio design problem seeks to ascertain what acquisition strategies result in an 
affordable set of available assets that may be assembled into any number of CSG SoS to 
meet a variety of possible desired performance attributes. The SoS design problem, on the 
other hand, would occur downstream of portfolio design where a designer seeks to select 
available assets from the portfolio, apply concept of operations (CONOPS) to dictate SoS 
interactions, and meet specific desired capabilities.  
SoS and portfolio design considerations represent unique challenges for tradespace 
analysis, and especially for affordability analysis under uncertainty. Because engineering 
portfolios may include assets that are SoS themselves, and because there is typically a high 
degree of interaction and interdependencies in the costs, risks, and capabilities of the 
assets, traditional portfolio assessment techniques must be modified to address these 
complexities that violate prior assumptions. SoS-based design approaches enable 
consideration of these unique qualities of engineering portfolios and shall inform the 
development of the method presented in this research.  
This paper discusses recent efforts to adapt a resource-centric approach to EEA 
developed by Schaffner, Ross, and Rhodes (2014) for use in affordable portfolio design 
through the integration of elements of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and the SoS design 
literature. The proposed method is demonstrated in a case study on the acquisition of a 
portfolio of assets from which a CSG may be assembled. The method is leveraged to 
provide design insight into CSG lifecycle affordability. This insight is achieved by identifying 
the utility and costs of portfolio designs in potential future contexts that embody a variety of 
uncertainty factors, such as unit availability, budget constraints, capability requirements, 
strategic threats, and technology development. The 11 processes of the proposed method 
are described as applied to the CSG portfolio, and they illustrate the method’s potential 
value for naval acquisition and operations. Furthermore, a discussion of the potential for 
broad applicability of the method to other DoD capability portfolios is proffered, specifically 
with respect to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).  
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Motivation 
Between 1997 and 2011, there were 74 Nunn-McCurdy program unit cost breeches 
in 47 of 134 major DoD acquisition efforts (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). 
According to an audit by the GAO, many of these breeches corresponded to context 
changes in the environment surrounding the acquisition programs. These context changes 
included affordability measurement statute modifications, presidential administrations 
turnover, unit order size reduction, schedule changes, and requirements changes. These 
cost breeches occurred in over one third of major DoD acquisition programs and indicate the 
need for conceptual design methodologies that consider potential changes in context in 
order to achieve consistent lifecycle program affordability.  
In light of these breeches, and supported by the DoD emphasis of an “affordability 
mandate” in BBP 1.0, 2.0, and now 3.0 (Carter, 2010; Kendall, 2012, 2014), design for 
affordability literature and practice grew rapidly. This provides the foundation for extending 
EEA to the portfolio-level. First, the concept and meaning of the term affordability was 
explored and defined by many organizations including INCOSE and the NDIA, as well as by 
the DoD (Schaffner et al., 2013). Second, metrics were developed to assess the contextual 
and dynamic attributes of affordable systems (Bobinis et al., 2013), and a variety of tools 
were produced to support affordability tradeoffs between potential systems. Third, EEA was 
employed to reveal system affordability across a variety of uncertain futures and to provide 
insight into changing contexts, such as those which caused many of the recent Nunn-
McCurdy breeches (Wu, Ross, & Rhodes, 2014).  
These advances, however, address only a part of the challenge in achieving 
affordability for the DoD since they do not explicitly consider the higher order complexities 
inherent to multi-system acquisition and operations (Wu, 2014). As early as 2010, DoD 
decision makers recognized that design for affordability at the system level did not 
necessarily translate to the affordability of the overall capability portfolio. Remarks by 
General Peter Chiarelli indicate an understanding of this concept and call for a portfolio-level 
conceptual design paradigm (Association of the United States Army, 2010, p. 1): 
If you look at any one of these systems as an individual system, you can sell 
just about anything. But, when you look at [an] entire portfolio you can start to 
see where we have duplication in different systems or maybe we’re 
overinvesting in one and underinvesting in another. 
A variety of portfolio management techniques have been developed to begin to fill 
this design and acquisition capability gap. The Systems Engineering Guide for System-of-
Systems (2008) provides guidelines for the engineering of SoS in DoD acquisitions. 
Komoroski et al. (2006) applied a variant of real options analysis to identify long-term SoS 
acquisition strategies for information technology. The Computational Exploratory Model by 
Mane and DeLaurentis (2011) was developed to assess development networks of SoS 
architectures. Initial efforts to inform the acquisition and integration of systems in a SoS 
through MPT were also made by Davendralingam, Mane, and DeLaurentis (2012). Epoch-
Era Analysis complements these previous efforts by adding the ability to assess the 
influence of changing contexts on the affordability of potential portfolios. 
Extending EEA for Affordability From “System-Level” to “Portfolio-Level”  
To clarify the terminology used in this paper and link it to trends in the SoS literature, 
a set of terms is introduced to describe three “tiers” of design abstraction. Table 1 presents 
an example of the design scope for each tier of design abstraction as applied to the CSG 
case.  
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System-Level: System design occurs at a “level of decomposition that is inclusive of 
a major architectural element and is semi-independent from the rest of the architecture” 
(Walton, 2002). The designer of a system typically has full design authority, and although a 
system may be composed of multiple components (such as a launch vehicle), it is not 
considered a SoS as the sub-elements are not managerially independent (Maier, 1999).  
Program-Level: Program design is distinguished from system design in that it 
requires joint consideration of multiple independent or semi-independent constituent 
elements (typically systems themselves). However, like system-level analysis, the designer 
of a program is typically assumed to have a moderate to high degree of design authority. 
Two primary types of programs have been identified, and they are distinguished by the 
attributes of the constituent systems: 
• Type I programs are composed of homogenous constituent systems. Type I 
program design is readily conducted through traditional EEA where the most 
promising single system solution is also expected to produce the greatest 
program benefit. Initial research into Type I programs was conducted by Wu 
(2014). 
• Type II programs are composed of heterogeneous constituent systems which 
often complete similar missions and are evaluated by a common set of value 
metrics. Because Type II programs concern either semi-independent or fully-
independent constituent systems, as opposed to the closely managed 
homogenous systems in Type I programs, the design problem involves SoS 
challenges. 
Portfolio-Level: A portfolio is a collection of selected assets that may be either new 
or legacy programs as defined above, which are simultaneously invested in to collectively 
provide a set of capabilities. A portfolio designer does not necessarily have a significant 
level of control over the design of the constituent programs, or their ultimate 
operationalization in a SoS, but can create a portfolio with attractive procurement, 
management, and capability features based upon the possible assets and their likely 
applications. Design at the portfolio-level must not only consider traditional financial portfolio 
investment techniques that identify emergent properties from a set of independent assets, 
but also must consider SoS techniques that consider value arising from the potential 
interaction of the assets when operationalized.  
Table 1. Design Abstraction Tiers as Applied to a Carrier Strike Group 
 
In prior research, Wu (2014) proposed a methodology for program and portfolio-level 
affordability analysis utilizing a bottom-up “survival of the fittest” approach. Wu’s approach 
leveraged EEA to identify promising individual systems for affordability; such system-level 
analysis is an extensively explored capability of EEA. At the next tier of design abstraction, 
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the program level, new program-level performance attributes were applied to a set of 
programs seeded from the “promising” systems identified in system-level design. It was then 
ascertained which combination of these systems most promisingly fulfilled the program-level 
goals. This “wrapping” approach was a logical first step towards program and portfolio 
design with EEA. However, the method may prematurely discard potentially valuable 
designs that do not appear attractive in lower levels of design abstraction, but produce a 
favorable overall portfolio. 
The concern for premature abandonment of potential assets is supported by Walton 
(2002). Walton’s work applied portfolio theory to tradespace analysis for a space science 
mission and found that the most promising portfolio of assets to minimize uncertainty was 
not consistently a constellation of the most promising single satellite design(s). Rather, 
Walton found that designs for portfolio-level minimum uncertainty included sub-par, system-
level solutions that interacted to exhibit emergent benefits and the highest portfolio-level 
utility.  
Recognizing the limitations of both the bottom-up and top-down (traditional 
requirements-driven design) approaches to portfolio design for affordability, Wu suggested 
that a two pronged method to leverage the strengths of each approach may lead to higher-
utility portfolios. TSE is inherently a bottom-up process where constituent systems are first 
designed for desired system level attributes, and then linked together through multiple levels 
of larger subsystems to result in portfolio capabilities. MPT is an inherently top-down 
approach where designers identify desired portfolio-level attributes (big picture), and an 
algorithm then seeks to compile a set of investments (systems) which satisfy those attributes 
in aggregate (Amenc & Sourd, 2005). This paper intends to leverage both of these 
techniques by applying elements of MPT and TSE to EEA. Synthesized bottom-up and top-
down models have found traction in land use portfolio planning and energy portfolio 
management (Castella et al., 2007; Wing, 2006). 
Overview of an EEA-Based Approach for Design for Affordability 
Acquisition program planning under affordability considerations requires analysis of 
factors such as system development schedules, legacy hardware and operations, 
resources, and political capital. Furthermore, these factors must be considered with respect 
to the dynamic environments in which they exist over the system lifecycle. Epoch-Era 
Analysis is an effective mechanism to evaluate acquisition strategies in anticipation of future 
context shifts. An epoch is a time period of static context and stakeholder expectations, like 
a snapshot of a potential future. An era is an ordered sequence of epochs with finite 
durations that describe a potential progression of contexts over the lifecycle of the system.  
EEA consists of several distinct, but related analysis techniques. In single-epoch 
analysis, potential portfolios are evaluated in individual epochs to determine how close to 
the Pareto front the portfolio lies. When the performance of the same portfolio is compared 
in different epochs through multi-epoch analysis, the various influences of contextual 
uncertainties may be perceived and shifts in portfolio proximity to the Pareto front may be 
observed. If ordered epochs are strung together into an era, changes in the value of 
proposed portfolios over time becomes apparent, and portfolios which may become 
unaffordable are identifiable. Figure 1 illustrates how single-era analysis may reveal lifecycle 
deficiencies in initially promising portfolio designs. 
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Note. This Epoch-Era Analysis reveals the performance (including affordability) of a system through a sequence 
of varying contexts illustrating the potential lifecycle value of the system. 
 Figure 1. Epoch-Era Analysis  
(Ross & Rhodes, 2008) 
In prior research, Schaffner et al. (2014) developed a composite method for 
affordability based upon the Responsive Systems Comparison (RSC) method, and applied 
their approach to the acquisition of a Next Generation Combat Ship (NGCS) for the Navy. 
RSC is a variant of EEA which leverages TSE as a powerful tool to conduct analysis. 
Complex system design, and particularly SoS design, involves multiple dimensions of 
relevant benefits, expenses, and boundary conditions which do not lend themselves to 
optimization and are often too complex for intuitive decision making. TSE applies the 
capabilities of modern computing to enumerate a large variety of design alternatives to 
support a decision maker to holistically investigate subtle tradeoffs and previously 
unconsidered designs. As a result, RSC may lead a designer to select an acquisition 
program with superior lifecycle results than those determined by a numerical optimizer 
operating under simple tradeoffs and rules of thumb (Wu et al., 2014). Building on this prior 
research, this paper describes the extension of the method to the program and portfolio 
levels.  
Overview of Modern Portfolio Theory in Systems Engineering 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) has a ubiquitous impact on financial investment 
strategies. MPT provides a methodology to identify an efficient frontier of portfolio 
investments based upon the elicited values and preferences of the investor(s) and the asset 
performance forecasts. Such an efficient frontier is composed of potential portfolios of 
investments which maximize the return on investment while minimizing the risk. To achieve 
this end, MPT relies on the concept that groups of investments with negative trending 
covariance exhibit a portfolio risk which is less than the average of the risks of each 
constituent investment (Amenc & Sourd, 2005).  
Numerous derivatives have extended the capabilities of MPT. Post-Modern Portfolio 
Theory (PMPT) allows for the consideration of non-normally distributed risks (a more 
realistic assumption) and provides for the minimization of “downside risk” (negative 
outcomes) rather than mean variance (Swisher & Kasten, 2005). Walton (2002) employed 
TSE to allow for formal tradeoffs between value and uncertainty (risk) in an effort to reveal 
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“synergistic combinations of architectures.” Furthermore, Walton’s work introduced semi-
variance as a method to treat upside and downside risks independently in portfolio 
optimization. The authors have elected to utilize MPT in this initial application to EEA due to 
its greater simplicity, and the availability of literature documenting application to fields 
beyond finance. 
The fusion of aspects of portfolio theory with TSE is not a novel concept. 
Davendralingam et al. (2012, p. 63) introduced a modification to a model of SoS acquisition 
originally developed by Lane et al. (2010) as a mechanism to support portfolio design and 
“maintain compliance with the ‘top-down integration, bottoms-up implementation’ paradigm” 
of traditional SoS design. Davendralingam et al.’s approach relied upon an ongoing, iterative 
circuit of design, implementation, and feedback to mitigate dynamic contextual uncertainties. 
The method in this paper utilizes EEA to consider the potential uncertainties of the internal 
and external environment at the outset, and select a portfolio which is resilient against 
changes in context.  
Generalization of MPT and Combination with EEA 
While MPT and EEA share a variety of commonalities including value elicitation from 
stakeholders/investors, the use of models to describe investment/system value, and a 
foundation in utility theory, there are also fundamental differences in the design of SoS 
which violate assumptions necessary for MPT. Ricci and Ross (2012) conducted a review of 
the similarities and differences of MPT and EEA. Their work yielded Table 2, which 
describes key differences between financial and SoS portfolios. 
Table 2. List of Salient Differences Between Financial and SoS Portfolios 
(Ricci & Ross, 2012) 
 
Ricci and Ross propose a variety of modifications to MPT which address asset 
availability, diversification costs, carrying costs, and switching costs. However, the 
disconnect between SoS and financial portfolios over non-normal distributions and non-
linear relationships of constituent systems to portfolio value is yet to be addressed. 
In MPT, the distribution of return (utility) is assumed to be a normal distribution 
around the expected value. This is an effort of MPT to characterize asset response to 
potential changes in future context. The assumption of a normal distribution may not be 
appropriate for engineering portfolios where, especially for novel systems, thee is not a large 
set of historical data upon which constituent system performance simulations may be 
grounded. EEA proves a convenient mechanism to address this challenge. Multi-Epoch and 
era-level analyses reveal changes in utility through possible changes in context and 
expectations, while also identifying path-dependent uncertainty. EEA may therefore be used 
to determine promising portfolios that maintain acceptable value across these potential 
futures, rather than relying on value predictions from the aggregation of utility distributions. 
In a sense, when EEA and MPT are combined, assumptions about the distribution of risk of 
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constituent systems no longer need to be made, but rather the impact of various uncertainty 
factors may be readily simulated and examined in the ultimate design choices. 
When considering an engineering portfolio, the utility (and expense) of the overall 
portfolio may not simply be the aggregated, linear-sum of the stand-alone utilities of the 
constituent elements. Rather, engineering portfolio utility may be greater or less depending 
upon additional operational relationships among the constituent elements. For example, 
while a Ticonderoga-class cruiser provides a great deal of anti-ship missile defense value, 
two cruisers do not necessarily provide a potential CSG with twice the value. The anti-
missile systems, radar systems, and concept of operations (CONOPS) used by the cruisers 
are identical (and therefore susceptible to the same vulnerabilities) and would not provide a 
CSG with twice the value of a single cruiser. Therefore the presence of both systems should 
not increase the acquisition portfolio value for these capabilities by the linear sum of both 
systems’ utility. Conversely, the anticipated Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) on Flight 
III Arleigh-Burke destroyers is expected to provide enhanced value beyond the linear 
aggregation of the individual ship capacities when two more ships operate in conjunction. 
While MPT does not consider such investment interactions, the development of SoS utility 
from the capabilities of constituent systems is an active field of research. Therefore, this 
paper adopts two possible constructs based on SoS research as initial attempts to address 
this challenge for portfolio design: the capability tree and combination coefficients. 
Introduction of the Method for Portfolio Affordability Analysis 
Portfolio-Level Epoch-Era Analysis for Affordability (PLEEAA) is proposed as a new 
method for portfolio affordability analysis. The key innovative feature of the method is the 
fusion of elements from Modern Portfolio Theory with the capabilities of Epoch-Era Analysis. 
Figure 2 displays a graphical representation of how this is achieved. 
 
 Figure 2. Portfolio-Level Epoch-Era Analysis for Affordability (PLEEAA) Process 
Model for Affordability Analysis 
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) is a method that has been used 
extensively in system-level design. When used with EEA, MATE may design for a variety of 
“ilities,” including affordability. As shown in RSC, MATE combined with EEA may be used to 
consider dynamic uncertainty of contexts and needs. PLEEAA extends RSC with two new 
constructs to enumerate viable portfolios: a portfolio selector and a portfolio design tool. 
Additionally, a “portfolio capability tree” is also implemented to link system performance to 
portfolio utility.  
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Portfolio Design Tool and Portfolio Selector 
A fundamental element of MPT is “asset allocation,” or the identification of potential 
asset classes which a portfolio designer (the systems engineer applying PLEEAA) desires to 
consider for inclusion in the portfolio. In finance, these assets may be stocks, bonds, or cash 
(Amenc & Sourd, 2005). For Navy portfolios, asset allocation may involve identifying 
fundamental categories of assets such as cruisers, destroyers, aircraft, and submarines, for 
example. The portfolio designer may apply specific constraints to each class, such as a 
maximum number of units (or funds) they are willing to allocate to that class; these class 
constraints mirror investment thresholds in financial portfolios.  
The asset allocation decisions in the portfolio design tool represent the most 
significant lever a portfolio designer has to influence the outcome of the PLEEAA method. If 
a portfolio designer wishes to constrain the analysis to reflect current institutional inertia or 
design paradigms, they may develop highly specific classes and class constraints which 
force the portfolio selector to only consider designs similar to existing portfolios. However, if 
the designer wishes to explore potentially novel approaches and unconsidered emergent 
qualities of constituent systems, they may choose to set few to no class constraints on the 
analysis. This would enumerate a far greater portion of the potential portfolios design space, 
but possibly at significant computational cost. 
A second role of the portfolio design tool and class constraints is to reduce the 
computational complexity of the portfolio design problem, as shown in the case example. 
Portfolio Capability Tree  
A key challenge of any tradespace-based portfolio analysis is linking constituent 
system performance attributes with portfolio-level capabilities. This research uses the 
concept of a capability tree, a capability-based value mapping, to both percolate portfolio 
designer needs down through the portfolio levels to the constituent system managers, and 
then to amalgamate system-level performance attributes back up the capability tree and 
define a portfolio-level utility. The structure and inspiration of capability trees are rooted in 
means-ends objectives networks, as developed by Keeney (1992). Means-ends objectives 
networks link decision alternatives to their impact on the overall objective to enable 
quantitative modeling. Capability trees seek to link portfolio asset options to the overall 
portfolio utility for the same purpose.  
The process to develop the capability tree begins with value-elicitation. A portfolio 
designer decomposes the strategic objectives of the portfolio-level stakeholders into a set of 
desired capabilities, or performance attributes. Performance attributes become a measure of 
how well a potential portfolio meets the needs of the portfolio designer. Each performance 
attribute of the portfolio is communicated to a unique program-level manager who is the 
decision maker for constituent programs contributing to that portfolio performance attribute. 
Similar to before, the program-level manager decomposes their values into a set of 
program-level performance attributes which are communicated to either another program-
level manager, or to the constituent systems of the portfolio. 
It is important to recognize that the portfolio designer and program-level managers at 
each level in the portfolio hierarchy are empowered to develop their own performance 
attributes and mental value models to measure the operation and utility of the systems (or 
programs) in their subtree. The utility measurement developed is then shared by the in-level 
manager with the manager one level above in the capability tree hierarchy. Therefore, the 
utility measurement of a program must be effectively communicated at the interface of the 
two managers, referred to as a “node.” The effective communication of utility between 
individuals is a non-trivial task, and in general, may benefit from multi-party utility 
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negotiations such as those under research by Fitzgerald and Ross (2015). The capability 
tree model, as described here, is an imposed constructed value model and is illustrated in 
Figure 3, where nodes are represented by collate symbols.  
The “nesting” process utilized to decompose portfolio-level strategic objectives into 
performance attributes, and communicate these values to constituent programs or systems, 
creates a two-dimensional root or tree structure of desired performance attributes at various 
levels of the portfolio hierarchy. The multi-document symbol in Figure 3 represents a 
program-level manager who utilizes their own value and performance models to determine 
the utility of the constituent systems or programs in their subtree. 
 
 Figure 3. PLEEAA “Capability Tree” Portfolio Design Architecture 
Through the capability tree, desired portfolio strategic objectives flow down to lower 
level program managers as performance attributes. The capability trees are extendable to 
multiple levels of programs: Three have been shown in Figure 3. Each additional level of the 
portfolio hierarchy allows for the design of more intricate portfolios through TSE techniques, 
but may also substantially increase the analysis complexity. All “branches” of the tree do not 
need to have the same number of levels. Some capabilities will naturally terminate in 
system-level attributes after the first level, while others may require multiple levels of 
decomposition to equate to system-level performance attributes. A portfolio objective is fully 
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decomposed when the system-level “leaf node” performance attribute is readily described 
by a metric of the potential component systems, such as the number of missiles on a ship. 
In the command hierarchy of military institutions, utility handoffs may be 
straightforward due to the subordinate decision-making (chain of command) architecture. 
For example, the structure of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
represents the information hierarchy that the capability tree seeks to leverage for portfolio 
affordability analysis. JCIDS manages the DoD’s joint capability portfolio and conducts 
capability gap assessments, among other capability requirement development and approval 
functions, by identifying joint capability areas (similar to the capability tree portfolio-level 
performance capabilities) and engaging decision makers in a four-tier hierarchy which 
moves information from individual subject matter experts up to four star decision makers 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b). In a very real sense, the PLEEAA method 
adopts the portfolio management structure of the JCIDS process established by Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015a) and integrates MPT and EEA tradespace exploration 
techniques to produce more robust, data-driven portfolio analyses. 
Complementary and Substitute Systems 
A fundamental challenge unique to engineering portfolios versus financial portfolios 
is that portfolio-level capability may not simply be an aggregate sum of the constituent asset 
capabilities. As discussed previously, while a portfolio is a non-operational construct that 
describes the acquisition and inherent values of a set of assets, engineering portfolios must 
consider emergent value from asset interaction in a SoS. The concept of complementary 
and substitute systems in SoS has been an area of intense academic focus. To provide a 
few definitions, 
1. Complementary systems are two or more constituent systems that 
experience a change in value delivery towards existing performance 
attributes, or gain capability in new performance attributes, when 
simultaneously present in a SoS (in this case, a portfolio). Such changes in 
value usually result from an adjustment in the CONOPS of the systems. The 
sign and magnitude of the performance change is variable. For example, the 
missile strike capability of a submarine may be significantly increased when 
combined with the advanced radar and fire control capabilities of a missile 
cruiser. However, the same submarine may experience a reduction in stealth 
capability as it must be within a certain range of the cruiser and transmit 
targeting information.  
2. Substitute systems are those that provide an overlapping performance 
attribute capability in an operating scenario (i.e., CONOPS) of interest. A 
guided missile cruiser and guided missile destroyer may perhaps be 
considered substitute systems in terms of anti-ballistic missile capabilities. 
However, they would not likely be substitutes for littoral operations as their 
capabilities and vulnerabilities differ.  
The PLEEAA capability tree architecture provides a unique mechanism to identify 
and assess substitute systems. Since all potential systems are simultaneously evaluated by 
each bottom-level portfolio hierarchy manager, substitute systems that provide similar 
capability are likely to be identified. The manager’s value model may then appropriately 
determine the node’s aggregate utility resulting from the interacting substitute systems.  
The identification of complementary systems is not as straightforward, but is still 
enabled by the capability tree architecture. Again, because bottom-level portfolio hierarchy 
managers ideally have visibility of the relevant potential constituent systems of the portfolio 
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that contribute to the performance attribute of interest, they will likely be able to identify 
system pairings which complement each other’s value delivery. The bottom-level managers, 
unlike the portfolio designer or higher level program managers, will reasonably have the 
expertise to understand the potential interactions between systems. In other words, the 
capability tree framework releases portfolio-level designers from trying to make technical 
evaluations on the numerous constituent systems in the portfolio, but rather allows each 
manager in the capability tree to only consider system or program interactions and values at 
their node. If a bottom-level portfolio manager is unable to identify system interactions, then 
emergent complementary value may not be properly considered in the portfolio design.  
On an additional note, both complementary and substitute systems are likely to 
represent opportunities for cost savings through joint development or production programs. 
While this information is unlikely to be offered by the constituent system operators during 
value elicitation, the bottom-level managers will likely recognize such potential. Therefore, 
the capability tree framework may allow for the adjustment of both utility and costs with 
respect to complementary and substitute system interactions.  
While the capability tree framework may help discern the influence of complementary 
and substitute systems, the approach outlined above would require the decision-making 
models of each manager to be well represented at every node. For this initial CSG case 
study, and indeed for many conceptual design or acquisition programs, this assumption is 
not realistic. Therefore, this research also adopts a second approach to manage 
complementary and substitute systems in lower fidelity analyses. 
In her work to apply tradespace exploration to SoS, Chattopadhyay (2009) 
introduced the concept of “level of attribute combination complexity.” Chattopadhyay 
identified three levels of combination complexity which express general, first-order estimates 
of performance attribute interaction from different constituent systems in the portfolio. “Low-
level combination” characterizes performance attributes which exist independent of one 
another. An example of low-level combination may be an E-2 Hawkeye early warning 
capability and a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) green-water minesweeping capability. “Medium-
level combination” describes attributes of systems which contribute to the delivery of the 
same portfolio performance attribute, but are characterized by a sharing of value deliver, 
such as through a handoff of responsibility. The handoff of targeting information from a 
Ticonderoga cruiser to a Virginia-class submarine may be envisioned as medium-level 
combination for the cruise missile strike performance attribute. Finally, “high-level 
combination” are system attributes which interact to simultaneously provide a portfolio 
performance attribute, such as the anti-submarine warfare capabilities of a Virginia-class 
submarine and an Arleigh-Burke destroyer. A given system may contribute to performance 
attributes at one or all of these levels of combination complexity when considering their 
interactions with other systems. 
PLEEAA elicits bottom-level portfolio hierarchy managers to characterize the 
combination complexity for each performance attribute in their area of responsibility for each 
of the potential constituent systems. Various models may be used to represent the impact of 
the level of combination on the resulting utility and cost of the portfolio. For the CSG case 
study, in general, low-level combination attributes are not adjusted, medium-level 
combination attributes utilize alternative models for utility calculation, and high-level 
combination attributes receive appropriate utility and cost multipliers.  
Overview of PLEEAA 
PLEEAA is a variant of the RSC method for affordability analysis developed by 
Schaffner et al. (2013). The Gather–Evaluate–Analyze structure of the RSC method was 
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maintained and supplemented with additional steps necessary for portfolio design. 
Specifically, the value-driven design formulation now occurs with multiple groups of 
stakeholders corresponding to different levels of the portfolio hierarchy. 
The basic steps of PLEEAA are represented as an 11-process method shown in 
Figure 4. Processes 1 through 5 involve value elicitation of multiple-levels of stakeholders in 
the portfolio to define the problem scope, assess stakeholder needs, identify contextual 
variables, and assess combination complexity information for potential systems. Process 6 
conducts the composite EEA/MPT analysis to produce a tradespace of potential portfolio 
designs for the considered epoch. Before proceeding to the following processes, feedback is 
provided to the designers and stakeholders to allow for adjustments in the provided 
information, as necessary. This feedback loop is a key element of TSE as stakeholder 
values may change as portfolio options and tradeoffs are made clear. Finally, Processes 7 
through 11 support designers at the portfolio-level to compare the dynamic properties of 
potential portfolios in light of their anticipated performance in a variety of point futures 
(epochs), as well as possible lifecycle narratives (eras). These processes are described and 
applied to the CSG study in the following section. 
 
 Figure 4. A Graphical Overview of the Modified Gather–Evaluate–Analyze 
Structure for PLEEAA 
Demonstration Case: Carrier Strike Group Design for Affordability 
According to a 2006 RAND study, the cost growth rates for new naval units such as 
“amphibious ships, surface combatants, attack submarines, and nuclear aircraft carriers 
have ranged from 7 to 11 percent,” an inflationary rate which significantly outstrips 
development costs in other sectors (Arena et al., 2006). In the decade since this report, the 
severe cost overruns in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Zumwalt-class destroyer 
(DDG1000) programs have likely exacerbated this figure. In light of this matter, it appears 
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appropriate to apply PLEEAA to an application of large ship acquisitions in order to display 
the potential of this method to assist decision problems in the following ways: 
• As the LCS and DDG1000 programs are scaled back (or eliminated) and 
replaced with alternative systems, portfolio-level affordability analysis may aid 
the identification of resulting capability gaps in the Navy’s strategic portfolio. 
• The use of a PLEEAA may facilitate the definition of acquisition program 
requirements which limit capability creep, such as what was seen in the LCS 
development. 
• Portfolio-level affordability analysis will give decision makers insight into the 
value tradeoff of investing in high-capability, high-costs systems, versus low-
capability, low-cost systems for future naval group operations. 
• EEA, when applied to a ship acquisition portfolio, will allow designers to 
foresee the affordability of the proposed capability portfolio in multiple 
potential future scenarios. 
Considering these potential benefits to the naval acquisition process, the design of a 
portfolio of systems, from which a CSG(s) may be developed, presents itself as an 
appropriate case study to demonstrate PLEEAA. Beyond the relevance of the analysis to 
the DoD’s goals of an affordable Navy and the emergence of new tactics and asymmetric 
threats for exiting CSGs, the complexity the CSG design problem is conveniently reduced 
through a series of realistic assumptions. The simplifying assumptions adopted include the 
following: 
1. A CSG is a directed SoS as defined by Maier (1999), in which a central 
authority (the combatant commander [CCDR] and operational commander) 
have decision authority over the constitute systems (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2010). A directed SoS is ideal for the initial application of this 
method as the additional complexities inherent to incomplete managerial 
influence or decentralized control are avoided (Shah, 2013). 
2. The baseline composition and basic mission capabilities of CSGs are well-
defined by Chief of Naval Operations (2010), enabling effective bounding of 
the potential portfolio asset set for the purposes of this case study. 
Furthermore, a CSG is intended to function autonomously for many of its 
operations. This further simplifies the scoping of the portfolio boundary 
conditions and interfaces. 
3. The hierarchy of the Navy designates specific decision-making authority to 
specific individuals. This structure, including the Navy’s use of subject matter 
experts, is directly paralleled by the capability tree structure of PLEEAA. 
Therefore, in the analysis, each node of the capability tree may be mapped to 
a specific decision maker in the CSG command structure. 
The following sections briefly describe each process in PLEEAA. A representational 
outcome is included, which provides a first pass, high-level application of PLEEAA to CSG 
portfolio design, subject to the assumptions highlighted previously in this section. The values 
of stakeholders, models for performance aggregation, and system performance parameters 
were notionally created from publically available information and feedback from experts 
familiar with the systems.  
Process 1: Value-Driving Context Definition 
The first process in PLEEAA begins by identifying the basic problem statement and 
design space for the proposed portfolio. The portfolio-level stakeholders are identified and 
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engaged as necessary to formulate relevant exogenous uncertainties and outline initial 
value propositions. An inchoate set of potential constituent systems is constructed, and the 
portfolio designer’s degree of influence over these systems is predicted. 
Representational Outcome: According to the Chief of Naval Operations (2010), the 
primary portfolio-level stakeholders influencing the design of a CSG are the combatant 
commander (CCDR) and operational commander of the naval group. The CSG value 
proposition is outlined therein as a “responsive, flexible capability for sustained maritime 
power projection and combat survivability to shape the operation environment, respond to 
crises, and protect the United States and allied interest in any threat environment.” An initial 
set of 12 potential constituent systems is provided in the work instruction. Seven more 
systems were added to capture the NGCS work conducted in prior research and the new 
Zumwalt-class destroyer. For this analysis, the portfolio designer is assumed to have total 
control over the acquisition of new systems for the CSG portfolio (subject to the defined 
constraints).  
Process 2: Portfolio-Level Stakeholder Value-Driven Design Formulation 
In Process 2, the portfolio designer elicits a variety of information from the portfolio-
level stakeholders to establish the root (top level) of the capability tree and clarify the 
constraints of the portfolio design and composition.  
• Performance Attributes: A set of overarching capabilities which the portfolio 
must be able to fulfil to meet the strategic objectives. These capabilities, or 
performance attributes, are assigned weights based on elicited information to 
reflect the stakeholder preferences. A utility function is developed. 
• Expense Attributes: Portfolio resource statements are translated into specific 
costs measured in the portfolio. Acceptable expense thresholds are identified, 
and expense functions are created. 
• Portfolio Investment Strategy Constraints: Constraints are set concerning 
viable portfolio composition. These constraints may define limitations on 
resources, types of constituent systems, and acceptable risk. They could also 
be more specific and govern internal investment strategy decisions such as 
the maximum number of component systems allowed or the minimum 
resource allocation value to any single system.  
Representational Outcome: Simplified interpretations of notional, portfolio-level 
performance and expense attributes for a CSG portfolio are shown in Table 3. For this initial 
case study, the performance and expense attributes yield multi-attribute utility and multi-
attribute expense through linear weighted sum aggregation functions. The value weights at 
each node sum to one. This requires an assumption that the performance and expense 
attributes contribute independently to aggregate value. While this is not necessarily a 
realistic assumption for a CSG portfolio, it is sufficient first order estimation for the 
demonstration purposes of this case study.  
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Table 3. Portfolio-Level Performance and Expense Attributes for a CSG 
 
Process 3: Capability Tree Stakeholder Value-Driven Design Formulation 
From the information gathered in the previous processes, the portfolio designer 
creates a notional structure of the capability tree by identifying specific program managers at 
each node. As a reminder, the manager at each node controls, or has expertise in, a 
performance capability identified in the higher level of the portfolio. The portfolio designer 
elicits a variety of information from each program manager of the capability tree and 
continues the process until all branches have terminated into the system-level attributes, or 
leaf nodes. 
Representational Outcome: The capability tree for the CSG case study attests to the 
inherent complexity of portfolio analysis. For while the representation of the CSG has been 
simplified, the corresponding capability tree developed contains five branches 
(corresponding to the five portfolio-level performance attributes from Process 2) and, 
through up to four levels of decomposition, 91 distinct system-level performance attributes. 
For the sake of brevity, the entire capability tree has not been included in this paper; 
however, Figure 5 displays the tree with all but the system-level performance attributes 
included. It should be noted that some branches terminate after only the portfolio-level 
attributes, while other branches decompose capabilities through three nodes before 
reaching system-level attributes. 
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Note. Read tree from left to right. 
 Figure 5. CSG Case Study Capability Tree Outline 
Process 4: Epoch Characterization 
All stakeholders related to the portfolio (portfolio decision makers, program 
managers, system operators, external stakeholders, etc.) are engaged to identify possible 
key future contexts that might impact success, and to characterize the uncertainty of each 
context. It is anticipated that a core set of contextual uncertainties will emerge from the 
stakeholders that may be parameterized by a common set of epoch variables. Any 
anticipated changes in stakeholder preferences (performance attribute weightings) are 
identified.  
Representational Outcome: Seven epoch variables were identified from five major 
categories of uncertainty (technology levels, maintenance events, policy environment, SoS 
management abilities, and CSG threats). Table 4 displays the range of uncertainty 
represented by each epoch variable as well as units of measurement. The technology epoch 
variables most directly influence constituent system performance. The maintenance, policy 
and SoS management epoch variables most directly influence the cost functions. The 
threats epoch variables change the stakeholder preferences for portfolio attribute 
performance.  
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Table 4. Contextual Uncertainties of CSG Captured in Epoch Variables 
 
For the initial case study presented in this paper, the technological epoch variables 
were excluded to simplify the analysis and focus the results on affordability considerations of 
the variance in portfolio cost attributes.  
The five remaining epoch variables were enumerated independently and combined 
to produce a total of 243 potential epochs. For the sake of simplicity, five possible epochs 
that represent recognizable potential futures were extracted from this set in a “narrative” 
sampling approach. These five epochs and their epoch variable levels are provided in Table 
5. 
Table 5. Epoch Construction From Epoch Variables for Five Selected Epochs 
 
Process 5: System-Level Capability Assessment 
Each potential constituent system must be evaluated for its performance in each 
system-level performance attribute. This “capability assessment” may take a variety of 
forms. In some cases, the bottom-level capability tree hierarchy managers may utilize 
performance models to computationally assess the potential constituent systems’ 
performance. In other cases, however, such models may not exist and the bottom-level 
managers, or an appropriate subject matter expert, shall be engaged to assess system 
performance qualitatively. Each constituent system must be assessed for all performance 
attributes in each epoch.  
Representational Outcome: The notional performance of the 19 potential constituent 
systems was assessed for each of the 91 system-level performance attributes in the five 
potential epochs. Publically available information was utilized to assign performance on a 0, 
1, 3, 9 scale; 0 represented no performance, 1 was minimal performance, 3 was moderate 
performance, and 9 was performance sufficient to meet the desired portfolio capability. The 
CSG capability assessment results were reviewed for reasonableness by individuals familiar 
with naval systems.  
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Process 6: Design-Epoch-Era Tradespace Evaluation 
A key high-level summary visualization is a tradespace with axes of Multi-Attribute 
Utility (MAU) versus Multi-Attribute Expense (MAE), as demonstrated by Wu (2014). 
However, unlike in traditional TSE, the points inside a portfolio tradespace do not represent 
single systems or programs, but rather represent unique combinations of assets determined 
by the portfolio investment strategy. The process flow of PLEEAA depicted in Figure 2 
highlights the process utilized to design portfolios, find portfolio MAU and MAE, evaluate the 
validity of the result, and create the data necessary for depicting a tradespace of viable 
alternatives.  
Representational Outcome: Without the ability to elicit performance attribute 
aggregation models from each of the program-level managers, this research developed a 
series of six functions to evaluate bottom-level portfolio manager utility and cost attributes 
from the constituent systems in a portfolio. Each performance and cost attribute of the 
portfolio was assigned one of the six functions depending upon which one best represented 
the notional program-level manager value. Once the bottom-level performance and cost 
attributes had been calculated, the value was multiplied by the preference weighing of the 
program-level manager at the node in the next level of the portfolio hierarchy. This process 
was repeated for each level of the portfolio hierarchy until all branches were aggregated to 
the portfolio-designer. The portfolio-level preference weightings were then applied to find the 
ultimate utility and costs of the portfolio. Table 6 provides information on the approach and 
result for utility evaluation at each level of the capability tree. 
Table 6. Approach to Derive Portfolio-Level Utility From System Performance 
Attributes Through the Capability Tree 
 
The PLEEAA method enumerated 53,018,336 possible portfolios and identified 
524,160 portfolios which met the class constraints. This subset of portfolios was then 
evaluated according to the stakeholder preferences and constituent system performance of 
each epoch. Table 7 displays the number of valid portfolios, or portfolios which met the MAU 
and MAE constraints, and the percentage of the total potential designs that were found to be 
feasible. The Small Navy epoch is the most limiting epoch due to its 80% budget and 150% 
cooperation costs.  
Table 7. Single-Epoch Tradespace Evaluation Summary 
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Process 7: Single Epoch Analysis 
The valid portfolios for each epoch may be plotted in a tradespace of MAU versus 
MAE. By exploring each single-epoch tradespace, a designer can identify which portfolio 
design options for the CSG perform particularly well for the context represented in that 
epoch, and what constituent systems Pareto efficient portfolios have in common.  
Representational Outcome: The tradespace of viable CSG portfolios for the Baseline 
epoch is provided in Figure 6. The Pareto frontier of the Baseline epoch contains a total of 
26 potential portfolio designs. The specifications for five example Pareto optimal portfolios 
have been provided. Figure 7 visually displays the composition of the promising portfolios 
and highlights constituent system investments. The constituent system types which differ 
between the promising portfolios were identified with Portfolio A as a reference. This 
portfolio comparison is intended to reveal to what degree the same constituent systems 
appear in various promising portfolios. Two portfolios which have the same types of 
constituent system, such as Portfolios A and C, are identified as having no different systems 
despite possessing varying numbers of each system type. 
 
 Figure 6. Portfolio Affordability Tradespace (MAU v. MAE) and Pareto Efficient 
Portfolios for the Baseline Epoch 
 
 Figure 7. Constituent System Comparison for Promising Portfolios With Portfolio 
A as the Reference Portfolio 
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Process 8: Multi-Epoch Analysis 
A fundamental technique within EEA is the comparison of potential portfolios across 
multiple epochs. Following single-epoch portfolio analysis, a general understanding of 
performance of the SoS in each epoch has been established. By comparing the 
performance of each portfolio across multiple epochs, various metrics can be utilized to 
assess the design’s robustness against change and uncertainty, or how well a single 
portfolio can maintain its value across multiple epochs. The reader should consult Schaffner 
et al. (2013) for a detailed explanation of multi-epoch analysis.  
Representational Outcome: A particularly useful concept to assess the performance 
of a promising portfolio design across multiple epochs, or to discover passive robust 
solutions, is the concept of Normalized Pareto Trace (NPT; Ross et al., 2009). An NPT 
score is assigned to each portfolio design of interest and describes the percentage of 
epochs in which that design constitutes a Pareto optimal point. A variant of NPT, the fuzzy 
NPT (fNPT), reveals the percentage of epochs for which a particular design is within a 
certain threshold factor of the Pareto front. The width of this threshold zone is defined by a K 
factor, where a K factor of zero indicates 0% fuzziness and is identical to the NPT metric. 
Figure 8 illustrates the concept of fNPT, and Table 8 displays the NPT and fNPT measures 
for the five portfolios identified in Figure 6. 
 
 Figure 8. Illustration of the fNPT Metric, Where K Is the Threshold Width Applied 
Below the Pareto Frontier 
Table 8. The NPT and fNPT Metrics for Five Promising CSG Portfolio Designs 
Over the Five Representative Epochs 
 
Table 8 displays that Portfolio A has an NPT value of one. This indicates that 
Portfolio A remains on the Pareto frontier in all epochs considered. From Figure 6, it is 
apparent that Portfolio A also represents the lowest expense and utility of any of the 
promising portfolio designs. Meanwhile the NPT for Portfolio C is 0.6, indicating that in 60% 
of the epochs, the design is Pareto optimal. However, Portfolio C reaches an fNPT value of 
one at a K value of 10%. This means that Portfolio C is within 10% of the Pareto frontier in 
terms of MAU and MAE for all epochs. These two portfolios (A and C) are the most 
passively robust to the uncertainties in the considered epochs. No other considered portfolio 
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beyond A or C has an fNPT value of one, even at a K value of 20%. This indicates that the 
other promising portfolios are significantly removed from the Pareto front in at least one 
epoch. 
Process 9: Era Construction 
Another useful technique in EEA involves the concept of evaluating portfolio designs 
over an ordered set of epochs, called an era, to represent a potential lifecycle of the 
portfolio. Era analysis enables the designer to understand how portfolio designs could 
maintain their value through the uncertainty of a long run potential future. Disturbances and 
degradation from an earlier epoch in the era may diminish the long term value of a particular 
portfolio design with respect to another. Time-dependent concerns, such as cumulative 
carrying costs and time to initial operating capabilities of various assets, can be considered 
during era analysis. While such time-dependent factors were not considered as part of the 
initial CSG case study, they are an anticipated area of future research.  
Representational Outcome: Eras may be developed through stakeholder elicitation, 
probabilistic modeling (e.g., Monte Carlo or Markov models), or through a narrative 
approach to produce likely potential futures. Two eras were created for this case study. A 
narrative approach was used to select the order and duration of the epochs to represent a 
potential 30-year operational life for the carrier strike group: 
Era 1: Baseline (5 yr), War on Terror (5 yr), Peacekeeping (10 yr), Baseline (3 yr), 
Small Navy (7 yr) 
Era 2: Peacekeeping (5 yr), Major Conflict (7 yr), Peacekeeping (10 yr), Small Navy 
(5 yr), Baseline (3 yr) 
Process 10: Single-Era Analysis 
In single era analysis, the performance of portfolio designs is assessed over a 
sequence of epochs as described in Process 9. Single-era analysis enables designers to 
understand the time-ordered effects of the epochs on the portfolios. This allows for the 
identification of portfolios which maintain utility and affordability throughout the sequence of 
potential futures, and of those which may become unaffordable. The concepts of NPT and 
fNPT may also be applied to an era to quantitatively measure how well a particular portfolio 
design compares to the Pareto front solutions of each epoch in the era.  
Representational Outcome: For the CSG portfolio design study, both the variance of 
utility and expense of a potential portfolio over the lifecycle of the CSG are of interest to a 
potential designer. Therefore, Figure 9 contains two subplots which display the change in 
MAU and MAE over the five epochs for the five Pareto efficient portfolios in the Baseline 
epoch. Tracing the trajectories reveals the emergent affordability, or unaffordability, of the 
potential CSG portfolios. 
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 Figure 9. (a) Expense Considerations for Era 1; (b) Utility Considerations for Era 1 
The purpose of this initial case study was to explore the ability of PLEEAA to support 
design for affordability. The case study was therefore constructed to focus on exogenous 
factors anticipated to impact expense attributes. As a result, the MAE of the portfolios 
exhibits significant variance over the era in Figure 9(a). However, there is relatively little 
variation in the MAU values between the selected portfolios through all epochs in Figure 
9(b). The utility variation is small because the technology epoch variables, which most 
significantly influence constituent system performance, were not included in this initial study. 
Additionally, the class constraints of this analysis required all portfolios to have an aircraft 
carrier, a submarine, and at least one multi-mission capable surface combatant. The class 
constraints therefore provided a relatively high minimum utility of all valid portfolios which 
further reduces apparent variation. Finally, as illustrated in Figure 7, the promising portfolios 
primarily contained multiple units of the same constituent systems. As a result, the portfolios 
exhibit similar utility responses to the uncertainties modeled. Future research will include 
epoch variables which strongly impact capability performance attributes in order to more 
fully represent the design problem.  
Process 11: Multi-Era Analysis1 
Multi-era portfolio analysis expands single-era analysis by identifying patterns of 
affordability (and unaffordability) as well as utility delivery that emerge from the path 
dependent development of portfolios through multiple contexts. This process enables a 
designer to develop metrics that characterize the affordability of potential portfolio designs 
across a variety of potential lifecycles. The reader should consult Schaffner et al. (2013) for 
a detailed explanation of multi-era analysis.  
Discussion of the “Affordable” CSG Design Through PLEEAA 
There are hundreds, if not thousands, of factors that influence the lifecycle design of 
a CSG portfolio. While it may not be possible to ever consider each of them, modern-day 
computing capabilities and systems engineering methodologies enable a designer to 
consider far more of these influence factors during conceptual design than was traditionally 
1 This process was not demonstrated by the current study due to the representative nature of the 
analysis, but is described here for completeness. 
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possible. PLEEAA provided a method to consider 91 distinct CSG system-level performance 
attributes and relate their value back up to the overall portfolio utility. The performance 
attributes and expense attributes, along with the preferences of the relevant stakeholders, 
were defined in PLEEAA for five epochs to characterize contextual uncertainty of potential 
future states.  
PLEEAA supported the identification of CSG designs which appear on the Pareto 
frontier of each epoch through single-epoch analyses. Furthermore, utilizing the metrics of 
NPT and fNPT in multi-epoch analysis, PLEEAA identified five promising portfolios which 
exhibit acceptable performance and affordability across a majority of the epochs considered. 
From Table 8, it can be seen that Portfolio A remains Pareto optimal through all epochs. 
Portfolio C, which may have been overlooked in traditional analysis as it does not appear 
Pareto optimal in two of the epochs, is the only other design which is Pareto dominant in all 
epochs when a 10% fuzziness factor is applied. Therefore, Portfolio C represents a passive 
robust solution that remains affordable against uncertainty, but is displaced in some cases 
from the Pareto frontier. Portfolios A and C are composed of identical types of constituent 
systems, simply with different numbers of these systems. This may indicate to a portfolio 
designer that the constituent systems in these portfolios provide promising value to potential 
future CSGs while maintaining affordability under potential uncertainty.  
Finally, though single-era analysis, PLEEAA discerned which initially promising 
portfolio designs were likely to remain affordable, while maintaining their utility, over the 
lifecycle of the CSG. Figure 9 illustrates that while all portfolios maintain sufficient utility 
delivery, Portfolios B, D, and E become unaffordable in the Small Navy epoch. Upon 
investigation, these portfolios were found to exceed the operational costs allowable under 
the context of hypothetical Navy downsizing, while Portfolios A and C remained affordable. 
Single-era analysis of portfolios provides a mechanism to identify challenging lifecycle 
circumstances and robust solutions during conceptual design.  
Discussion of PLEEAA Application to Portfolio Conceptual Design and 
Analysis 
The conceptual design of systems of systems and portfolios presents a variety of 
challenges to traditional toolsets, including influence considerations, complexity of 
combination factors, and dynamically changing portfolio composition. However, with the 
prevalence of major acquisition Nunn-McCurdy breeches in recent years, the ability to 
evaluate the affordability of portfolios with respect to lifecycle uncertainty is desired to 
support acquisition decision makers. The PLEEAA method enables designers to enumerate 
and consider a greater number of potential portfolio designs than would be possible by 
current techniques. This is advantageous because it increases the ability of a designer to 
identify portfolios which display superior performance qualities such as affordability and 
robustness against exogenous uncertainty.  
Tradespace exploration supports decision makers to identify portfolio compositions 
they may not have previously considered, to recognize macro-level trends in portfolio 
affordability, and to conduct micro-level tradeoff studies between portfolios in the area of 
desired performance. Epoch-Era Analysis provides acquisitions officers with new abilities to 
identify how potential designs may respond to a variety of anticipated contextual 
uncertainties, including the impact of simultaneously occurring uncertainties, in the lifecycle 
development and operation of the portfolio. The insight provided from these studies will 
support the selection of portfolios which may remain affordable over the entire lifecycle of 
the program, without the need to alter requirements or design in response to changing 
contexts. In implementation, the authors envision a network of system designers, each using 
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tradespace exploration to design their own systems, connected by a SoS and interacting 
through the PLEEAA method to ensure that needed capabilities are provided in the portfolio 
at an acceptable cost with a desired level of uncertainty robustness.  
Conclusion 
The differences between capability portfolios of assets and individual systems 
necessitate specialized and distinct approaches for design and acquisition planning. Epoch-
Era Analysis has shown promise in previous studies to enable the design of affordable 
systems that provide adequate utility while remaining under cost thresholds through a 
variety of potential contexts that may be experienced over the lifecycle of the system. 
Modern Portfolio Theory is a well-known financial tool that has been used for decades to 
select portfolios of investments which maximize utility subject to fixed uncertainty. This 
research leveraged EEA with elements of MPT to facilitate design for affordability of systems 
of systems with uncertain futures using a portfolio-based hierarchical perspective. The 
proposed method was used to explore 524,160 potential carrier strike group portfolio 
designs across five different epochs and two eras. This type of analysis may help decision 
makers to identify long-term acquisition strategies for affordable portfolios that are resilient 
against the types of contextual uncertainties that have negatively impacted recent DoD 
acquisition efforts.  
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Abstract 
This paper proposes an analytic model to improve Department of Defense (DoD) investment 
and divestment decisions. It builds from rules of thumb (RoTs) natural to government 
decision-makers and uses best practice models to improve the RoTs. It suggests three 
recommendations for the DoD: adopt the proposed model and address analytical barriers to 
inform RoT decisions, track investment vs. divestment decisions and Yes/No data points, and 
institute a Divestment Panel. 
Introduction and Background 
Organizations invest and divest resources to prepare for the future and respond to 
events or conditions in the relevant social, political, resource, or business environment 
(Scott, 2006).2 Successful preparation requires an effective and persistent process of 
management. Successful response requires a continuous and dynamic ability to offset 
threats and risks, or take advantage of opportunities. Both successful preparation and 
response require governance and management processes that focus decisions on the 
outcomes of the organization and improve the organization over time.3 Because resources 
are limited, prioritization of activities and deciding what to divest from is as important as 
making decisions on where to invest next, whether budgets are increasing or decreasing.  
Deliberate Processes and Strategic Response 
While commercial businesses deal with these challenges every day, this is difficult 
for the federal government for several reasons. The complexity, purpose (public goods), and 
1 © 2015 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. Approved for Public Release; Distribution 
Unlimited. Case Number 15-0971. 
2 “Resources” can include capital, time, and any effort in activities. 
3 The best literature for combining the value of strategic response with persistent management 
techniques can be found in Enterprise Risk Management guides. A recent book includes case 
studies: Fraser, Simkins, and Narvaez’s (2015) Implementing Enterprise Risk Management: Case 
Studies and Best Practices. See Chapter 32 for the lessons learned in the financial crisis of 2008. 
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scale present unique challenges to successful government preparation and response efforts 
(Wolf, 1979). First, the government sector in general, and the Department of Defense (DoD) 
in particular, is riddled with imperfect information and uncoordinated analytics. These often 
drive decision-makers to adopt rules of thumb (RoTs) to make what are usually suboptimal 
resource decisions (GAO, 2014). Second, best and possibly new practices are needed to 
simplify the logic and leverage natural biases already inherent to investment/divestment 
decision-making. Third, improvements in these factors would increase DoD leaders’ 
confidence of outcome impacts inherent in planning cycles, and to be more responsive to 
mission or fiscal disruptions.  
Models of governance responsiveness are also needed to assess the ability of 
leaders to produce results, the accountability of leaders to do what is “right,” and the desire 
of stakeholders to make leaders more responsive in the public sector. This paper will look at 
best practices in the private sector and borrow applicable concepts from other complex risk-
driven domains to derive and present a framework for government decision-makers to 
identify and govern the systematic divestment of low performing investments across the 
organization and free up funds for better operational and organizational choices. The 
proposed construct draws a corollary between typical commercial drivers and the DoD 
resource impact areas of Readiness, Modernization, and Force Structure. The construct 
then proposes to use and assess performance criteria of organizational and operational 
impact, performance viability of capabilities as core competencies of an organization, and 
the economic value and affordability of the investment set for the DoD.  
Human Decisions: “Imperfect” Resorts to Rules of Thumb  
Decisions to divest are often harder than decisions to invest.4 The culprit is often 
emotion or self-interest even when individuals believe they are doing the right thing. The 
challenge is compounded when the possession in question is providing some value, even if 
that value could be achieved more effectively elsewhere. For example, an organization 
decides to outsource an important non-core function to a specialty organization that can 
deliver it more effectively and cheaper than keeping it in-house. While this makes sense at 
an enterprise level, the internal providing unit meets the decision with resistance and 
reluctance driven by self-interest. In both cases, money spent or saved has direct impact on 
individuals involved in the function, jobs, or bonuses. 
In the case of public money, the drivers may be less direct, but emotional 
nonetheless. Transparent governance is often cited as a long pole in the tent for effective 
decision-making, but add to this the notion that divestments are harder than investments, 
and the problem compounds (United Nations, 2003). Criteria-driven accountability and 
evidence- and performance-based management become crucial to preparing good 
investment and divestment decisions because they allow decisions to have a basis besides 
emotion. The absence of such criteria also results in organizations optimizing locally as 
opposed to the enterprise level; the end state is uncoordinated at best, and likely suboptimal 
for the enterprise. Without objective, consistently applied criteria, there is no repeatable, 
impartial way to assess performance of sub-organizations and sub-objectives and how they 
4 There is a literature that discusses this fact even for “regular” stock markets, where there is a 
reward—of making money, or losing less of it—when a good divestment is made (Brown, 2013). See 
also Franklin Templeton Investments, 2013. 
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contribute to the success of the overall enterprise. Effective governance of these choices 
relies on symmetric and shared awareness of the impacts on enterprise goals and an 
understanding of the associated risks so informed resource decisions can be made. This 
paper proposes three criteria to enable the needed assessments: 
1. Organizational and operational impacts: impact of decision on outcomes 
and enterprise goals 
2. Performance viability: measurable performance of capabilities that are/are 
not core competencies for the mission and organizational outcomes 
3. Economic value: investment costs and economic value of the 
investment/divestment set 
The Priority Order of Divestment May Not Be the Opposite of the Priority Order of 
Investment 
In the context of organizational decision-making, the list from which divestments are 
selected is not necessarily the opposite of the list of proposed investments. This is true for 
two main reasons:  
• Synergy and scale: The whole is sometimes greater than the sum of its parts. 
Interdependencies may not be exposed until all the pieces are put together, 
and an attempt is made to break the whole apart or remove a part. Without 
tracked data supporting key types of criteria, the imperfect information and 
lack of causality in measurement causes pause when divestment proposals 
are made (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010).  
• No financial meter or value proposition: In public goods environments, such 
as Defense, the lack of a “bottom line” makes comparing the value of both 
investment and divestment choices difficult. For example, which is more 
important: a weapons platform, cyber security, the network, or force 
protection? Size of budgets becomes a meter and this does not promote 
divestment, nor does a notion of “affordability,” which is challenging to define 
and execute (see findings and progress at MORS, n.d.). 
In addition to the uncertainties and omissions in decision making, cognitive biases 
may reinforce predisposed notions regarding investment or divestment options. Table 1 
provides a summary of cognitive biases in the context of acquisition or divestment decision-
making that are shown to result in rules of thumb (RoTs) that are used to make decisions in 
the absence of a performance- or evidence-based approach (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985).  
Table 1. Cognitive Biases in Decision-Making 
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Without a data-driven understanding of the operational impacts and fiscal portfolio 
implications of investment sets, reasoning by analogy can turn perceived familiarity (“We 
have always done it this way.”) into a strategic error about projected outcomes and 
organizational and operational impacts. If not measured and tracked, the impacts generated 
by a particular investment set are easy to over-estimate with the illusion of control. This is 
especially true when emotional biases come into play (e.g., the idea that a broken program 
is fixable and is better than no program at all). Additionally, escalating commitment may 
arise, especially when a project is failing. Personal commitment to “save” the situation is 
natural for risk-averse thinkers. Risk averseness has been shown to increase with wealth, 
and should be relatively high for government fiscal stewards.5 These biases cloud the 
perception of performance viability, and true economic value of available options is not 
considered well enough to substantiate decisions. These all result in rules of thumb (RoTs) 
to help deal with complexity and ambiguity but yield poor choices (Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1999).  
The Government Environment Arrives at Its Own “Rules of Thumb” 
In the absence of shared awareness, legislatively required governance, constraints 
or negative feedback mechanisms, and evidence or performance driven decisions, public 
organizations generally end up with RoTs or traditions that appear to overcome common 
sense (see Table 2).6 The outcomes of low rigor can be inefficiencies and/or omissions that 
cause errors in decision-making in the aggregate, even though they may not have been 
made at the aggregate level.  
5 While the income level of government workers may be disputable, and the monies they are working 
with are not their own, government employees are instructed to be highly regarded fiscal stewards, 
and we will stick with that theme in this paper. See Chu, Nie, & Zhang, 2014. 
6 These rules of thumb were collected from MITRE subject matter experts in the area of acquisition 
and resource management. 
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Table 2. Rules of Thumb: Common Government Divestment Approaches 
 
Business Best Practices to Deal With Cognitive Biases 
Because risks and returns are involved in divestment choices, the private sector has 
developed best practices (Mankins, Harding, & Weddigen, 2008). Table 3 compares best 
business practices against the DoD’s common government practice.  
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 232 - 
Table 3. Divestment Commercial Best Practices vs. Common Government 
Practices 





Common Government Practice 
1 Dedicate a team to divestment full-
time, just as you do with acquisitions. 
Reasoning 
by Analogy 
DoD has thousands of people that work on 
strategic and investment planning. Not 
many focus on divestment, but closing 
funding gaps7 
2 Make sure you can clearly articulate 
how the deal will benefit the buyer and 
how you will motivate the unit’s 






Understanding costs of transition and 
divestment is a captured, but under-
appreciated set of costs in the DoD 
because transition takes a very long time 
with many changes in leadership  
3 Work through the details of the de-
integration process before you divest.8 
DoD’s duplicate costs for capabilities or 
services are on the books, yet may change 
names over the transition time, and are 
difficult to track. Limited insight into 
interdependencies 
4 Establish objective criteria for 
determining divestment candidates—





While DoD demands auditability, it does 
not emphasize accountability for losses, 
sunk costs, and returns on investment 
(Under Secretary of Defense 
[Comptroller]/Chief Financial Officer, 2013) 
Towards a Solution 
The model presented here proposes that decisions should be made based on three 
key factors when selecting investments or divestments (Campbell & Whitehead, 2014): 
• Strategic value: the criticality of the investment to operations of the enterprise 
• Performance: potential to improve the business or create synergy with other 
businesses 
• Economic value: net present value (NPV), capital flows (capital required and 
lifecycle efficiencies), and external or secondary effects 
The Proposed Framework and Criteria 
Figure 1 below diagrams the investment/divestment logic for a commercial business 
(Suozzo, 2001). There are three general cases in Figure 1: (1) “obvious” buy/sell cases, (2) 
situations where the candidate is not strategic, and (3) cases where the candidate is 
strategic, but the required competencies or cost advantages are not necessarily evident. 
These latter two cases are most interesting for investment houses, but they are all 
interesting for government, because even “obvious” buys are an opportunity cost of another 
7 As repeatedly witnessed by the authors. 8 DoD architectures are listed in the Defense Acquisition Registry System (DARS): 
www.dodenterprisearchitecture.org/exhibits/Pages/DoDArchitectureREgistrySystem(DARS).aspx 
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choice, so they must not only answer “Yes” to all three criteria, but the choice must also 
surpass the holistic value of competitors for the resources. Figure 1 makes commercial 
business sense. 
 
 Figure 1. Three Criteria for Investment/Divestment for Commercial Business 
But what about self-interest and emotion? The “unmaking” of a product line? The 
transition of support to potential partners? These factors alter the speed and cost of 
transition, which are guided efficiently by negative feedback mechanisms that ensure 
survival (Hardin, 1968).9 
How might this apply to the DoD? For example, in response to wars, a DoD resource 
manager may choose to invest because the capability is strategic and high performing, but 
refuse to consider the high budget share and opportunity cost, or the risks that are unknown, 
or because the impacts to the defense industrial base are unacceptable. We end up with an 
array of buried or obfuscated investments that would benefit from an independent 
divestment panel equivalent. Figure 2 presents a proposed mapping of the business model 
to the DoD’s key drivers. Not only are the DoD resource concepts of Readiness, 
Modernization, and Force Structure attributes that the DoD seeks, but they are also 
Resource areas reflected in the budget (Trunkey, 2013). 
9 This article is actually a testimony to what happens when decision-makers choose to act in their own 
self-interest and are not guided by higher order feedback mechanisms, such as the over-grazing of 
public lands or the pollution of air. 
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 Figure 2. Translation of Valuation Criteria to DoD Resource Areas 
Figure 3 shows 70 years of DoD trends approximating the Congressional Budget 
Office’s (CBO’s) budgetary definitions of Readiness (all Operations & Maintenance [O&M], 
except Healthcare, Revolving funds, and Civilians), Modernization (Research, Development, 
Test, & Evaluation [RDT&E], Procurement, Military Construction, Science, & Technology, 
and Weapons Acquisition), and Force Structure (Military Personnel, Military Health [O&M], 
Family Housing). 
 
 Figure 3. Seventy Years of Spending Trends: Impact (Readiness), Performance 
(Modernization), and Economies (Force Structure) 
At any given time, resources are developing, equipping, organizing, training, 
sustaining, and manning the force, and many dollars may “cross-over” and affect other 
resource pools. The high manpower of the 1950s shows the human warfighting power 
needed in the Korean War, the high Readiness costs in the wars since 9/11 shows the force 
is highly equipped for operations, and the increase in modernization of the 1980s shows the 
DoD’s strategy to the Cold War.  
These appear to be logical given the environments, but there is no objective way to 
assess the relative goodness of the decisions here. Additionally, a criticism across the three 
DoD processes—Requirements, Acquisition, and Budgeting—are that the criteria used for 
decision-making are not defined or well-coordinated (Defense Business Board, 2012): 
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• The processes do not have contemporaneous objectives (some are farther 
out than others).  
• They track the resource pools differently: joint capability areas, program 
executive office families, Budget Activities, Program Elements, 
Appropriations, etc.  
• DoD goal achievement is not measured, tracked, or aligned to resource pools 
to measure any kind of efficacy of planning or delivery.  
While Figure 3 reflects the striking of an appropriate balance, it is impossible to 
determine within the current construct what balances have been achieved (Sledge, 2010). 
Figure 4 provides a summary of the model developed in this paper and shows how an 
analyst can arrive at answering “Yes” or “No” to the evaluation criteria proposed. 
 
 Figure 4. Proposed Investment/Divestment Framework for the DoD  
Figure 5 borrows the logic from Figure 2 and puts the concepts in DoD terms to 
propose a set of criteria to assess such balance. This modified framework applied to the 
DoD should enable the use of a common language and valuation approach so that 
decisions could be made on common criteria of readiness (operational effectiveness), 
modernization (capability performance promise), and force structure efficacy (sustainable 
cost). Every investment set can be assessed against these three concepts with a “Yes” or 
“No” answer. We assume that all investments are compared from an end-to-end basis. 
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 Figure 5. Proposed Investment/Divestment Framework for the DoD 
Proposed Criteria 
Criteria #1: Strategic Value, Impact Readiness10 
Congress uses DoD-provided quarterly readiness assessments to determine 
resourcing requirements of the military (Trunkey, 2013). Therefore, any resource-consuming 
activity that occurs within the DoD should promote or support readiness either directly or 
indirectly. If a relationship between an activity and readiness cannot be demonstrated or 
articulated, then the determination should be “No” to this criterion. All investment sets could 





10 Much of this material was taken from Trunkey, 2013, and Osman, Wilk, and Oakley-Bogdewic, 
2013. 
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Much effort is spent assessing how to measure how the DoD resources readiness, in 
addition to measuring Readiness levels.11 The assessments are for units (“unit readiness”) 
and organizations within the military departments, which is not necessarily about an 
investment but the ability of the outputs supported to fill the critical operational logic 
presumed for the mission. Note that it is possible for an investment to have a “No” 
determination for this criterion and still be a viable investment choice. For example, activities 
that do not have a visible impact on the effectiveness of units but that allow them to execute 
their missions more efficiently or economically could be viable investment candidates. 
To meet Criteria 1, the investment set must meet critical equipping, training, and 
operations needs for current or future missions of critical Combatant Command forces or be 
vital to the accomplishment of a QDR Goal.12 Outcome indicators are needed for each 
investment set to track expectations of impact. 
Criteria #2: Core Competency, High Performance, or Modernized 
To satisfy Criteria #2, investment sets should be able to answer one or more of the 
following: 
• Is it a Core Competency? (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 
2012a, p. 2).13 The DoD has nine Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), each with 
Capability Based Analyses and current validated requirements. Each has a 
Functional Control Board that oversees and rationalizes its area’s 
11 Recent examples include the following:  
From the CBO, see (1) CBO, 2013, p. 13; (2) CBO, 2011, pp. 3–4 & 8: This report separates Mission-
Related and Infrastructure Related readiness spending; (3) Trunkey, 2013, pp. 1 & 17: Trunkey uses 
Personnel, Equipment, Supply, and Training in his definition (p. 17), as he states, “DoD spends about 
$350 billion to further the readiness of its forces for current and future military operations. This 
includes attracting, retaining, educating, and training top quality military personnel; keeping 
equipment well maintained; and providing the food, fuel and other material needed to support 
operations” (p. 1). 
From the GAO, see (1) GAOb, 2013, Table 1; (2) GAO/NSIAD-95-29 (GAO, n.d.).  
From the DoD, see DoD, 2013, Annexes A–M: Each of these functions can potentially be tied to one 
of the three concepts: A. SPACE; B. CYBER; C. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL; D. MILITARY 
PERSONNEL; E. READINESS; F. MUNITIONS; G. ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE 
COMPONENT (AC/RC); H. NAVAL PRESENCE; I. STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND DETERRENT; J. 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF); K. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND 
RECONNAISSANCE (ISR); L. ENERGY; M. INDUSTRIAL BASE & THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC 
ADJUSTMENT. 
From the CSBA, see Harrison, 2012, p. 16: Harrison stated, “Readiness funding includes the O&M 
budget activities for Operations Forces …, Mobilization …, and Training and Recruiting.” 
12 Criticality for COCOM forces is planned for by each service. See, for example, U.S. Army, n.d., 
Chapter 7. The QDR lays out the foundational force structure required from each service, which 
recently, was tied to the FY15 budget submission funding the force structures. See also 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16567 and 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_Budget_Request.pdf.  
13 While it is true that the Joint Staff keeps track of all requirements in the DoD, not all investments 
have formal requirements: “The responsibilities of the JROC over ‘joint military requirements’ include 
both joint requirements and single DOD Component requirements which makeup the entirety of the 
capabilities of the joint force and enable the DOD core mission areas” (CJCS, 2012 p. GL-6). 
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requirements (CJCS, 2012a, p. 2; CJCS, 2012b, Enclosure G). The DoD also 
conducts a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) every four years, and key 
goals are established with this review.  
• Does it deliver High Performance? The Joint Capability Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) Manual provides a guide to parameterizing 
performance, which is a full array of metrics to gauge performance of a 
military system’s actual and projected performance: Capability Performance 
(each JCA has defined performance attributes), Force Protection, 
Survivability, Sustainment (which includes Reliability and operating and 
sustainment costs), Net-Readiness, Training, and Energy (CJCS, 2012b).14 
Even if an investment set is not in the JCIDS process, these serve as holistic 
and common criteria. 
• Is the Modernization contribution needed? The age distribution of 
investments in the capability area within which the investment set lies 
suggests the importance of modernization to the capability area, and the 
degree to which the funds supporting the investment set in question are 
value-added. A third metric would assess the degree of modernization 
existent in the capability area and the expectation of the investment set’s 
contribution to this maturity. This would include market research on the DoD’s 
need to have a leading edge capability. 
Criteria #3: Economically Sound or Force Structure Supportable 
Investors solely seeking a return on investment (ROI) have beliefs about factors such 
as strategic value and performance for their financial needs. These beliefs lead to levels of 
confidence in investing, which in turn drive preferences over how much to change from, or 
divest from, their status quo portfolio. The preferences translate into behaviors such as 
larger numbers of trades or wider stock diversification. Investors using more highly informed 
analytics traded more (and therefore divested more), had more diverse portfolios, and had 
higher returns (Hoffman et al., 2010). With the general objective to manage the risk profile of 
their consumption stream, investors of all risk types (from low to high: retirement, financial 
diversification, capital growth, hobby, speculation) have various tendencies to “stick to the 
status quo” and not divest.15 
Leveraging Other Fields: Social Return on Investment & Insurance Models 
This evidence encourages the proposed DoD divestment framework to include an 
economic soundness calculation that shows savings or efficiencies for the budget 
environment (Moore, 2009) and consider a wider measure of Social Return on Investment 
(SROI). Not only will the SROI calculation consider the value of strategic impact and 
performance, the SROI concept takes into account two new variables—secondary effects 
14 See Appendix A of Enclosure A (pp. A-A-1–A-A-4) and Appendix A of Enclosure B (pp. B-A-1–B-A-
4). 
15 From Hoffmann et al. (2010, p. 16): “Status quo bias is strong.” Mitchell et al. (2006) provide 
evidence that 80% of participants in 401(k) accounts initiate no trades in a two-year period, and an 
additional 11% make only one trade. Therefore, few investors in their sample rebalance. Similarly, 
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) find that 50% of the investors in their sample do not rebalance over a 
nine-year period. 
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and deadweight (Rauscher, Schober, & Miller, 2012)—that make divestment decisions more 
difficult (Rauscher et al., 2012, p. 6): 
• Secondary effects include impacts on other portfolios, including intended 
externalities and unintended consequences (e.g., the effects on other 
portfolios or the defense industrial base as a result of terminating a program). 
Enterprise architectures and cross portfolio management should capture and 
account for these. 
• Deadweight is a placeholder for the levels of productivity or outcome changes 
that would have happened anyway, without the intervention (e.g., technology 
obsolescence or a politically driven decision to withdraw troops). The intent is 
to factor out double counting, especially if more than one or a complex 
intervention is being assessed.  
Based on models of social investment, social entrepreneurship, and venture 
philanthropy, the SROI model captures varied types of impacts and outcomes. It focuses on 
an investment “intervention” at the enterprise, program, or project level. In addition to 
mission effects, their SROI calculation includes how the intervention affects how the 
organization functions as well—activity efficiencies—through the size of secondary and 
deadweight effects, as shown in Figure 6. 
Time and portfolio averages taken from the insurance industry as variables that 
impact actuarial calculations are also worth considering here. For example, as the insurer of 
national security, the DoD’s needs, risks, and cost patterns evolve with threat cohorts, 
weapons, and technology generations over time. How these factors may change and 
complicate lifecycle calculations for costs and returns cannot be overlooked (Lebar, 2012; 
Wadsworth & Woodley, 2013). These added concepts parameterize factors that usually 
“blur” or are omitted from the standard DoD return on investment calculation, making 
divestment decisions more difficult. Figure 6 summarizes the logic model behind the SROI 
concept. 
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Note. Terms and definitions used in Figure 6: 
Context: Economic, political, and social circumstances 
Income: Target group needs; for the DoD, this can be a mission outcome 
Input: Financial and personnel resources available 
Structure: Legal and financial characteristics of sponsor 
Concept: Roles, responsibilities, due dates of targets 
Process: Targets linked to activities 
Output: Directly provided contributions of program/activity to achieve desired impact(s) 
Outcome(s): Effects or desired conditions of target group after activities are completed 
Impact: Overall effects that are logically, theoretically, or empirically substantiated 
Initial: Time for initial intervention impacts to be realized 
Interim: Time for secondary effects to be observed and quantified/qualified 
Long-Term: Time for relationships between impacts and deadweight to be delineated  
 Figure 6. Logic Model Behind SROI Concept 
(Rauscher et al., 2012) 
In addition to Secondary Effects and Deadweight, our model leverages two factors 
from insurance modeling as important considerations (Lebar, 2012; Wadsworth & Woodley, 
2013): 
• First, there is a time element critical to returns on the portfolio. Time is 
important because of the timed targets set in the plan and because 
performance of incoming investments in the intervention may be masked by 
portfolio-wide calculations of ROI. When older investments retire, the ROI for 
the portfolio may rise or fall dramatically. 
• Second, risk categorization errors may occur in NPV calculations. For 
example, models may rate a threat (or policy) being abated by the 
intervention as higher or lower than it should be. Not only will the error apply 
to the investments in the intervention, but it may also affect secondary effects 
or deadweight. 
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What the Model Tells Us 
While the detail in each criterion is potentially exhaustive, holistically the information 
derived from Figure 4 should address some of the biases discussed in Section 2.0 and 
enable improved decisions. Table 4 threads the constructs discussed in this paper. The 
generally omitted criterion in the first column leads to the cognitive bias usually relied upon 
in the second column. This leads to the DoD RoTs for divestment in the third column, to 
commercial best practices recommended to avoid mistakes typically made with these 
biases. These tie to the simple Yes/No criteria presented above. 
Table 4. Tying It All Together 
 
Table 5 summarizes the options across three factors and Investment versus 
Divestment Decisions.  
Table 5. Relations Between Factor Acceptance and Invest/Divest Decisions 
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The following are key observations from Table 5:  
1. The economic factors drive the decisions.  
• Cost Effectiveness drives investment except when mission criticality and 
performance are high, and secondary benefits are high and the deadweight is 
minimal. 
• Deadweight—Other factors actually drive the outcome, not the investment—
uniquely determines investment and must be accounted for. 
• Only in one case are the Secondary Effects immaterial to investment 
choices, where everything else is affirmative (the first column under Invest). 
2. High performance or modernization impact worked with the economic 
variables. The Impact on Balance of Investment Types is also nearly 
collinear with invest/divest decisions. 
3. Mission Criticality may not be necessary for investment selection (e.g., 
when investments drive costs down while minimally impacting missions). 
These conclusions are not natural products of the traditional RoTs discussed in the 
Introduction and Background and further demonstrate how uninformed RoTs lead to 
suboptimal decisions.  
Figure 7 shows some well-known DoD investment and divestment choices overlaid 
on the proposed model. For example, an obvious investment area is Classified Networks 
since it easily meets all three criteria presented by model. The decision to divest of the next 
generation of amphibious assault vehicle is also supported by the model since while useful, 
it does not materially appear to affect the DoD’s ability to execute missions (not mission 
critical), and, crucially, it presented limited force structure supportability. An example of a 
non-mission critical/non-strategic recommended investment area is Defense Finance and 
Accounting Services (DFAS) because it is important for efficiently operating the enterprise 
while minimally impacting actual execution of operational missions. 
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 Figure 7. Exemplars Demonstrating the Proposed Model 
Recommendations 
From a very wide discussion of rules of thumb in environments with imperfect 
information to SROI models to DoD criteria and data, we have drawn together an 
understanding of why persistent investment and divestment management data and 
processes can overcome predictable mistakes in resource decisions. We now present three 
basic recommendations:  
1. Adopt the model presented in this paper and address the analytical barriers 
to allow decision-makers to answer the three basic questions presented in 
the model. 
2. Track the logic of Yes/No data points as a feedback mechanism to decision-
makers.  
3. Implement an industry best practice: divestment panels.  
Recommendation 1: Adopt the model presented above to enable shared 
awareness and improved analytics so decision-makers are no longer forced to rely on 
uniformed RoTs to make decisions. 
Start small. Use the model for key program choices, and then for capability area 
choices (such as a program executive office), and then for portfolio choices. Understand the 
types of data needed to answer the questions in Figure 4. Begin using data from the DoD 
Requirements, Acquisition, and Budgeting processes to answer questions previously 
answered by rules of thumb. Enable the population and use of the SROI model, which 
incorporates data from all three criteria sets. The use of deliberate criteria could lead to the 
reward of auditability and the delivery of better results. 
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Recommendation 2: Track the logic of Yes and No investment data points—at least 
at a capability level—so that the logic is captured, results are transparent, and the 
organization improves and learns from successes and mistakes. This will perpetuate 
responsive governance. 
Create a database of Invest/Divest decisions, traceable to the three criteria, and to 
the actual results produced over time. This traceability is difficult, as investments get joined 
and split, and the investment decisions made at the time are often altered before 
investments are actually implemented. The intent can be tracked, however, and the 
investment and divestment strategies can be logically understood. This should help stage 
migration plans so that Divestments become part of the usual process. Make decisions 
using the proposed framework and encourage the use of analytics, tracked to productive 
implications. 
Recommendation 3: Adopt an industry best practice of divestment panels as a way 
to promote the best use of resources instead of relying on rules of thumb as reliable 
predictors. 
The DoD should adopt the framework described in the earlier section, Human 
Decisions: “Imperfect” Resorts to Rules of Thumb, as a method for determining investments 
with simple and meaningful criteria while at the same time employing a divestment panel as 
a portion of their means of governance.  
It should also establish standing divestment panels comprised of non-advocates who 
report their results annually to senior Component leadership. Investment panels exist at 
many levels in the DoD, but per Title 10, the Secretary of Defense and the Military 
Secretaries have the final say on divestment.  
The DoD has the ability to divest, for example, when politics calls for “peace 
dividends.” In response to the 2011 Budget Control Act, the DoD was able to divest from 
$500 billion per year (7%–10% of totals, varied across organizations). The DoD reduced 
Force Structure and also found “efficiencies” under the oversight of Secretary Gates (see 
the Defense Strategic Guidance [DoD, 2012]; DoD, 2010). Cuts can be taken in 
Strategic/Readiness endstrength equipping and training, Performance/Modernization 
upgrades to weapon and systems portfolios, or Economic/Force Structure areas of 
manpower-related investments. Savings take time to realize and are difficult to account for 
when continued operations and innovation are still taking place (Pellerin, 2013). 
The DoD also has the Issue Paper process supporting RMD-700, which allows 
community leaders across the DoD to recommend shifts of resources before the budget is 
finalized. Money moved in this process is usually a small fraction of total spending and is 
considered fallout from the annual budgeting process (Huo, 2011; USD[C], 2013).16 Both 
types of formal divestment processes are normal parts of the current bureaucracy, but do 
not necessarily illustrate a governance process relying on an informed thought construct to 
foster and maintain a forward-looking, innovative organization. 
16 In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President Budget Submission, the USD(C; 2013) claimed, “RMD 700 
identifies a limited number of DoD-wide performance goal priorities” and suggests that “DoD 
Component-specific budget justification material should be consistent with” these goals. 
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In a budget-scarce environment, divestment strategies such as those recommended 
in this paper could prove to be useful for justification and selection of the “keeper” 
investment sets. The impact of a divestment panel could be measured. If the DoD captures 
and tracks distinct data on strategic impact, performance, and economic efficiencies, the 
DoD and Congress could reward good results with leadership recognition and continued 
fiscal support to sustain the positive pattern. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper outlined a logical investment/divestment choice structure that corrects old 
RoTs that predictably lead to suboptimal choices. It relies on decision-makers having the 
capability and reward structure to use such a structure in a complex environment. It 
assumes that the DoD institution would be motivated by Congress to hold decision-makers 
accountable, and in turn, these leaders would be rewarded for being responsive and 
productive in their choices. In this new frame, divestments would be seen as strategic 
opportunities, and the reward structure would incentivize accountability and measurable 
outcomes. The following are two recommended next steps:  
• Design a tool for Preparation: Gather data to answer Yes/No questions; 
program tool to produce Invest/Divest choices; alter model’s basis with 
events.  
• Use for effective Response: Use analytics to increase capability of leaders; 
link analytics to “accountability data”; and effectively reward organizations 
and their leaders. 
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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) can foster dynamic, efficient, and innovative solutions for 
tomorrow’s warfighter by structuring acquisition portfolios that deliver an integrated suite of 
capabilities. Such portfolios would permit execution of many core acquisition elements and 
processes at a level above the individual program to enable enterprise management, 
economies of scale, and faster capability deliveries. While large DoD programs navigate the 
acquisition life cycle individually, large commercial businesses manage integrated product 
lines for items ranging from automobiles and personal electronics to software and health 
services. The portfolio framework proposed in this paper establishes broader entities that 
involve an active government and industry community throughout the acquisition life cycle. 
Portfolios would scope programs and increments from high-priority requirements, mature 
technologies, and rigorous analyses covering a comprehensive mission area. Portfolio 
strategies, roadmaps, and architectures would guide development of a suite of smaller 
programs, allocating budgets, personnel, and other resources dynamically to the highest 
priority efforts. Reorganizing from a product-based model to a portfolio model would enable 
more successful and faster delivery of integrated mission capabilities. 
Introduction 
Challenges of the Program-Centric Acquisition Model 
In today’s defense acquisition system, each program navigates the acquisition life 
cycle individually. This results in an acquisition enterprise that leads to stove-piped 
solutions, long acquisition cycles, and a highly inefficient use of resources. Initial conceptual 
requirements drive program scope and budgets, yet often inappropriately constrain the 
solution space for long-term programs that develop major systems. The lengthy 
congressional approval process for new start programs contributes to setting a high bar up 
front to DoD exploration of new solutions.  
Developing systems individually makes it extremely challenging to deliver the 
integrated, net-centric systems and services required for the DoD’s complex and dynamic 
operations. Acquisition programs design, develop, test, and produce isolated systems that 
must meet a defined set of requirements within an allocated budget. Analyses of alternatives 
(AoAs) occur at the program level, with minimal consideration of enterprise performance, 
1 Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 15-0862. © 2015 The MITRE 
Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 249 - 
                                            
 
 
costs, or risks. Each program must conduct its own research and development (R&D) to 
mature its critical technologies in order to begin development (see Figure 1). 
 
 Figure 1. Program Silos in the Current Acquisition Framework 
Guiding large systems through the acquisition life cycle over a period of 10–20 years 
has proven inefficient and ineffective as technologies, operations, and budgets change. 
Selecting a development contractor alone takes a year or longer, and in the process 
programs often lose critical insights that could be gained from subsystem prototypes and 
preliminary designs. As other nations rapidly adopt commercial technologies and exploit 
global networks, the DoD’s technological advantage confronts greater risk.  
In the years 2001‒2011, the DoD spent over $46 billion on Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that were ultimately canceled (Harrison, 2011). A major 
contributing factor common to these failures is that the programs tried to do too much at 
once: they used a big-bang approach to develop and integrate a wide array of technologies 
to meet all envisioned requirements. For example, the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) 
attempted to develop a dozen classes of ground systems, unmanned aerial and ground 
vehicles, and an integrated network as a single MDAP; FCS was cancelled after spending 
$18 billion. The Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) sought to 
replace over 250 legacy logistics information technology (IT) systems with a single new 
system and invested $1.1 billion and nearly a decade of effort before program cancellation 
(Levin, 2014).  
The DoD’s acquisition budget has been reduced by tens of billions of dollars annually 
from the levels of the previous decade. The DoD’s fiscal year (FY)2015 research and 
procurement budgets alone have declined by 21% and 29%, respectively since FY2010 
(Weisgerber, 2014). In an era of continued global threats, the DoD could lose its 
technological edge unless it takes bold steps to structure and streamline the acquisition 
framework to deliver capabilities to the warfighter more effectively (Kendall, 2014). To 
accomplish this, the DoD must leverage the structure and methods of large commercial 
enterprises, including auto manufacturers, consumer electronics companies, and 
professional services firms, all of which use product lines to obtain the greatest benefits from 
their investments. 
Commercial Product Lines 
Commercial firms use an approach that evolves a product to its ultimate 
capabilities on the basis of mature technologies and available resources. This 
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allows only the product features and capabilities achievable with available 
resources in the initial development. Further product enhancements are 
planned for subsequent development efforts when technologies are proven to 
be mature and other resources are available. (Walker, 2013)  
Many large corporations organize along product lines to leverage economies of scale 
and react swiftly to emerging trends and changes in consumer demands. For example, 
Apple revolutionized consumer electronics because it did not simply develop products that 
outperformed others in the marketplace but focused on delivering a full integrated user 
experience across products and services. Toyota designs, develops, and produces its cars, 
trucks, and SUVs by leveraging technology innovations across all of its models.  
With many Fortune 500 companies facing strong challenges from emerging startups, 
executives are aggressively breaking down corporate silos and reengineering operations to 
pursue innovative solutions. Leading companies embrace “design thinking” that prompts 
them to observe market nuances, experiment with many options, and rapidly prototype 
ideas to bring the best ones to reality. They maintain strategic variety, to include creating 
portfolios of new strategic options, building a magnet for great ideas, and minimizing the 
cost of experimentation (Hamel, 2012). 
Companies designate product line managers to maximize revenue and profit from 
the company’s investments and executives grant these managers significant latitude to 
shape the products they manage. This includes marketing, developing new products, 
forming corporate partnerships, and conducting R&D. The success of a product line 
depends on the company’s ability to track the market closely and react faster than the 
competition to emerging trends, technology advancements, and changes in consumer 
tastes. The success of this strategy, in turn, stems from aligning each product line 
manager’s responsibilities with accountability: Those who perform these tasks effectively 
receive handsome rewards, while those who do not quickly find themselves in a new line of 
business.  
Successful companies continuously analyze market demands, technology 
performance, and resources to optimize their product lines. Competitors quickly integrate the 
key product features of industry leaders into their own designs based on consumer 
preferences and sales forecasts. Short- and long-term investments in R&D, production 
facilities, and support services undergo extensive performance analyses for financial (e.g., 
return on investment), technical (e.g., performance benchmarks), and business (e.g., market 
share) aspects. Businesses invest in data to regularly update and fine tune analytical 
models to support strategic and tactical decisions to maximize revenue, profits, and market 
share. They rigorously identify and prioritize market demands to exploit these opportunities 
with an optimal balance of portfolio solutions. 
Time-to-market represents one of the most powerful drivers in commercial product 
development. Some companies seek to achieve “first mover advantage” by introducing a 
new product into the marketplace. Others then offer products or services with additional 
features, better performance, or a lower price point to gain market share. The more time that 
companies waste on perfecting “the next big thing” the more time competitors have to sell 
their products. Rarely are the best products on the market a business’s first version. Instead, 
an iterative series of competing models usually generates the strongest, innovative 
products, from the current year’s model hybrid car to the latest smartphone. While 
commercial enterprises operate in a different environment, the DoD can adopt many 
valuable private sector practices to structure and execute acquisition portfolios.  
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What Is a Portfolio? 
A DoD portfolio would comprise a collection of programs, projects, increments, and 
related development efforts designed to achieve a set of strategic outcomes. A portfolio 
could expand on the system-of-systems model or span a program executive officer’s (PEO) 
full suite of programs. Many DoD headquarters organizations use portfolio management 
from a functional oversight perspective, rather than on designing integrated solutions. This 
portfolio vision is a more tactical approach to structure acquisition elements above a 
program by those closest to the program execution. 
To avoid the common DoD pitfalls of complexity and bureaucracy, portfolios should 
encompass a small group of related programs, such as those within a PEO’s portfolio. For 
example, IT portfolios could manage a suite of applications and services that run on a 
common infrastructure platform, while aircraft portfolios could leverage a common airframe 
(e.g., C-130) with different payloads for each mission profile. Portfolios could also leverage 
common subsystems across programs, to include engines, sensors, communications suites, 
or avionics software (e.g., Special Operations helicopters). The DoD may find it easier to 
begin with portfolios of programs that are easily divisible, such as IT systems, rather than 
with large programs developing new bombers, ships, or space systems. Over time, if 
successful, the DoD could expand and scale these portfolios.  
Overview of the Portfolio Acquisition Model  
Just as industry has succeeded by applying a portfolio model around product lines, 
the DoD could achieve similar success by structuring and managing acquisition via 
portfolios. This would require decomposing large systems into multiple smaller programs, 
projects, or increments. These portfolios would group related capabilities across programs 
and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and services, thereby elevating the time-
consuming acquisition processes to the portfolio level, reducing program workload, and 
allowing programs to deliver products faster (see Figure 2). 
 
 Figure 2. Portfolio Acquisition Framework 
A portfolio structure can foster innovation to deliver affordable solutions that achieve 
mission outcomes. The DoD would construct programs and increments from federated 
inputs, priority requirements, mature technologies, and rigorous analysis focused on a 
mission area. This would include an active government and industry R&D community 
aligned to advancing technology solutions. Enterprise management via portfolio strategies, 
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roadmaps, and architectures would guide development of a suite of smaller capabilities. 
Dynamic allocation of budgets, personnel, and other resources would lead the DoD to invest 
in the highest priority efforts. Portfolios would extend beyond delivery of an initial capability 
to optimize operations and sustainment of the capability suite.  
Table 1. 12 Major Elements of Portfolio Acquisition 
 
Acquisition Elements 
This section presents details on the acquisition elements shown in Table 1, 
describing the program model (as-is) and offering a vision for a portfolio model (to-be). 
Requirements 
Program Model 
Programs capture initial requirements in an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) at the 
start of the acquisition life cycle to outline a broad capability gap. They then refine and 
solidify requirements in a Capability Development Document (CDD) that contains key 
performance parameters. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) must approve 
the CDD before system development begins. MDAPs usually take an average of 24 months 
to complete CDDs that in essence lock down the program scope for the next 10 to 15 years 
of development and production (Sullivan, 2015). During this time frame, change occurs 
constantly across operations, threats, priorities, budgets, technologies, and related systems, 
but the requirements remain fixed.  
Operational sponsors often inflate the scope of a CDD by including all known 
requirements, as potential subsequent increment or program would follow many years later. 
This compounds risk by expanding the program scope, the number of critical technologies to 
mature, and variances in estimates, creating longer timelines to achieve initial operational 
capability.  
Portfolio Model 
Given the rapid pace of technology change, the DoD can no longer afford to lock in 
requirements for a decade or more. Instead of attempting to predict long-term operational 
and technical needs prior to defining short-term operational capabilities, programs must 
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focus on incremental advances. Managing via a broader set of portfolio requirements would 
enable greater system interoperability than a series of large, fixed CDDs for major weapon 
systems. 
A dynamic and agile requirements model with users at its center would serve as the 
foundation for effectively scoping programs in a portfolio model (Figure 3). ICDs would cover 
a broad mission or capability area and align with the scope of a portfolio rather than that of a 
single program (Winnefield, 2015). They would be broad documents central to ensuring that 
the operational, acquisition, and intelligence communities align around common outcomes, 
priorities, and expectations. In coordination with operational commands, operational 
sponsors could manage capstone requirements via portfolio ICDs as living documents. This 
would include annual updates to reflect their current concept of operations, strategic 
guidance, priorities, threats, capability gaps, and desired effects. 
 
 Figure 3. Mapping Portfolio Requirements 
A database or requirements management software would capture the next level of 
portfolio requirements, which many products or services in the portfolio could ultimately 
satisfy. A requirements board and team of operational sponsors would manage the dynamic 
requirements list, reprioritizing it on the basis of operational priorities, threats, and desired 
effects. The acquisition community and potentially industry would translate the items on the 
list into engineering requirements while exploring notional technologies and solutions for 
each. Portfolios would reprioritize and revisit the requirements regularly to ensure increased 
fidelity. The Defense Intelligence Agency could continue to supply inputs on mission and 
system threats as well as adversaries’ current and planned capabilities to help shape and 
prioritize requirements.  
Programs and increments would have a smaller scope than today’s systems. The 
smaller the scope, the easier it would be to analyze, plan, estimate, design, develop, test, 
and produce capabilities with reduced technical and programmatic risks. Portfolios would 
scope the next program or increment on the basis of the highest priority requirements and 
the availability of mature technologies and affordable solutions. Delivering capabilities to 
users faster would reduce risk while responding more rapidly to changes in operations, 
technologies, and budgets. For example, portfolios would seek to deliver weapon system 
capabilities in five to 10 years rather than the 15 to 20 years common today and IT 
capabilities in less than 18 months rather than five to eight years.  
To do so, portfolios would leverage the Joint Staff’s IT Box model, allowing more 
speed and agility in software system requirements (Winnefield, 2015). The IT Box model 
delegates requirements oversight and validation of documents following an ICD to a flag-
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level organization rather than the JROC. Portfolios would streamline and tailor successor 
documents according to the oversight authority and program needs.  
Analysis 
Program Model  
During the Materiel Solutions Analysis (MSA) phase, programs conduct an AoA to 
compare the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle costs of potential 
alternatives. The Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) director provides guidance 
for major programs and approves the final analysis. AoAs are led by the operational sponsor 
with support from the acquisition community. The analyses often reveal a bias toward 
alternatives that look and feel like the legacy system the new program will replace, but with 
more modern technologies and improved performance.  
Contrary to the perception that acquisition executives stress due diligence in this up-
front analysis, programs often experience pressure to complete the analysis so that they can 
advance to the next acquisition phase in pursuit of the preferred alternative. Once a program 
achieves Milestone A approval, it rarely revisits the AoA to validate constraints and factors 
and ensure that the program is still pursuing the best solution. Programs refine their cost 
estimates in each phase, with the life-cycle costs determined on the basis of tradeoff 
decisions made early on.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio structures would enable robust, integrated, continual analysis to optimize 
cost, risk, performance, and mission impact. Portfolio AoAs would be robust, continual 
processes designed to optimize the performance and/or efficiency of a suite of programs 
over their life cycle. Analysts would regularly assess the portfolio capabilities (fielded, in 
development, and planned) to maximize mission impact and minimize portfolio life-cycle 
costs. In-depth knowledge of technical baselines tightly aligned to cost models would drive 
affordability and trade-space analysis at the program and portfolio levels. Portfolio-level 
modeling and simulation (M&S) and experimentation would optimize system performance, 
operational effectiveness, and suitability. Threat assessments would track adversaries’ 
military capabilities and the risk they pose to U.S. personnel, systems, and national 
interests. These analyses would continuously monitor and evaluate a variety of 
technologies, systems, services, and nonmaterial considerations such as doctrine, training, 
or procedures. Technology advances would drive requirements changes and the resulting 
system capabilities supported by a flexible contract and budget structure. Analyses of 
programs in development would consider their acquisition performance and operational 
priorities to ensure the programs continue to represent worthwhile investments. Data would 
drive the design and adaptation of portfolio capabilities. Divestment analyses would assess 
if and when to terminate a program and what alternative approaches to consider as a way 
forward.  
Research and Development (R&D) 
Program Model 
Programs in the Technology Maturity and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase focus on 
prototyping and maturing the technology to a point where the program can begin 
development in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Most 
programs today develop the full scope of capabilities to meet all the approved requirements, 
and the resulting systems can take a decade or longer to field. Individual programs are 
responsible for maturing all critical technology elements and demonstrating them in a 
relevant operational environment.  
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Program offices face pressure to transition to EMD as soon as possible so that they 
can deliver capabilities before the requirements and technologies become completely 
outdated. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) regularly criticizes the DoD for 
allowing far too many MDAPs to advance into EMD with immature technologies that create 
cost, schedule, and technical risks (Sullivan, 2014).  
During the TMRR phase, many interested companies may contribute technology 
research and competing preliminary designs. Once a program reaches Milestone B, most 
R&D stops and a single prime contractor develops and produces the system. 
Portfolio Model 
A portfolio R&D environment would enable mission-focused research and rapid 
exploitation, both critical to maintaining technological superiority over adversaries. 
Establishing a long-term R&D environment for a portfolio would allow an active community 
to contribute to advancing innovative capabilities. Each portfolio could include government 
labs, federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), universities, DoD 
University Aligned Research Centers (UARCs), and diverse industry players in a 
collaborative environment. Portfolios could include pools of industry players large and small, 
traditional defense contractors, and innovative new entrants (see Figure 4). An open 
innovation culture would pursue ideas across contractors, partners, users, and even 
adversaries to shape R&D goals (Kelley, 2010). Both government and industry could 
contribute R&D funding to portfolio solutions and share intellectual property when 
appropriate. They would also make long-term investments in M&S, experimentation, and 
rapid testing capabilities. Portfolio leaders would provide their priorities for research and 
feedback to shape investments and determine which technologies to integrate into the next 
program. R&D organizations focused on technology maturity would reduce program risk and 
improve delivery speed. 
 
 Figure 4. Portfolio R&D Environment 
As the DoD would increasingly rely on commercial technologies rather than military-
unique developments, portfolios would make long-term investments in assessing current 
and emerging technologies. A portfolio R&D group knowledgeable about technology 
solutions would intelligently shape operations, requirements, and designs. This group would 
demonstrate capabilities, prototype emerging technologies, and compete in challenges to 
achieve performance goals. Robust M&S capabilities and experimentation would evolve, 
drawing on the latest technologies and threat assessments. Given the current era of 
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Huge, monolithic MDAPs develop all CDD requirements in a single, big-bang 
approach. MDAPs take 10 to 15 years from Milestone A to initial operational capability, with 
many of the largest systems taking even longer. Programs enter EMD with immature 
technologies, which leads to design instability, technical challenges, and significant cost and 
schedule overruns. Lengthy timelines between deliveries drive operational sponsors to add 
requirements to the scope of each increment, thereby compounding risks and increasing 
cost and schedule delays. For example, the F/A-22 took 22 years to become operational, 
with a 71% quantity decrease and 62% cost increase against initial plans. The Air Force 
could have delivered more capability sooner via a three-block incremental approach 
(Walker, 2013). The block upgrade model for B-52, F-15, and F-16 proved successful over 
decades, yet with its big-bang structure the F-35 program is struggling with costly retrofits. 
In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will buy just one tactical aircraft 
… which will have to be shared by the Navy and the Air Force 6 months each 
year, with the Marine Corps borrowing it on the extra day during leap years. 
—Augustine’s Law XVI (Augustine, 2015) 
Portfolio Model  
Given competing missions, priorities, budgets, authorities, and many other factors, 
designing any element across platforms has historically added risk across programs, 
particularly joint programs. One of the biggest benefits of a portfolio structure would be the 
ability to design common platforms, subsystems, and services across programs. 
Stakeholders could shape these common elements to optimize portfolio performance, 
efficiencies, and mission impact.  
Portfolios would structure developments to deliver a continual set of capability 
releases via small programs or increments. Smaller programs carry lower risk because of 
their well-understood scope, simpler design, more accurate cost/schedule estimates, and 
rapid delivery of capabilities. Speed reduces exposure to change and aligns requirements 
and capabilities delivered.  
As illustrated in Figure 5, portfolios would scope each program or increment by 
leveraging the highest priority portfolio requirements and mature technologies from the 
portfolio R&D environment. This would help programs to deliver capabilities within five years 
for weapon systems and 18 months for IT systems, with estimated costs falling within the 
allocated budget. 
 
 Figure 5. Bounding the Program Scope 
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For example, instead of designing C4ISR aircraft independently, the DoD could 
examine the viability of a common aircraft platform with a modular design to allow for a 
diverse set of payloads. Common vehicles, communication suites, sensors, or ground 
stations would improve interoperability and cost efficiencies. Common services from IT 
infrastructure networks to system sustainment could improve mission impact and lead to 
cost savings.  
Architectures 
Program Model 
Programs are designed individually and focus primarily on subsystem interfaces and 
performance. Each program develops a series of DoD Architecture Framework (DODAF) 
products to capture the capability, operational, services, and systems viewpoints 
(Winnefield, 2015). While these architecture products help programs to understand the 
bigger picture, designs remain program centric. A diverse set of defense industry contractors 
often integrates proprietary design elements, which creates risks to interoperability and 
system evolution. The maturity of architectures varies widely across the DoD, with few areas 
of a strong enterprise architecture driving program designs and interfaces. Programs have 
collaborated to jointly develop common subsystems, but often encountered considerable 
risk due to competing designs, distributed budgets, and cross-organizational dynamics. 
Many interfaces between systems are costly point-to-point designs difficult to evolve in a 
dynamic environment.  
Portfolio Model 
Establishing a portfolio for a mission area would provide a structure to develop and 
mature an effective enterprise architecture. Collaboratively developed and proven 
standards, interfaces, and processes would guide each program’s development. This 
strategic design approach would enable optimization in production, operations, and 
sustainment. A central portfolio authority for an enterprise architecture would ensure that 
new program designs leverage the architecture from the outset. Portfolios could more 
effectively design the modular open systems strongly advocated by Congress, the GAO, 
and the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiative (Kendall, 2014). Portfolio systems engineers 
would develop notional designs for each acquisition program using mature technologies 
from the portfolio’s development environment to address the top capability gaps identified in 
the relevant ICD. Robust portfolio enterprise architectures and collaboratively developed 
notional designs would outline how each capability fits within the portfolio suite. Portfolios 
would resist over-engineering complex architectures by driving simplicity and maximizing 
use of commercial technologies.  
Strategies 
Program Model 
Major acquisition programs develop dozens of documents to support major milestone 
decisions. On average, programs take over two years to complete milestone documents, 
expending an average of 5,600 staff days (Sullivan, 2015). These documents force the 
program office to explore effective strategies for the next acquisition phase, yet the sheer 
quantity and complexity become overwhelming. As conditions change during the acquisition 
phase, programs rarely update strategy documents and resubmit them for approval. In 
short, program strategies are shortsighted and often do not reflect current approaches. 
Lengthy program strategies simply gather dust in file cabinets. “Working without a plan may 
seem scary, but blindly following a plan that has no relationship to reality is even scarier” 
(Fried & Hansson, 2010). 
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After awarding the contract, agencies are often locked into a single vendor for the 
program life. This eliminates competition—the single best method to control costs and 
improve performance.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio strategies would provide a long-term vision of how to deliver an integrated 
suite of capabilities most effectively and efficiently. The vision would include a clear set of 
portfolio goals, outcomes, risks, and performance measures. Unifying around an inspiring 
vision or challenge would provide clarity on investment decisions and rally a diverse 
community to develop innovative solutions. Portfolios should embrace LinkedIn’s CEO Reid 
Hoffman’s two rules for strategy decisions: speed and simplicity (Casnocha, 2015). 
Consistent, repeatable processes across programs would foster a dynamic 
workforce, accelerate program execution, and allow for tailoring as necessary. Portfolio 
documentation would serve as the foundation for each program, thus reducing the amount 
of program-unique content to develop and coordinate. Common portfolio strategies and 
practices would ensure that each program leverages best practices and provide new 
programs an established framework on which to build.  
Portfolio strategies would take industry considerations into account to optimize 
production lines across systems and foster an active, competitive environment. Integrating 
OSD/AT&L’s Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) industrial base analysis into program 
strategies would support a vibrant supply chain and affordable, stable development and 
production rates (Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy [MIBP], n.d.). Strategies would 
explore innovative approaches to nurture an active industry community in R&D and in 
program development/production, and would consider sponsoring competitions to address 
critical risks or opportunities. Strategies could encompass more dual awards, split buys, and 
parallel developments to keep participants in an active contractor base leapfrogging each 
other with evolutionary upgrades or new, revolutionary solutions. 
Contracting 
Program Model 
Contracting today involves a set of lengthy processes, with source selections that 
often take a year or more to complete. The contractor or contractor team selected to design 
and develop a new system often gains monopolistic power over the government for a 
majority of a program’s life span. As the DoD has moved toward acquiring larger and fewer 
major systems, this has changed the dynamics of the defense industry. Instead of creating a 
steady pipeline of potential work through periodic competition for new work, many of these 
large contracts become all-or-nothing, make-or-break outcomes that shape a major market 
segment for a decade or longer. 
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio contracting would focus on developing active, long-term partnerships with 
many companies rather than only a few. The goal would be to build a vibrant community of 
large and small companies actively contributing to R&D, architectures, designs, 
development, production, and sustainment of portfolio capabilities.  
Competition remains the best way to drive down costs and increase innovation in 
defense programs. Therefore, a portfolio strategy should actively foster continuous 
competition over a program’s life cycle via broad industry participation. Decomposing large 
systems into a smaller set of programs would increase opportunities for industry, especially 
small businesses, to compete for DoD work. A potential portfolio contract strategy could use 
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multiple-award, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts to establish targeted 
pools of large and small businesses with key technological and domain expertise. 
The DoD could streamline contract timelines by establishing portfolio contracts with 
standardized business practices and pre-competed contract vehicles to enable rapid 
generation of task orders for programs and increments. Standardized business practices 
would include pricing, terms and conditions, templates, and selection criteria. Portfolios 
could maintain continuous competition by restricting the size of the contract vehicles with on 
and off ramps to refresh the vendor pools. Past performance on task orders within the 
portfolio would represent a valuable selection criterion for future work, as it would reward 
superior performance by contractors. 
A portfolio approach should incentivize innovative companies to pursue defense 
work. New entrants, more than the major defense companies, offer the greatest promise for 
designing and integrating technologies in new ways to achieve a military advantage. The 
DoD has a variety of contracting programs to reach companies willing to offer new 
technologies, collaborative research, and experimentation. Broad Area Announcements 
(BAAs) foster competition to advance state of the art research and prototypes. Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
programs fund cooperative R&D projects with small businesses and universities (DCAA, 
n.d.). Portfolios could provide these small companies with an environment to prototype and 
demonstrate a focused set of capabilities tightly aligned with an operational mission. 
Promising small businesses could partner with established defense companies to navigate 
the DoD’s regulatory gauntlet to develop and produce a new system.  
Roadmaps 
Program Model 
Each program must develop and maintain a strategic schedule and detailed 
integrated master schedule (IMS). The quality of program schedules often increases in the 
lead-up to major milestones, while dropping off during acquisition phases. Detailed IMSs 
should integrate government and contractor activities, yet are often managed as contractor 
deliverables. Some operations, acquisition, and budget headquarters may have roadmaps 
or enterprise view of program schedules, yet the underlying data often lacks sufficient fidelity 
or currency.  
Portfolio Model 
A portfolio roadmap such as the one shown in Figure 6 would serve as a central, 
long-range planning tool for operations, acquisitions, and budget domains and include the 
following: 
• Schedules of all legacy systems and planned programs/capabilities 
• Quantities of operational systems and new production planned 
• Identification of gaps, overlaps, and migrations from legacy to modern 
systems 
• Current and projected performance levels for systems or mission areas 
• Identification of legacy system risks due to technical factors, sources, or O&S 
costs 
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 Figure 6. Notional Portfolio Roadmap 
Portfolio roadmaps would provide operational, acquisition, and budget leaders and 
stakeholders with an integrated plan. They would support collaboration across these 
domains on status, risks, and plans, and foster discussions on priorities. Identifying risks or 
gaps would support decisions on accelerating new systems, delaying retirement of legacy 
systems, or implementing interim fixes. Aligning roadmaps with portfolio cost estimates and 
budgets would enable portfolios to optimize investments, ideally supported by analytical 
tools and methods. Many leading schedule software products already enable linking of 
program schedules. A portfolio schedule framework that integrates program dependencies 
would show the impacts of program schedule slips and support scenario planning.  
Governance 
Program Model 
Governance presents one of the biggest challenges to effective portfolio 
management. Different stakeholder organizations across domains and levels have a 
competing set of priorities, incentives, cultures, and constraints. PEOs oversee the 
execution of the individual programs in their portfolio, but dedicate little time and resources 
to cross-program integration and optimization. The larger the portfolio, the harder it is to 
manage. Each layer of oversight across requirements, acquisition, and budget communities 
and functions groups programs differently, with little alignment around common portfolios. In 
some instances up to 56 organizations at eight levels reviewed program milestone 
documentation (Sullivan, 2015). With no two portfolios the same, it is difficult to reach 
consensus across communities on program priorities and budgets. The DoD incentivizes 
program managers to ensure that their program delivers the required performance within 
cost and on schedule. External dependencies are seen as risks. Therefore, many PEOs 
believe that the best way to minimize risk consists of scoping each program to include its 
own infrastructure as well as all subsystems and support equipment. Each program then 
progresses through the acquisition life cycle on an individual schedule and meets with its 
Milestone Decision Authority only at major milestones.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolios would govern through collaborative, strategic partnerships with five key 
elements:  
• Shared responsibilities of operational, acquisition, budget, and sustainment 
executives 
• Portfolio alignment to ensure stakeholders represent the same mix of 
programs 
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• Decision authorities delegated to the appropriate level to enable timely 
decisions  
• Central knowledge repository to provide stakeholder transparency and 
leadership insight 
• Incentives aligned to ensure all organizations are working to common 
outcomes 
Carefully limiting portfolio scope would ensure a manageable governance level. 
Program managers should be empowered to make decisions about technologies and 
subsystems (Berteau, 2014). Regular discussions among a diverse stakeholder group on 
priorities, status, risks, resources, and opportunities would ensure that the pipeline of 
programs supports the desired portfolio outcomes. Partnerships between operational 
commands and acquisition portfolios would foster collaboration on operational details and 
on which technologies/capabilities can be rapidly tailored for their missions. The partners 
would have wide latitude to shape the program scope and features.  
Portfolio charters would clearly define authorities, roles, and responsibilities. Online 
repositories would capture and share portfolio knowledge to provide real-time insight and a 
common understanding. Embracing a servant leadership mindset would foster program 
support, integration, and innovation. Robust portfolio analytics would enable the data-driven 
decisions essential in these complex environments.  
Governance would balance gate-check reviews (e.g., milestones) with time-phased 
portfolio and program reviews. Establishing a battle rhythm to discuss program status, 
issues, and ways ahead would minimize the burdens imposed by major milestone reviews. 
Portfolio strategy documents would reduce the burden on programs by requiring only 
constrained annexes that contain program-unique information. Reviews would still take 
place to ensure programs have a sound enough strategy and mitigated risks to warrant 
entry into and funding for the next acquisition phase. With delegated authorities, common 
processes, and regular insight, programs would minimize the documentation and reviews 
required to make informed decisions.  
Budgets 
Program Model 
Historically, the DoD programs with the largest budgets have been the most likely to 
overrun costs and fail to deliver capabilities, while those with the smallest budgets were 
most likely to underrun cost and exceed performance expectations (Ward, 2014). Most 
acquisition programs today are funded via budget accounts called program elements (PEs), 
which are outlined in the president’s budget to Congress and included in the annual 
appropriations bills. Funding for each program is closely monitored by Congress, the DoD 
comptroller, each service and agency, and the program managers. PEs often fail to provide 
Congress with consistent, complete, and clear information (Sullivan, 2007). The lengthy 
DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process requires budget 
requests and approvals years before programs are executed, with frequent adjustments 
made each year. The biggest challenge posed by the current budget constraints involves 
responsiveness to changes in operations, threats, opportunities, program performance, and 
priorities. Transfers of funds between PEs are limited to 10% of the budget for the current 
execution year, with congressional approval needed for larger transfers.  
Portfolio Model 
Some PEs today include multiple programs, with each broken out at a subaccount 
level called a budget program activity code (BPAC). Transferring funds between BPACs 
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requires lower approval thresholds than transfers between entire PEs. Thus, allocating a 
portfolio budget at the PE level with programs at the BPAC level would offer funding 
flexibility and agility, while also providing sufficient transparency to oversight officials. 
This funding approach would increase the effective use of constrained resources and 
would direct funds toward the highest-priority capabilities with the greatest enterprise 
impact. Pentagon executives would focus on strategic budget allocations at the portfolio 
level. Portfolio stakeholders would allocate program funding following key milestone 
reviews. Portfolio managers would then establish funding lines for technology development, 
enterprise platforms, and personnel for enterprise efficiencies. Fortunately, such a change 
would not require a wholesale restructuring of the PPBE process but would simply call for 
shaping a few PEs for an initial set of portfolios.  
Workforce 
Program Model 
Program office staff are often assigned to a single effort for an extended period of 
time, limiting their exposure to and experience with other programs or DoD-wide procedures 
and often leading to atrophy of their skills. Military personnel rotate every three to four years, 
with program management turnover frequently highlighted as a systemic program risk. While 
stability of key leadership positions can be beneficial, an inflexible staffing model that ties 
staff to a program for a decade is grossly inefficient and ineffective.  
Hundreds of acquisition programs go through roughly the same major acquisition 
processes, yet often reinvent the wheel each time rather than tailoring a common approach 
to program specifics. As a result, a program planning for a major event—for example, a 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR)—may have few staff with recent PDR experience, and 
most staff may need to relearn some of the key elements to prepare for and execute the 
PDR.  
Portfolio Model 
Programs and acquisition workforces would perform more efficiently and effectively 
in a portfolio matrix organization. In an era of budget and workforce challenges, a dynamic 
staffing model would yield cost efficiencies, a strengthened workforce, and improved 
program outcomes.  
Each program would have a balance of long-term staff with deep historical program 
knowledge and technical and process subject matter experts (SMEs) dynamically assigned 
throughout the program’s life cycle. In a portfolio structure, individual programs or 
increments would have shorter durations, which itself would reduce the skill decay that can 
result from lengthy program assignments.  
In a portfolio matrix model, a percentage of the workforce could serve as process or 
technical experts who augment program office staff via short-term assignments. Process 
experts, for example engineers who specialize in system design, could advise program 
offices in the preparation and execution of PDRs and Critical Design Reviews and their 
associated design drawings. Schedule experts could assist in development and 
implementation of integrated master schedules to effectively manage the program and its 
dependencies on external efforts. Market research or commercial technology experts could 
ensure programs have a sound understanding of market offerings and technology solutions 
to shape the program scope and strategies.  
Technical experts, by contrast, would offer deep insight in particular technical 
domains (e.g., avionics, sensors, stealth, or cyber). As programs progress through the 
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acquisition life cycle, these SMEs would phase in and out of the program office as 
conditions warrant. Using expertise only when required, instead of committing personnel to 
long-term assignments while demand for specialized skills ebbs and flows, would provide an 
optimal staffing model. SMEs could support multiple programs at the same time, thus 
establishing repeatable processes and horizontal integration across the portfolio.  
Process and technology SMEs would focus on mastering their niche areas by 
collaborating with other SMEs across the DoD. Process SMEs would develop and maintain 
guides, templates, and repeatable processes for easy program adoption. Technology SMEs 
would research and collaborate with labs, FFRDCs, and industry in a focused technology 
domain to support program designs and innovative solutions. As staff members progress 
through their careers, they could transition between program and process focused roles.  
Sustainment 
Program Model 
Government depots and prime contractors sustain the DoD’s weapon systems 
following a variety of operational models. Related major programs in a similar mission area 
are often sustained at diverse locations across the country, leading to massive inefficiencies 
in facilities, personnel, and support equipment.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio enterprise architectures and designs would enable strategic sustainment 
strategies to leverage common subsystems, parts, and support services. Portfolio 
sustainment strategies would leverage economies of scale via strategic investments and 
operations. Designing a holistic approach to sustaining portfolio capabilities would enable 
government and industry to make smarter long-term capital investments for production and 
sustainment. Subdividing monolithic systems into capability suites would create a smaller, 
steady pipeline of new systems to sustain. An enterprise analysis of costs, benefits, and 
risks could support a balanced portfolio of leasing versus buying solutions. Portfolios could 
establish public–private partnerships across programs, considering resources, demand, and 
expertise. Portfolio-level sustainment performance metrics and measures could incentivize 
industry to move from system-specific measures toward integrated mission-area capability 
rates.  
Summary 
Acquisition programs today are burdened by the complexity of the acquisition 
environment, the difficulty of maturing critical technologies, and the inability of the 
acquisition system to respond to changing operations, technologies, and budgets. 
Budgetary, workforce, and regulatory constraints further compound program risk. In a 
complex, integrated environment, defense acquisitions can no longer rely on a structure 
based on individual systems. Embracing a capability-focused portfolio structure modeled on 
the commercial sector offers many solutions to the DoD’s top challenges.  
The principles of simplicity, commonality, and agility should guide all acquisition 
portfolios. By adopting the commercial product-line approach, the DoD could address long-
standing acquisition issues associated with speed, resilience, and interoperability. Elevating 
the time-consuming acquisition processes to the portfolio level would reduce program 
workload, allowing each program to deliver products faster. Managing requirements, 
budgets, and staffs at the portfolio level would enable dynamic allocation to high-priority 
programs. Portfolio strategies, roadmaps, and architectures would guide program 
development. 
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In a portfolio structure, an active government and industry community would 
collaboratively develop technologies and designs and employ continuous competition to 
develop and produce the individual systems. Portfolios would design and optimize 
acquisition processes to deliver a suite of smaller programs rapidly, ensuring that 
warfighters regularly receive integrated, incremental capabilities with the latest technologies 
designed to achieve operational missions. 
Advancing a portfolio model will require the DoD to address various strategic 
challenges. Congress maintains strict control over program budgets and location of depots 
to sustain systems. Reaching agreement between the DoD and Congress on the proper 
balance of insight, authorities, and accountabilities will take time. Each functional area (e.g., 
requirements, systems engineering, testing) would require tailored processes and possibly 
new policies to enable portfolio strategies, and the DoD would need to identify which suite of 
programs would comprise the initial portfolios. Finally, the culture of the acquisition 
workforce would have to shift to support a new portfolio acquisition model. With forward-
thinking acquisition leaders in place across the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, the DoD has a 
prime opportunity to pursue a portfolio acquisition model that can achieve transformational 
solutions.   
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Abstract 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition requires IT to undergo the DoD information 
assurance certification and accreditation process (DIACAP), which makes architecture-
dependent assumptions. Emerging IT architectures, such as mobile and cloud-based 
platforms, invalidate these assumptions and prevent the DoD from acquiring commercial 
technologies that are readily available to adversaries. To address this problem, we extended 
our initial automation framework, wherein an application profile is expressed in a formal 
language and scaled with evolving architectural assumptions. These profiles will help ensure 
that information assurance requirements are commensurate with risk and scalable based on 
an application’s changing external dependencies. Information assurance risk levels must 
account for changing environmental and IA parameters (confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability) that result from dynamic recombination of applications during runtime. Our 
proposed language aims to address dynamically composable, multi-party systems that 
preserve security properties. Software developers and certification authorities can use these 
profiles expressed in first-order logic with an inference engine to advance the DIACAP and 
re-check compliance as IT systems evolve over time. 
Introduction 
Ensuring confidentiality in information systems is of paramount importance to 
mitigate the likelihood of data spills. But as systems change and requirements evolve, it 
quickly becomes unclear how these changes may affect the security of protected 
information with regard to secure enclaves. The DoD is increasingly reliant on software in all 
operational contexts, and agility in terms of the ability to certify and deploy new and 
improved software technologies necessitates greater agility in certification processes. 
Software recertification processes require significant expenditure in order to provide 
evidence of information assurance (IA) policy conformance. The costs of both sourcing and 
developing software are compounded by the need to maintain these certifications, especially 
when changes occur. Current processes are manual, and cannot scale as complexity 
increases. Savings and scalability can be achieved by employing formal analysis to assist 
humans and manage risk. This increases trust and reduces validation time, useful in 
complex systems and where high-confidentiality data may be deployed in low-confidentiality 
enclaves (or in other high risk scenarios).  
We believe rapid recertification can be enhanced by documenting assumptions in 
tool-supported frameworks where assumptions that continue to hold may be reused. One 
approach is to use lightweight formal analysis to model and validate security requirements. 
This analysis should focus recertification efforts on only those requirements that may conflict 
with IA policy. Furthermore, such conflicts should be resolvable through reconciliation 
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strategies in which changes to the system can be checked against conformance to the IA 
policy, without requiring a complete review of the entire system.  
In this paper, we present our methodology which principally focuses on modelling 
and validating specifications of data flow as the basis for evaluating IA policy. The method 
permits automated analysis of data flowing into and out of a system or component to detect 
conflicts in the data’s specified purpose, which illuminates potential areas of non-
conformance and further expedites conflict resolution in regard to the recertification process. 
We also classify and present reconciliation strategies for resolving the different types of 
conflicts that may occur. We show that our method is scalable to permit analysis of large, 
complex, and evolving systems—whose specifications can involve numbers of policies no 
longer tractable by manual analysis alone.  
Organizational granularity refers to the view at which a policy or design artifact is 
intended to represent its context within an organization. Our scalable, automated analysis 
can be repeated rapidly as specifications change with the aim to reduce recertification time 
at any point in the software lifecycle and at any level of organizational granularity. For 
example, design artifacts detailing collections of software components represent a very high 
degree of organizational granularity. Networks and departmental interconnections represent 
a medium degree of organizational granularity. Enterprise-level architectures and inter-
organizational connections represent a very low degree of organizational granularity. From 
the software perspective, these conventions are often referred to by their “level,” which 
comprises the same notion as organizational granularity but on an opposing scale: Software 
components and their implementations are referred to as low-level artifacts. Network 
diagrams, detailed design documentation, and inter-departmental processes are referred to 
as mid-level artifacts. Inter-organizational processes and enterprise architectures are 
referred to as high-level artifacts. Discussions which must be paired with their context for 
policy or design artifacts in this paper are referred to by their organizational granularity, for 
consistency. 
Changes to information systems include the addition of new features or new 
behaviors, or the establishment of new connectors between existing system components 
and others. Thus, we can envision a range of scenarios that yield characteristically different 
recertification challenges. For example, designing new systems to replace legacy systems 
(early lifecycle), integrating new systems with existing systems (mid-lifecycle), reworking 
existing systems to perform new functions (mid- to late-lifecycle), and during perfective 
maintenance tasks (late-lifecycle). During these lifecycle stages, software systems are 
increasing in size due to the nature of these changes, and this increases the time and cost 
for validation and recertification. 
Unfortunately, the naïve approach of dividing up the software system and 
parallelizing recertification tasks is a separate and more costly challenge that does not gain 
traction over the problem. Decomposing the system in ways that violate architectural and 
source code artifact boundaries, such as software interfaces, can increase accidental 
complexity of certification tasks (Brooks, 1995) when systemic quality attributes, such as 
ensuring confidentiality, cut across these boundaries. For this reason, our approach 
employs the notion of a context that may cover a specific application, called an application 
profile, or an entire secure enclave. Within this context, we can reduce data flow analysis 
from across enclaves to conform to the same expression and reasoning needed to detect 
policy conflicts within an enclave. This level of reasoning would correspond to a high or 
medium level of organizational granularity. In Figure 1, we present two secure enclaves, “A” 
and “B,” with a support service connected to enclave “A” and a handheld application 
connected to enclave “B.” The links that connect these two enclaves are assumed to be 
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secure as they are within the same operational environment. However, bringing in support 
services and mobile devices from the outside context into these secure environments 
represents a change in functionality, which may be a recertification trigger. These 
recertification triggers are discussed later in our Evaluation section. 
 
 Figure 1. Example of DoD Distributed IT System Illustrating the System 
Decomposition Boundary Between Secure Enclave and External Areas 
In this simplified context, we focus narrowly on data actions that access and make 
available information and postpone addressing questions about which specific security 
mitigation is needed to address a specific vulnerability. For example, answers to questions 
about when to use encryption correspond to sensitivity of data and under what contexts that 
data is made available, which we account for. However, the question about what level of 
encryption to use is not a central focus of our method, and is well documented in IA policy 
based on data sensitivity. We now discuss the technical background to our approach. 
Technical Background  
The Bell-LaPadula model simplifies the characterization of information flow from low 
confidentiality to high confidentiality, but not vice versa (Bell, 2005). This model has long 
been the traditional view of enforcing multi-level security policies in government and military 
applications. In our method, we characterize the purpose for which information is used as 
the security level and then allow policy authors to express compositions of security levels 
through containment and disjointness, for example, a security level may contain or be 
disjoint with another level. This formalism extends our prior work on semantic 
parameterization (Breaux, Anton, & Doyle, 2008) for expressing actions on data in 
Description Logic (DL) as a composition of actors, objects, and purposes, and for 
transactions involving data, the source and target of the transaction. More recently, we 
developed a human-readable SQL-like language for expressing these application profiles 
(Breaux, Hibshi, & Rao, 2014), which we refer to in this paper as the “Application Profile 
Language.” Application Profile Language syntax is parsed and compiled into the Web 
Ontology Language (OWL), which is suitable for computer processing by an automated DL 
reasoning tool (Bechhofer et al., 2004).  
 
Legend
Enclave “A” - Zumwalt’s CIC Enclave “B” - Zumwalt’s SH-60 
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Subsumption is a syllogism in which one concept describes a more general class of 
another. This is commonly referred to as a superclass/subclass relationship. In DL, we can 
check whether one data action subsumes another action, which means every interpretation 
of the second action is contained in the set of interpretations of the first action. Subsumption 
allows us to detect conflicts, in particular, when one action is deemed permissible and the 
same or a subsumed action is deemed impermissible. The relationships between concepts 
expressed in a specification are mapped directly into the DL model. For example, through 
subsumption, high-confidentiality purposes for a data transmission may include “top secret” 
or “for mission-critical purposes,” or any number of other concepts which are desired to 
express with respect to crafting a data requirement. 
The DL model is comprised of two parts:  
1. an ontology in which key terms are defined, including information type 
categories and type compositions expressed using subsumption 
2. a set of rules governing collection, usage, and transfer of data to third parties 
For each data action, the purpose for the action and the party from whom that data is 
sourced is stated, and for transfer, the party who will receive the data is stated. Actions may 
be expressed as permitted or prohibited in the application profile. The rules expressing 
permissions or prohibitions in the profile represent the high-level specification of what 
actions an application is permitted or restricted from performing, whereas the 
implementation would entail mapping these actions to functions in code, such as database 
queries or radar telemetry-based analysis, and so forth. 
Figure 2 is a process diagram which illustrates the recertification process steps using 
our tool. The highlighted area on the right of the figure spotlights the novel contribution of 
this paper, which is the conflict reconciliation strategies we present later. The recertification 
challenge that we focus on herein concerns how to compose systems of systems that 
collect, use, and transfer data across system boundaries, between secure and unsecure 
enclaves. 
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Approach and Running Example 
We now present a running example that we use throughout the paper. The example 
draws from public accounts of real-world vessels and technologies that are currently 
undergoing sea trials—specifically, we chose scenarios regarding Zumwalt-class destroyers, 
which we generalize and refer to as “Zumwalt.” The running example is used to illustrate the 
high-level certification concepts that exist in real software systems aboard sophisticated 
platforms, such as those integrated into Zumwalt’s Total Ship Computing Environment 
Infrastructure. Certification concepts deal with software requirements, and are not reasoned 
about based on lines of code, given the complexity of software. Zumwalt’s electronic 
systems are comprised of approximately 6 million lines of code—far too much to reason 
about at the low level, pedantically analyzing each line to determine if it meets requirements 
or not. Software must be analyzed in terms of high-level concepts, and certification auditors 
must align analysis methods to meet the same high level of abstraction. 
To help achieve alignment between the level of abstraction for our analysis and high-
level abstraction in software, details unrelated to software requirements about the ship-class 
have been removed. Details about the software requirements themselves have been 
generalized in order to make the focus of our discussion centered on the essential transitive 
qualities of data. We are not concerned about the underlying functionality or supporting 
systems of compartments aboard; rather, we are focused on understanding and analyzing 
systemic behaviors that specify to consume or move data to a certain place, for a certain 
purpose, to achieve requirements. Rather than being concerned about the memory chips, 
logic boards, networks, and radiation-emitting or receiving hardware that comprise the air- 
and surface-borne vessel sensing capabilities aboard a ship, we can abstract this entire 
sensory capability as the radar system. We can reason about the broad concepts of radar 
data that may be produced by such a system. The application profiles which we use to 
formalize such concepts give us the capability of automated reasoning at this level. In 
Application Profile Language, the radar system would be written as an actor. The radar data 
would be expressed as a data concept. Requirements, expressed through policies inside 
application profiles, provide the necessary details for determining what is being done with 
this data in the context of expressed actors. The contents of an application profile can 
therefore be articulated in notional scenarios based on our running example that captures 
the necessary details to express an intended new system functionality.  
Our running example is designed to be illustrative of high-level software concepts, 
and may not reflect the entirety of the underlying details of a vessel, the bits and bytes of 
data in their onboard computer systems, or a platform’s true capabilities. However, the 
example provides sufficient detail about where and what data is being used, so that we can 
reason about data’s transitive properties given the general characteristics of these systems. 
Without worrying about the lines of code that comprise these software systems, we can 
reason about how data is used, and how this data may need to be transferred outside of a 
vessel’s enclave to another party to fulfil requirements. 
In our running example, Zumwalt’s key capabilities that we have abstracted 
correspond to some of the platform’s distinguishing features compared to other destroyers; 
these include Zumwalt’s advanced radar system (Tolley & Ball, 2014), abstracted as the 
radar system. Zumwalt’s sensor-netting capabilities that permit sharing of information with 
friendly platforms (O'Neil, 2007), including AEGIS technologies or the Total Ship Computing 
Environment Infrastructure, are abstracted as the information sharing mechanism. Together, 
these two abstracted systems permit enough expressivity in terms of the data concepts that 
exist in the real world so as to maintain realism with respect to DoD IA policies and software 
certification processes. We reason about requirements for these computerized systems 
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using already established directives for security used in practice, such as DoD Directive 
8500.01. Zumwalt may be considered to be in any theatre, with no specific mission, which 
permits our example to be illustratively modified and re-examined in different operational 
contexts. In any of these contexts, the underlying thought processes that are required to 
analyze decisions about adding new features, or modifying connections with outside 
information systems and processes, are the same. This focus on only information sharing 
concepts rather than technical implementation details also means that these scenarios could 
be extended to cover any vessel, or land-based system.  
The Zumwalt-class’ software implementations have made extensive use of real-time 
operating systems with stratified and segmented “high” and “low” security networks as part 
of the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure (Lynxworks, 2007). These 
technologies conflate directly with the Bell-LaPadula (Bell, 2005; Landwehr, 1981) view of IA 
and security, and is the same model for purpose which we show in our DL ontology. 
Attention on software aspects of the class’ radar system and information sharing capabilities 
is an identified concern in design reviews of the vessel (O'Rourke, 2012), emphasizing the 
need for reducing software certification costs and time, which contribute to the expenses 
associated with information sharing capabilities such as sensor netting. Certification 
becomes an even larger problem when considering information integration with multiple 
platforms or allied vessels in the demanding context of future battle spaces, which is the 
intent behind our selection of Zumwalt as the subject of our example.  
Profiles, Conflicts, and Tracing 
We now describe our approach to trace data flows in and through application 
profiles, and to detect conflicting requirements. When policies covering multiple 
organizational granularities are used in a single application profile’s policy, overlapping 
policies may result. In high and medium granularity overlaps, organizational policies may 
conflict with individual policies governing software components, and vice-versa, for example. 
In low and medium granularity overlaps, inter-organizational policies may conflict with 
departmental policies. High and low granularity overlaps are also possible, in which inter-
organizational policies may conflict with those governing software components. In general, 
overlapping policies may lead to conflict, and these conflicts must be reconciled in order to 
prevent data spills. Later in this paper, we discuss identifying and reconciling specific types 
of conflicts that exist as a result of these overlaps in light of this risk. 
Actions on Data 
In our model, application profile rules may govern three primary actions which 
express the transitive nature of data as it moves through a system. These actions are 
collection, usage, and transfer of data. Each action concept has assigned roles that relate 
the action to actors, data, and an associated purpose. The collection action describes an act 
by a party to access, collect, obtain, receive, or acquire data from another party. The usage 
action describes an act by a party to use or consume data in any way. Transferring 
describes an act by a party to transmit, move, send, or relocate data to another party so that 
they may collect it. Pairs of rules that permit collections and transfers on the same datum 
are referred to as a data flow. When one of the rules in the pair is expressed with respect to 
a third party, this data flow can be traced to the third party. 
For example, Zumwalt may need to transfer information about the presence of an 
enemy radar contact to a friendly vessel in the vicinity in order to initiate a combined 
engagement. In another scenario, a friendly vessel may need to transfer the same 
information to Zumwalt so that Zumwalt can engage it. In both scenarios, these actions 
performed on the radar contact data represent collection, transfer, and usage actions. 
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Collection actions generate radar data from both vessel’s radar systems, and permit one 
vessel to receive data from another. Transfer actions permit one vessel to share its data with 
another. Usage actions permit a vessel to engage the radar contact once the data is within 
its enclave. 
Actions are further described by DL roles. The hasDatum role represents the action’s 
affected datum. The hasActor role indicates the source actor from which the data was 
collected. The hasPurpose role indicates the purpose for which an action is being 
performed. These purposes, in line with the original Bell-LaPadula model, are abstracted as 
high-confidentiality and low-confidentiality. These classes of purpose may be further 
subsumed by any other purpose in order to extend the ontology to fit the policy expressivity 
needs of a specific organizational granularity. 
Finding Conflicts in Policies 
We now describe how the rules governing actions on data may conflict, and how we 
can detect these conflicts automatically. In our DL ontology, a conflict is defined as an 
instance when an action is permitted by one rule, and prohibited by another. Rules 
governing the permission and prohibition of specified actions are described using the 
Application Profile Language, which is parsed by our language parser into Web Ontology 
Language (OWL). OWL can be analyzed automatically by freely available open source DL 
inference engines such as Pellet, Fact++, Racer, and HermiT. These DL reasoning engines 
have historical pedigrees in academic usage for formal analysis (Baader, Horrocks, & 
Sattler, 2005). 
In the DL representation of an application profile, a rule must be determined by the 
reasoning engine as equivalent to both a right (also known as a permission) and a 
prohibition, in order to be found equivalent to a conflict. Both the right and the prohibition 
must act over the same datum and for the same purpose in order to be equivalent. 
An equivalence relationship requires equivalence in both directions, as one might 
find in a mathematical expression (such as 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 =  𝐷𝐷). In some cases, the conflict can only 
be reasoned about with respect to one rule, because reasoning can only occur on “one side” 
of the equivalence operator. This is explained through subsumption. We cannot distinguish 
the rule on the other side of the equivalence as truly involved in a conflict; there may be 
further subsumed interpretations using subclasses which do not conflict. 
Using our running example, we may imagine an application profile which governs 
how Zumwalt is permitted to share radar data that it has collected. In this case, radar data 
contains data about enemies, friendlies, and terrain. In DL, radar data subsumes data about 
enemy vessels, data about terrain, and data about friendly vessels. When radar data 
subsumes these more general concepts of data, radar data is the subclass, and data about 
enemies, terrain, and friendly vessels are the superclasses. The DL reasoning engine must 
reason about all of the superclasses of a datum when reasoning about the subclass, and 
different rules may exist that govern each of these data.  
We instantiate this example with a profile that contains data definitions and a basic 
policy for Zumwalt’s radar and information sharing, seen in Figure 3, and conforming to the 
profile language syntax defined in Breaux et al. (2014). This figure also shows the 
abstraction of Zumwalt’s radar system and information sharing system as actors. On the top 
of the figure are the data definitions that correspond to the header section of the profile. On 
the bottom of the figure is the policy, which is comprised of five rules. Together, the header 
and the profile of a policy comprise a full application profile. Each data definition and rule 
seen in Figure 3 is annotated with the English language representation of the Application 
Profile Language syntax.  
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This profile has been seeded with a conflict that is derived from the intended system 
functionality that would permit Zumwalt to share collected radar data with friendly fleets for 
low confidentiality purposes. The intention of this policy is to provide information sharing on 
this vessel, but this conflicts with an overarching organizational policy that does not allow 
data about friendly vessels to be shared with other friendly vessels. We now describe the 
nature of this conflict and how it is detected by our approach. 
 
 Figure 3. Representing Zumwalt as Two Abstracted System Components 
(Actors), With an Associated Application Profile That Describes the Rules 
That Govern the Data Produced and Transferred by These Actors 
If we write a policy that permits us to share all radar data, but prohibits sharing data 
about friendly vessels, we cannot share all radar data. This is a one-sided conflict. This 
conflict occurs because the relationship between these general data concepts and the 
specific radar data subclass is actually defining a composition rather than a subsumption; 
however, the semantics of the relationship are the same when expressed in this way. As a 
result, we may not be able to reason about the superclass of general data that we have 
defined here, but we can reason about the subclass of radar data, and its relationship with 
friendly data. Superclasses and subclasses are not equivalent, but we can infer enough 
about radar data to know that the policy would still generate a conflict—this reasoning about 
the subclass rather than the superclass is similar to reasoning about one side of an equation 
based on inferences about the other side (hence the name one-sided conflict).  
One-sided conflicts are highlighted by the DL reasoning engine on one rule. This is 
convenient for our purposes because this single rule is the one that must be acted upon 
using the conflict reconciliation methods seen in the next section. The other conflicting rule, 




D collected_radar_data < friendly_data, enemy_data, terrain_data
SPEC POLICY
1 P COLLECT collected_radar_data FROM radar_system FOR high_confidentiality
2 P TRANSFER enemy_data TO friendly_fleet FOR low_confidentiality
3 P TRANSFER collected_radar_data TO friendly_fleet FOR low_confidentiality
4 P TRANSFER friendly_data TO friendly_fleet FOR high_confidentiality
5 R TRANSFER friendly_data TO anyone FOR low_confidentiality
Transmission Mechanism
Radar System
Our collected radar data means the 
collection of friendly data, enemy data, 
and terrain data (which we get from 
the radar system).
We want to permit Zumwalt to use it’s 
transmission mechanism to transfer 
data to third parties that can help 
them engage targets, but we don’t 
want to reveal information about our 
own fleet in case there’s a data spill.
Terrain data is unregulated and can be 
sent to anyone without any policy 
governing it.
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due to the nature of this one-sided conflict. We cannot say for certain whether we should 
perform the reconciliation action on the “other side” of the conflict since we cannot say that it 
conflicts in all possible subsumed interpretations. An example of such a conflict is seen in 
our running example. 
We infer that collection/transfer data flow traces are functionally the same as 
collection/usage traces, in terms of the transitive properties of data. However, given that the 
scope of our analysis is to determine where data spills may occur due to information 
transmission to third parties, collection/usage data flow traces are not relevant. 
Collection/usage flows can only occur within the system bounds of a single party. A party 
may consist of more than one secure enclave. Collection/use traces may still generate 
conflicts, but these conflicts would indicate mismatch of an intended purpose within a secure 
enclave, and do not impose a serious risk of data spills unless there is a separate rule 
permitting the transfer of this datum elsewhere. 
Conflict Reconciliation 
When conflicts arise, we have identified two main strategies which work to match the 
generality of purpose. Matching the level in the class hierarchy of subsumed purposes 
reconciles conflicts in which a more specific high-confidentiality purpose is permitted, but 
more general low-confidentiality purposes are prohibited. This serves to mitigate the 
likelihood that data will be transferred outside of the secure enclave without explicit 
authorization for a specific high-confidentiality purpose. Matching purposes also serves to 
mitigate being mismatched with a third party that will consume (or retransfer) this data for a 
more general purpose, which would constitute a data spill. The reconciliation actions which 
we have identified, redaction and generalization, serve the same purpose as their 
namesakes in legacy document-oriented processes. Both actions serve to transform data in 
such a way that it is permissible to transfer it for low-confidentiality—and therefore more 
general—purposes. 
Redaction 
Redaction means to remove elements from a collection of data in order to limit the 
spread of information that must remain only within the secure enclave for some specified 
purpose. In effect, our conceptualization of redaction in data flows within our process is the 
same. In the context of reconciling conflicts across data flow policies, redaction can be 
performed on any datum which is itself a collection of subsumed data. In our ontology, this 
means the collection is a superclass. This is because the act of redacting data eliminates 
one or more subsumption relationships between the collection datum itself, and the 
subsumed data types. Redaction results in a new, redacted datum which is fit for a more 
general low-confidentiality purpose, as compared to the original datum which was only 
suitable for a specific high-confidentiality purpose. 
As per our running example, Figure 4 shows a basic profile that has been retrofitted 
to permit Zumwalt to share radar data with a third party, which is a friendly fleet. The 
definition for radar data in this instance refers to data about friendly vessels, data about 
enemy vessels, and data about terrain/surface objects, which is expressed through the 
subsumption relationship seen on the left side of Figure 4. Internally, Zumwalt collects this 
radar data within its own secure enclave from the vessel’s onboard radar system, and this 
data is intended for consumption or transfer with an unspecified high confidentiality purpose 
only. It should be noted that in this scenario, the policies which govern consumption of this 
data internal to the Zumwalt are not within the scope of this discussion, as they are not 
related to the risk of data spill during transfer to a third party, and have been left out of the 
profile for simplicity. The area of security interest for our analysis in this scenario is with 
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respect to the requirements that govern how this data may be transferred to third parties 
outside of Zumwalt’s secure enclave, where the risk of data spill does exist.  
 
 Figure 4. Simple Radar Data Sharing Profile for Zumwalt 
Next, we break down the individual rules that are seen in the profile introduced in 
Figure 3. The conflict is highlighted in Figure 4. Here we unravel the conflict and show how 
the redaction mechanism can be applied. First, we show the English language interpretation 
of a rule. Below, we show the application profile language used to express this rule, and the 
corresponding formalization in DL which is generated by our parser. 
1. Permit collection of collected radar data from Zumwalt’s radar system, 
designating it as high-confidentiality data. 
 
2. Permit transfer of data about enemy vessels to friendly fleet members for 

























1 P COLLECT collected_radar_data FROM radar_system FOR high_confidentiality
2 P TRANSFER enemy_data TO friendly_fleet FOR low_confidentiality
3 P TRANSFER collected_radar_data TO friendly_fleet FOR low_confidentiality
4 P TRANSFER friendly_data TO friendly_fleet FOR high_confidentiality
5 R TRANSFER friendly_data TO anyone FOR low_confidentiality
Implicit Policy
Policy 4 Policy 2





Sending friendly fleet data 
is not allowed except with a 
specific high-confidentiality 
purpose...
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3. Permit transfer of all collected radar data to friendly fleet members for 
general, low confidentiality purposes. This rule generates a conflict, which is 
explained below. 
 
4. Permit transfer of data about friendly vessels to friendly fleet members for 
specific, high-confidentiality purposes. 
 
5. Prohibit transfer of friendly fleet data to anyone for general, low confidentiality 
purposes. This rule conflicts with Rule 3, explained below. 
 
Rule 5 works to prevent information about the friendly fleet leaking to third parties. 
This implies that regardless of the target for the data flow, a high-confidentiality purpose 
must be specified to justify friendly fleet data leaving the secure enclave of the Zumwalt. 
This requirement is instantiating a normal compartmentalization strategy for managing the 
flow of information, but this rule is in conflict with the intended new functionality. The 
retrofitted functionality requires the collected radar data to be shared with friendly fleet 
members, since collected radar data has been defined as friendly fleet data, as well as 
enemy fleet data and terrain data. This conflict can be resolved through redaction, as the 
prohibition only restricts the transfer of friendly fleet data for general, low-confidentiality 
purposes. By redacting this datum from its relationship with the collected radar data concept 
(given that it is the superclass for the other three types of data specified), we can define a 
new datum. Redacted radar data only contains enemy fleet data and terrain data, which are 
both unrestricted by purpose to high-confidentiality. The redacted datum may instead be 
used for low-confidentiality purposes as permitted by Rule 2), or implicitly permitted due to 
there being no rule which exists in this profile’s policy that governs the flow of terrain data. 
Thus, the redaction statement syntax appears as follows: 
 
The above syntax represents the original datum to be redacted (linked with the -> 
operator to the new datum definition), the concept in the subsumption relationship to be 
removed from the original datum, and the newly established purpose for the redacted 
datum. This then permits the modified Rule 3 to read as follows, after resolving the conflict: 
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3.  Permit transfer of all redacted radar data to friendly fleet members for 
general, low confidentiality purposes. 
 
There is an alternative conflict resolution approach which is functionally the same as 
redaction, and may be more or less desirable depending on the functional context of the 
requirements. If there had been a high-confidentiality purpose specified for sharing the 
friendly fleet data in Rule 3, then the conflict would not have existed since Rule 5 only 
restricts the transfer of this datum for general low-confidentiality purposes. By narrowing the 
allowable purposes for which the data can be transferred and therefore consumed by a third 
party, the policy expressed in the profile would have been in alignment with the new 
requirements to transfer the radar data. However, there is a strong likelihood that the 
narrower range of purposes permissible for this datum may not be general enough for the 
third party’s intended purpose, especially if they had expressed a broader (low-
confidentiality) intended purpose for the subsumed data. 
A simple scenario which illustrates this case may be that the friendly fleet’s policy 
had intended, by their system’s internal design, to communicate the location of the enemy 
fleet to nearby civilians somehow. This action would still violate Rule 3 with respect to 
Zumwalt’s requirements since the enemy fleet data also includes collected radar data, and 
is therefore subject to being restricted to high-confidentiality purposes only, as low-
confidentiality purposes are prohibited for transferring data. Due to the policy expression 
having deliberately chosen the more inclusive datum concept of all collected radar data, the 
previous resolution is to redact the datum and remove the general relationship with friendly 
fleet data.  
The functionally similar alternative reconciliation is to completely recreate new 
policies which govern the data differently and express prohibitions and permissions uniquely 
for each individual datum concept. This secondary approach, while functionally the same as 
the action of redacting the original datum, may result in lengthy policies which do not gain 
expressiveness over the simpler act of redaction, and does not require completely redefining 
the data entities that are expressed in the original profile. 
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 Figure 5. Transmission of Redacted Datum 
Generalization 
Generalization refers to the process of capturing a broader notion of a concept using 
inferences from a series of specific cases. In this context, generalization refers to the 
process by which a datum is transformed to represent a far broader notion of the original 
information, retaining enough precision to be useful, but not supplying enough precision to 
infer the original data. Examples in common usage include generalizing a position into a 
region, rather than a series of coordinates (such as Pacific Ocean, which is far more 
general, versus 0.0000° S, 160.0000° W, which is far less general) in order to obscure the 
precise location of a fleet by generalizing it to include a much broader area. The level of 
specified measurement precision selected for generalization must be appropriate to the 
datum. The act of performing generalization differs from redaction since the original 
ungeneralized datum cannot be a collection, or the generalization must be performed on all 
members in the collection. Generalization may also not have the same subsumed 
relationships as those applicable to the data undergoing redaction. 
Generalization uses the same conflict resolution mechanism as redaction, in that it 
acts to realign the specified purposes for which a datum may be collected and transferred 
(or collected and used). For example, friendly fleet data such as locations may be 
generalized to express only regions rather than precise coordinates, in order to permit 
usage under low-confidentiality purposes among the collection of other data, as seen in 
Figure 4. In doing so, the superclass of what constitutes collected radar data is modified, 
and all subclasses in the collection which have been expressed already in the profile 
become permissible for use with low-confidentiality purposes. This is because friendly fleet 
data, enemy fleet data, and terrain data have all been generalized under this reconciliation 
strategy; each datum that is part of the superclass has been transformed and redefined as a 
new datum. These new data are implicitly permitted for transfer under general low-
confidentiality purposes, just as terrain data had already been permitted without 



















D redacted_radar_data < 
enemy_fleet_data, terrain_data
SPEC POLICY
1 P COLLECT collected_radar_data FROM radar_system FOR high_confidentiality
2 P TRANSFER enemy_data TO friendly_fleet FOR low_confidentiality
REDACT(collected_radar_data -> redacted_radar_data, friendly_data, 
low_confidentiality)
3 P TRANSFER redacted_radar_data TO friendly_fleet FOR low_confidentiality
4 P TRANSFER friendly_data TO friendly_fleet FOR high_confidentiality
5 R TRANSFER friendly_data TO anyone FOR low_confidentiality
Implicit Policy
Policy 2
Now our purposes 
are in alignment.
Now our purposes 
are in alignment.
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Merging: Undoing Redaction and Generalization 
Aside from simple differences in interpretation of policies and the conflicts that may 
result, our findings show that designers may accidentally introduce conflicts through actions 
that transfer data with mismatching purposes to those of their third party collector (or vice-
versa) in order to realize system requirements that do not obviously conflict. This may occur 
in instances where the original design of a system did not consider collections of data to be 
usable as separate data when removed from the collection, as in our running example with 
collected radar data. In this example, the nature of the separate data in the collection was 
obscured by the subsumption relationship. The purpose of data which is combined from 
separate data can also be obscured. Merging disjoint data for more general purposes can 
create a new single datum that should only be used for the same generality of purpose as 
the original separate data. If this data is used for a more general purpose than any of those 
originally specified for any of the recombinant parts, there is a risk of repurposing data in a 
way that violates the original intention of the policy, which can lead to data spills. In our 
methodology, we define this act as merging, which requires two or more data to be used in 
conjunction with one another to create a new datum. 
Given the transitive nature of data, and the inability to reason about data which 
moves past the designed system boundary of the protected enclave, proactive security 
assumptions must be made such that possible recombination of data may occur in any 
instance in which data has been transferred outside of the enclave for a general low-
confidentiality purpose. This transfer and its associated risk of recombination with other data 
holds that the data may possibly be used for any similarly low-confidentiality purpose in 
conjunction with all other data of the same level of purpose. Conversely, if a datum is 
transferred for a specific high-confidentiality purpose, it may not be used for a low-
confidentiality purpose without violating a policy or generating a conflicting requirement that 
must be reconciled. 
The merge act combines one or more related data to create a new datum. This new 
datum may be equivalent to a datum originally specified for a high-confidentiality purpose, 
but had been previously redacted. The outcome of a merge act may yield more information 
than the original high-confidentiality purpose of a constituent data point. For example, a 
datum describing the position of a destroyer fleet at a time T only has the power to assert 
that the fleet was at that position at that time, which may be sufficient for some specific low-
confidentiality purpose, such as establishing a point of rendezvous during a fleet maneuver. 
However, possessing additional data about the position of a fleet at time 𝑇𝑇 + 1, 𝑇𝑇 + 2 and so 
on can yield sufficient information to determine the previous bearing of the fleet and/or the 
likely future course of the fleet. This additional information may be restricted to a higher 
confidentiality purpose than was unintended for the data by its original specification, which 
could serve to mitigate the likelihood of merging this data without a specified high-
confidentiality purpose. Generalization of this data may also serve as a countermeasure for 
this merging, since less precise coordinate data at all of these times would render an 
adversary unable to track the fleet precisely enough for the data to be useful. Increasing the 
amount of data points that are merged together in this basic example can further increase 
the precision or predictive power for a determination of the fleet’s movements, even in the 
presence of course corrections or evasive maneuvers which attempt to obscure the true 
intent of the fleet. This may also counteract the generalization strategy if some data points 
have been generalized while others have not, because the data flows transferring 
generalized data versus the ungeneralized data had low- and high-confidentiality purposes 
specified, respectively. 
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The same reasoning applies to other compositions of data with different information, 
even including the data that are not time sensitive. For example, determining the individual 
composition and outfitting of an individual ship in a fleet may yield only some tactical 
information about how Zumwalt’s executive officer may assay it as a single threat in 
isolation. However, finding similar data about all ships in a fleet and combining this 
information into a newly merged report about the whole fleet configuration may yield 
important clues about the strategic significance and intent of the fleet, far beyond the original 
tactical information of any one given ship’s threat. 
In order to shield against an adversary performing this same merging of disjoint 
information to their advantage, the DoD must safeguard against the likelihood that data 
flows with specific purposes are repurposed for more general, low-confidentiality purposes. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that similarly purposed data flows may be merged. 
Merge-related conflicts may be detected by determining the generality of the purpose 
in which data is transferred outside of the secure enclave and to a third party, which is a 
typical IA strategy. One general principle of IA strategy is that information should be 
disseminated on a need-to-know basis (based on the purpose of its usage, as per Bell-
LaPadula), and those who do not need to know will not receive the data in question. Tracing 
data flows and matching the generality of the specified purpose is key to determine if a 
datum may be used for a different purpose elsewhere. Recall the example seen in Figure 5: 
If the friendly fleet had seen fit to recompose the original, non-redacted radar data using the 
redacted radar data in conjunction with the terrain data and enemy fleet data that they 
received, Zumwalt’s data sharing policy would be in violation due to the friendly fleet’s 
merge action. 
Sending data for a specific, high-confidentiality purpose means that the collection 
actions that correspond to a datum’s transfer from the perspective of a third party must also 
match our high-confidentiality purpose, as must all subsumed classes of data related to the 
datum in question. If there is a mismatch in purpose, then there is a risk that any of the 
subsumed data may be repurposed for a more general purpose, which then increases the 
risk that it will be recombined with other subsumed data for the same superclass. This 
mismatch is in itself a conflict, as it violates the specified purposes expressed in the profile, 
and can be identified in the model by using our conflict detection methodology. This 
pinpoints the specific policies that are in conflict, and these policies become the subject of 
our conflict reconciliation strategies. 
Evaluation and Identifying Recertification Triggers 
Based on our running example, we surmise that conflicts may arise as a result of 
unintended or implied actions in a profile designer’s expression of data as a collection, 
which we see as a direct result of the new requirements imposed by new system 
functionality. Designers may express policies without having considered the individual 
elements in collections and the implications of adding new features that require usage at a 
different level of purpose than the original specification. In our running example, the original 
definition of collected radar data and the prohibition of sharing any data about friendly 
vessels implicitly did not consider that some future requirement would need this data to be 
shared with a third party. This conflict arises as a result of developing profiles that meet 
current system IA requirements, as well as functional requirements, but these profiles may 
not be useful as functional requirements change. Over time, operational requirements 
change, system designs change, and each of these changes may be unpredictable but still 
necessitates re-evaluation. Therefore, we must evaluate the effectiveness of our approach 
in terms of conflicts that can be identified and reconciled based on these changes. 
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We have identified that conflicts may result from overlapping organizational 
granularities expressed on one profile, and these conflicts must be reconciled. We have also 
identified that conflicts may result from changes in the intended functionality for a system 
governed by its profile’s policy. Recertification is then triggered by the reconciliation of these 
conflicts because they necessarily result in further changes to the profile beyond those 
originally introduced by new functionality. We assert that the recertification triggers are those 
actions that change a system’s profile sufficiently to merit reanalysis of the policies 
expressed. These actions include (but are not limited to) the addition of new features, 
modification of an existing behavior or feature requiring new connectors to outside parties, 
and modifying an existing connection to an outside party to serve a new purpose.  
Our running example suggests that adding a new feature to a system is likely the 
most obvious recertification trigger, as it is functionally the same as modifying existing 
behaviors, and may also involve new connectors to outside systems for which data flows 
must be analyzed. In the case of Zumwalt introducing new functionality for its radar and 
information sharing systems, we could see that conflicts arose because of the mismatch in 
intended purposes for the previous policy which prohibited sharing of data about friendly 
vessels. This conflicted with the intended new functionality to share radar data with a 
friendly fleet, because the original policy was not intended for this functionality given the 
collection of friendly, enemy, and terrain data within collected radar data. Under 
circumstances such as these, the conflicts can be reconciled using the strategies we have 
defined, and profiles can be rapidly re-evaluated using our tool. Any new conflicts that arise 
may be reconciled using the same strategies until all of the conflicts are eliminated. Under 
this approach, potential conflicts that lead to data spill risks can be reasoned about prior to 
the development of the components which act as recertification triggers, or may be 
remediated if they are found after they have been instantiated as part of a new design or 
upgrade. 
Scalability Evaluation 
We must also evaluate our approach in terms of its efficient application and 
scalability to increasingly large profiles. In order to determine whether this approach is 
computationally scalable for extremely large compositions of systems, a performance 
simulation was conducted. This simulation was used to determine how much time was 
required for the language and DL reasoning engine to reason over profiles and detect 
conflicts, based on the size of the profiles. The simulation was designed to examine a much 
larger number of requirement statements than the simplified 5-rule profiles used in our 
running example, and strived to simulate profiles that would be as large as existing systems’ 
requirements. Previous case studies showed that the number of rules in a policy that we 
would expect to see in an integrated service scenario in commercial civilian applications is 
approximately 144 statements, so this provided a basis for determining the extent to which 
our simulation should scale, but no relative measure for performance.  
We held the number of concepts and individuals constant and varied the number of 
rules to determine the time required to reason over the entire profile as the size of the profile 
increased. The scalability of our approach is largely dependent on the DL inference engine 
used to analyze the OWL ontology, rather than the tools which parse the Application Profile 
Language syntax. For the purposes of our study, we used the HermiT reasoning engine, as 
previous studies had shown it to have the fastest performance (Breaux et al., 2014) 
compared to other contemporaries (such as Pellet, Fact++, and Racer).  
Our simulation results suggest that the parsing process, reasoning process, and 
output occurs expediently enough to claim that it scales quasi-linearly to analysis of profiles 
involving hundreds of data flows, and hundreds of rules. Our simulations show that even the 
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largest profiles within our test dataset could be analyzed in under 400 seconds. We expect 
that this would be sufficiently little time to permit modification and reanalysis of similar 
profiles several times in rapid succession. However, with no point of comparison with other 
tools that perform this functionality, we have no objective basis for which to determine the 
impact of our performance claims. We can only conjecture that for most purposes, it would 
be sufficient to be able to reanalyze a real profile of corresponding size to our largest 
simulated profiles three times within one hour, and use this as a baseline for our 
performance analysis. This conjecture is based on the fact that that there is substantial 
cognitive load on the analyst to determine the correct conflict reconciliation approach for the 
given conflicts they encounter. However, these claims may be substantiated better in 
controlled experiments that quantify the amount of time required to instantiate each conflict 
resolution strategy, in order to validate this conjecture and substantiate the overall impact of 
our performance claim. An exploration of similar methodologies may also yield a point of 
comparison for the relative speed of our approach. 
Simulations were performed in groups of 27 repetitions, in which an ontology was 
randomly generated as a result of a syntactically accurate minimal profile that expresses 
generic data definitions and purposes. This profile would have no semantic meaning to an 
analyst since it does not express concepts within the true problem space of IA requirements, 
but it is valuable for performance analysis and simulations of the reasoning process since it 
is structurally similar to real profiles and can be easily varied in size. For profiles of this kind, 
there appears to be a proportionally increasing probability of a conflict arising to the number 
of requirement statements and individuals specified in each profile. We found that there is a 
relationship of approximately 1.13 conflicts found for each increment in the number of rules 
expressed in the simulated profile for profiles containing greater than 15 rules. This 
relationship is visible in Figure 8, which is a scatterplot that shows that the number of 
conflicts increases quasi-linearly with respect to the size of the profile. There does not 
appear to be a direct correlation between the reasoning times required and the number of 
conflicts found within the reasoning process; using Pearson’s correlation, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship found with  {𝐷𝐷(874) =  .36,𝑝𝑝 >  .05}. Sixteen data types 
were used uniformly across all simulations, and simulation groups ran with increasing 
numbers of statements (an increase of two statements for odd numbered runs, and three 
statements for even numbered runs) from three statements up to 80 statements. The 
number of actors specified was random and increased proportionally to the number of 
statements, beginning from two with a maximum of 113, with mean of 59 and standard 
deviation of 24. 
Figure 7 is a scatterplot graphing the increasing size of profiles versus the time 
required to reason over them. The figure shows that there is a proportional relationship 
between the time required to reason over the profile and the profile size (which is also the 
size of the OWL ontology), but aside from some outliers, the largest proportion of reasoning 
time required remained below 400 seconds even as the number of security requirements 
increased. Minor outliers appear to be a result of increased conflicts, and extreme outliers 
may be explained by aberrations in the time measurements resulting from changes in the 
proportion of processor time allocated to our test environment versus background processes 
on the same system, rather than the structure of the ontology or the speed of the tool itself. 
Parsing an entire profile requires less than one second on average. The major portion of the 
end-to-end processing time is devoted to HermiT’s automated reasoning and final output of 
the detected conflicts. 
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Note. Arrows represent the subsumption relationships between concepts seen in the 
ontology. This ontology corresponds to the policy seen in Figure 4’s profile. Mechanically 
reasoning over this ontology using a DL reasoning engine permits us to determine where 
permissions and prohibitions acting on the same (or subsumed) data conflict. 
 Figure 6. A Simple DL Ontology, Showing 5 Rules, Consisting of 4 Permissions 
(p), One Prohibition (r), and 3 Datum Definitions  
In large profiles, there may be hundreds of conflicting requirements. In the presence 
of hundreds of rules, any collection/usage, or collection/transfer rule pair may increase the 
likelihood of a conflict. Each conflict must be identified and reconciled in order to mitigate the 
risk of a data spill. Without automation to find and analyze these conflicts automatically, 
there is a far more substantial risk that they will be overlooked by humans due to the effort 
and repetition required to analyze these policies manually. Manual analysis is a long and 
tedious process that quickly becomes intractable for humans even with small numbers of 
policies analyzed in isolation. This process necessitates mechanical analysis and 
automation, only possible through formal analysis using the supporting software tools. An 
example visualization of the complexity of profile ontologies can be seen in Figure 6, which 
visualizes five rules and three datum definitions, using the Protégé ontology visualization 
tool from Stanford University and the University of Manchester. This visualization is the 
same profile seen in our running example. In order to manually analyze this ontology without 
tool support, analysts would need to cross-reference each prohibition rule with each 
permission rule to determine if they acted on the same datum. Then, this subset would need 
to be examined to see if the prohibitions restricted an action that existed in one of the 
 
P COLLECT collected_radar_data 
FROM radar_system FOR 
high_confidentiality
P TRANSFER enemy_data 
TO friendly_fleet FOR 
low_confidentiality
P TRANSFER collected_radar_data TO 
friendly_fleet FOR 
low_confidentiality
P TRANSFER friendly_data TO 
friendly_fleet FOR 
high_confidentiality
R TRANSFER friendly_data TO 
anyone FOR low_confidentiality
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 286 - 
permissions. That same analysis would need to be repeated for each subsumed concept 
that existed for each datum, and for each purpose. 
Table 1. Scalability Analysis Summary 
 
 
 Figure 7. Plotting the Number of Security Requirements in the Profile vs. the 
Amount of Time (in Seconds) Required to Reason Over the Entire Profile 
(and Its Resultant DL Ontology) 
 
Note. There is a clear proportional relationship with few outliers. 
 Figure 8. Plotting the Number of Requirements Expressed vs. the Number of 
Conflicts Detected in a Simulated Profile 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we recounted our methodology for performing rapid recertification tasks 
using formal analysis with our Application Profile Language. Our approach to automated 
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conflict detection was detailed. Based on this methodology, we identified three conflict 
reconciliation strategies that may be employed to resolve detected conflicts, and illustrated 
the process with a running example.  
In our future work, we plan to extend the automation in our tool to provide automated 
recommendations to analysts for employing these conflict reconciliation strategies on 
existing profiles. We also plan to perform further performance analysis in order to objectively 
characterize the time savings gained by using this tool versus manual processes, and 
emerging formal analysis methods. 
References 
Baader, F., Horrocks, I., & Sattler, U. (2005). Description logics as ontology languages for 
the semantic web. In F. Baader, I. Horrocks, & U. Sattler, Mechanizing mathematical 
reasoning (pp. 228–248). Berlin, Germany: Springer. 
Bechhofer, S., van Harmelen, F., Hendler, J., Horrocks, I., McGuinness, D. L., Patel-
Schneider, P. F., & Stein, L. A. (2004, February 10). OWL Web Ontology Language. 
Retrieved from W3C Reccomendation website: http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref/  
Bell, D. E. (2005). Looking back at the Bell-LaPadula model. Proceedings of the 21st Annual 
Computer Security Applications Conference, 337–351. 
Breaux, T., Anton, A., & Doyle, J. (2008). Semantic parameterization: A process for 
modeling domain descriptions. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering 
Methodology, 1–44. 
Breaux, T. D., Hibshi, H., & Rao, A. (2014). Eddy, a formal language for specifying and 
analyzing data flow specifications for conflicting privacy requirements. Requirements 
Engineering, 281–307. 
Brooks, F. P. (1995). “No silver bullet” refired. In The Mythical Man Month. Retrieved from 
Addison-Wesley. 
Landwehr, C. (1981). Formal models for computer security. New York, NY: Association for 
Computing Machinery. 
Lynxworks. (2007). GE Fanuc Embedded Systems selected by Raytheon for Zumwalt Class 
Destroyer Program. Retrieved from 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20070725005359/en/GE-Fanuc-Embedded-
Systems-Selected-Raytheon-Zumwalt#.VTACepPGqEw  
O’Neil, W. D. (2007). The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy. 
O’Rourke, R. (2012). Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer programs: Background and 
issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Tolley, A. L., & Ball, J. E. (2014). Dual-Band Radar development: From engineering design 
to production. NAVSEA Leading Edge, 7(2), 53–61. 
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 288 - 
Panel 19. Factors Influencing the Selection of 
Contracting Strategies 
Thursday, May 14, 2015 
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: Elliott Branch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and 
Procurement 
Antecedents and Consequences of Federal Bid Protests 
Tim Hawkins, Western Kentucky University 
Michael J. Gravier, Bryant University 
E. Cory Yoder, NPS 
Avoiding Terminations, Single Offer Competition, and Costly Change 
Orders With Fixed-Price Contracts 
Andrew Hunter, CSIS 
Gregory Sanders, CSIS 
Alexander Lobkovsky Meitiv, CSIS 
Price Analysis on Commercial Item Purchases Within the Department of the 
Navy 
Janie Maddox, NPS 
Paul Fox, NPS 
Dr. Ralucca Gera, NPS 
Elliott Branch—is the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and Procurement) in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). He is the 
senior career civilian responsible for acquisition and contracting policy that governs the operation of 
the Navy’s worldwide, multibillion-dollar acquisition system. Branch is the principal civilian advisor to 
the Navy Acquisition Executive and serves as the Department of the Navy’s Competition Advocate 
General for procurement matters and is the community leader of the Navy’s contracting workforce. 
Prior to joining the Navy Acquisition Executive staff, Branch was the first civilian director of contracts 
at the Naval Sea Systems Command. In that role, he led one of the largest and most complex 
procurement organizations in the federal government. As the senior civilian for contracting at 
NAVSEA, Branch was responsible for the contractual oversight of the nation’s most complex 
shipbuilding and weapons systems procurement programs. His duties involved the obligation and 
expenditure of approximately $25 billion annually. He is a member of the Senior Executive Service 
(SES). Members of the SES serve in the key positions just below the top presidential appointees. 
They are the major link between these appointees and the rest of the federal work force. SES 
members operate and oversee nearly every government activity in approximately 75 agencies. 
Branch spent time in the private sector, where he specialized in acquisition and project management 
education, training and consulting for the federal workforce and its associated contractors. In this role, 
Branch was responsible for the design, development, delivery and maintenance for a wide variety of 
course material ranging from project management to contract law. Branch’s clients included 
Computer Sciences Corporation, QSS Group, BAE Systems, the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice and State. Prior to that, he served as 
the chief procurement officer for the Government of the District of Columbia, where he was the 
agency head responsible for procurement operations, policy, and for formulating legislative proposals 
for local and congressional consideration. Branch led a staff of over 200 employees that supported 
over 40 city agencies, administered a $14 million annual operating budget, and oversaw the 
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member of the SES as the director, Shipbuilding Contracts Division, at NAVSEA. He next served as 
executive director, Acquisition and Business Management for DoN, responsible for policy and 
oversight of contract operations throughout the entire Navy. While in this position, he also served as 
project executive officer, Acquisition Related Business Systems. In this role, he was responsible for 
the formulation and execution of a multi-year effort transforming the Navy’s acquisition system from a 
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Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award, two 
Presidential Rank Awards for Meritorious Executive, and the Vice Presidential Hammer Award for 
Reinventing Government.
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Abstract 
The fear of receiving a bid protest is said to affect acquisition strategies, yet it has not been 
empirically explored. Based on the Public Value Framework and interviews with contracting 
personnel, this research tests a model of antecedents to and consequences of the fear of a 
protest. Survey data was obtained from a sample of 350 contracting personnel. The fear of 
protest is mitigated by having sufficient procurement lead time and by source selection 
competence, and increased by protest risk. Fear of protest increases compromised technical 
evaluations, added procurement lead time, and transaction costs, while it decreases 
contracting officer authority and is associated with source selection method 
inappropriateness. Compromised technical evaluations, in turn, decrease contractor 
performance while contracting officer authority increases contractor performance. Thus, 
findings suggest that fear of protests affect acquisition strategy decisions, which, in turn, 
affect contractor performance. The research concludes with several managerial implications, 
study limitations, and future research directions. 
Research Issue 
Seemingly, the rate of errors in acquisition procedures is increasing since the 
quantity of bid protests received each year is increasing. In 2009, 1,989 protest cases were 
filed across the federal government. Of those protest cases that made it to a decision (i.e., 
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the few that were not dismissed, settled, or withdrawn), only 18% were sustained, but 45% 
of all protest cases were effective (either sustained or resulted in corrective action by the 
agency prior to decision). In 2013, 2,429 protest cases were filed; 17% were sustained, and 
43% were effective. When accounting for the number of contract actions awarded (i.e., the 
protest opportunity), the number of protests increased from 2011 to 2013 (from 0.014% to 
0.018% of contract actions including delivery orders). 
Bid protests come with monetary and non-monetary costs. An agency must incur 
costs to prevent a potential bid protest (e.g., thoroughly documenting and substantiating 
proposal evaluations and trade-off decisions), to defend against an actual protest lodged, 
and to take corrective actions. The end users bear costs as well, since their requirements 
are delayed or go unfulfilled. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition workforce seemingly believes that it is 
important to avoid protests. This desire to avoid a protest is the driving force behind 
acquisition decisions, internal and external policies, and resources applied to mitigate the 
threat of a protest. Evidence suggests that agencies sometimes change their acquisition 
strategies due to fear of protests. For example, fear of a protest could prompt officials to try 
to structure a contract in a manner they deem less likely to be protested, such as using a 
lowest-price, technically-acceptable (LPTA) source selection method instead of a full 
tradeoff (Schwartz et al., 2013). Other reactions include awarding more contracts than 
intended to avoid a protest (e.g., Littoral Combat Ship). While scholars and the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) have identified these deleterious effects of bid protests on the 
government (Gordon, 2013), no research to date has quantified them. Specifically, we do 
not know the magnitude of fear of protests. Neither do we know the extent that fear of a 
protest affects acquisition strategies nor the lengths that acquisition professionals will go to 
avoid a protest. 
Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this research is to quantify the magnitude of protest fear, and to 
explore the antecedents and consequences of protest fear. The research questions 
addressed include the following: 
• Do bid protests lead to sub-optimal acquisition strategy decisions? 
• Do bid protests affect source selections? 
• If yes, does contractor performance suffer? 
• How are contracting officers’ authorities affected? 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Fear of a protest is understandable. Significant time is consumed addressing a 
protest. High dollar contracts, in particular, hold great interest to media and elected officials. 
A protest would reflect negatively on the contracting official as well as the contracting and 
program offices. There may be an element of shame if a source selection is protested, 
particularly if there is a notion that management would not support the contracting officers 
and that the protest may reflect poorly on them. With these concerns in the back of a 
contracting officer’s mind, there can be a tendency to take measures in order to avoid a 
protest that can sub-optimize source selection decisions and outcomes. For example, the 
contracting officer may rely too heavily on the LPTA method rather than utilizing a full 
tradeoff approach. The motivations and reactions to fear of protest can be better understood 
by applying the public value framework (PVF). 
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Public Value Framework 
PVF was introduced by Harvard professor Mark H. Moore and has been used to 
evaluate and identify value in, mainly, the public sector. Value in the public sector is much 
different than it is in the private sector. Often in the private sector, industry uses shareholder 
value as a means of evaluating itself. The public sector, however, is much different. The 
PVF has been utilized to “get public managers thinking about what is most valuable in the 
service that they run and to consider how effective management can make the service the 
best that it can be” (Coats & Passmore, 2008, p. 4). 
The PVF can be explained by the strategic triangle (Heymann, 1987; Moore, 1995). 
The three elements are public value, legitimacy support, and operational capability. In 
contrast to private sector operations, the government’s strategy does not revolve around a 
specific bottom line, such as shareholder wealth. Contracting professionals are often 
satisfying multiple stakeholders such as regulatory requirements (e.g., the FAR), internal 
customers, the private sector, and the taxpaying public. The first element, public value, 
“directs managerial attention to the value proposition that guides the organization. For an 
enterprise to succeed in producing value, the leaders of the enterprise have to have a story, 
or an account, of what value or purposes that the organization is pursuing. They need a 
reason for the organization’s existence, a claim about the way in which the world would be 
made better through the operations of the enterprise” (Moore, 2000, p. 197). In essence, 
value in a governmental organization equates to mission. Contracting officers add value by 
connecting capable suppliers to internal organizations in need of quality goods and services. 
Legitimacy and support “directs managerial attention to the question of where the 
support for pursuing the value will come from. It is not enough that an entrepreneurial leader 
judges some purposes to be valuable. Others, who provide the necessary financial 
resources and authorization, have to agree with that judgment. In government, those others 
include citizens, elected representatives, interest groups, and the media, which has been 
called the “authorizing environment” of the organization (Moore, 2000, p. 198). 
Finally, operational capacity  
focuses attention on the question of whether sufficient know-how and 
capability exist to achieve the desired results. Often, this capability lies 
entirely in the organization that the manager leads. However, sometimes it 
lies outside the organization’s boundary, and the organization has to find 
ways to engage capacities beyond its own to achieve the desired result by 
creating partnerships of various kinds. (Moore, 2000, p. 198)  
Contracting professionals add value by helping to meet the operational needs of the 
government and, at the same time, provide fairness and address the various public policy 
issues that are required by law and regulation. When these align, customers receive what 
they require at a fair and reasonable price, and this satisfies the requirements of governing 
policies. Through this, government contracting professionals add value to all of their 
stakeholders. Contracting officers sometimes take steps throughout the acquisition process 
to avoid a protest, such as minimizing discussions or even employing an LPTA source 
selection process when a full tradeoff method is more appropriate (Gordon, 2013, pp. 36–
37). When this occurs, the contracting system is not optimizing its value. 
Contracting officers are also accountable to provide fairness to commercial entities 
with which they contract for goods and services. Often, though, a fear of a bid protest will 
result in awarding more contracts than would have been awarded if there was no fear of a 
bid protest. In multiple-award contracts, there is a minimum dollar value that the government 
is obligated to pay (as consideration). This results in increased spending of taxpayer money 
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that could have been more efficiently spent by awarding to fewer, more competitive 
contractors. For example, the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG; 2009a) found that under the 
Navy’s Seaport-E program, the Navy awarded 1,279 contracts for professional services, yet 
975 (75.6%) never received a task order. Each of these contracts required either a $10,000 
or $2,500 minimum obligation. Added contracts also create extra work for the contracting 
officer to administer, duplicate inventory, can increase transportation costs, result in non-
optimal use of taxpayer money, and often upset contractors who never get an award under 
a multiple award contract. Although a reduced risk of a protest is accomplished, ultimately 
less value is added by the contracting process. What this does not accomplish is a best 
option for the customer or the taxpayer, nor does it provide fairness to the stronger 
contractors. 
Antecedents to Fear of Protest 
Sufficiency of Planned Procurement Administrative Lead Time:  
Sufficient planned procurement administrative lead time (PALT) represents the 
extent to which adequate time is allotted to accomplish a source selection. Insufficient PALT 
is often the result of funding constraints that occur toward the end of the fiscal year. 
Expedited requirements and poor planning are common reasons that can lead to insufficient 
PALT. Failure to allocate sufficient lead time to properly define requirements (Hawkins et al., 
2011)—evaluation criteria, and instructions to offerors; train the technical evaluators; 
evaluate proposals; document evaluations and tradeoffs; and prepare for and brief decision-
makers—makes protestable errors more likely to occur. Sufficient time bolsters acquisition 
team capability to perform a source selection: “Time has become a major variable in the 
typical buyer’s decision process of choosing a supplier” (Hansen, 2009, p. 234). 
PVF’s operational capability experiences a positive relationship with sufficient 
procurement time. Time affords the ability for acquisition teams to apply their knowledge and 
skills; absent sufficient time, operational capability is constrained. Therefore, it is posited 
that 
H1: Insufficient PALT is positively related to fear of protest. 
Contracting Officer Competence: 
PVF holds that operational capability is necessary in order for government activities 
to deliver value. Operational capability represents the requisite knowledge, skills, and 
abilities—all of which develops with experience. The more experience a contracting officer 
has, the less concern of a protest there should be since the individual has acquired more 
knowledge in techniques and practices to prevent bid protests and prevail in the event of a 
protest. Buyer experience has been found to affect government procurement processes 
(Hawkins & Muir, 2014). 
Time spent in a competency correlates strongly with self-reported proficiency levels 
in that competency (Federal Acquisition Institute [FAI], 2012). Econom (2006) argued that 
federal agencies must consider contract management as a core competency because the 
functions performed by third-party contractors are often essential in successfully achieving 
organizational goals. She concluded that the success of acquisition organizations is largely 
dependent on hiring personnel who possess the right mix of skills, abilities, experience, and 
training. Other studies have also found that the right mix of experience and competency is 
critical to achieving contract performance outcomes (United States Merit Systems Protection 
Board, 2005). Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
H2: The greater a contracting officer’s competence, the lower the fear of 
protest. 
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Consequences of Fear of Protest 
Compromised Technical Evaluation: Evaluation factors and significant sub-factors 
must (1) represent the key areas of importance and emphasis to be considered in the 
source selection decision; and (2) support meaningful comparison and discrimination 
between and among competing proposals (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 
15.304(b)).  Agencies must evaluate the proposals and assess their relative qualities 
based only on the factors and sub-factors specified in the request for proposal (RFP; 
Rumbaugh, 2010). Deviations from the strict language defining the meaning of factors and 
sub-factors can invite protests. Technical evaluators often do not understand or appreciate 
this constraint. In the PVF terms, poorly trained or technical evaluators unknowledgeable in 
source selections inhibit the agency’s operational capability. Exacerbating this problem are 
cases in which evaluators assessing proposals are not the same individuals who defined the 
meaning of the factors and sub-factors, leading technical evaluators to develop their own 
interpretation or agenda. 
For these reasons, the contracting officer, legal advisor, and contracts committee 
advisors often require numerous, meticulous changes to precise wording of evaluations. 
Definitions of the factors or sub-factors may not account for meaningful distinctions, or 
evaluators are constrained on what they can say in the evaluation even though the point 
otherwise intended may make a meaningful distinction between offers. Additionally, often 
this phenomenon reflects a lack of foresight—sometimes preventable, sometimes not. 
Sometimes, only upon evaluation of proposals is the distinction illuminated. At this point, the 
source selection team must weigh a delay in the schedule with the benefit of changing the 
definition of factors or sub-factors to account for the meaningful distinction, and allow 
offerors time to revise their proposals. Often, however, the customer is not willing to delay 
the source selection, and the sub-factors are not revised. Therefore, it is posited that 
H3: Fear of protest is positively related to compromised technical evaluations.  
Source Selection Method Appropriateness:  
Competitive formal source selections may follow one of several methods—lowest-
price, technically-acceptable (LPTA), price-performance tradeoff (PPT), or a full tradeoff. 
According to FAR 15.101-2, the LPTA source selection process is appropriate when best 
value is expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the 
lowest evaluated price. There are many reasons why a contracting officer might opt for the 
LPTA method. One major benefit of this strategy is that the agency can greatly shorten the 
evaluation process because once the low price proposal has been found to be technically 
acceptable, there is no need to evaluate the acceptability of any other proposals (Cibinic et 
al., 2011, p. 680). The source selection method appropriateness depends on the 
requirement and the buying situation. Generally, the greater the performance risk, criticality 
of the requirement’s successful delivery to the agency’s mission, dollar value, environmental 
dynamism, uncertain requirements, and complexity, the more important contractor 
performance becomes and the less critical cost/price become. In these cases, an agency 
may decide that the best-value offer is determined by a full tradeoff of price and non-price 
factors. A full tradeoff process is appropriate when it may be in the best interest of the 
government to consider an award to a company other than the lowest-priced offeror or other 
than the highest technically rated offeror (FAR 15.101-1).  
But, agencies may not select the source selection method that is best suited to the 
requirement and the buying situation. Today’s budget-constrained environment may 
influence managers to prefer LPTA over a full tradeoff. Managers may also wish to avoid a 
protest, in which case the LPTA method is clearly the lower-risk alternative. In fact, Air Force 
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acquisition leaders, following several bid protests and failed attempts to acquire a new 
tanker aircraft, seriously considered an LPTA method for a multi-billion-dollar weapon 
system (Pocock, 2009). Finally, quite often managers prioritize the contract award date (i.e., 
PALT) over due diligence in contractor selection (Hawkins, 2012). Therefore, we posit that 
H4: Fear of protest is negatively related to source selection method 
appropriateness. 
Added PALT:  
Naturally, as the concern over a protest grows, acquisition teams take added 
measures to prevent them. This is often manifested in increased reviews resulting in 
increased iterations of source selection documents such as source selection plans, requests 
for proposals, technical evaluations, small business strategy, comparative analyses, briefing 
charts, source selection decision documents, and evaluation notices to offerors—just to 
name a few. These revisions consume time during the source selection. Additionally, a 
conservative stance may result in added rounds of discussions to clear up all proposal 
deficiencies and weaknesses—a concept referred to as technical leveling. Conservatism 
may also result in retaining otherwise non-competitive offerors in the competitive range, 
adding time to negotiate with and to evaluate another offer. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
H5: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the 
added PALT. 
Contracting Officer Authority:  
Contracting officers uniquely hold authority to enter into, administer, and terminate 
contracts. They are the only individuals authorized to bind the U.S. government. Contracting 
officers are responsible for (1) ensuring that all the necessary actions for effective 
contracting are accomplished, (2) ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, and 
(3) safeguarding the interests of the U.S. government in its contractual relationships. In 
terms of the Public Value Framework, the role of the contracting officer is to exercise his or 
her authority, thereby protecting the various stakeholders’ interests (e.g., taxpayer, 
contractor, government, internal customers). In this capacity, the contracting officer 
reinforces legitimacy support.  
While contracting officers must request and consider the advice of specialists (e.g., 
law, engineering, finance, etc.), ultimately, decisions within their purview are their 
responsibility (FAR 1.602-2). Upon receipt of a protest, legal counsel must divert time and 
effort to defend the agency’s actions. Thus, legal counsel reviews the many iterations of the 
multitude of source selection documents to ensure legal sufficiency, compliance to 
regulations and policies, and to mitigate the risks of protests. With the consequences at 
stake, such as setting precedent, reputation, and invested time, legal counsel is typically 
conservative in attempting to prevent a bid protest. Since legal counsel brings their own 
unique legal authority and professional expertise, contracting officers and acquisition 
managers rely heavily on its opinions and recommendations. One interviewee shared, “We 
almost never move forward unless they [legal] give us their okay. It would be very, very 
hard—very challenging.” This comment alludes to the influence of legal counsel on 
acquisition and unit leaders. Contracting officers are likely to yield their decision-making 
discretion (e.g., removing an offeror from the competitive range) when legal counsel 
disagrees with them. Thus, legal counsel, in its advisory role, subtly, yet strongly, affects the 
contracting officer’s authority through its opinions and recommendations.  
Other parties impose a similar phenomenon on contracting officers’ decision 
authority. For example, higher ranking contracts committee members and leaders may also 
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hold opinions on a particular source selection matter that are contrary to that of the 
contracting officer. In such cases, contracting officers may perceive unwritten career 
implications to making contrarian decisions. Thus, although certain statutory authority 
resides with the contracting officer, the reality is that such authority is yielded in practice. As 
protest risk—and thus, fear of a protest—grows, so does the involvement of legal counsel, 
other reviewing parties, and acquisition leaders. Increased involvement likely reduces the 
contracting officer’s perception of decision latitude. In some instances, contracting officers 
indicate that legal counsel would not allow them to make decisions—creating the 
organizational norm that legal has the final decision, not the contracting officer. Thus, we 
posit that 
H6: There is a negative relationship between fear of protest and the 
contracting officer’s perceived authority. 
Transaction Costs:  
The DoD  
has experienced a significant increase in the number of competitive source 
selection decisions which are protested by industry. Protests are extremely 
detrimental to the warfighter and the taxpayer. These protest actions 
consume vast amounts of the time of acquisition, legal, and requirements 
team members; delay program initiation and the delivery of capability. 
(Young, 2007, p. 1)  
Transaction costs reflect the monetary costs of resources devoted to executing a formal 
source selection—largely comprised of labor costs of the different acquisition professionals 
involved (contracting officer, contracting specialist, technical evaluator, legal, cost/price 
analyst, past performance team, program manager, Small Business Administration 
representative, and consultants). Transaction costs could be considered an opportunity cost 
of resources not devoted to other work requirements (e.g., contract and program 
administration). As the risk of a protest increases, and the fear of a protest, more personnel 
are involved and they allocate more of their time and effort to defending against a potential 
bid protest. Thus, 
H7: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and 
transaction costs. 
Contractor Performance:  
A central aspect of the Public Value Framework is providing value through the 
organization’s mission. An organization’s mission is increasingly performed or supported via 
outsourced contracts. Thus, in order for the government to attain mission success, 
contractors must be successful. They must perform well under the obligations of their 
contract. The source selection process can affect the level of performance ultimately 
received. 
When the government utilizes a best-value source selection method, technical 
evaluators apply evaluation factors and sub-factors to proposals to determine the best-value 
offer. This process helps the government to hedge against substandard and/or non-
performance by weeding out the less-capable firms (or teams of firms). The premise of 
source selection is that by applying the evaluation factors and sub-factors, a very capable 
contractor has higher odds of being deemed the best-value offer. Nonetheless, the 
government struggles in its efforts to select and sufficiently define high-quality technical 
factors and sub-factors such that they can make meaningful distinctions between offers 
(Rumbaugh, 2010). Once weaknesses in evaluation factors are realized, particularly after 
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receipt of proposals, acquisition teams are reluctant to fix the factors by amending the RFP 
and inviting revised proposals since these actions delay the acquisition milestones. 
Additionally, conservative evaluators (and their advisors), for fear of protest, often engage in 
multiple rounds of discussions that essentially level the playing field of competitors, and 
often they retain mediocre offerors in the competitive range for fear of receiving a bid 
protest. Had the evaluation criteria been better able to distinguish amongst the firms, the 
propensity to retain mediocre firms within the competitive range would be diminished. 
Together, therefore, it is expected that 
H8: There is a negative relationship between compromised technical 
evaluation and contractor performance. 
Contracting officers are generally more cognizant of and empathetic to the effects of 
contractor performance on the requiring organization’s mission attainment than are risk-
averse advisors—such as legal counsel. Thus, contracting officers may prioritize mission 
performance over protest risk in making key decisions during a source selection. For 
example, they may be more apt to remove a less-competitive or less-capable offeror from 
the competitive range, assign a lower proposal rating, and not engage in added rounds of 
discussions solely to mitigate protest risk (thereby mitigating technical leveling). In some 
cases, contracting officers may also be more apt to choose a full tradeoff rather than a LPTA 
source selection method as the most appropriate means to attain the best-value contractor. 
The full tradeoff method allows the government the flexibility to pay more for superior 
capability and/or past performance when warranted. But, this method also requires more 
effort, invites more error, and thus, protest risk, since the procedures are so nuanced. These 
actions reduce the odds of having to award a contract to a less-capable contractor, for 
example, in the case of a LPTA source selection method. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
H9: There is a positive relationship between source selection method 
appropriateness and contractor performance. 
When an individual holds decision-making authority coupled with accountability for 
the results of decisions (e.g., a contracting officer), he or she tends not to defer decisions 
entirely to others. This is not to say, however, that others are not consulted. In public 
contracting, similar to input from advisors on source selection method choices, advisors 
review all of the written technical evaluations with respect to the evaluation criteria published 
in the request for proposals. They screen for errors, omissions, consistency, and other 
matters of compliance with laws, regulations, and policies in an effort to mitigate the odds of 
receiving a bid protest. In doing so, advisors often limit what the technical evaluators can 
say. Such scrutiny can make difficult the ability to meaningfully discriminate between 
proposals. Similar to the previously discussed rationale, while contracting officers also 
review the technical evaluations for errors, they are more apt to accept more risk. Thus, it is 
posited that 
H10: Contracting officer authority is negatively related to compromised 
technical evaluations.  
Taken together, then, it is expected that a contracting officer with decision-making 
authority—and who does not defer that authority to others—will make decisions that accept 
more risk yet does not impede the selection of the best-suited contractor for the task at 
hand. When the selection is not constrained by procedures, greater decision latitude results 
in a better match between the offeror’s capabilities and the contractual requirements. This 
better match should facilitate better performance. Examining the troubled U.S. defense 
acquisition system, the Defense Business Board concluded, “Of the eight findings, three of 
them concern the acquisition workforce, a large group of dedicated public servants who 
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work diligently, but ultimately struggle within a broken system that is focused on avoiding 
mistakes rather than producing more, in less time, at less cost” (Punaro, 2012).Therefore, it 
is posited that 
H11: There is a positive relationship between contracting officer authority and 
contractor performance. 
The relationships posited above are visually depicted in Figure 1. Fear of protest can 
also be affected by the criticality of the requirement and by protest risk. Therefore, these 
constructs are shown as control variables.  
 
 Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Fear of Protest 
Methodology 
This study employed a mixed design (Creswell, 2003) of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. The qualitative work involved discussions with academicians and interviews with 
practitioners to ensure face validity and construct validity, to construct and validate a 
conceptual model, and to develop survey items to measure the constructs—many of which 
did not previously exist. Next, the research employed structural equation models using 
cross-sectional survey data. The remainder of this section details the qualitative design, 
interviews, survey development, sample, data collection, and reliability and validity. 
Interviews 
Contracting officers at two military organizations were chosen for interviews due to 
(a) proximity, (b) a willingness to support the research, and (c) the availability of a wide 
variety of contract types and contracted goods and services for wide generalizability (e.g., 
external validity). A series of questions was asked to each participant (Appendix A). 
Eighteen individuals were interviewed over two days. Demographics of each 
respondent can be found in Table 1. Each interview was recorded and transcribed. The 
average interview lasted 26 minutes. The interviews resulted transcribed into 229 pages. 
Informants were given a copy of the conceptual model during the interview and asked 
whether they agreed with the independent variables being used. They were also asked if 
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anything that I need to add.” Another contracting officer stated, “I think this is a great 
research that you are doing because this is a bigger and bigger issue. I think you are right 
on.” Other statements that validated the model were, “I think I like the model. For the most 
part it says everything.” 
Table 1. Informant Demographics 
 
Questionnaire Design and Construct Measurement 
All scales measuring latent constructs used a Likert-type scale. Fear of protest is a 
term used for this research to identify the level of apprehension a contracting professional 
has about receiving a bid protest. No previously validated scales were available to measure 
the fear of protest; thus, scale items were developed from the interview data (Appendix B). 
The contracting officer authority construct described how empowered the contracting officer 
is to make final decisions during the source selection process. Similarly, there were no 
previously validated scales available for this construct. A three-question scale was used to 
measure the sufficiency of planned PALT in the milestones and allocated by the acquisition 
team and its managers to conduct the source selection (Hawkins & Muir, 2014). 
Compromised technical evaluation assessed the extent to which technical evaluators 
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complained about the limitations imposed on the wording of their written technical 
evaluations. Contractor performance is a measure of the contractor’s performance levels 
and the degree to which requirements were satisfied. The scale was adapted from Fawcett, 
Smith, and Cooper (1997), Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach (2000), and Prahinski and 
Benton (2004). Source selection method appropriateness is the perceived extent that the 
chosen source selection method fits the requirement, the goals of the source selection, the 
commercial market, and the acquisition situation. There were no previously validated scales 
available for this construct. Source selection experience was measured as the number of 
source selections the respondent previously experienced. This could include FAR Part 15 
(i.e., formal) and non–FAR Part 15 (e.g., simplified) source selections. It could also include 
those source selections to which the respondent served as the procuring contracting officer 
as well as those to which the respondent served as an advisor or reviewer. Added PALT 
objectively measured the difference between the planned PALT and the actual PALT. 
Transaction costs attempted to quantify the personnel costs based on amount of time spent 
on the source selection by each member of the team.  
Survey Pretest 
Six industry practitioners and academicians tested the initial survey. Feedback 
received was used to refine questions and limit survey length. As a result, one construct was 
removed, and the order of the survey questions was structured to reduce bias among scale 
items by mixing questions across constructs with like scales and scale anchors. 
Sample 
The population for this study consisted of civilian and military contracting personnel 
who had executed a FAR Part 15 formal source selection (i.e., a dollar amount greater than 
$150,000). This excluded simplified procurements that are generally less susceptible to bid 
protests. A list of e-mail addresses was generated using data extracted from the Federal 
Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG) database to encompass all 
transactions that fit the criteria previously stated. 
The unit of analysis for this survey was a source selection. Since nearly all bid 
protests stem from a protestable action (e.g., a proposal rating, rating justification, or basis 
of a tradeoff analysis) associated with a source selection, this is the proper unit of analysis 
for the study. Respondents were instructed to answer the survey questions using their 
experience from their most recently completed FAR Part 15 source selection. The most 
recent source selection was required to serve as the basis of reference in order to prevent 
respondents’ self-selection bias. 
Results 
The fear of protest was empirically validated. To examine fear of protest, a structural 
equation model of its antecedents and consequences was tested and found to exhibit good 
fit to a sample of data from 350 FAR Part 15 source selections. 
The less sufficient the planned procurement lead-time is thought to be, the level of 
fear of a protest increases. When acquisition personnel have less time than they believe is 
necessary to properly conduct the source selection, there are greater odds of making a 
mistake that could be protested. Additionally, a contracting officer’s competence—in terms 
of the number of source selections experienced—lowers the level of fear of bid protests. 
As a result of protest fear, technical evaluations appear to be somewhat 
compromised. This is important since compromised technical evaluations also decrease 
contractor performance. While a fear of protest did not affect perceived source selection 
method appropriateness, protest fear was associated with the inappropriate use of the LPTA 
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source selection method. In turn, LPTA inappropriateness negatively affects contractor 
performance.  
The fear of protest diminishes a contracting officer’s perceived authority (i.e., 
discretion in making decisions). This is important since diminished contracting officer 
perceived authority was found to decrease contractor performance directly. Contracting 
officer’s perceived authority also affects contractor performance indirectly by decreasing 
compromise technical evaluations.  
The fear of protest is positively related to an increase in transaction costs. Costs 
were assessed in terms of the number of personnel involved in a source selection and their 
allocated time. The average cost per source selection was $235,236 (median = $165,832) 
with a standard deviation of $291,620. Notably, these costs are understated by considering 
direct salaries only; they exclude the fully burdened cost of a government employee. An 
average of 9 different people worked on a given source selection team in the various roles 
(an average of 3.5 full-time equivalents). Post hoc analysis showed that as the fear of 
protest increases, the number of personnel and the actual procurement lead time increase.  
Implications 
The more insufficient the planned procurement lead-time is thought to be, the level of 
fear of a protest increases. When acquisition personnel have less time than they believe is 
necessary to properly conduct the source selection, there are greater odds of making a 
mistake that could be protested. Interestingly, when they are rushed, contractual documents 
(e.g., statements of work) and pre-award communications (e.g., negotiations) could be 
compromised, which may, in turn, decrease contractor performance (Hawkins et al., 2011). 
Shortcuts could preclude the selection of the best contractor or result in selecting a 
contractor that does not fully understand the requirements. Thus, acquisitions should not be 
hastened short of the time thought to be adequate by the contracting officer. To prevent 
rushed acquisitions, standard lead times by type of source selection and by complexity of 
the requirement could be established. 
A contracting officer’s competence—in terms of the number of source selections 
experienced—lowers the level of fear of bid protests. Therefore, efforts should be made to 
increase the number of source selections experienced by contracting officers. Of the 350 
survey respondents, the average number of source selections experienced over a career 
was 36.7. That is just under 2.8 source selections per year. Note that this seemingly high 
number of source selections likely includes simplified buys and experience in a variety of 
roles such as a peer or committee reviewer as well as a contracting officer. There is no 
equal alternative to on-the-job-training (OJT), but source selection simulations and scenario-
based training could be utilized as an alternative and as a supplement to OJT. If the 
acquisition community is relying solely on OJT, it can take a contracting officer and technical 
evaluators far too long to gain an adequate level of competence with FAR Part 15 source 
selections. 
As a result of protest fear, technical evaluations appear to be somewhat 
compromised. This is important since compromised technical evaluations also decrease 
contractor performance. This construct assessed phenomena such as (1) technical 
evaluators not being allowed to say what needs to be said in a technical evaluation, (2) 
constraints imposed on the evaluations impeding the ability to write a meaningful evaluation, 
and (3) upon evaluation of proposals, a technical evaluator recognizing a need to change at 
least one evaluation criterion or its definition. Additional training for the technical evaluators 
could help increase their level of competence within the evaluation process. The evaluation 
process involves many people that are not necessarily familiar with the case law and pitfalls, 
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giving rise to bid protests. Additionally, the technical individuals that determine and define 
the evaluation criteria should be the same individuals that evaluate proposals (i.e., apply the 
criteria). Current, detailed, and standardized training for technical evaluators should result in 
better-defined evaluation criteria and better application of them to proposals. 
While a fear of protest did not affect perceived source selection method 
appropriateness, protest fear was associated with the inappropriate use of the LPTA source 
selection method. In turn, LPTA inappropriateness negatively affects contractor 
performance. While these effects have been anecdotally espoused by practitioners, this 
research is the first to quantitatively test the postulates. There were 23 respondents (7.5%) 
that revealed that the source selection method used was to some degree inappropriate. 
While this proportion appears small, it can be argued that any single instance of an 
inappropriate source selection method gives room for pause. LPTA could be inappropriately 
used since (1) evaluations can generally be accomplished more quickly and easily when 
evaluated as pass/fail rather than by a subjective rating; (2) the government’s recent 
increased focus on low price; and (3) the lower odds of receiving a bid protest compared to 
arduous and mistake-prone procedures of a full tradeoff method. Further research should 
confirm reasons why inappropriate source selection methods are employed, then acquisition 
leaders should seek ways to mitigate those factors. Perhaps contracting officers should be 
able to tap an independent panel of contracting professionals when they encounter leaders 
or reviewers who will only approve a source selection method that does not correspond well 
to the buying situation. This anonymous panel would then insert its documented opinion into 
the contract file. 
These findings are also germane to contractors. When a buying office concocts an 
acquisition strategy that appears ill-suited to the buying situation (e.g., LPTA versus full 
tradeoff for a highly complex requirement), it may be due to the fear of a bid protest. 
Prospective offerors may misinterpret the use of LPTA as an added emphasis on price. 
Their bid strategy, then, may be influenced by reducing costs and price, thereby putting high 
performance at risk. Whereas, the agency may not actually be terribly concerned about 
price. 
The fear of protest diminishes a contracting officer’s perceived authority (i.e., 
discretion in making decisions). This is important since diminished contracting officer 
perceived authority was found to decrease contractor performance directly. Contracting 
officer’s perceived authority also affects contractor performance indirectly by decreasing 
compromised technical evaluations. Many decisions and source selection documents 
receive scrutiny via a litany of outside reviews (e.g., supervisors, peer review, contracts 
committees, legal). Often, legal and committee advisors will conservatively require wording 
changes to documents, changes to ratings, amendments to the request for proposals, 
further discussions to clear up any uncertainty in evaluations, and retain offerors in the 
competitive range—just to name a few. This level of oversight is another signal of the 
importance the government places in avoiding a bid protest. Admittedly, it also coincides 
with a less competent acquisition workforce (Punaro, 2012). Rather than treating the 
problem, however, the symptoms gain the attention. Fixing the problems of contracting 
officer competence and a cumbersome source selection process is difficult and lengthy. 
Adding oversight is quick and simple. The implications are clear; better training is needed for 
contracting personnel and technical evaluators to develop the requisite competence in 
source selections, then oversight and reviews should be curtailed. Some protest risk must 
be accepted for the sake of efficiency and better decision-making (i.e., negotiations and 
award determination) leading to higher contractor performance. 
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This research confirmed the presence of outside influence on acquisition strategy 
decisions, and these influences carry associated implications for contracting. One interview 
informant commented, “I will tell you, legal pushes the LPTA. They push it a lot.” One survey 
respondent offered, “At this juncture, there are too many hands in the soup, and the 
procuring contracting officer (PCO) authority has been diminished. Attorneys need to 
resume the role of counselors again.” Since the source selection method is not a matter of 
legal sufficiency, attorney influence is curious. Selecting the source selection method is a 
contracting officer’s decision based on experience, knowledge, and professional judgment. 
Otherwise, government agencies may employ a costly professional contracting workforce 
with a high degree of accountability but diminished authority. If not capable, trusted, and 
empowered to make the necessary decisions, procurement clerks (e.g., Series 1105) would 
be much less costly than contracting professionals (e.g., Series 1102). 
The fear of protest is positively related to an increase in transaction costs. Costs 
were assessed in terms of the number of personnel involved in a sources selection and their 
allocated time. The average cost per source selection was $235,236 (median = $165,832) 
with a standard deviation of $291,620. Notably, these costs are understated by considering 
direct salaries only; they exclude the true burdened cost of a government employee. An 
average of 9 different people worked on a given source selection team in the various roles 
(an average of 3.5 full-time equivalents). As a percentage of the total contract price, the 
transaction costs averaged 7.7% (median 1.2%). Compared to common interagency 
surcharges for contracting services (that cover post-award administration costs in addition to 
sourcing costs) of 1%–8%, these sourcing-only costs seem excessive. Thus, agencies may 
be operating at costs well above their collected fees, and these costs can be traced to fear 
of protests. 
Post hoc analysis showed that as the fear of protest increases, the number of 
personnel and the actual procurement lead time increase. From the data, the average 
planned PALT was 183 days. The average actual PALT was 237 days. The difference, 54 
days, constitutes added transaction costs. Thus, efficiency is compromised with greater fear 
of protest. While these salary costs may be dismissed as sunk costs, certainly excess 
personnel could accomplish other pertinent work if not serving on the source selection team 
for an extended time. These opportunity costs should not be ignored—particularly given the 
ubiquitous, persistent failures in other areas of acquisition such as contract administration 
(DoDIG, 2009b). If measures can be taken that reduce the fear of protest, transaction costs 
can be decreased. Likewise, if evaluation, negotiation, internal reviews, and documentation 
processes can be streamlined and if agencies can accept more protest risk, perhaps lead 
time can be saved, resulting in reduced transaction costs. Given today’s budget constraints 
and highly-leveraged financing, the significant transaction costs associated with source 
selections should not continue to be ignored. A first step would be to capture the quantified 
resources required to execute a source selection in a contract action reporting database 
(e.g., FPDS-NG). Agencies could also follow the for-profit sector’s lead by assessing and 
publishing key metrics such as total spend per sourcing full-time equivalent (CAPS 
Research, 2011). 
These results surrounding transaction costs raise questions concerning the 
acquisition process in general. For instance, the single criterion for new case law—and 
hence, new reactive policies and regulations—is fairness, with no regard for efficiency. Is 
there a ceiling cost on fairness? Is there a point at which fairness is too costly? Additionally, 
the high amount of transaction costs suggests that the drivers of those costs be considered. 
Can policies, procedures, laws, case law, and regulations be reexamined and streamlined 
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without compromising fairness? Is government procurement at the point of a source 
selection overhaul with a keen eye toward efficiency? 
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Abstract 
Fixed-price contracts offer the promise of controlling costs but are less likely to succeed when 
there is uncertainty regarding requirements. While these broad principles are uncontroversial, 
disagreement rages regarding the practical question of how widely they should be used. This 
study tests a variety of hypotheses regarding what contract characteristics are associated 
with better performance under fixed-price contracts. Here, performance is measured across 
three dependent variables: (a) the Number of Offers Received for competed contracts, (b) 
whether the contract was terminated, and (c) the extent to which change-orders raised the 
contracts’ cost ceiling. The study team has created a Bayesian network, populated by 
completed, publicly reported DoD contracts from FY2007 to FY2013 to address this research 
question. 
The public purpose of this process also includes facilitating future acquisition research on a 
range of topics. To support future research, all analytical data and codes developed and/or 
used are posted on the CSISdefense GitHub (Sanders, 2015). This resource addresses two 
vexing issues that bedevil a wider use of the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) by 
academia, government, and industry researchers, namely (a) the data-selection barrier to 
using the FPDS and (b) the difficulty of deriving performance outputs from FPDS. 
 
 
1 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) does not take specific policy positions; 
accordingly, all views expressed in this presentation should be understood to be solely those of the 
author(s). 
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The current preference within the executive branch and congressional oversight 
committees for fixed-price contracts is a reaction to external budget pressures and cost 
overruns associated with certain high profile acquisition programs (Younnossi et al., 2007).2 
But even the DoD acknowledges that fixed-price contracting is not a panacea for all that ails 
federal acquisition.3 Discussions on the role of fixed-price contracting in acquisition is really 
a discourse on requirements, risk allocation, and uncertainty. Accordingly, as a contracting 
vehicle, fixed-price contracting will find more utility in specific, well defined scenarios such as 
in events where requirements and likely costs are well understood. More so, than in 
contracting situations characterized by uncertainty. This issue is acknowledged by OMB 
which has issued the guidance governing such acquisition transactions (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009). 
Under what circumstances are fixed-price contracts most likely to succeed?4 This 
paper addresses that question by examining seven years of DoD contract transactions 
available through the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). The project compares the 
performance results of fixed-price and cost-based contracts across a range of 
characteristics that typically would be known to the contracting officer before the contract 
was signed. While FPDS does not directly measure performance, it does capture three 
variables that directly measure the possible drawbacks of fixed-price contracts. These are 
• Single Offer Competition, 
• Contract Terminations, and 
• Cost-Ceiling-Raising Change Orders. 
“Single-Offer Competition” can be indicative that the pricing vehicle involves too 
much risk on the vendor side, which makes bidding on the contract unattractive to potential 
vendors. Tracking “Contract Terminations” addresses the risk of outright failure because a 
2 Cost growth in defense acquisition is driven by several factors that include schedule, unrealistic 
estimates, acquisition strategies and funding availability. Studies of weapon system cost growth, 
notably by researchers indicate that across board the average adjusted total cost growth for a 
completed program was 46% over the study period of 30 years. 
3 On numerous occasions, Frank Kendall, the under secretary of defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, has underscored the need to use appropriate contracting vehicles by pointing out the 
problems that a fixed-price contract caused during its development of the A-12 Avenger. 
4 The concept “fixed price” deserves some further illustration. A fixed-price contract suggests a price 
that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the 
contract. And according to provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), a firm-fixed-price 
contract is suitable for acquiring commercial items (see Parts 2 and 12) or for acquiring other supplies 
or services on the basis of reasonably definite functional or detailed specifications (see Part 11) when 
the contracting officer can establish fair and reasonable prices at the outset. But as is succinctly 
noted in the DoD’s (2014) Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2014 Annual Report (pp. 
iii–vi), “Prices on fixed-price contracts are only ‘fixed’ if the contractual work content and deliverables 
remain fixed”; such contracts can be (and often are) easily modified to handle unexpected technology 
gaps, engineering issues, or shifting threats, leading to cost growth. At times fixed-price vehicles can 
be virtually indistinguishable from cost plus vehicles, as was the case with the Air Force’s canceled 
Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS). This reading of “fixed price contract” by the DoD 
guides our understanding of fixed-price contracts in the framework of this study. 
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vendor has taken on more risk than they can handle. And finally, “Cost-Ceiling-Raising 
Change Orders” demonstrates that the government customer finds the present contract 
structure unsatisfactory and may indicate cost overruns.  
The study team analyzes the drivers of these three dependent variables using a 
Bayesian network populated with all unclassified5 completed DoD contracts from FY2007 to 
FY2013. The study objective is to determine when fixed-price contracts are most effective. 
The team drew hypotheses from the literature regarding under what circumstances the 
fixed-price mechanism would lead to better results. The team also developed control 
variables. These controls divide the data to capture factors not relating to pricing mechanism 
that may lead to better or worse performance.  
Addressing the question of when fixed-price contracts are most effective is only a 
portion of the public purpose of this project. The data that undergird this investigation 
originate from FPDS and are thus open source and pertinent to a wide range of government 
contracting questions. With this chosen approach, the study team simultaneously addresses 
two of the most vexing issues that have bedeviled the wider and more effective use of FPDS 
by academic, government, and industry researchers: the high barrier to entry for accessing 
complete and relevant data and the difficulty of deriving performance outputs from FPDS.6 
To ensure reproducibility of this analysis and to provide a starting point for future research, 
the entirety of the dataset is published through the CSISdefense GitHub account along with 
the typographies and analytical code that the study team used to create the statistical 
models (Sanders, 2015). 
Background 
Since the inception of the federal acquisition business, issues of performance have 
vexed policy-makers. In the last years, major data analytics work by DoD analysts found 
scant statistical correlation between industry profit margins and program performance in cost 
and schedule. For example, rigorous analysis of data from hundreds of major weapons 
programs strongly suggest that hitherto fixed-price contracting does not always achieve the 
set goals (DoD, 2014). As far back as 1949, John Perry Miller, in Pricing of Military 
Procurements, exposed the lack of symmetry between incentives and contract performance 
(as cited in Williamson, 1967, p. 218). In the same hue, scholarly works from the early 1960s 
by Frederick M. Scherer (1964) and Peck also support the notion that there is a discrepancy 
between values attached to incentives and performance results (Kaysen, 1963). Speaking to 
this issue, Williamson (1967) glumly stated,  
My analysis of these relations leads me to conclude that neither the 
manipulation of profit incentives, nor the monitoring of contract progress can 
be expected, in any dependable sense, to yield significant improvements in 
contract performance as long as the specification of the task remains 
unchanged. (pp. 217–218) 
Procurement has long been at the top of the government’s laundry list of activities 
that need improvement. However, this policy focus has come in cycles—with attendant ups 
5 There is no regulatory mandate to report classified contracts; as a result, CSIS assumes that they 
are not included within FPDS. 
6 For a more detailed remark on these factors, please see the following section of this report. 
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and downs over the years. Practically every administration since the 1970s has embarked 
on some form of acquisition reform or at least paid lip-service to the process. Over 150 
major studies devoted to the field of acquisition reform have been produced since the end of 
the Second World War (Schwartz, 2014). Despite these efforts, according to Congressional 
Research Service analyst Moshe Schwartz, DoD development contracts since 1993 have 
experienced a median of 32% cost growth—not adjusted for inflation. Since 1997, 31% of 
major defense acquisition programs have had cost growth of at least 15%. Schwartz 
observed that every year between 1996 and 2010, the Army spent more than $1 billion on 
programs that were ultimately canceled.  
In 2009 and 2010, these problems led to the latest round of reforms, including the 
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act and Better Buying Power. The first set of DoD 
Better Buying Power initiatives called for greater use of fixed-price incentive fee contracts 
when appropriate (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2010). The second iteration of these reforms in 2012 
suggested fixed price for low-rate initial production but emphasized contracting officer 
discretion in choosing the right pricing mechanism (OUSD[AT&L], 2012). In 2013, the 
annual report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System reinforced this change, 
finding that use of fixed-price contract types were not themselves correlated with cost 
savings. Throughout this debate, all sides agree that fixed-price contracts are more 
appropriate in some cases than in others.  
Study Dataset and Performance Measures 
The dataset for this study consists of DoD contracts reported in FPDS that were 
initially signed no earlier than FY2007 and completed by FY2013. Notable exclusions 
include classified contracts not mandated to be reported in FPDS, contracts funded but not 
managed by the DoD, and Defense Commissary Agency contracts which have not been 
reported in recent years.7 To enable comparisons, the dataset is not limited to fixed-price 
contracts. 
Determining when contracts are completed is the most challenging portion of 
compiling the dataset. Contracts closed out or terminated by the end of FY2013 are included 
even if their current completion dates run into the next fiscal year. However, many contracts 
in FPDS and in the sample are never marked as closed out or terminated in the Reason for 
Modification field. In these cases, completion status is based on the current completion date 
of the most recent transaction in FPDS. This method could accidentally include contracts 
that have not reached their ultimate conclusion dates and are merely dormant. However, the 
FY2013 sample end date means that any such contracts would have to be inactive for an 
entire fiscal year, which is remarkably unlikely.  
FPDS raw data is available in bulk from USAspending.gov starting in FY2000. 
However, data quality steadily improves over that decade, particularly in the commonly 
referenced fields of interest to this study. In most cases, unlabeled rates topped out at 5% to 
10%. The critical exceptions are the Base and All Options and Base and Exercised Options 
fields, which report contract ceilings. Prior to FY2007, these fields are blank for the majority 
7 These exclusions are common with other DIIG work. See DIIG methodology for more details: 
http://csis.org/program/methodology  
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of contracts. When that field is not available, calculating the percentage growth rate due to 
cost-ceiling–raising change orders is impossible. In addition, this study classifies contract 
size by initial ceiling and not total obligations because the latter figure is dependent on 
contract performance. 
Because a key dependent and independent variable are not available prior to 
FY2007, the study team chose to set FY2007 as the start date rather than risk sample bias 
by including only those earlier contracts which were properly labeled. This restriction poses 
a significant limitation in that no contracts of more than seven years in duration can be 
included and five-year contracts are only in the study period if they started by October 1, 
2007, or were closed out early.  
The dependent variables, as well as the other study variables, are available through 
the project's GitHub page (Sanders, 2015). The entire dataset includes nearly six million 
contracts, and as a result the study team will also provide smaller samples as a more 
accessible starting point. The means of sampling will be determined by consultation with 
members of the likely user community at the NPS conference and the interviews during the 
refinement phase of this project.  
The largest sampling challenge is that approximately two-thirds of the contracts have 
a total obligated value less than $25,000, but these contracts represent only about 3% of the 
obligations for the period. As a result, when this paper deals with samples for computation 
reasons, the sample is weighted by total obligations to better reflect DoD spending patterns 
rather than merely describing the numerous, but comparatively insignificant in aggregate, 
small contracts. The Bayesian model developed later in this paper is calculated using the 
complete dataset but includes a variable differentiating by initial contract ceiling, which is 
intentionally constructed to ease study of larger contracts. 
This approach addresses two of the largest obstacles to wider use of FPDS within 
the government, academia, and industry. First, the two official portals, USAspending.gov 
and the FPDS web-tool, both perform a critical service in giving access to contract 
transaction in aggregate or detailed form. However, for many researchers the relevant unit 
of analysis is contracts and not transactions. Both websites can be used to access the full 
records of individual contracts, but due to data inconsistencies and bulk download 
restrictions, they are not well suited to larger sample studies. 
The limitations of the data in raw form can be overcome by downloading the 
complete data feeds via the data tab of USAspending.gov, but with each year accounting for 
multiple gigabytes, this represents a high barrier to entry for researchers who lack the tools 
or training for large dataset work. This challenge is further increased by the often arcane 
nature of the data fields and the need to undertake cleanup and refer to multiple columns to 
get to data of interest. This first challenge is attested to by the regular calls the study team 
receives from other researchers seeking to use FPDS. 
The second obstacle is that FPDS almost exclusively measures contract inputs but 
not performance outputs. Measures of contract performance do exist in other databases, but 
they are largely inaccessible without, at very least, an official government purpose or permit. 
This project takes a step towards overcoming that problem through three dependent 
variables referenced earlier in this section. These variables were chosen due to their 
relevance to fixed-price contracting and availability, but they are also applicable to a wider 
range of research questions. Due to their importance and broader reference, this paper 
discusses each of the three in detail in a subsequent section.  
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Single-Offer Competition 
Whether or not a contract is competed is primarily an input into performance. 
However, single-offer competition also reveals information about the request for proposals. 
A solicitation that only has a single respondent indicates some combination of three factors: 
thinness in the underlying market; a failure to notify or give adequate response time to 
potential competitors; or a contract that is unappealing to vendors. That final point is of 
interest to this study. Fixed-price contracts transfer risk to vendors, and if vendors perceive 
greater risk than the government is willing to pay for, then fewer vendors may be willing to 
bid.  
Methodology  
Non-competed contracts are not included in this analysis because the choice of 
whether or not to compete is based on factors that are already known before the choice 
between fixed-price and cost-based contract is made. For example, when a sole-source 
award is justified based on there being “only one source,” that rationale refers to the total 
number of potential vendors and not the number of interested vendors. As a result, for the 
graphs on single-offer competition and for analysis at the end of this piece, sole-source 
awards are excluded. While multiple variables are used to judge whether a contract has 
been completed, only one, the Number of Offers Received, is necessary to determine how 
many vendors really did submit an offer. 
Whether a contract is competed is calculated largely using the same approach as in 
prior CSIS studies (“Methodology,” n.d.). This method emulates the official DoD 
methodology to the extent possible when using raw data downloads rather than the FPDS 
webtool. In the vast majority of cases, competitive status is classified for the entirety of the 
contract duration. Thus if a contract had a duration of three years and was competed in the 
first year, it qualifies as competed for the entirety of the duration. This also extends to single-
award indefinite delivery contracts, which are classified based on whether the original 
vehicle was competed rather than consistently treated as only receiving an offer from the 
single awardee. The Number of Offers Received is calculated using the same strategy.  
To see more details on the construction of the number of offers, visit 
Contract_Competition.md on the project’s CSISdefense/Fixed-Price GitHub page (“Fixed-
price/Contract_Competition.md.,” 2015). Summary charts are included in the parallel CSIS 
report on Competition, which is also in the conference proceedings. 
Terminations 
Abruptly ending a contract through termination is a challenging endeavor for the 
government. The proximate cause of the termination may not be vendor performance, but 
instead a drastic change in government needs, the failure of a related contract, or the 
cancellation of the entire program. However, in all three cases the government has the 
option of simply running out currently exercised options and stopping further payments. 
Thus, even if the source of the failure was outside the contract, a termination indicates that 
the contract was unable to adapt to changing circumstances. Critically, the greatest 
vulnerability of fixed-price contracting will result in a termination: if too much risk is placed on 
the vendor and they outright fail beyond the point at which adjusting the contract could turn 
things around. In this instance, the government may lose any resources that have already 
been invested as well as paying a significant cost in time to start the project over. 
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Methodology 
Contract termination is determined using the Reason for Modification field in FPDS. 
A contract is considered to be terminated if it has at least one modification with the following 
values: 
• “Terminate for Default (complete or partial)” 
• “Terminate for Cause” 
• “Terminate for Convenience (complete or partial)” 
• “Legal Contract Cancellation” 
These four categories and the “Close Out” category are used to mark a contract as 
closed. As is discussed above, many contracts well past their current completion date never 
have a transaction marking them closed, however, a termination is an active measure that 
mandates reporting unlike the natural end of a contract which can go unremarked. 
The four different values of contract termination provide useful granularity, but for 
aforementioned reasons even a partial termination for convenience indicates that something 
has likely gone awry. Thus, given the already low number of terminations, the study team 
treats a contract as either terminated or it is not, rather than subdividing by type.  
To see more details on the construction of the number of offers, visit 
Contract_Competition.md on the project’s CSISdefense/Fixed-Price GitHub page (“Fixed-
price/Contract_Competition.md.,” 2015).  
Cost-Ceiling-Raising Change Orders 
Change orders are not as severe an indicator of trouble as terminations. A change 
order might result from a contract being adapted to a changing environment or even being 
adapted to further take advantage of a successful innovation. Even when the change order 
indicates a mistake, it may often not be on the vendor side. Instead, requirements creep 
prompted by the government may add expensive new tasks to the contract. The affordability 
of fixed-price contracting comes in part from their simplicity and inflexibility. Thus, when 
fixed-price contracts are subjected to a large number of change orders, whether prompted 
by government or vendor actions, this is a warning sign that a different form of pricing may 
have been more affordable. 
Methodology 
Similar to contract terminations, change orders are reported in the Reason for 
Modification field. There are two values that this study counts as change orders: “Change 
Order” and “Definitize Change Order.” For the remainder of this report, contracts with at 
least one change order are called Changed Contracts. 
There are also multiple modifications captured in FPDS that this current study will not 
investigate as change orders. These include:  
• Additional Work (new agreement, FAR Part 6 applies) 
• Supplemental Agreement for work within scope 
• Exercise an Option 
• Definitize Letter Contract 
The Number of Change Orders refers to the number of FPDS transactions for a 
given contract that lists one of the two change order categories as their Reason for 
Modification. The vast majority of contracts do not receive change orders, but changed 
contracts are still far more common than terminations. 
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This study uses changes in the Base and All Options Value Amount as a way of 
tracking the potential cost of change orders. The Base and All Options Value Amount refers 
to the ceiling of contract costs if all available options were exercised. The alternative ceiling 
measure, Base and Exercised Value Amount, is not used because contracts are often 
specified such that the bulk of the eventually executed contract, in dollar terms are treated 
as options. In these cases, the all-inclusive value provides a better baseline for tracking 
growth.  
The Obligated Amount refers to the actual amount paid to vendors. This study team 
does not use this value for this analysis because spending for change orders is not 
necessarily front-loaded. For example, a change to a contract in May of 2010 could easily 
result in payments from May 2010 through August 2013.  
The % Growth in Base and All Options Value Amount from Change Orders is 
calculated as follows:  % 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡ℎ =  𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 & 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵
𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 & 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 
To see more details on the construction of the number of offers, visit 
Contract_ChangeOrders.md on the project’s CSISdefenses/Fixed-Price GitHub page 
(“Fixed-price/Contract_Competition.md.,” 2015). 
Bayesian Network Model Building 
A variety of statistical techniques are appropriate for inferential analysis on when 
fixed-price contracts are most likely to be successful. The study team chose a Bayesian 
network approach for three key reasons. First, this approach scales well to large datasets, 
such as the nearly six million defense contracts completed between FY2007 and FY2013. 
Traditionally, only a sample of such data would be available, but thanks to FPDS and 
modern computing, it is possible to analyze the entire population. Second, while a Bayesian 
network approach and other similar techniques can be used for prediction, it is particularly 
well suited to understanding the how the different pieces of evidence are interrelated. 
Because this project seeks to provide a starting point for future research, enhancing 
understanding of the model’s causal logic is more important than creating a model which 
optimizes the ability to predict outcomes. 
Finally, the knowledge engineering process used with Bayesian models—building 
connections between evidence, called whitelists and blacklists, and the subsequent model 
queries—is well suited to CSIS’s strength in accessing acquisition domain experts and data 
scientists. The initial model in this paper will be built upon over time in two ways. First, it will 
be expanded from examining only the Number of Offers Received to including all three 
dependent variables. Second, it will be refined by consultation with additional external 
experts and listening to their insight about which pieces of evidence should be connected 
and where more granularity may be appropriate. 
The model is built in the open source statistical programming language R using two 
modules. The module BnLearn is used for the Bayesian network learning process, which 
turns the collected data into a directed graph that is acyclic, which is to say there are no 
loops (Scutari, 2010). The module gRain is used for the second part of the process, creating 
the conditional probability table and then querying the resulting multiples (Højsgaard, 2014). 
Both modules are also open source and the data as well as the processing and analytic 
programming code used to implement this process are available through the CSISdefense 
fixed price GitHub repository (Sanders, 2015). 
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Description of Evidence 
As with most statistical models, the first step with a Bayesian network is to gather, 
clean, and transform the data. Each piece of evidence was collected by first applying CSIS 
transaction-level lookup tables. Once the transaction level data was categorized in SQL 
server, it was then collated into contract-wide values. The first step in this process was done 
using codebooks available at the lookup-tables repository of the CSISdefense GitHub 
account. The combination stage was done on a variable by variable basis and that process 
is covered in the fixed-price repository of the CSISdefense GitHub account. The last stage 
was conversion into evidence notes, each having between two and eight distinct states. The 
processing required for a Bayesian network increases exponentially with each new node of 
evidence. As a result, the initial model is intentionally minimalist, and our study team will add 
more granularity to the model as developments warrant. 
Contract Fundamentals 
These nodes of evidence are largely set by the needs of the relevant portion of the 
Department of Defense rather than chosen by the acquisition official. There are choices to 
be made within them, for example, whether to fill a need directly with as a product or via a 
service provider. However, as a rule these nodes of evidence influence the contracting 
method and not vice versa. 
Who (Component: Army/Navy/Air Force/Other DoD): Determined by the 
contracting office rather than the funding office. This will be referred to as “component” 
throughout this discussion. 
What (Platform: Air/Land/Vessel/Electronics & Communications/Missiles and 
Space/Weapons and Ammunition/Facility Related Services & Construction/Other): 
Determined by the combination of the claimant program code for the platform when 
available and otherwise via the product or service code. This will be referred to as “platform” 
throughout this discussion. 
PSR (Product/Service/R&D): Determined by the product or service codes, with 
R&D management and support being treated as a service. 
Intl (International: Just U.S./Some International): Based on the place of 
performance. Those contracts with any transactions in foreign countries are treated as 
having some international. Lookup tables are primarily used when imputing data is 
necessary due to a missing or malformed value in either the country or U.S. state place of 
performance fields. 
Link (# of linked contracts: none/1–749/750+): This calculated column is the study 
team’s first effort to account for the possibility of problems cascading from other related 
contracts. For those contracts without a system code, the value is set equal to the number of 
preexisting contracts in the same contracting office that share a Platform characterization 
(excluding the Facility-related Services and Construction [FRS&C] and other platforms). For 
those contracts with a system equipment code, the value is equal to the number of 
preexisting contracts sharing the system equipment code. This value is then supplemented 
with the number of contracts with the same platform and contracting office (with the 
aforementioned exclusions) that are not labeled with any system or equipment code. This 
field will be referred to as “Interlinkages” throughout this discussion. 
See the fixed-price repository of the CSISdefense GitHub account for processing 
code used for this calculation.  
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Contract Approach 
The contract approach refers to those contract characteristics that are chosen by the 
relevant acquisition officials in the pursuit of a successful outcome. 
Comp (Competition: Comp./No Comp.): Is determined using the standard CSIS 
methodology, with the critical exception that the numbers of offers received is treated as a 
separate piece of evidence. 
Ceil (Ceiling: $15,000/$100,000/$1,000,000/$30,000,000): Refers to the initial 
ceiling on total potential contract obligations. Is set by the initial Base and All Options Value 
for the contract. This value was chosen rather than the initial Base and Exercised Options 
Value because exercising options happens regularly during the course of an on-time and 
on-budget contract. 
Dur (Duration: One day to Two Months/Seven Months to a Year/More than a 
Year): Refers to the duration and is calculated using the number of days between the initial 
effective date and the current completion date for the contract. The ultimate completion date 
is also available but was regularly unlabeled. 
FxCb (Fixed price or Cost-base): Fixed price includes all forms of fixed-price 
contracting except fixed-price level of effort. That comparatively rare form has been 
described in meetings with DoD officials as exhibiting more properties of cost-based 
contracts. Cost-base includes all forms of cost-plus contracts as well as time and materials 
and labor-hours contracts. 
Indefinite Delivery Vehicle (IDV): Indicates whether or not a contract is one of the 
many forms of Indefinite Delivery Vehicles (IDVs). This is a contracting approach in which a 
single root contract is used as a basis for multiple other contracts. 
Contract Outcomes 
Offr (Number of Offers Received: 1, 2, 3–4, 5+): This is the first dependent 
variable and is described in greater detail earlier in this document. Cases with no 
competition are categorized as only one offer, although for hypothesis purposes, the 
existence of competition will typically be included in the model query. The remaining 
dependent variables will be added in to the model in coming research stages. 
The Whitelist of Mandatory Arcs Between Pieces of Evidence 
The whitelist is a collection of directed arcs between pieces of evidence that must be 
included in the final model whether or not the learning algorithm recommends them. 
Developing the whitelist was an iterative process. First the team determined which pieces of 
evidence were most strongly linked and then, after seeing initial results, added further 
connections where the learning algorithm could not determine the flow of causality. Finally, 
the team compared different versions of the model created using variant algorithms and 
added those arcs which the study team deemed important but that were absent in some 
models. The whitelist in Figure 1 is the final one at the time this paper was written, including 
all three iterations of building the list. 
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 Figure 1. Whitelist of Arcs That Must Appear in the Bayesian Model 
In interpreting this graph, each circle is a piece of evidence or node. Each arrow is a 
directed arc, and the parent node influences the child node that the arrow points to. For 
example, there is an arc from the parent Component ("Who") node to the child Platform 
("What") node because the different components buy different mixes of platforms. Thus if 
Component is “Army” then the Platform is substantially more likely to be “Land Vehicles” and 
less likely to be “Vessels.” So long as no loops are formed, each node can be linked to 
multiple or no other nodes, for example Product/Service/R&D (PSR) influences both “Fixed 
price or Cost-base” and Interlinkages (“Link”) and “Number of Offers Received” (Offr) has 
arcs coming from both comp and “Fixed price or Cost-base.” 
Working from the bottom, “Number of Offers Received” has “Fixed price or Cost-
base” and Comp as its parents because the number of offers directly depend on whether a 
contract is competed and “Fixed price or Cost-base” is the study variable, and thus the 
connection with the dependent variable is highly of interest. On the next level up, 
Interlinkages is a constructed variable and both Platform and PSR are used to create it. 
Who also plays a role, but primarily at the contracting office level and thus the connection is 
not as direct. ”Fixed price or Cost-base’s” arc from PSR was there from the start, as R&D 
contracts are classically the domain of cost-based pricing. ”Fixed price or Cost-base’s” 
second parent, Ceiling, was added near the end of the process because “Fixed price or 
Cost-base” only had one parent in some of the models and consistently including Ceiling in 
the rest. Further analysis via cross-sectional graphs showed that after accounting for PSR, 
Ceiling appeared to have the strongest influence on “Fixed price or Cost-base.” Namely, 
contracts with high ceilings are notably more likely to be Cost-Based or Combination. 
Platform is influenced by Components in another straight forward connection as was 
covered in an earlier example. IDV is a parent of Ceiling because the learning algorithm 
could not decide on the direction of the relationship. The study team decided that IDV was 
the parent because choosing an IDV can often mean choosing to break a goal into multiple 
smaller pieces, each with a small scope. Thus the Ceiling of a project can depend on 
whether or not the contracting officer feels an IDV is available and appropriate. The last two 
nodes, Intl and Duration, do not have any whitelist entries at this time. During model 
creation, the study team experimented with linking Duration to “Number of Offers Received,” 
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but that caused the learning algorithm to reject the stronger connection between Ceiling and 
“Number of Offers Received.” The team could force both connections, but it is not necessary 
to do so and the relationship between Duration and “Number of Offers Received” appeared 
complex in cross-sectional graphs. As will be shown later, this does leave Duration without 
any children, but this problem will likely be remedied once additional dependent variables 
are added. 
The Blacklist of Mandatory Arcs Between Pieces of Evidence 
Black lists are the inversion of white lists: arcs that may never be included in the 
model regardless of the findings of the learning algorithm. Developing the blacklist was 
similarly an iterative process, although with one notable exception, most of the revisions 
were merely adding more arcs to the blacklist to correct for possibilities overlooked in prior 
iterations.  
For Figure 2, the red lines indicate arcs that are not allowed. For example the arrow 
from “Number of Offers Received” to Platform means that the number of offers cannot have 
a causal influence on what sort of platform is being bought. In many cases, this is for 
straightforward causal reasons. The evidence regarding contract fundamental can influence 
the contracting approach, but not vice versa. This graph is has many more arcs than the 
prior Whitelist graph because it is straightforward for experts to establish which evidence 
factors are decided earlier along the timeline or are take precedence over deciding other 
related factors. For example, the relevant acquisition official will typically first determine 
whether they can compete a given contract and only then determine what vehicle or pricing 
mechanism would be appropriate. 
The existence of a blacklist arrow does not mandate that there is a connection going 
the other direction. In fact, that is the point of the blacklist, to prevent spurious connections 
from being made without committing to an arc going in the opposite direction. For example 
“Number of Offers Received” is blacklisted to every other piece of evidence in the model, 
because competition takes place only after the other factors are set in broad terms. 
However, as will be seen in the causal model, not every piece of evidence that can arc to 
“Number of Offers Received” does so. 
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 Figure 2. Bayesian Network Blacklist 
In a smaller number of cases, the blacklist extends to arcs in both directions. This 
means that the two evidence nodes, connected with a purple arc and an arrow pointing in 
both directions cannot be parents nor children of each other. In the case of IDV and linked, 
this is because the causal link is difficult adjudicate because of confounding factors. For 
contracting office and platform pairings that have IDVs available, the number of preexisting 
interlinked contracts will typically be higher. However, that reflects the omitted variable of 
whether there are active IDVs rather than a direct connection between the two evidence 
nods.  
Component evidence node has bidirectional blacklisted arcs with all of the 
contracting approach evidence nodes as well as with the “Number of Offers Received” 
outcome node. The study team chose to block these links because the literature review did 
not find a theoretical basis for the organization itself, rather than the characteristics of its 
contracts, being a key determiner for fixed-price success or failure. CSIS is separately 
examining that question in its report on DoD components, which is also being presented at 
this conference. Pending the outcome of that study, these bidirectional blacklisted arcs may 
be revisited. 
Initial Results 
After the iterated whitelist and blacklist generation process, Figure 3 shows the 
ultimate result. In the figure, the blue arrows are those arcs that were mandated by 
whitelists. With the exception of links to Duration from Ceiling, IDV, and Comp, the direction 
of the remainder of the arcs was locked in by the blacklist. Thus, PSR did not have to have a 
direct connection to Duration, but the alternative was disallowed.  
The resulting Bayesian network is highly interlinked, as is shown by the sheer 
number of arcs, well in excess of the small number required by the white list. However, there 
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are two notable areas where connections are sparse. Duration is influenced by six different 
evidence nodes but does not influence Offr or any other node. This may change in the future 
as a result of introducing greater granularity to Duration or after the introduction of the other 
dependent variables. The second evidence node that is remarkably isolated is ”Fixed price 
or Cost-base,” which suggests humility may be necessary regarding the influence of the 
study variable. 
 
 Figure 3. Initial Bayesian Network 
Preliminary Hypothesis Testing 
This initial model allows for preliminary testing of four of the five study hypotheses as 
well as robustness checking using five different controls. The study team developed each of 
these hypotheses and controls from the literature, rather than through learning algorithm 
described above. 
As presently configured, the various evidence nodes are not granular enough to fully 
test the hypotheses proposed in the early stages of this research. However, four of the five 
hypotheses can be tested. These hypotheses were often formulated with a greater level of 
specificity than the model presently allows, for example, examining contracts with a ceiling 
of greater than $500 million or addressing only software contracts. Categories which only 
apply to a small fraction of contracts can increase the complexity of the model while 
reducing its statistical power. This trade-off can be worthwhile, but it will first be tested with 
model variants and only when most insightful will these additional breakdowns be included 
in the model as a whole. 
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The current Bayesian model enabled five different controls which were employed by 
comparing fixed price and cost-based Number of Offers Received for a different subsets of 
the contract dataset. As the Bayesian model becomes more inclusive, more controls, such 
as separating undefinitized contract actions, will be added. 
• Past research has found aircraft and drone contracts to be especially 
challenging,8,9 so the first control split the dataset using the Platform 
evidence node (DoD, 2015; Ritchie, 1997).  
• Both larger and smaller contracts sometimes show different trends than those 
in the middle. The second control separated out large contracts as those with 
a ceiling of/over $30 million. The third control separates out contracts with a 
ceiling of less than $1 million.10  
• Indefinite Delivery Vehicles are associated with higher rates of competition 
and are separated out for the fourth control.11  
• Finally contracts with a duration of greater than a year may have higher risk 
thus experience different dynamics. 
Hypothesis 1: Large R&D contracts will perform better as cost-based 
contracts. 
Our interim findings generally support both the academic literature12 and policy 
documents13 that posit large R&D contracts may perform better under cost-based contracts. 
As expected, cost-based contracts had a substantially lower single offer competition rate, 
22.5% for cost-based versus 29.7% for fixed price. Cost-based similarly had a higher rate of 
competition with five or more offer. This pattern held for long duration contracts and for 
aircraft contracts. In the latter case fixed-price contracts received only a single offer 37.6% 
8 Aircraft have a 22 point corresponding effect on total contract growth that is explained by schedule 
and cost overruns. The report looked at time, schedule, and differences between major commands, 
but not contract pricing mechanism. 
9 During WWII, fixed-price contracts were favored for aircraft, but due to factors relating to the “degree 
of organization by weapons companies,” only Britain was able to develop primarily fixed-price 
procedures. 
10 For overall DoD contracting in 2013, contracts with an annual value of less than $250,000 saw the 
highest rate of competition with two or more offers (62%), and that rate generally declines as size of 
contract increases (CSIS Analysis of FPDS Data). That breakpoint did not align with the buckets of 
the Ceiling evidence node and the lower than $1 million captured this dynamic more effectively than 
lower than $100,000. 
11 Past CSIS research has found that contracts using a purchase orders and “Other IDCs” (Other 
IDCs includes Federal Supply Schedule, Basic Ordering Agreements, Blanket Purchasing 
Agreements, Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts) have notably higher rates of single-offer 
competition than other vehicles (CSIS, Federal Services Contracting and the Supporting Industrial 
Base, 2000–2012). Multi-award IDVs however have notably higher rates. This hypothesis will be 
retested when greater granularity in the vehicle evidence node is available. 
12 “In particular, we find that the [contracting office] principal prefers a cost-plus contract in cases of 
large R&D projects or rising innovation benefits. … The agent increases its research out-lays in 
response to a higher sharing rate when the expected rewards from innovation significantly exceed 
research costs” (Goel, 1999). 
13 USD(AT&L) describes low technical risk as a reason to choose fixed-price contracts. Large R&D 
contracts are known for their technical risk (Kendall, 2015). 
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of the time versus 11.3% for cost-based! In these categories and in the overall sample, 
combination contracts more closely resembled fixed-price contracts when it came to offers 
received. Cost-plus only loses its advantage for IDV contracts, where 26% of contracts 
receive only a single offer compared to 24.9% of combination contracts and 20.5% of fixed-
price contracts. This discrepancy merits further study to determine what sort of IDV drives 
up the rate of single offer competition for cost-plus contracts. 
Hypothesis 2: Complex projects, as measured by pre-Milestone B major 
defense acquisition project status, will perform better as cost-based contracts. 
Complex projects, such as the development stage of Major Defense Acquisition 
Projects, are favored for cost based contracts in the literature (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001)14 but 
not supported by our analysis when the placeholder of linkages was used. However, the 
results were not highly robust and were contradicted for two of the five controls. The single 
offer competition rate for cost-plus contracts was six percentage points lower for large 
contracts and two percentage points lower for aircraft. Since both large contracts and 
aircraft and drone contracts are associated with MDAPs, this suggests that the study team 
will need to refine linkages or test the hypothesis directly by looking at system equipment 
codes. 
Hypothesis 3: Contracts with a longer duration will perform better as cost-
based contracts. 
While prolonged schedules and unforeseen cost growth are reasons a vendor may 
prefer cost-based contracting,15 the hypothesized relationship did not hold. Unlike 
Hypothesis 2, the results appeared to be fairly robust. Overall, 25.3% of fixed-price contracts 
with durations greater than a year receive only one offer compared to 31.4% of cost-plus 
contracts. This gap narrows to less than a percentage point for large contracts and aircraft 
and drone contracts,  
Combination contract rates resembled fixed-price rates in most categories, with the 
exception of aircraft and drones where more than half of all competed contracts received 
only one offer. Further analysis may be merited to determine whether the hypothesis holds 
when the threshold is set at two or more years. 
Hypothesis 4: The potential for greater competition improves fixed-price 
performance. 
The hypothesis that fixed-price contests are preferred by acquisition officials when 
they are likely to receive more competition16 may indicate that contracts that are more likely 
to be competed will perform better. This hypothesis is not testable with this dependent 
variable. However, given the high variability for the Number of Offers Received for fixed-
price contracts and the number of evidence nodes influencing both competition and number 
of offers, this hypothesis should be straightforward to test in future stages. 
14 Cost-plus contracts are preferred to fixed-price contracts when a project is more complex. 
15 “But price redetermination might be used whenever contingency charges otherwise would be 
included in a contract price due to such factors as prolonged delivery schedules, unstable market 
conditions for material or labor, or uncertainty as to cost of performance” (Fixed Prices and Price 
Redetermination in Defense Contracts). 
16 “[Government principals] would prefer a fixed-price contract when the number of bidders increases” 
(Goel, 2001). 
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Hypothesis 5: Large software projects perform better as fixed-price contracts. 
Our results surrounding this hypothesis were inconclusive. We based the hypothesis 
on one piece of literature which stated that vendors prefer fixed-price contracts for 
software,17 contradicting other literature that hypothesized that venders prefer cost-plus 
contracts for larger, more complicated projects. For this iteration, Electronics and 
Communications services were used as a proxy for software. We found that for small 
contracts, the hypothesis holds, with fixed-price contracts nearly 10 percentage points less 
likely to receive one offer compared to cost-based (28.8% versus 38.7%). However, this 
relationship reverses itself for large contracts; 29% of fixed-price contracts receive only a 
single offer versus 21.2% of cost-based contracts.  
Conclusions 
This promising hypothesis testing shows the value of the Bayesian network built by 
the study team. The analysis of single-offer competition for larger R&D contracts confirmed 
the conventional wisdom that vendors would be less likely to bid on fixed-price contracts but 
also revealed an intriguing wrinkle that this does not hold for large IDV R&D contracts. In 
addition, both the model building and the hypothesis testing surprisingly failed to uncover a 
relationship between contract duration and the number of offers a contract received. Both 
the literature and practitioners have often mentioned the importance of contract duration, 
and it may prove more consequential for contract terminations and ceiling-raising change 
orders which the study team will explore as this work continues.  
Finally, the study team is excited to pursue the next steps of refining the model via 
external consultation and also expanding the model to include the remaining two dependent 
variables as well as a small number of intervening variables. The latest version of the model 
will be available at the CSISdefense GitHub account, and CSIS welcomes feedback from 
readers.18 
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Abstract 
The objective of this project is to research current pricing memorandums and determine 
whether the use of price analysis techniques and pricing memorandums can improve 
acquisition-pricing outcomes. The purpose of the research is to explore the efficacy of the 
government’s current documentation of price analysis information. The intent is to diagnose 
the price analysis techniques that are being utilized and documented in the contracting file, 
and to explore potential improvements. This analysis is based on a review of a sample size of 
contract files and a personnel survey at a Department of Defense contracting office. 
Introduction 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 significantly changed government 
procurement practices. This act expanded the definitions of a commercial item and a non-
developmental item, which in turn allowed vendors to avoid submission of certified cost and 
pricing data for commercial items in response to government contracting solicitations 
(Rumbaugh, 2010). One impact of this change is that contracting professionals must now 
look at market forces to establish price reasonableness for commercial item procurements. 
The importance of market research and price analysis methods has increased because of 
this change (Gera & Maddox, 2013). Since this change was made, the Department of 
Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) has issued multiple reports that are critical of 
contracting officers. Contracting officers have consistently failed to adequately justify price 
reasonableness, or they have failed to provide documentation that explains their price 
reasonableness determination. The purpose of this research is to explore which price 
analysis techniques are being utilized and documented in the contracting file, and to explore 
potential improvements within Department of Defense (DoD) Navy contracts. This project is 
a continuation of research accomplished on DoD contracts (Redfern, Nelson, & White, 2013; 
Gera & Maddox, 2013).  
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The objective of this project is to determine whether better use of price analysis 
techniques can improve DoD contract pricing. The intent is to diagnose both strengths and 
weaknesses and to explore potential improvements utilizing a contract file review and a 
personnel survey.  
Many government audit reports since 2001 have documented problems in 
determining fair and reasonable prices within the Department of Defense (DoD) and federal 
contracting generally.  
In July of 2014, another DoDIG report to the Director Defense Logistics Agency 
reviewed the prices for a sole-source commercial purchase. The DoDIG found that the 
contracting officer did not sufficiently determine whether prices were fair and reasonable for 
sole-sources spare parts negotiated for helicopters. The report found that the contracting 
officer used a previous purchase price without determining the reasonableness of that 
previous price and did not sufficiently review the contractor’s sales data in a noncompetitive 
environment. The report stated that the DLA potentially overpaid $9 million for this contract 
and may overpay as much as $2.6 million on future orders under this contract (DoDIG, 
2014). The audit recommended that the DLA establish a quality assurance process that 
reviews whether contracting officers verify and document that sufficient analysis was 
performed to determine if the previous price was justified in accordance with DFARS PGI 
215.403-3(4). The report was also directed to the Director of Defense Pricing. The report 
recommended that the Director of Defense Pricing issue guidance to establish a percentage 
of commercial sales that is suffcient to determine fair and reasonable prices when items are 
being acquired on a sole-source contract and market-based prices are used. The guidance 
should also require contracting officers to request information “other than certified cost or 
pricing data” to include cost data if sales data are not sufficient (DoDIG, 2014). 
Gera and Maddox made similar recommendations in their October 2013 report. They 
suggested that the DoD implement oversight procedures to ensure the price analysis is 
documented and reviewed for completeness and adequacy and that local activities include 
internal controls to make sure price analysis is being done properly. In addition, they both 
forecasted that when price analysis is done poorly, it could cost us thousands, if not millions, 
in higher prices, such as the $9 million overpay found by the DoDIG in 2014 (Gera & 
Maddox, 2013, p. 51).  
Previous research has been conducted on this subject outside of government audit 
reports. The findings from the research reports are consistent with the findings in 
government audit reports and do not appear to be surprising revelations. 
As briefly discussed, there are multiple findings of deficiencies in each of the 
inspection reports; however, there were five deficiencies that repeated themselves more 
than others. First, the lack of proper price reasonableness determination documentation in 
the contracting file was mentioned in six separate inspection reports. Second, the failure to 
properly challenge commercial item designations, and third, the failure to properly verify 
previous prices paid as fair and reasonable, were both mentioned in four different reports. 
Fourth, the audit reports suggest that the wording of cost or pricing data regulations for 
commercial items has led contracting officers to hesitate to ask, or fail to ask, for certified 
cost and pricing data. Fifth, high workload and the amount of qualified contracting personnel 
were mentioned in four different reports. 
In addition, the current authors highlighted three of the previously identified 
deficiencies (in Gera & Maddox, 2013). We then found that documentation of price 
reasonableness, and the failure to verify previous prices paid, were both apparent during the 
review of contract files during the research. The “personnel survey” results utilized during 
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the research identified that supervisors believed that manpower shortages were a reason for 
the failure to properly establish and document price reasonableness. Therefore, the recent 
research demonstrates that there is a consistency between the research findings and the 
inspection reports. 
The existing literature provides evidence that this problem of conducting effective 
price reasonableness determinations will not be solved in the short term. Further research 
on these concerns is warranted. 
Methodology 
Contract File Review 
We utilized a checklist for the contract file review. This checklist identified the price of 
each contract, commercial item designation, supply or service, estimates, competition, 
procedures, documentation present, and the price analysis techniques used. The 
parameters for file review were an acquisition price greater than $150,000 and under two 
years old. The DoD contracting office pulled a listing of contracts that met these parameters. 
Based on the contract list, we pulled randomly-selected files for review. The authors pulled a 
random sample of 30 contracts to provide the required data, and later we pulled another 20 
contracts for a total of 50 contracts to be reviewed. The contract file sample contained 50 
contract files valued at $72.2 million. They were a mix of supplies and services contracts. 
There were 19 contracts for the purchase of supplies valued at $23 million, and 31 contracts 
for services valued at $49.2 million. In addition, 41 of the 50 contracts (82%) in the sample 
were classified as commercial item contracts, and nine were classified as non-commercial; 
14 contracts of the 41 (34%) were missing a statement in the file documenting that the item 
met the commercial item definition. 
Personnel Survey 
We utilized a personnel survey to anonymously determine the skill level and 
knowledge for conducting price analysis and price reasonableness determinations. 
Contracting personnel possess different skills and knowledge depending on years of 
experience, certification level, and the types of procurements they are typically assigned. 
The survey was designed for the participants to assess their knowledge base and provide 
feedback on how often they utilize various pricing techniques. The personnel survey was 
limited to the contracting personnel who worked in the same office that the contracting files 
were reviewed in order to compare results of the personnel survey to the contract file review. 
There were 25 surveys completed out of a possible 50 personnel who met the qualifications 
described in Section III: Price Reasonableness Determination. One survey respondent 
completed the demographic information only, and 24 survey respondents completed the 
entire survey. There were two supervisors that completed the supervisor section of the 
survey. The research was based on 25 survey respondents for the demographic 
information, and 24 respondents for the specific activity and knowledge-base questions. The 
25 survey respondents who completed the demographic section of the survey indicated that 
18 people (72%) had greater than five years of acquisition and contracting experience, six 
people (24%) had three to five years of experience, and one person (4%) had less than 
three years of experience. None responded that they had less than one year of experience. 
Comparisons Between the Contract File Data and Contract Survey Data 
This section makes comparisons of the file data and the personnel survey data that 
were directly related. Comparisons are necessary in order to relate the two data sets to 
each other in order to draw conclusions and see whether the perceptions of the operators 
match with the reality we see in the random files. 
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There was some discussion of competition in the pricing memorandums in 23 of the 
50 contract files sampled. Pricing memorandums also indicated that one or more of the FAR 
15 price analysis techniques were utilized on 48 of the 50 (96%) of the contract actions 
sampled. Of the 48 pricing memorandums, only 27 (56%), were justified by our examination. 
When the 24 survey respondents were asked, “Do you execute a pricing memorandum (or 
something similar) in the corresponding contract file which explains how you determined the 
offered and awarded price (or modified price) as fair and reasonable?”, 21 people (88%) 
answered that they frequently executed a pricing memorandum, 19 people (79%) responded 
that a pricing memorandum was critical, and 19 people (79%) responded that they had 
advanced or expert proficiency in completing pricing memorandums. The use of quantitative 
techniques (price indexing) was found only twice in the sample; however, a majority 
indicated usage of quantitative techniques when determining price reasonableness. 
Supervisors where split on the skill level of their employees in this matter. 
There were 21 of 50 contract file actions that indicated that an IGCE was utilized for 
establishing price reasonableness; only five of those were substantiated by catalogs, 
contact with a vendor, or by a government technical report. When the 24 survey 
respondents were asked, “Does the customer provide an IGCE?”, seven people (29%) 
indicated that the requiring activity seldom/never provided an IGCE; seven people (29%) 
indicated that the requiring activity frequently provided an IGCE, and nine people (38%) 
indicated the customer always provided an IGCE. 
When the 24 survey respondents were asked, “If the customer provides an IGCE, is 
it substantiated?”, 13 people (54%) indicated that it was seldom or never substantiated. 
When the 24 survey respondents were asked about their ability to determine whether an 
IGCE was reliable, 16 people (67%) of the respondents indicated yes. When the 24 survey 
respondents were asked whether IGCEs were used to determine price reasonableness for 
services, 11 people (46%) indicated yes. 
A majority of contract files (25 of 32) in the sample contained market research 
information as required. The 18 contract actions were task/delivery orders where market 
research had occurred on the base contract and therefore were not counted. A majority of 
the contracting personnel surveyed indicated that market research was frequent (18 
people), critical (18 people), and that contracting personnel were proficient at conducting 
market research (19 people). In a majority of the cases, contracting personnel indicated that 
both the customer and the contract specialist both provided market research information; 
however, 13 people (54%) questioned the reliability of customer-provided information. In 12 
of the 25 research reports in the contract files pricing information in the market research was 
used for a price comparison.  
Research Questions and Findings 
We present answers to the research questions that drove this research by detailing 
applicable findings questions mentioned with our analysis of such. We follow these answers 
with our recommendations to the questions. In addition, the last two sections of this 
summary chapter include a discussion of the significance of the data we sampled for this 
report in comparison to what we found in our 2013 report, plus our suggestions for future 
research. 
1. Do pricing memorandums deviate from Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) , Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) requirements, 
and DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) procedures? There are 
multiple findings reqarding this question. Rather than grouping our findings into one answer, 
we have addressed them individually (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Summary of Inadequately Justified Price Analysis Documentation in the 
Files by FAR Price Analysis Technique 
 
1a. Inadequate Documentation Finding: A number of contract files that we 
reviewed were unable to demonstrate that prices paid were reasonable due to inadequate 
FAR price analysis methods, as depicted in Table 1: Summary of Inadequately Justified 
Price Analysis Documentation in the Files by FAR Price Analysis Technique.  
1a. Analysis: From this data, we determined that the personnel involved in 
performing these contract actions did not include sufficient documentation to support the 
price analysis method used as required by FAR and DFARS. Considering the number of 
inadequate price analysis found in our sampled memos, it appears that contracting 
personnel are not familiar with how to appropriately perform and document price analysis. In 
particular, two types of price analysis, prior prices and IGCEs were performed and 
documented incorrectly more than 50% of the time. See details specific to prior price and 
IGCEs as follows under answers for 1c and 3b. 
1a. Recommendation: A lack of supporting documentation could be easily corrected 
upon discovery by internal audits and returning the contract actions to have the applicable 
contracting personnel include the necessary documentation in the file. Additionally, 
reinforcement by internal procurement leadership in the importance of file documentation 
and including more hands on type training to make sure personnel understand what is and 
what is not proper supporting documentation. 
We came across impressive recommendations from the contracting personnel who 
completed the surveys. When asked for suggestions on improving pricing documentation 
within the agency, respondents made the following comments: 
• “It would be a good idea to review the FAR definitions of what constitutes an 
acceptable fair and reasonable determination. Even though training has been 
conducted on this topic, this is the sort of thing that should be reviewed 
periodically.” 
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• “A peer review could definitely be useful.” 
• “(Perform) in-house quality assurance surveillance assessment (QASA) 
reviews (on the contract files)and provide training from the findings.” 
When asked to make suggestions on DAU pricing courses, respondents replied with 
the following that support improved documentation: 
• “Having a ‘real’ contract to analyze would definitely improve the courses.” 
• “More on-site instruction. Not enough emphasis on sole-source/single source 
price analysis of commercial items. Most of the courses revolve around cost 
analysis—which is a small percentage of our buys. By the time we get an 
acquisition that requires cost analysis we’ve forgotten the course material 
(since most of the classes are taken within our 1st 2 years of employment).” 
• “Often the applicability and level of documentation is missed.” 
1b. Contract Review Board Checklist Finding: The contracting office for the DoD 
activity reviewed includes a local contract review board (CRB) checklist that also served as 
a business clearance memorandum (BCM) for significant actions as designated by the 
senior procurement officer. This checklist was extensive, including a section on pricing, and 
provided contracting personnel a means to check off any FAR/DFARS requirements, pre-
award administration policies, procedures, and techniques that were utilized. The use of this 
checklist as a BCM makes it difficult for contracting personnel to fail to at least identify the 
type of price analysis utilized in an award decision.  
1b. Analysis: We agree that the type of price analysis documented was indeed 
identified throughout the file review. It was the lack of poor documentation in the files that 
influenced our decisions to rate a pricing memo as justifiable or not. However, one would 
think that if the CRB were looking in depth into the documentation behind the identification 
of price analysis conducted, they would unearth some of the very same findings we made. 
Overall, we believe this checklist could be of use agency wide with the precaution of a 
deeper review of the documentation identified in the checklist.  
1b. Recommendation: Well written checklist are indeed helpful to both contracting 
personnel and for file reviewers. In particular, we found that file reviewers use the checklist 
without verifying the applicable documentation. Reviewers should build their own checklist 
based on the actual documentation they find and review instead of just using the existing 
checklist in the file for their review. 
1c. Comparison of Current Offered Pricing Findings: Eleven pricing 
memorandums included some comparisons of current proposed (offered) prices when the 
lowest price was smaller than 80% of the next lowest price. For example, if the prices are 
$10, $50, and $55, respectively, then lower than 80% would be anything lower than 80% x 
$50, which equals $40. So the lower quote of $10 would be considered smaller.  
In one file a price from a technically unacceptable offeror was still used to make a 
price comparison. This inappropriate comparison raises the issue that although competition 
is present and sought, is there actual price competition? 
1c. Analysis: Proposed prices that are not within 80% of the next lowest price raise 
questions to the reliability of the proposed prices, and the existence of actual price 
competition. This could indicate that there is a mistake in offered price, a misunderstanding 
of the contract requirements, etc. In few cases there was documentation that included some 
determination of why there was such a large gap between the lowest price and next valid 
price or a price verification request by the CO to the lowest offeror.  
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According to the FAR Part 6, the award of a contract to a supplier based on lowest 
evaluated price alone can be false economy if there is subsequent default, late deliveries, or 
other unsatisfactory performance resulting in additional contractual or administrative costs. 
While it is important that government purchases be made at the lowest price, this does not 
require an award to a supplier solely because that supplier submits the lowest offer.  
1c. Recommendation: A contractor who cannot perform is never a good deal at any 
price. More affirmative action needs to be taken by contracting personnel to affirm an 
offeror’s ability to perform at a low price which is considerably lower than the next offered 
price to ensure that the low price is fair and reasonable. 
1d. Comparison of Proposed Price to Previous Price (Historical) Findings: 
Comparison of proposed prices to previous (historical) prices paid was utilized on 12 
contract actions. In the seven instances that had an invalid previous price documented in 
the file, there was a previous price that could not be validated for one or more of the reasons 
displayed in Figure 1. Invalid previous (historical) prices were found because of one or more 
of the following reasons: time lapse, changes to terms and conditions, or uncertain 
reasonableness of the prior price. 
 
 Figure 1. Contract File Data—Prior Price Disqualifiers 
1d. Analysis: If invalid previous prices are utilized, then price reasonableness has 
not actually been determined. For example, it would not be sufficient to use price(s) from a 
database produced by another contract specialist without understanding the type of analysis 
that was performed to determine the price. DoD-strengthened guidance on this subject is in 
PGI 215.403-3(4). 
Since previous price comparison is one of the two preferred price analysis 
techniques, it is used quite often by contracting personnel in determining price 
reasonableness. This method is effective provided the validity of the comparison (similar 
items, categories, quantities, quality, qualifications, and/or circumstances) and the 
reasonableness of the previous price(s) can be established. 
In this sample, more than 50% of the previous price comparisons made were invalid 
since the previous price was not verified. This illustrates why the authors determined that 
the contracts sampled do deviate from FAR/DFARS/PGI requirements and procedures. 
Further, If contracting personnel are not diligent in validating previous prices prior to using 
them for current pricing actions, then unreasonable prices can continuously perpetuate 
themselves into future contracting actions.  
1d. Recommendation: Contracting personnel must first validate previous prices 
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make them comparable with the current offered price. If the previous price is not found to be 
valid, the contract specialist or contracting officer must find another method to determine 
price reasonableness. In-house reinforcement of how a previous price is verified is needed 
in this contracting activity. The DAU must include more classroom focus on this subject. The 
authors plan to write an article to be included in the National Contract Management 
Association Journal to assist in spreading the importance of perfoming this type of price 
analysis correctly. 
Also, consider the following response to the DoDIG by the Director Defense Pricing 
for such situations. He suggested that contracting personnel use the support of the Pricing 
Centers of Excellence and the Contract Business Analysis Repository Information (CBAR) 
database. He stated that both methods are designed to supplement and improve the pricing 
skills of the acquisition workforce (DoDIG, 2014). 
The authors agree that the Defense Director recommendation to use the CBAR 
database is useful, but its focus is on contract pricing actions exceeding $25 million. Also, 
the CBAR database does not include contractor sales data or validity of previous prices, 
which is what the DoDIG report number 2014-088 referred to.  
2. Do pricing memorandums document the type of price analysis used in 
pricing formulation? What price analysis methods are being used?  
Findings: All of the pricing memos documented some type of price analysis used in 
determining that the price was reasonable. The research findings show that 23 of the files 
used current competitive prices as a price analysis method (which is 46% of the total files). 
Comparison with the IGCE was documented in 21 pricing memos out of the 50 files, namely, 
42% of the files. Previous prices (historical) documentation and comparison through market 
research were present in 12 of the 50 files, totaling 48% of the files as seen in Figure 2. 
 
 Figure 2. Contract File Data—Price Analysis Techniques Used 
Analysis: Current offered prices led the type of price analysis techniques used; 
IGCEs came closely behind, according to the contract files sampled. It is noteworthy that the 
contract files documented that adequate price competition through current offered prices is 
prevalent in most of the reviewed files. Normally, adequate price compeition establishes 
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reliable as current offered prices so their usefullness is questioned. Further price analysis 
techniques should supplement an IGCE. 
The application of price analysis techniques is notable. Contracting personnel at this 
office recognize the importance of price analysis in determining price reasonableness. 
However, as discussed in Question 1a (Inadequate Documentation), contracting personnel 
did not include sufficient documentation to support the price analysis method used as 
required by FAR and DFARS. Without the proper supporting documentation, the value of the 
techniques used are questionable.  
Recommendation: Clearly the routine use of price analysis techniques is certainly 
present in pricing memos so recommendation is required. However, the recommended 
solutions for inadequate documentaion under 1a apply at this point. 
3. Do pricing memorandums refer to market research information or IGCE 
information? The findings regarding market research and IGCEs are not grouped 
together and we have addressed them individually, as follows: 
3a. Market Research Findings: There were 12 contract pricing memorandums 
reviewed in the contract files that did utilize market research reports to establish price 
reasonableness, and a majority of the files in the sample contained market research reports; 
namely, of the 27 market research reports, 18 (67%) of those contracts addressed the type 
of pricing data collected, as shown in Figure 3. There were nine contracts in the sample that 
did not address the type of pricing data collected in the market research report, and there 
were five contracts in the sample that did not have a market research report that should 
have. In seven files, the IGCE and market research report were combined into one 
document. 
 
 Figure 3. Contract File Data—Market Research Reports That Address Price 
When the 24 survey respondents were asked whether the customer provided market 
research information, 21 people (88%) responded that both the requiring activity and the 
contracting activity provided market research information. When asked about the adequacy 
of the market research information, 13 people (54%) indicated the customer seldom 
provided adequate market research information, nine people (38%) indicated that the 
customer frequently provided adequate market research information, and 8% of the 
respondents indicated the customer never provided adequate market research information 
3a. Analysis: The authors found that market research is included in most of the files 
we reviewed. Market research does improve the buyers’ understanding of pricing in the 
marketplace. The authors didn’t look in depth at the quality of the market research reports 
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the authors conclude that market research reports, if reviewed, would have improved the 
buyers’ understanding of pricing in the marketplace. Redfern et al. (2013) found that 
contracting personnel did not always believe customer-provided information to be adequate; 
our research draws the same conclusion. According to the contracting personnel survey, 13 
people (54%) indicated the customer seldom provided adequate market research 
information. Also, the authors found that reports that combined an IGCE with market 
research were confusing as to whether market research was done to support the IGCE or as 
full market research reports.  
3a. Recommendation: Reliable market research from their customers/requirement 
activities will improve the buyers’ understanding of the marketplace. It will also give the 
buyer an opportunity to make better decisions when it comes to prices offered. The 
contracting and requiring activities should review agency guidance on market research and 
consider combined in house training. This will give both parties responsible for market 
research an opportunity to express their issues with conducting market research, 
documenting market research, and applying the information in the the market research 
report to inform pricing determinations.  
Gera and Maddox (2013) recommended that FAR Part 10 require that pricing be 
discussed in the market research reports (p. 54). The FAR identifies market research as a 
method for determining price reasonableness, but does not require that pricing be 
documented in the report. The authors still have the same opinion and would like to include 
a more extensive review of market research reports in the files. 
For future research, the authors should review the quality of the market research 
reports. Knowledge of marketplace suppliers and prices can be critical to the government’s 
ability to negotiate a reasonable price. Poorly done market research could lessen an 
activity’s ability to achieve fair and reasonable prices. The authors would focus our research 
on how market research was conducted, and if it informed and influenced the contracting 
officer’s analysis of price reasonableness. 
3b. IGCE Findings: The IGCE has two roles: one, as price analysis technique per 
FAR Parts 13 and 15, and two, IGCEs also support what the customer and contracting 
offices believes is the “should price” and should be completed before receipt of price 
proposals. In answering this question, the authors are only examining the IGCE’s role as a 
price analysis technique. 
Next to current offered prices, IGCEs were heavily used as the basis for price 
reasonableness in 21 of the 50 files, essentially 42% of the contract actions reviewed. 
However, the authors found that only five of the 21 IGCEs used for determining price 
reasonableness could be substantiated and determined reliable. When the 24 survey 
respondents were asked, “If the customer provides an IGCE, is it substantiated?”, 13 people 
(54%) indicated that it was seldom or never substantiated.When the 24 survey respondents 
were asked about their ability to determine whether an IGCE was reliable, 16 people (67%) 
indicated yes. When the 24 survey respondents were asked whether IGCEs were used to 
determine price reasonableness for services, 11 people (46%) indicated yes. 
Gera and Maddox (2013) recommended that agencies increase the importance of 
IGCEs. The contracting office we reviewed provided an IGCE template to the acquisition 
customer for assistance in filling out IGCEs since they are required to be completed by the 
acquisition customer. The IGCEs were required to be completed before receipt of the 
contractor’s price proposal. No further guidance on how complete the template was 
available. An IGCE was required on each purchase, but the template standard varied 
depending on whether the purchase was for supplies or services. A vendor quote would 
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satisfy the requirement for a commercial item supply purchase, but a more substantiated 
IGCE was required for services or non-commercial procurements.  
The FAR lists an IGCE as a price analysis technique in both Parts 13 and 15, but it 
does not elaborate on what substantiates an IGCE. Best practices in pricing handbooks 
require that the source and methodology used in developing IGCEs be documented. More 
detailed information is found in CPRG Volume 1, paragraph 6.1.5, on techniques to properly 
validate and use an IGCE (Office of the Deputy Director of Defense, 2012).  
3b. Analysis of IGCEs: The use of an IGCE to determine price reasonableness is 
frequent, and the reliability of IGCEs is not consistent. The contract personnel survey 
findings noted that more than 54% believed that IGCE are never substantiated by the 
custormer but that 67% personally knew how to determine the reliability of an IGCE. Our 
actual contract file review findings raise questions regarding what the personnel in this 
survey considered to be a reliable IGCE. In contrast, only 23% of the IGCEs used in 
determing a fair and reasonable price could be substaniated as reliable. This real finding in 
the contract files contrasts with what contracting personnel perception that they know what 
is a reliable IGCE is. The fact that more than 54% questioned the reliability of a customer’s 
IGCE is discouraging because the customer’s IGCEs are still being used for determing price 
reasonableness.  
We found that IGCEs were used as a primary price analysis comparison in 42% of 
the contract files we reviewed. In conclusion, this contracting office’s IGCEs basically are not 
effective in determining price reasonableness. However,the contracting personnel are still 
using the IGCE on a regular basis to determine a price is fair and reasonable though the 
contracting personnel know they are most likely not reliable. The fact that 77% of the IGCEs 
the authors examined are unreliable and, conversely, that 64% of the personnel think they 
know what a reliable IGCE is, indicates that the IGCEs in this contracting office’s files are 
truly questionable. 
3b. Recommendations: The reliability of the IGCE should be considered when 
determining the usefulness of this technique. The authors recommend that contracting 
personnel become acquainted with what is a reliable IGCE by reviewing CPRG Volume 1, 
paragraph 6.1.5, on techniques to properly validate and use of an IGCE. DAU needs to add 
focus on the importance of the IGCE what makes it reliable in their pricing courses.  
In addition, the authors still find last year’s recommendation in their 2013 report also 
applicable. The authors propose that government activities increase the importance of 
IGCEs and consider the following steps to make IGCEs more reliable for use in conducting 
price analysis: (1) the contract specialists should be presented with good training on what 
good IGCEs are and what to document, (2) the individuals that develop IGCEs need to know 
how to do it (there should be more specific training in this area), (3) an online check system 
should be put in place where government IGCEs are accepted if and only if the 
substantiation is provided, and (4) there should be consideration to acknowledge IGCEs in 
the FAR/DFAR/PGI with more importance than it currently is given. The policy-makers need 
to appreciate how much IGCEs are being used and how more guidance will assist s in 
determining what the contract specialist “should pay” and hopefully giving the contract 
specialists the ammunition to negotiate better prices (Gera & Maddox, 2013, p. 62). 
4. If deviations in pricing memorandums exist, do they differ by the same 
characteristics and/or by unsimilar characteristics? 
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In 46% of the files, deviations in pricing memorandums do exist as depicted as 
inadequate justification in Table 2. Some deviations found in the files reviewed were 
consistently the same and others uniquely not similar to others.  
Table 2. Contract File Data—Adequate vs. Inadequate Justification for Price 
Reasonableness 
 
A majority of the pricing memorandums do deviate by two consistent characteristics: 
the lack of supporting documentation to justify the technique utilized to establish price 
reasonableness, and the use of unsupported IGCEs. See findings that support inadequate 
documentation under the answers to 1a and findings behind the unsupported IGCEs in the 
answers to Question 3b. 
The pricing memorandums in the sample reviewed established that the contract 
specialist determined price reasonableness as well as listed the technique utilized; however, 
substantiating documentation (e.g., calculation sheets, reference materials such as catalog 
data found on line, copy of previous price documentation, and methodology) are not always 
included, supporting the source of their recommendations. A very small percentage of the 
IGCEs in the contract files were reliable enough to support that the offered price being 
analyzed was indeed reasonable. Contracting personnel listed the IGCE as justifying the 
price of 17 service and four supporting contracts. Only five of the 21 were judged as reliable 
and therefore substantiated by the authors. 
Some of the files reviewed contained unique deviations in their pricing memos 
(Maddox, Fox, & Gera, 2014). 
5. What are the most predominant price analysis techniques exercised in 
purchasing supplies versus services? 
This data is listed in Table 3, and offers insight into the predominant type of price 
analysis techniques exercised in purchasing supplies versus services. 
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Table 3. Contract File Data—Answers to the Question “What Was the 
Documented Justification for Price Reasonableness?” 
Price Justification in Pricing Memos  Total number Supply Services 
Comparison to current offered price? 23 10 13 
Comparison to previous prices paid? 12 4 8 
Parametric estimating? 0 0 0 
Competitive published price lists? 6 5 1 
Comparison of proposed prices with 
independent government cost estimates? 21 4 17 
Comparison of proposed prices obtained 
through market research? 12 5 
7 
Analysis of sales data provided by the 
offeror? 1 1 0 
Findings: According to the contract file data sampled, contracts for both supplies 
and service made use of comparisons to current offered prices and market research prices 
equally as price analysis techniques.  
Services are far more dependent on IGCEs than supplies. We found that 17 of 31, or 
55%, of service contracts tapped IGCEs as a primary price analysis technique. Only four of 
19 supplies, 21%, benefitted from IGCEs.  
Supplies take advantage of competitive price lists in justifying price reasonableness 
much more often than services. Five out of six employments of competitive price lists as a 
price analysis technique, represents a rate of 83% utilization for supplies versus services. 
Analysis: The authors don’t know the why part of the answer, but can infer that it is 
much easier to find prices in the marketplace for supplies than for services, thus the use of 
competitive price lists. For services, there is more dependence on IGCEs to make price 
comparisons, since IGCEs generally disclose an estimate of labor hours by the type of effort 
required. IGCEs are more effective for justifying the price of services than other price 
analysis techniques outside of two or more current offered prices. 
Recommendations: This is the same recommendation as last year’s report by Gera 
and Maddox (2013):  
Buying services is different than buying supplies; that also means that they 
are different when it comes to pricing. A step should be added to the services 
acquistion guidebook that focuses just on the pricing of services. Possibly the 
FAR, DFARS, and PGI need to reframe price analysis methods that are more 
useful in purchasing services, as opposed to current references to supplies 
only.  
One of the authors discussed the uniqueness of pricing services with Frank Kendall, 
U.S. defense undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics at 2014’s AFCEA 
symposium. He agreed and encourage the author to explore that concern. Unfortunately she 
is no longer instructing in contract pricing. She is now holding employment that little allows 
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this type of activity nor the access to students and peers in generating new ideas. A review 
of how the commercial world prices services would have been the place to start. 
IGCEs play such an important part in pricing services as a “should price” before the 
request for vendor prices and as a tool to determine price reasonableness after a price is 
proposed. The generation of local guidance and policies and actual instruction to educate 
the customer/requirements personnel could bring true and valuable savings.  
6. Why do pricing memorandums lack sufficient justifications and supporting 
information? What challenges are present in executing price analysis? 
Findings: When the 24 survey respondents were asked what the challenges in 
executing price analysis, determining price reasonableness, and documenting were, four 
people (17%) indicated a lack of knowledge in conducting price reasonableness 
determinations, nine people (38%) indicated the amount of time to complete price 
reasonableness determinations, four people (17%) gave other reasons as challenges, and 
seven people (29%) did not answer the question (see Figure 4). 
 
 Figure 4. Answers to the Question “What Is Your Challenge in Executing Price 
Analysis, Determining Price Reasonableness, and Documenting?” 
The respondents who indicated other reasons gave the following inputs: 
• “Lack of competition and sufficient IGCEs can be somewhat challenging.” 
• “Sole-source acquisitions—finding similar products in the market to compare 
prices with.” 
• “Conducting market research when the item is sole source/single source and 
no other vendors can provide price quote.” 
• “Inadequate product description from the requiring activity.”  
• “Lack of similar offerings; sole source prevents apples-to-apples price 
analysis with other offerings.” 
Analysis: Redfern et al. (2013) found that pricing memorandums lack justifications 
and supporting information because of a lack of time to complete adequate price 
reasonableness determinations. Our research draws the same conclusion. A majority of the 
survey respondents who answered this question also gave specific reasons as to why time 
was a challenge. Each comment can be linked to specific time-related measures, such as 
procurement action lead times (PALT) or other time-consuming activities directly linked to 
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The personnel survey results indicates that the contracting personnel in the surveyed 
office were well qualified, with a majority of personnel having more than five years of 
experience. Eighteen of 24 surveyed had both Level I and II pricing course, namely 75%. 
However, four personnel had no Level I pricing training. Price Analysis is only taught in 
Level I courses.  
The survey did not ask respondents to quantify manpower shortages, but at least 
one supervisor did believe manpower shortages were a problem for the agency. The 
supervisor’s opinion that manpower shortages are a problem is consistent with the findings 
of several DoDIG reports that found high workloads and shortages of qualified personnel 
lead to the government paying more than what is fair and reasonable.  
Another supervisor identifed the skill level of the employees as the organization’s 
biggest challenge. Considering the poor quality of price analysis (unjustified) documentation 
found in 23 of 50, 46% of files reviewed, the authors agree and conclude that employees 
skill levels are not up to standard. 
Overall, the use of price analysis techniques are common, but there are serious 
deficiences when it comes to actually using the techniques correctly and including proper 
supporting documentation. Poor documentation to support the price reasonableness 
determination was the biggest weakness. When competition by itself does not establish 
price reasonableness, the most utilized techniques for determining price reasonableness 
within this office were comparison through market research, comparison to previous pricing, 
and comparison to IGCEs. The use of indexing, regression, and parametric analysis is 
uncommon for commercial item purchases; however, contracting professionals in this 
contracting office are aware of the techniques and are trained to use them. Consistent with 
DoDIG report findings, this contracting activity is concerned with high workloads and 
shortages of personnel. Survey results and comments show that contracting personnel are 
spending time either validating customer requirements or researching requirements on their 
own to validate inadequate customer provided market research information and customer-
provided IGCE documentation.  
The contracting office that provided the contract file data and personnel survey data 
is concerned with pricing inaccuracies and seeks to constantly improve its adherence to 
policy with extensive internal reviews. However, the number of unjustified pricing memos we 
reviewed is worrisome. The authors found that over $3 million in supplies and $39 million in 
services was not adequately justified for price reasonableness.  
Recommendation: This activity needs to take a hard look at what is disabling the 
personnel in their activity from performing price analysis properly, such as  
• Determine if their current assessment methods like the contract review board 
and quality assurance assessment team consistently follow price 
reasonableness standards in accordance with the FAR/DFARS. 
• Train and retrain contracting personnel on price analysis techniques in 
determining price reasonableness along with what is proper support 
documentation for pricing.  
• Eliminate or reduce the challenges that contracting personnel have in 
executing proper price reasonableness. For example, guidance is needed on 
“conducting market research when the item is sole source/single source and 
no other vendors can provide price quote.” 
• Add adequate guidance on the preparation of IGCEs and market reseach 
reports by customers (requiring activities). 
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Comparison to Past Research 
Contract File Data 
It would be easy to just go table by table and list the differences and the similarities, 
but we want to focus on the real reason why we are doing this research and what we have 
learned so far. Basically, the authors wanted to know if price analysis and the associated 
price analysis techniques are being exercised and conducted correctly in determing price 
reasonableness. The authors believe that when price analysis is not conducted properly, 
there is reason to believe the prices offerred and paid are unreasonable.  
Our data in this report came from a different agency. Dollar values were higher 
(nothing below $150,000), and there appeared to be much more oversight of buys at any 
value within this agency. Little use of Part 13 simplified pricing proceedures were found, like 
last year’s data in purchasing commercial items. However, with all of these differences, the 
results are very much the same, such as 
• Inadequate documentation  
• Little use of quantitative skills learned in pricing classes  
• Unreliable IGCEs 
• Infrequent requests for offeror data when needed  
This year, the authors added emphasis on auditing previous prices as a price 
justification and particularly if they were sole source. In many of the contract files reviewed, 
the authors found that contract specialists were using previous prices that were not 
reasonable and continuously perpetuating the same unreasonable price for justification on 
other proposed price. The authors also prodded further into the documentation that used 
current offered prices as the price justification. The authors found that contracting personnel 
were not verifying low prices that were considerably less than the next offered price. It would 
have been interesting to find out if the contractor in those cases actually delivered at such 
low prices. In reviewing what type of price justifications are used in supplies versus services, 
the authors found few differences. Essentially, in cases other than current offered prices, 
IGCEs were the most used for justifying a price for services and published price lists/market 
research for supplies. One significant improvement in our current research was the access 
to real paper files. In 2014, the current authors had only access to electronic files. It was 
hard to retrieve and review files if they were not well filed. Having paper files to review 
allowed the authors to now look more closely at the documentation, and it was much easier 
to find documentation misfiled or misnamed.  
The authors’ recommendations are not very different. They are similar issues, same 
suggestions. The authors would like to conduct a comprehensive exploration of market 
research reports. The authors think there may be a link to why so many IGCEs are 
unreliable.  
Inaccuracies in pricing memorandums can result in increased procurement costs, 
sustained protests, and loss of agency contracting authority, and the authors conclude that 
those inaccuracies continue to occur at most, if not all, DoD agencies. The big questions is, 
can we remove the reasons for these inaccuracies?  
Personnel Survey Data 
In comparing the current research surveys to last year’s report, one would think this 
is the same personnel who submitted their responses. The majority of the personnel have 
more than five years of experience in supplies or services. There are few responses from 
personnel with three or fewer years’ experience. The majority were qualified at Level II. Very 
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few were at Level III. Most had taken Level I and II contract pricing courses. “Time to 
complete” and “inadequate skill level” were still the challenge in executing price analysis 
according to the nonsupervisory personnel. In both years, supervisors pointed to skill level 
as an issue. In comparing the file data and survey data, personnel responded that they use 
quantitative methods often, but the authors did not find any real use of quantitative methods 
in the contract file pricing documentation.  
The authors’ added new questions to the survey that directly asked the survey 
participant to rate the effectiveness of DAU contract pricing classes. The majority said they 
were effective. However, all the written comments by the surveyed participants supported 
that price analysis is underemphasized in the DAU courses. In potential future research 
efforts, the researchers will consider scaling down the personnel survey questions and focus 
on the areas of price analysis where the authors historically found inadequate 
documentation, and explore survey participants’ opinions on why the use of IGCEs are more 
prevalent in service versus supply purchases. 
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Abstract 
We have been studying DoD acquisition decision-making since 2009. The U.S. DoD 
acquisition process is extremely complex. There are three key processes that must work in 
concert to deliver capabilities: determining warfighters’ requirements/needs, the DoD budget 
planning, and the procurement of final products. Each process produces large amounts of 
information (Big Data). There is a critical need for automation, validation, and discovery to 
help acquisition professionals, decision-makers, and researchers understand the important 
content within large data sets and optimize DoD resources throughout the processes. Lexical 
Link Analysis (LLA) can help, by applying automation to reveal and depict—to decision-
makers—the correlations, associations, and program gaps across all or subsets of acquisition 
programs over many years. This enables strategic understanding of data gaps and potential 
trends, and can inform managers where areas might have higher program risk and how 
resource and big data management might affect the desired return on investment among 
projects. In this paper, we describe new developments in analytics and visualization, how 
LLA is adaptive to Big Data Architecture and Analytics (BDAA), and needs for Big Acquisition 
Data used in Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE). 
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Background 
We have been studying Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition decision-making 
since 2009 (Gallup et al., 2009; Zhao, Gallup, & MacKinnon, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 
2013, 2014). The U.S. DoD acquisition process is extremely complex. There are three key 
processes that must work in concert to deliver capabilities: definition of warfighters’ 
requirements/needs, DoD budget planning, and procurement of products, as in Figure 1. 
Each process produces volumes of information (Big Data). The need for automation, 
validation, and discovery is now a critical need, as acquisition professionals, decision-
makers, and researchers grapple to understand data and make decisions to optimize DoD 
resources. 
 
 Figure 1. DoD Acquisition Decision-Making 
Since 2009, we have been working on the problem of how the interlocking systems 
processes become aware of their fit between DoD programs and warfighters’ needs. How 
are gaps revealed? Moreover, in the performance of DoD acquisition processes, each 
functional community is required to review only the particular information for which it is 
responsible, further exacerbating the problem of lack of fitness. For example, the systems 
engineering community typically only examines the engineering documents and feasibility 
studies, the test and evaluation community looks only at the test and evaluation plans, and 
the acquisition community looks at the acquisition strategies. Rarely do these stakeholders 
review each other data or jointly discuss the core questions and integrated processes 
together as shown in Figure 1. 
Motivated by this lack of fit and horizontal integration, we have been applying Lexical 
Link Analysis (LLA), a data-driven automation technology and methodology across DoD 
acquisition processes to 
• surface themes and their relationships across multiple data sources 
• discover high value areas for investment 
• compare/correlate data from multiple data sources 
• sort/rank important and interesting information 
LLA is a data-driven method for pattern recognition, anomaly detection, and data 
fusion. It shares indexes not data, feasible for parallel and distributed processing, adaptive 
to Big Data Architecture and Analytics (BDAA) and needs for Big Acquisition Data. 
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As an example from past work, we took a detailed look at the Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget modification practice from one year to 
the next over the course of 10 years and about 450 DoD program elements. We found a 
pattern that the programs with fewer links (measured by LLA) to warfighters’ requirements 
received more budget reduction in total but less on average, indicating the budget reduction 
may have focused only on large and expensive programs rather than perhaps cutting all the 
programs that do not match warfighters’ requirements. Furthermore, the programs with more 
links to each other received more budget reduction in total, as well as on average, indicating 
a pattern of good practice of allocating DoD acquisition resources to avoid overlapping 
efforts and to fund new and unique projects. These findings were useful as validation and 
guidance for future decision processes for automatically identifying programs to match the 
warfighter’s requirements, limit overall spending, minimize efficiencies, eliminate 
unnecessary cost, and maximize the return on investment.  
In this paper, we demonstrate a set of comprehensive LLA analysis reports and 
visualizations generated automatically from multiple data sources. These reports and 
visualizations reveal data correlations and gaps among multiple data sources. These 
correlations and gaps could form the basis for pattern recognition, anomaly detection, and 
further inquiry or future reconciliation of the expectations (e.g., acquisition strategy) and 
realities (e.g., engineering feasibility) from various communities. The automatic discovery of 
the disconnection or gaps could be fed back to the human analysts or decision-makers for 
decision-making and resource management. 
Methodology 
Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) 
LLA has been used to analyze unstructured and structured data for pattern 
recognition, anomaly detection, and data fusion. It uses the theory of system self-awareness 
(SSA) to identify high-value information in the data that can be used to guide future decision 
processes in a data-driven or unsupervised learning fashion. It is implemented via a smart 
infrastructure named “system and method for knowledge pattern search from networked 
agents (U.S. patent 8,903,756),” also known as Collaborative Learning Agents (CLA), 
licensed from Quantum Intelligence, Inc. (Zhou, Zhao, & Kotak, 2009). 
In LLA, a complex system is expressed in specific vocabularies or lexicons to 
characterize its features, attributes, or surrounding environment. LLA uses bi-gram word 
pairs as the features to form word networks. Figure 2 depicts using LLA to analyze 10 years 
of reports in the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Acquisition Research Program with word 
pairs as groups or themes. Figure 3 shows a detail of a theme in Figure 2. A node 
represents a word. A link or edge represents a word pair.  
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 Figure 2. Themes Discovered in Colored Groups 
 
 Figure 3. A Detailed View of a Theme in Figure 2 
LLA is related to bags-of-words (BAG) methods such as LDA (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 
2003) and text-as-network (TAN) methods such as the Stanford Lexical Parser (SLP; 
Stanford Natural Language Processing Group [SNLPG], 2015). LLA selects and groups 
features into three basic types: 
• Popular (P): They are the main themes in the data. Figure 3 is an example of 
a popular theme centered around word nodes “analysis,” “model,” and 
“approach.” These themes could be less interesting because they are already 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 348 - 
in the public consensus and awareness. They represent the patterns in the 
data. 
• Emerging (E): Themes may grow to be popular over time. Figure 4 is an 
example of an emerging theme centered around word nodes “national,” 
“defense,” and “acquisition.” 
• Anomalous (A): These themes may be off-topic themes that are interesting 
for further investigation. Figure 5 is an example of anomalous theme centered 
around word nodes “stock” and “market(s).” 
 
 Figure 4. An Example of Emerging Theme 
 
 Figure 5. An Example of Anomalous Theme 
Figure 6 summarizes LLA used for historical and new data. The red part shows a 
pattern (e.g., a theme) discovery phase using historical data including data fusion that come 
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from multiple learning agents. The black part shows an application phase that new data is 
compared with the patterns discovered and hence the anomalies are revealed. 
 
 Figure 6. Diagram for the LLA Method 
Word Pairs Generalization and CCC Method 
Figure 7 shows the word pairs/bi-gram in an LLA can be generalized as a Context-
Concept-Cluster (CCC) model, where a context is a generic attribute that can be shared by 
multiple data sources, a concept is a specific attribute for a data source, and a cluster is a 
combination of attributes or themes that can be computed using a word community finding 
algorithm (e.g., Girvan & Newman, 2002) in Figure 6 to characterize a data set. Context can 
be a word, location, time, or object, and so on. 
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 Figure 7. The Word Pairs/Bi-Gram in LLA a Context-Concept-Cluster (CCC) Model 
Figure 8 summarizes how a generalized CCC method is used for historical and new 
data. Similar to Figure 6, there is a pattern discovery phase using historical data where 
patterns are learned and discovered, and an application phase for a new data is compared 
with the patterns discovered, and anomalies are revealed. 
 
 Figure 8. Diagram for the CCC Model 
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Research Results 
Task 1 
We are working with the OSD OUSD(ATL) (US) to install the LLA/SSA/CLA system 
as a web service using a Linux platform (i.e., CentOS) in the Defense Acquisition Visibility 
Environment (DAVE) test bed. We created a publically available data set with the installation 
to test. In this example, data sources include 10 days of business news of about 1,000 
companies, which are organized in industries as follows: 
• Technology  
• Services 
• Healthcare  
• Utilities 
• Basic Materials 
• Financial 
• Consumer Goods 
• Industrial Goods 
• Conglomerates 
Each category of information such as “Healthcare” or “Consumer Goods” are 
indexed, mined, and listed under “Index Management” separately in a single LLA server. 
When clicking “Fuse,” these indexed/mined models are fused into one model. Figure 9 
shows “Fuse Results” from LLA listed. 
 
 Figure 9. Fuse Results Listed 
Figure 10 shows the discovered themes, where green themes 101(P) and 20(P) are 
“popular” themes, blue themes 156(E), 49(E), and 46(E) are “emerging” themes, and gold 
themes 208(A), 62(A), and others are “anomalous” themes. 
• Popular themes are the main themes in the data. Figure 11 is an example of 
a popular theme centered “dividend cuts, see dividend” for this data. Columns 
“Consensus” is the ratio of the number of matched word pairs (i.e., at least 
two data sources contain the word pairs) over the number of unique word 
pairs (i.e., only one data source contains the word pairs). These themes 
could be less interesting because they are already in the public consensus 
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and awareness. They represent the patterns in the data. The red links 
represent the word pairs that are shared for at least two data sources while 
the black data sources are unique to one data source. 
• Emerging themes may grow to be popular over time. Figure 12 is an example 
of an emerging theme centered “back shares, Canada back.”  
• Anomalous themes may be off-topic themes that are interesting for further 
investigation. Figure 13 is an example of anomalous theme centered around 
“top buys, set top.” Anomalous concepts are more interesting to investigate, 
for example, concepts in Figure 13 such as “buys web,” “streaming service,” 
“buys insider,” “web ipo,” and so on, may have better returns on investment 




 Figure 10. Discovered Themes Listed 
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 Figure 11. Visualization for the Popular Theme 101(P) 
 
 Figure 12. Emerging Themes (e.g., 156[E]) 
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 Figure 13. Anomalous Theme (e.g., 208[A]) 
Match Matrix Unique Word Pairs by Theme 
Figure 14 shows the numbers of unique word pairs in a data source and a theme. 
For example, there are 12 unique word pairs for the data source “Index_BasicMaterials” in 
the theme titled “101:dividend cuts, sees dividend” in Figure 14. Clicking this number leads 
to a list showing the 12 word pairs as shown in Figure 15. Figure 16 shows the list can be 
further drilled down to a search result list (e.g., “sees energy”) and to the original documents 
that contain the word pair. 
 
 Figure 14. Match Matrix Unique Word Pairs by Theme 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 355 - 
 
 Figure 15. Drill-Down List for the Unique Word Pairs in Theme 101 and 
Index_BasicMaterial 
 
 Figure 16. Drill-Down Search on “Sees Energy” 
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Match Matrix 
Figure 17 shows the match matrix for comparing data sources. The column “Match 
Score” shows the number of matched word pairs for Index_BasicMaterials. “5.00(0.02)” 
shows the number (5) of matched word pairs and correlation (0.02) between 
Index_BasicMaterials and Index_Financial. The correlation, computed as 
=5/(sqrt(30+223)*sqrt(28+270)), is normalized using the match scores and uniqueness 
scores for both data sources. Clicking on the “5.00(0.02)” leads to the list of the matched 
word pairs for the two sources as shown in Figure 18. Clicking on “Energy Prices” or “Oil 
Fund” (i.e., the red boxes in Figure 18) leads to the search results of two terms respectively. 
The search results are sorted in a descending order of the counts of how many “popular,” 
“emerging,” and “anomalous” word pairs appear in the original documents. For example, 
some marketing applications may need listing the popular terms, and business intelligence 
applications may need listing anomalous terms as shown in Figure 19 (a) and (b) 
respectively. Clicking the “vis” link in Figure 19 (a) and (b) lead to the corresponding themes 
to which these word pairs (e.g., “energy prices” and “oil fund”) belong. 
 
 Figure 17. Match Matrix and Visualization List 
 
 Figure 18. Drill-Down (e.g., Correlation Between Index_BasicMaterials and 
Index_Financial) 
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 Figure 19. Drill-Down Options From Figure 10 
Figure 17 also includes a list of D3 visualizations implemented. Figure 20 shows a 
D3 network visualization for all the data sources; their connections among the nodes are 
computed based on the correlations from the lexical links in Figure 17. The node 
connections represent all the correlations: thicker (thinner) connections indicate higher 
(lower) correlations. The clusters are generated based on the correlations. Figure 21 shows 
a D3 correlation matrix view of all the data sources. Figure 22 shows a D3 time-series 
bubble chart, which depicts the changing of the themes over time. 
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 Figure 20. D3 Network 
 
 Figure 21. D3 Correlation Matrix 
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 Figure 22. D3 Time-Series Bubble Chart 
Task 2 
We are also exploring how to use LLA jointly with other business intelligence tools, 
especially Big Data Architecture and Analytics (BDAA) tools: 
• Deep learning, machine vision, large-scale object identification across 
heterogeneous data sources. One important trend in Big Data is Deep 
Learning, including unsupervised machine learning techniques (e.g., neural 
networks) for recognizing objects of interest from Big Data [9], for instance, 
sparse coding (Olshausen & Field, 1996) and self-taught learning (Raina et 
al., 2007). The self-taught learning approximates the input for unlabeled 
objects as a succinct, higher-level feature representation of sparse linear 
combination of the bases. It uses the Expectation and Maximization (EM) 
method to iteratively learn coefficients and bases. Deep Learning links 
machine vision and text analysis smartly. For example, text analysis Latent 
Dirichlet Analysis (LDA) is a sparse coding where a bag of words is used as 
the sparsely coded features for text (Olshausen & Field, 1996). Our methods 
Lexical Link Analysis (LLA), System-Self-Awareness (SSA), and 
Collaborative Learning Agents (CLA) can be viewed as unsupervised learning 
or Deep Learning for pattern recognition, anomaly detection, and data fusion. 
A recursive data fusion methodology leveraging LLA, SSA, and CLA can be 
employed as follows: 
• An agent j represents a sensor, operates on its own like a decentralized data 
fusion; however, it does not communicate with all other sensors but only with 
the ones that are its peers. A peer list can be specified by the agent. 
• An agent j includes a learning engine CLA that collects, analyzes from its 
domain specific data knowledge base b(t,j)—for example, b(t,j) may represent 
the statistics for bi-gram feature pairs (word pairs) computed from LLA. 
• An agent j also includes a fusion engine SSA with two algorithms SSA1 and 
SSA2 that can be customized externally. SSA1 integrates the local 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 360 - 
knowledge base b(t,j) to the total knowledge base B(t,j) that can be passed 
along to its peers and used globally in the recursion in Figure 6. SSA2 
assesses the total value of the agent j by separating the total knowledge base 
into the categories of patterns, emerging and anomalous themes based on 
the total knowledge base B(t,j) and generates a total value V(t,j) as follows: 
o Step 1: B(t,j) = SSA1(B(t-1, p(j)), b(t,j)); 
o Step 2: V(t,j) = SSA2(B(t,j)) 
where p(j) represents the peer list of agent j.  
• The total value V(t,j) is used in the global sorting and ranking of relevant 
information. In this recursive data fusion, the knowledge bases and total 
values are completely data-driven and automatically discovered from the 
data. Each agent has the exact same code of LLA, SSA, and CLA, yet has its 
own data apart from other agents. This agent work has the advantages of 
both decentralized and distributed data fusion. It performs learning and fusion 
simultaneously and in parallel. Meanwhile, it categorizes the patterns and 
anomalous information. 
• Spark (2015): Map/Reduce is an analytic programming paradigm for Big 
Data. It consists of two tasks: (1) the “Map” task, where an input dataset is 
converted into key/value pairs; and (2) the “Reduce” task, where outputs of 
the “Map” task are combined to a reduced key-value pairs. Apache Spark 
could replace Map/Reduce for its speed and in-memory computation. 
• Bayesian Networks with R and Hadoop (Mendelevitch, 2015): It is a data-
driven learning of conditional probability or structure learning. It is a 
supervised learning method but best for Big Data with low dimensions. It is an 
approximate inference good for Big Data and Hadoop implementation. 
We have also met the acquisition professionals and discussed how BDAA can be 
applied to the DoD acquisition process; the following is a summary of the findings: 
1. In the current acquisition process, a small delay or anomaly in a contract 
negotiation process can have a huge impact in its performance and can 
therefore cost the government a lot of money downstream. 
2. It will be very useful to apply BDAA such as LLA for pattern recognition and 
anomaly detection for these kind of problems and make early warnings and 
predictions to prevent the downstream risks. 
3. The Big Acquisition Data might include programs’ cost/EUM, SAR, DIMIR, 
tech data, people data from DMBC, even outside economic environment data 
if the access is possible. 
4. The causes of the deviations from the normal behaviors for the 
programs/contracts might be modeled using physics (e.g., fluid dynamics 
theories). 
5. LLA’s network perspectives, social plays among the nodes and the System 
Self-Awareness (SSA) theory may be used to lay out the academic vigor for 
the business processes, for example, answering the following questions: 
• Are some nodes drawn towards some other nodes because the other nodes 
are more powerful? 
• Is the preferential attachment growth pattern or expertise growth pattern can 
be used here? 
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• How are the forces of the nodes modeled and mapped into the social network 
settings and actual business processes? 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we show improved LLA analysis reports and visualizations generated 
automatically using multiple categories of data sources. These reports and visualizations 
reveal that there are data correlations and gaps. LLA is able to discover in detail where the 
gaps and inconsistencies of the data across multiple data sources reside, which, in turn, can 
lead to the identification of future specific and productive directions for further examination 
regarding why gaps occur and where they exist. It is a data-driven method for pattern 
recognition, anomaly detection, and data fusion. It shares indexes, not data, feasible for 
parallel and distributed processing, adaptive to Big Data Architecture and Analytics and 
needs for Big Acquisition Data. 
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Abstract 
Competition is repeatedly cited in the acquisition world as a powerful tool, if not the most 
powerful tool, to ensure taxpayers get the most value for their tax dollars. A viable 
competition package (Request for Proposal [RFP], Statement of Work [SOW], Performance 
Work Statement [PWS], etc.) is not possible without having adequate technical data, 
computer software, and computer software documentation to provide to potential competitors 
to enable them to develop or evolve a system or support the solution needed. This paper first 
presents the acquisition professional with the knowledge to more effectively evaluate 
intellectual property in source selections to ensure the Government gets the intellectual 
property rights it needs to procure, support, and sustain systems the warfighter and others 
need; second, provides a structure and process to get these “rights” identified on contract 
while providing transparency for them throughout the period of performance; and, finally, 
presents a different way to look at the “necessary” rights when viewed from an open system 
architecture perspective. 
Introduction 
Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 challenged the Department of Defense (DoD) to “do 
more without more.” One focus area was to “promote effective competition” (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2013, 
p. 17). Competition is repeatedly cited in the acquisition world as a powerful tool, if not the 
most powerful tool, to ensure the taxpayer gets the most value for their tax dollars. It is very 
difficult, if not impossible, however, to develop a viable competition package (Request for 
Proposal [RFP], Statement of Work [SOW], Performance Work Statement [PWS], etc.) 
without having adequate technical data, computer software, and computer software 
documentation to provide to potential competitors to enable them to develop or evolve the 
system or support the solution needed. To this end, delivering the appropriate volume and 
content of technical data and computer software that are necessary to compete, support, 
and sustain weapon systems and their support infrastructures is critical.  
Promoting effective competition was also framed in the context of using Open 
Systems Architecture (OSA) approaches and managing technical data rights to foster those 
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architectures (OUSD[AT&L]), 2013, p. 18).1 Put quite simply, you can’t develop and maintain 
open architectures without access to the technical data and software they rely upon or at 
least utilize to some extent. BBP 3.0 does not abandon the progress of the two previous 
BBP releases. Rather, it  
continues the focus on continuous improvement with a new emphasis on 
initiatives that encourage innovation and promote technical excellence with 
the overarching goal of ensuring that the United States’ military has the 
dominant capabilities to meet future national security requirements. 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 2) 
OSA continues to be a BBP focus to stimulate technology insertion to keep pace with 
technology innovations and enable the design agility needed to keep ahead of our 
adversaries. We simply cannot effectively “refresh” our designs without the tools to foster 
these refresh cycles. The modularity of OSA not only stimulates innovation, but fosters 
competition as well from new entrants to the market from which to leverage not only 
commercial technology but new designs as well.  
This paper is not a “how-to guide” to implement OSA from a technical perspective. It 
does, however, provide an approach to aid acquisition professionals in structuring RFPs, 
evaluating them, and making best value award decisions in competitive acquisitions. In 
other words, how to get OSA on contract more effectively. What is unique in this approach is 
that it fosters significantly improved management and insight of technical data rights and 
computer software toward an end goal of implementing an open systems approach both for 
the instant contract and those that follow. This approach results in the program managers 
and their acquisition teams knowing exactly what intellectual property (IP), which includes 
not only non-commercial data rights but also commercial software, commercial technical 
data, and patented inventions, are incorporated into a contractor’s technical solution and 
how any restrictions impact the final deliverables from a future support, sustainment, and 
competition perspective.  
Background 
The two primary parts within acquisition regulations discussed herein are the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15 (Contracting by Negotiation), specifically, Subpart 15.1 
Source Selection Processes and Techniques; and DoD FAR Supplement (DFARS) Part 227 
(Patents, Data, and Copyrights), specifically, Subpart 227.71 (Rights in Technical Data) and 
Subpart 227.72 (Rights in Computer Software and Computer Software Documentation). It is 
where these two parts of the acquisition regulations intersect that we need to leverage to 
ensure the Government communicates what it needs with respect to intellectual property 
(IP). Getting the IP the Government needs is not an “option,” as the DoDI 5000.2 clearly 
levies this responsibility to program managers where it states, 
Program management must establish and maintain an IP Strategy to identify 
and manage the full spectrum of IP and related issues (e.g., technical data 
and computer software deliverables, patented technologies, and appropriate 
1 The essence of Open Systems Architecture (OSA) is organized decomposition, using carefully 
defined execution boundaries, layered onto a framework of software and hardware shared services 
and a vibrant business model that facilitates competition. For a full description, see (DoD, 2013, p. iii). 
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license rights) from the inception of a program and throughout the life cycle. 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2015, p. 76) 
This “IP Strategy” can only be effectively executed when the Government knows 
where IP is embedded within its components, items, and processes. Program managers and 
their acquisition team need to be in front of the IP challenge at the beginning of acquisitions 
during the RFP phase. If an IP Strategy and its related issues related to missing data, 
computer software, and the necessary rights and licenses to use them is implemented well 
into a program’s schedule, it is too late to capture the savings possible through competition. 
Before you build an RFP, you have to first have a Source Selection Plan (SSP) that you 
must follow toward contract award. A brief discussion of where in the source selection 
process IP can be better communicated and evaluated is useful to provide context of the 
recommended solutions presented herein. 
The Source Selection Process and IP Focus Areas 
A top-level source selection process is shown in Figure 1. This figure does not 
attempt to capture every potential step and process (for example, conducting clarifications 
or awarding without discussions). It serves only to highlight where this paper identifies the 
impacts evaluating IP has on the overall competitive proposal/source selection process. The 
light shaded boxes reflect the key areas this paper will elaborate on. The SSP, the 
importance of evaluating and scoring/rating IP, communicating what the Government wants 
through the RFP, evaluating proposals, and selecting the best value offer using IP as a 
decision element are important to grasp the real utility of leveraging IP in competitive source 
selections. 
 
 Figure 1. Source Selection Process 
Establishing a Sound IP Strategy in Source Selections and Communicating It 
Clearly to Industry Is Critical 
An SSP is required for all best-value, negotiated, competitive acquisitions under FAR 
Part 15 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011). It is within the SSP where IP can be identified as part of the 
evaluation criteria as either a factor or sub-factor. The more importantly IP is weighted within 
the total set of criteria will directly determine how much attention offerors pay to it with 
respect to winning the competition. The RFP must be developed to align exactly with the 
SSP with respect to process and the criteria to evaluate the offerors’ proposals. The RFP 
must also clearly communicate (through Section L, Instructions to Offerors) how to structure 
and present their proposal with respect to the criteria by which it will be evaluated.  
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Evaluation Criteria—Structure With Caution 
The government has wide latitude with which to establish its requirements and needs 
and exercise judgment when evaluating offerors’ proposals. The General Accountability 
Office, in adjudicating hundreds of protests, has consistently opined that in reviewing a 
protest against an agency’s evaluation of proposals, it will not substitute its (or the 
protester’s) judgment for that of the agency; rather, it will examine the record to determine 
whether the agency’s judgments were reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation 
criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations.2 The evaluation of proposals is 
therefore a matter within an agency’s broad discretion, since the agency (not Industry) 
[emphasis added] is responsible for defining its needs and the best method for 
accommodating them.3 What this means with respect to establishing IP as an evaluation 
criteria is that it is completely acceptable to do so. Just because an offeror is unhappy with 
how the IP (delivered with its solution to the Government’s requirements) was scored, does 
not, in and of itself, establish that the Government acted unreasonably. The Government is 
simply determining that the solution (with the related IP) did not represent the best value to 
the Government. All that being said, there are still some fundamental pitfalls that can derail 
an otherwise sound IP strategy.  
There are some limitations with respect to IP that must be recognized and respected. 
The Government cannot “force” a relinquishment of rights to data (and computer software) 
that was independently developed at private expense. This restriction is well founded in the 
U.S. Code and the DFARS.4 That doesn’t, however, preclude the Government from 
identifying its minimum needs for IP and evaluating the impacts restrictive IP elements (data 
and computer software) have on the best value determination. There are two basic ways to 
evaluate IP in the competitive proposal process, scoring IP as a criteria (factor or subfactor) 
or as an overall IP “Risk Assessment.” 
Aligning Evaluation Criteria With Ratings and/or Risk Assessments 
When establishing evaluation criteria with their respective factors and subfactors, the 
Government must communicate not only how ratings/scores will be assigned, but also when 
the various standards have been met. There is great latitude with how to establish scoring 
methodologies, from numerical, algebraic, narrative, to adjectival. Since IP is very complex 
to identify and evaluate, adjectival and narrative have the most merit. An example of a 
previously used adjectival rating scale can be found in Table 1. 
2 See GAO Protest Decision, B-406505; B-406405.2, dated May 21, 2012. 
3 See GAO Protest Decision, B-406505; B-406405.2, dated May 21, 2012. 
4 See 10 U.S.C 2320(F) and DFARS 227.7103-1(c), 227.7203-1(c). 
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Table 1. Technical-Management Rating Scale* 
 
One of the subfactors under the Technical-Management Factor was Innovation 
Approach (the highest of three total subfactors). Under this subfactor, the Government 
evaluated the offerors’ ability to identify and apply innovative methods of producing domain 
understanding and domain knowledge from multi-source, multi-dimensional data. The 
Government also evaluated the offerors’ ability to identify and apply innovative methods of 
automation human-computer interaction, data uncertainty management, and data pedigree 
maintenance. Lastly, the Government evaluated the offerors’ ability to minimize technology 
transition costs. While it’s not important for the reader to understand the technical nuances 
of this technical factor, it is important to focus on the last sentence of the factor from an IP 
perspective. This is because unless the Government has the appropriate rights and licenses 
to the IP necessary to execute the offeror’s technical solution, transitioning the technology 
developed and deployed across the Government’s organization will be cost prohibitive and 
potentially lead to a long term sole source acquisition situation. 
To ensure that IP independently developed at private expense (as discussed earlier) 
is not a “condition of offer” or that the solicitation “forces” a relinquishment of the same, the 
“standards” by which the subfactors will be evaluated against must clearly convey this. To 
this end, the standards associated with the above Innovative Approach subfactor stated that 
the standard would be met when the Offeror 
described the extent to which the rights in Technical Data (TD), Computer 
Software (CS), and Computer Software Documentation (CSD), and 
inventions/patents offered to the Government ensured unimpeded, 
innovative, and cost effective production, operation, maintenance, and 
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upgrade of the [System Name] processing prototypes throughout its 
lifecycle; allow for open and competitive procurement of [System Name] 
enhancements; and permit the transfer of [System Name] TD, CSD, and CS 
to other systems or platforms.  
Note the power of this one standard. In it, nine best value tradeoffs can be identified 
that are directly attributable to IP rights and licenses (unimpeded, innovative, cost effective, 
production, operations, maintenance, upgrade, future competitions, transfer to other 
systems or platforms).  
The standard went on to ensure that 
proposals will not be rated less that SATISFACTORY on this standard solely 
because an offeror does not offer a price for all items delivered with 
Government Purpose Rights. However, rating on this factor for proposals to 
deliver TD, CSD, and CS with less than the minimum rights specified for the 
Government by applicable statute (10 U.S.C. 2320) and regulation DFARS 
252.227-7013, 252.227-7014, and 252.227-7015 may be negatively 
impacted. For non-commercial acquisitions, these rights include Unlimited 
Rights in TD, CS, and CSD as specified in DFARS 252.227-7013 & 252.227-
7014, Limited Rights in TD as specified in DFARS 252.227-7013, and 
Restricted Rights in CS as specified in DFARS 252.227-7014. The minimum 
rights considered for TD associated with commercial item acquisitions are 
specified in DFARS 252.227-7015. For commercial CS acquisitions, 
evaluation of the offered license rights will assess the licenses customarily 
provided to the public with respect to their consistency with Federal 
procurement law and satisfaction of Government user needs as set forth in 
the solicitation.  
The key to having enough insight into the offeror’s proposal regarding the IP strategy 
reflected in the subfactor and its related standard is to “map” the IP within the proposal. This 
will be discussed later on. An alternative to “scoring” IP is to evaluate IP from an overall 
“Risk” perspective. To this end, an IP Risk Evaluation example is presented next. 
To simplify the evaluation of IP in a source selection, some acquisition teams have 
chosen to assess overall IP “Risk” as reflected in an offeror’s proposed technical solution. 
As example of this was where the Government evaluated Intellectual Property Risk as 
the extent to which the Intellectual Property in technical data, computer 
software and computer software documentation and inventions/patents 
offered to the Government will: 
• Ensure unimpeded, innovative and cost effective production, operation, 
maintenance, and upgrade of the capability/service throughout the  
• [System Name] life cycle 
• Allow for open and competitive procurement of enhancements; and will 
permit the transfer of technical data of non-proprietary object and code and 
source code to other contractors for use on other systems or platforms. (DoD, 
2013) 
This example used a Risk Rating table as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Intellectual Property Risk 
 
The “risk evaluation” approach implemented by Table 2 provides for assessing the 
impact of IP on the overall proposed solution across all the technical areas, vice a specific 
factor or subfactor as presented earlier. This gives the evaluation team even more flexibility 
and is actually easier to document in the IP evaluation. While both approaches, the “factor” 
approach and the “risk” approach, have great merit, they both require adequate clarity with 
respect to the identification of the IP throughout the offeror’s proposal. This is facilitated by 
the standard “assertions process” required in DFARS 252.227-7017 and standard Section 
K, Representations and Certifications, Provisions, but the methodology presented herein 
takes these longstanding processes to a much higher level.  
Evaluating Initial Proposals 
Figuring out where IP is buried within a contractor’s proposal, or more importantly, 
within the proposed solution, is not easy. This is because the primary enabling clauses rely 
upon Section K, which normally brings in the Assertions Clause, 252.227-7017 (the -7017 
clause), the Prior Delivery Clause, 252.227-7028 (the -7028 clause), and the required FAR 
assertions pursuant to the necessary Patent clauses in the contract when applicable 
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(52.227-6, 52.227-7, 52.227-9, 52.227-10).5 Unfortunately, even though the assertions 
become a part of the resulting contract, many elements of Section K are long forgotten after 
contract award. The net result is that IP is many times a proposal element that is 
overlooked, and it may come back to haunt the Government when the “impact” of the 
assertions become apparent upon delivery or earlier during contract performance. What is 
needed is a better methodology and form with which to identify and evaluate IP during the 
proposal evaluation process. One proven method is to leverage the assertions process. 
Leveraging the “Assertions Process” to Expand Clarity and Purpose 
The Assertions Process 
IP can be some of a company’s most valuable assets, the relinquishment of which 
can significantly impact not only their profitability, but their long-term survival as well. As a 
result, it is in their best interests to protect them to the maximum extent possible. While only 
one small component of data rights management, the “assertion step” is important to 
understand both pre and post award as there are different standards and responsibilities 
tied to each. Unfortunately, the assertions required by the -7017 clause leaves a lot of 
uncertainly with respect to just “where” the restricted elements reside in the technical 
solution or services provided. The “Intellectual Property Attachment” methodology provided 
herein represents a best practice that “maps” the contract line items (CLINS), the Contract 
Data Requirements List (CDRL) items, the minimum data rights the Government has 
determined necessary for each deliverable, the Statement Of Work (SOW)/Performance 
Work Statement (PWS), the Data Rights that will be delivered; and other IP (patented 
inventions), all in one contract attachment with seven tables that live throughout the life of 
the contract. This approach facilitates efficient and thorough evaluation of IP both for initial 
proposals and final proposal revisions. It also establishes an additional vantage point from 
which to eliminate weak proposals from the competitive range and to establish another 
element of the “responsiveness” determination of proposals.  
Rather than attempt to explain all the nuances and entitlements of the various 
categories of data rights, commercial technical data and software terms and conditions and 
patents/inventions, which are beyond the scope of this paper, the important takeaway is that 
the acquisition professional must clearly understand the nature and content of the technical 
data and computer software (both commercial and non-commercial) they identify as required 
to meet their minimum needs to execute their particular contract/program.  
What may not be so obvious to the acquisition professional is that assertions are a 
critical precursor to being able to mark any deliverable containing technical data or computer 
software with any restrictive marking, post award. In other words, if a deliverable contains 
such non-commercial intellectual property, identifying the items, the basis for the restrictive 
marking and what restrictive category is applicable is required before delivering with a 
restrictive marking affixed to the specific data items. The DFARS requires these assertions 
be furnished to the Government and identified in “an attachment” to the contract prior to the 
delivery of any data with restrictive data (DFARS 227.227-7013(e)(2)). The DFARS goes on 
5 Managing inventions and the patents that register them is not a primary focus of this paper due to 
the complexities of this topic and page limitations. The identification of them is however important and 
is presented later. 
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to cite the -7017 clause as the provision to facilitate this identification process, or for our 
purpose here the assertions necessary as a precursor to affixing restrictive markings on 
deliverables (DFARS 227-7103-3(b)). This Assertions List then becomes attached to the 
contract (DFARS 227-7103-10(a)(3)). 
In like fashion, the DFARS requires the identification of computer software and 
computer software documentation to be furnished with restrictions prior to delivery (DFARS 
252.227-7014(e)(2)). As with Technical Data, the -7017 clause is used again to facilitate the 
same due diligence actions by the contractor discussed earlier. It bears repeating again that 
unless a restriction is asserted, no restrictive markings may be affixed to the final software. 
(This is normally done via “code headers” within the software itself and the marking of the 
physical documentation of the software.) Both Government and contractor alike should take 
extreme care during the software acceptance process to ensure that non-commercial 
computer software is scanned to identify any internal restrictive markings as they can 
coexist with a transmittal letter that alludes to something else. Once incongruent markings 
are identified, the corrective actions may be invoked as set forth in both the -7013 clause 
and the -7014 clause.  
Before we get to the details of the Assertion List itself developed pursuant to the -
7017 clause, the causal link between assertion and delivery is useful to revisit. If you read 
both the -7013 and -7014 clauses carefully you will note that the activity of delivery is woven 
throughout. Thus the action of delivery is required to empower the Government to assert its 
data rights on the non-commercial Technical Data or Computer Software in question. As 
explained previously, any restrictions must be “asserted” prior to any such delivery. But 
before any such assertions may be made, the specific technical data or computer software 
must be “identified” as required for delivery. This is an important sequence of events that 
must take place to effectively manage data and the protection thereof. In other words, no 
assertion, no restrictive marking authorized if you are the contractor. But if you are the 
Government, beware, because without a requirement for “delivery” the contractor is not 
bound to identify or assert any restrictions. Only if delivery is later called for (via deferred 
ordering) or identified as a post award assertion (which has more strict limitations than pre-
award assertions) will the identification and the restrictions be brought to light.6  
Let’s now turn to one of the key elements of the discussion, namely, the Assertions 
List, or more importantly the -7017 clause elements that lead to the “List” or “Attachment” 
itself. This is the traditional methodology (combined with attaching commercial software 
licenses to the contract and citing patent royalty information in Section K, as discussed 
earlier).  
Since this is so critical to the discussion here, the elements of the clause are 
provided in Table 3.  
6 See DFARS 252.227-7013(e)(3), 252.227-7014(e)(3), and 252.227-7018(e)(3). 
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Table 3. -7107 Clause Elements 
(DFARS 252.227-7017(e)(3))7 
 
Columns two through four are the easiest to deal with. Column four is very 
straightforward: who is the right person to sign off. Column three is fairly simple as well: it’s 
either Restricted Rights (for software), Limited Rights (for technical data, (SBIR Rights), or 
Government Purpose Rights (where mixed funds are/were used). Column two, the basis 
column, is pretty straightforward as well, and it usually reads “Independently Developed at 
Private Expense” or “Jointly Developed with Contractor and Governments funds.” If you look 
at the information sought in column one, however, it may be interpreted in some instances 
ambiguously. Just what is required to “identify the technical data, computer software or 
computer software documentation”? An ambiguous assertion example could be “All XYZ 
software utilized in the ABC assembly.” This “notional” top level data description is extremely 
7 Note that the -7013, -7014, and -7018 clauses all have an identical table with some of the instruction 
language that is to be used for post award assertions. 
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problematic for two main reasons. First, the Government has no clue “what” software is 
being restricted (assuming, of course, Column three would indicate “Restricted Rights”), and 
second, the Government really doesn’t know clearly “what” software it really should be 
protecting with that level of restriction, where within the system or architecture design the 
restricted software resides, nor what it is really getting for its money. True, it is easy to 
simply say “all,” but is it fair and accurate? Most would agree, it’s not. You can’t really 
determine what you “need” to field, support, and sustain a system without knowing what you 
“have” to begin with (Pickarz, September 2012). In this instance, you just don’t know and 
most importantly, you have no baseline at contract award from which to later determine what 
changes the Government has funded and may have unlimited rights to.8 A huge entitlement 
may be lost from simply not paying attention to the assertions contained in the Assertions 
List. The solution to this dilemma is actually quite simple. Namely, make the instructions 
unequivocally clear. A formal deviation to the clause is probably not a timely solution. A 
better solution is clearer instructions to the contractor in the solicitation in Section L 
(Instructions to Offerors) with a resultant attachment to the contract that documents the 
technical data and computer software and their respective rights to be given to the 
Government. It is much better to articulate just what you expect the contractor to deliver in 
their proposal rather than have them guess. For the example earlier, the software version(s), 
and/or dates should be given to clearly identify just what will be restricted upon delivery. 
Even better, if you make clarity of the assertions a condition of offer, contractors will always 
comply or possibly lose the award. Let me be clear, however, as the DFARS deals with this 
very situation where it states, 
If an offeror fails to submit the attachment or fails to complete the attachment 
in accordance with the requirements of the solicitation provision, such failure 
shall constitute a minor informality. Provide offerors an opportunity to remedy 
a minor informality in accordance with the procedures at FAR 14.405 or 
15.607. An offeror’s failure to correct the informality within the time prescribed 
by the contracting officer shall render the offer ineligible for award. (DFARS 
227.7103-10(a)(1)) 
Note that while clarity would be considered a “minor informality,” failure to correct this 
shall render the offer ineligible for award. Another key point is that a minor informality could 
be resolved as a “minor error” pursuant to a “clarification” vice a “discussion” point, thereby 
preserving to ability to award without discussions should this be provided for in the 
solicitation (FAR 15.306(a)(2)). At the end of the day, additional emphasis in the instructions 
for completing the assertions goes a long way to enable the Government to later assert the 
rights it has paid for.  
The Intellectual Property Attachment—Mapping Critical IP Artifacts  
Non-commercial technical data and computer software assertions are really only part 
of the intellectual property portfolio as there are numerous commercial technical data and 
computer software artifacts, and in many cases previously developed inventions, that are 
relevant to Government contracts. The answer to the question, “What do I have?” is 
important not only at contract award but throughout contract performance as the 
8 See DFARS 252.227-7013(b)(1), 252.227-7014(b)(1). 
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deliverables from one contract provide the building blocks for another contracts and their 
programs/projects. All this assertion information can be captured in one place both to 
evaluate the proposal and then continue throughout contract performance as a living 
document. This is accomplished by adding an “Intellectual Property Volume” to your 
solicitation and the resulting “Intellectual Property Attachment” to the awarded contract. 
This original idea was first promulgated by Space and Missile Center (SMC) in Los 
Angeles and presented in the SMC Office of the Staff Judge Advocate Guide Acquiring and 
Enforcing the Government’s Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software Under 
Department of Defense Contracts: A Practical Handbook for Acquisition Professionals 
(Space and Missile Center [SMC] Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, March 2014). Now in 
its Sixth edition, this somewhat daunting document may seem to be a bit difficult to review at 
first, but searching for the “Data Rights Attachment” will get you to most of the components 
discussed herein. For the purposes of this paper, I will take SMC/JA’s approach and expand 
it to provide a comprehensive “Volume” to the proposal that lays out not only the Data 
Rights attributable to the effort but other areas of intellectual property as well. To do this, an 
Intellectual Property Volume is required from offerors. This volume would be structured as 
follows: 
Volume “X”—Intellectual Property9 
• Table 1—Data Rights Summary: Non-Commercial Technical Data and 
Computer Software & Computer Software Documentation 
• Table 2—Commercial Technical Data and Computer Software & Computer 
Software Documentation  
• Table 3—Assertions List: Non-Commercial Technical Data, Computer 
Software, and Computer Software Documentation 
• Table 4—Specifically Negotiated Licenses (Special Licenses to Non-
Commercial Technical Data and Computer Software) 
• Table 5—Rights in Background Inventions 
• Table 6—Third Party Patent Rights and Royalties 
It helps to visualize the Intellectual Property Volume approach so the following 
notional tables with example deliverable technical data and computer software deliverables 
are provided. The various elements of the tables and their mapping functions will be 
discussed.  
9 While this paper focuses on “data rights,” Tables 6 and 7 are provided and briefly discussed to add 
the listing of any relevant inventions (Patents) used in the contractor’s proposed solution. This 
incorporation then provides a comprehensive IP attachment to the contract. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 376 - 
                                            
 
 
Table 4. Data Rights Summary  
Non-Commercial Technical Data and Computer Software and Computer 
Software Documentation 
 
As you can see from the Data Rights Summary table, the data rights the Government 
will receive are clearly “mapped” to the contract’s Contract Line Items (CLINs), Contract 
Data Requirements Lists (CDRLS), and the SOW/PWS. CLIN 0002 in this particular 
solicitation was for “Data,” and a few notional items are presented. But there’s some 
important nuances to take note of that reflect the true power of this approach. Note first that 
the Government has clearly identified what its minimum needs are for this acquisition in 
Column 5. Note also that the User Manuals constitute OMIT data, which entitles the 
Government to Unlimited Rights, so this cell in the table has been “pre-filled” to establish this 
entitlement. The Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR) is marked N/A. This is because the 
CFSR constitutes financial data that is incidental to contract administration and outside the 
definition of “Technical Data,” which triggers the applicability of the various rights outlined in 
the clauses. Finally, Column 8 provides the ability for offerors to explain why the rights 
proposed do not meet the Government’s minimum needs (again to preclude forcing the 
relinquishment of rights to independently developed technical data or computer software.) 
This table from the proposal will become an attachment to the contract and a “living” 
document (as will all the tables discussed here) to provide for adding post award assertions 
and afford the Government complete Intellectual Property situational awareness.  
Table 5 provides the insight to any commercial technical data or computer software 
the contractor must deliver under the contract. This table contains nine columns.  
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Table 5. Commercial Technical Data, Computer Software, and Computer 
Software Documentation 
 
In like fashion of the other tables, the first three columns provide for CLINs, CDRLS 
and SOW/PWS paragraphs that are mapped to the commercial technical data and 
commercial computer software that are to be delivered that is provided for in the proposal. 
Instructions in Section L will again guide offerors how to populate the table. The 
Government needs to ensure that identifying commercial software is not enough, and Open 
Source Software (OSS) and other openly shared software must also be identified since they 
are also commercial products in nature. This is because even though a software artifact may 
be “open,” it still has terms and conditions by which it must be shared. The commercial 
license terms can be problematic and the Government may have concerns regarding these 
commercial technical data and computer software licenses and these must be adjudicated. 
Some of these concerns relate to the following: 
• Subsequent rights to updates, software maintenance patches, minor version 
changes and substitutions provided at no additional cost 
• License transferability to the Government (for option exercise and 
CDRL/CLIN delivery) 
• Disputes provisions 
• Choice of law provisions 
• Payment of attorney’s fees 
• Automatic renewal provisions that violate the Anti-Deficiency Act 
• Provisions that prohibit disclosure of license terms/conditions 
• Open Source Software terms that mandate sharing and posting of changes 
when doing so may jeopardize national security 
Of course the Government has no idea if any of these unwanted terms are embodied 
within the commercial licenses unless the offeror is instructed to actually provide all licenses 
as an addendum to the table in the IP Volume. Once provided, the Government can perform 
its due diligence. There have been instances where offerors have claimed that license terms 
cannot be provided until the licenses are executed after award and failed to provide copies 
of the standard licenses normally required from commercial vendors. This argument is not 
completely true. While it is true that the final license will reflect the actual terms and 
conditions agreed to, virtually every commercial software product (or standard technical data 
documentation) has a standard license that is at least the starting point for negotiating the 
final terms. These “standard” licenses must be provided to enable a thorough proposal 
review and to develop clarification questions, information requests, and assign strengths, 
weaknesses, or deficiencies. In the event terms that are not acceptable to the Government 
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are unable to be removed, then it is a good practice to establish an overall Intellectual 
Property “Risk” rating to capture the additional risk to the Government from the restrictive 
terms as was discussed earlier.  
The Assertions List, generated in response to the -7017 clause, is provided for in 
Table 6 of the IP Volume and again maps the restrictions and data rights proposed to the 
Government’s requirements laid out in the CLINs, CDRLs, and SOW/PWS. The additional 
benefit this approach establishes is that the clarity needed to effectively manage the 
Technical Data and Computer Software is mandated as a consideration of responsiveness 
to the solicitation. It is important to understand the difference between Table 4, which 
identifies the overall data rights assigned to the various data items, to Table 6, The 
Assertions List. Table 4 assigns the data rights, but Table 6 identifies the specific restrictive 
items (if any) that are tied to the restrictions. In other words just “what” makes the 
deliverable Limited Rights technical data. These assertions are also required for those 
instances where the Government identifies Government Purpose Rights (GPR) as its 
minimum and the contractor proposes GPR. This is because there are still elements or 
activities of GPR that provide for additional due diligence on the part of the Government 
when sharing with third parties (additional Non-Disclosure Agreements, for example). The 
Assertions List would thus look similar to that shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. Assertions List—Non-Commercial Technical Data, Computer Software, 
and Computer Software Documentation 
 
The “prior delivery list,” generated in response to the -7028 clause, is provided for in 
Table 7 and maps the technical data and computer software that was delivered to the 
Government prior to the current effort (or is scheduled to be delivered on another ongoing 
contract). Readers should keep in mind, however, that unless there were deliveries earlier in 
time (or planned for the future) that would be subject to reporting in the table, the offeror will 
simply report “none.” Again, delivery is paramount for the successful functioning of various 
clauses and the rights they impose. In addition to the standard information required, the 
relevant CDRLs are identified, as well as all contract information from which the items 
were/are to be delivered that are identical or substantially similar to documents or other 
media that the offeror has produced for, delivered to, or is obligated to deliver to the 
Government under any contract or subcontract (DFARS 252.227-7028).  
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Table 7. Prior Delivery List for Technical Data or Computer Software 
 
Table 8 constitutes the identification of any Special Licenses relevant to a specific 
CDRL data item. It is important that the scope or terms and conditions of any special license 
be clearly articulated in the proposal and a copy of the actual license to be executed be 
provided as an Addendum to Table 8 for subsequent review, evaluation by the Government, 
and incorporation into the contract as an attachment. A notional format for Table 8 can be 
found below. 
Table 8. Specifically Negotiated Licenses (Special Licenses)—Non-Commercial 
Technical Data and Computer Software) 
 
Table 9 provides the insight to any inventions the contractor plans to incorporate into 
any component, item, or process. A “background invention” is any invention, other than a 
subject invention, that is covered by any patent or pending patent application in which the 
offeror (including its sub-offerors or suppliers, or potential sub-offerors or suppliers at any 
tier) (1) has any right, title, or interest; and (2) proposes to incorporate into any items, 
components, or processes to be developed or delivered, or that will be described or 
disclosed in an technical data, computer software, or computer software documentation to 
be developed or delivered under the resulting contract (DoD, May 2013). This table contains 
six columns.  
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Table 9. Rights in Background Inventions1 
 
1. The Patent rights clauses of the solicitation provide additional guidance regarding the identification and 
management of inventions used on the contract. The purpose of this table is to capture the 
inventions/patents to be incorporated in one place as an attachment to the contract to preclude losing 
their identity as part of the technical baseline after the initial award is completed.10 
Table 10 provides the insight to any third-party patent rights for which the contractor 
plans to pay royalties. This table provides information concerning these third-party patents 
and the amount of the royalties it will pay in order to perform under the contract. This table 
contains seven columns.  
Table 10. Third Party Patent Rights and Royalties1  
 
Communicating the Government’s Expectations Is Vital to Success 
The acquisition team crafting the RFP needs to pay close attention when drafting the 
instructions in Section L related to the Intellectual Property Volume. Explaining what is 
needed within the various tables ensures all offerors have a common understanding. Trying 
to avoid specifying the “table format” and just provide Section L language tends to give 
inconsistent results and lead to more clarifications and/or discussions. Some offerors will 
interpret the instructions differently, and the result is data rights information spread across 
the proposal and is a virtual “scavenger hunt” to figure out just what IP impacts there are in 
10 The identification of inventions to be used in a contractors technical solution described in their 
proposal is normally required in Section K of the solicitations. This completed section is, however, 
buried in the contract file documentation at contract award and can be difficult to locate in a 
voluminous contract file. The table methodology presented here keeps it at the forefront of the 
acquisition team to manage throughout the contract period of performance. 
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offerors’ proposals. The best approach is a Tabular One by IP topic and then incorporate the 
individual tables as “Tabs,” with clear instructions to populate the tables. Finally, the 
Government must ensure that updates to the various IP tables in the IP Attachment are 
reviewed and approved prior to incorporating the technical changes reflected in the 
projected updates during post award performance. This is to ensure configuration 
management of the technical changes is carefully managed and maintained. 
Open Systems Architecture (OSA)—Where Does It Fit? 
Open Systems Architecture provides for designs that accommodate updated 
technology (data and computer software) by leveraging modular, loosely coupled and highly 
cohesive components within a system. A system should be designed in major “modules” 
where potentially proprietary data and/or computer software is “encapsulated” (i.e., 
segregated within the design). These modules must be “loosely coupled” whereby individual 
modules do not depend upon each other to enable the entire system to function.) Lastly, the 
modules must be highly cohesive so the module functionality works together via common 
standards. The system relies on open interfaces well known by all competitors to enhance 
future competitions as well as more effective sustainment and supportability. This approach 
enables even highly restrictive and even proprietary designs to be incorporated into the final 
system yet still enable technology insertion with new and innovative upgrades. It is only 
made possible, however, if the “critical” IP components are or have been delivered to the 
Government earlier in the system’s life cycle. Knowing where the IP is embedded within the 
various designs fosters this approach as well by enabling strategic decisions where to focus 
on “opening up” the system for more competition and technology insertion. The IP Volume 
discussed earlier provides for the situational awareness necessary to bring it all together. 
For a thorough discussion on Open Systems Architecture and multiple examples and 
guides, readers should review the OSA Guidebook for Program Managers (DoD, May 2013). 
Government Insistence on Additional Openness and IP Rights—Is It Viable? 
It is important to discern whether or not the Government, in implementing the 
processes and strategies presented here can be sustained and implemented when 
challenged by Industry. There are numerous Government Accountability Office (GAO) bid 
protest decisions that have upheld the Government’s decisions which supports the concepts 
presented herein. What is important to take away from these decisions are some key 
principles that when adhered to, result in new IP and OSA strategies that are executable 
and sustainable when challenged. 
As stated earlier, if the Government establishes a plan to evaluate proposals (a 
source selection plan), follows the plan, consistently applies the criteria and their standards 
fairly to all offerors, then makes a best value decision based upon all evaluation areas (cost 
and non-cost), the GAO will not overturn the Government’s decision. This has been a 
consistent result in multiple bid protest decisions. Can the Government use Open 
Architecture as a criteria in source selection? Can it require offerors to clearly identify what 
data rights the Government will obtain with an offeror’s proposed design/solution? Finally, 
can the Government make a best value decision using Open Systems Architecture 
(OSA/OA) and the delivered data rights for the technical data and computer software 
artifacts? The answer to all is unequivocally, yes. 
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A recent bid protest concerning an Engagement Skills Training (EST) system will 
help illustrate.11 In this instance, the Government provided for an Open Architecture 
subfactor to assess the ability of the offeror’s design to “fully support, maintain, and modify 
the EST software and technical data throughout the program life cycle to include the legacy 
EST systems, weapons and scenarios.”12 The acquisition team evaluated the proposals 
using the scales and criteria called out in their RFP. During the evaluation the team 
identified several areas where the Government’s license rights were cited inconsistently in 
different sections of an offeror’s proposal. Because of this, the evaluation team was unsure 
just what rights the Government would receive. A lower “marginal’ rating under the open 
architecture subfactor was then assigned. The ambiguity was created by the offeror in the 
errors it submitted related to a material aspect of the technical approach regarding open 
architecture.13 Specifically, the inability of the Government to share many IP artifacts of 
technical data and computer software. The unsuccessful offeror challenged other areas of 
the evaluation but these will not be recounted here for the sake of brevity. The lessons 
learned are important, however. First, if the Government communicates what it will evaluate, 
how it will evaluate, and what will be taken into consideration in the best value decision, the 
GAO will support the Government’s decision. Second, it’s not the Government’s job to 
“rewrite” the offeror’s proposals and identify each and every error and weakness identified. 
The FAR requires agencies conducting discussions with offerors to address, “at a minimum 
… deficiencies, significant weaknesses and adverse past performance information to which 
the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond” (FAR 15.306(d)(3)). The Government 
does not have to “spoon feed” an offeror as to each and every item that could be revised to 
improve and offeror’s proposal.14 Finally, data rights can be directly rated and scored in a 
competitive source selection to enable the Government to make a best value decision. 
In another bid protest decision, the Governments requirement was for a commercial 
off-the-shelf, “web-based, automated e-Recruitment solution, including all software, software 
documentation, implementation support, and services to support the full life cycle of an 
enterprise-wide hiring/recruitment system.”15 An unsuccessful offeror did not include an 
adequate explanation, as requested by the solicitation, of the proposal’s compliance with the 
solicitation’s minimum mandatory requirements concerning intellectual property/data 
rights.16 At issue were terms of the license whereby the agency’s data once entered into the 
offeror’s database became the property of the offeror. This was because a term of the 
license required all data be identified prior to contract start. Since the goal of the project was 
to manage employment and other HR data throughout the period of performance, this did 
not meet a material requirement of the RFP which was clearly called out in a mandatory 
“functional requirements matrix.” The offeror’s proposal was scored commensurately and 
they were eliminated from the competitive range. This protest illustrates a critical lesson 
relevant to our discussion here. Namely, establishing material requirements in an RFP is 
something that standard commercial licenses may be in conflict with. Recall the language in 
both the “Scoring” and “Risk” approaches to evaluating IP discussed earlier. In both, 
11 See GAO Bid Protest B-410006; B-410006.2, dated October 8, 2014. 
12 See GAO Bid Protest B-410006; B-410006.2, dated October 8, 2014. 
13 See GAO Bid Protest B-410006; B-410006.2, dated October 8, 2014. 
14 See GAO Bid Protest B-404671.2, B404671.4, dated April 8, 2011. 
15 See GAO Bid Protest B-298380.4, dated June 11, 2007. 
16 See GAO Bid Protest B-298380.4, dated June 11, 2007. 
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inconsistency with the “requirements of the RFP” and “satisfaction of Government user 
needs as set forth in the solicitation” were key discriminators. Thus, “hiding behind the 
commercial item veil” as it were, to claim that a standard commercial license may not be 
challenged regarding its terms and conditions is not sufficient to negate the basic needs of 
the Government for IP that effectively meet their needs. What is important is to provide an 
adequate license to meet the Government’s requirements called out in an RFP.  
Offerors should provide their best initial proposal in response to the Government’s 
RFP or risk being eliminated from the competitive range. This is an important point to 
understand as was illustrated in a recent bid protest where an offeror failed to provide 
significant material data and information required by RFP In Section L.17 The GAO has 
opined previously that “an offeror has the responsibility to submit a well-written proposal, 
with adequately detailed information that clearly demonstrates compliance with the 
solicitation requirements and allows a meaningful review by the procuring agency.”18 The 
offeror in this instance admitted it failed to provide information requested by the RFP and as 
a result their proposal failed to demonstrate that it met the solicitation requirements and they 
were eliminated from the competitive range. The lesson relevant to the discussion here, 
specifically to the IP Summary Attachment/Volume described earlier, is that unless an 
offeror pays close attention to the detailed instructions for this volume they run the risk of 
being eliminated from the competitive range. This is especially true when IP and the 
associated license rights and license terms and conditions are necessary to make a best 
value decision that has decision criteria based on IP and/or Open Architecture.  
Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was three-fold: first, to present the acquisition professional 
with some tools to ensure the Government gets the intellectual property rights it needs to 
procure, support, and sustain the systems the warfighter, and others, need; second, to 
provide a structure and process to get these rights identified on contract while providing 
transparency into them throughout the period of performance and not finding out “upon 
delivery” what rights are really being delivered; and finally, to present a different way to look 
at the “necessary” rights when viewed from an open architecture perspective. This is 
facilitated by strategically seeking the “necessary” IP rights (based upon the Government’s 
minimum needs) that focus on interfaces and other artifacts to implement an OSA approach. 
When this approach is implemented at the onset of a contract/program, restricted and 
limited rights become mitigated inhibitors to technology insertion and instead become 
catalysts to enable more affordable support, sustainment, and cost effective systems and 
solutions for the Government.  
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Introduction 
Acquisition efforts are under increasing pressure to deliver systems rapidly and at 
lower cost while providing enhanced performance capability. This is happening in an 
environment where research and development budgets are decreasing across the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the acquisition workforce is rebuilding, and the DoD is 
looking to rebalance warfighting portfolios. This has been compounded by an extremely 
dynamic environment of fiscal change and uncertainty imposed by significant budget cuts 
and sequestration impacts in the recent past.  
The overall trend of DoD budgets has been declining. The president’s fiscal year 
(FY) 2015 budget recognizes the fiscal imperative of deficit reduction, reducing projected 
defense budgets by about $113 billion over five years compared to levels requested in the 
FY2014 budget (DoD, 2014). As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the DoD 
budget has been declining from approximately 15% in the mid-1950s to around 3% today. 
The growth in the DoD’s costs under the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projection of 
the base budget is somewhat less than the CBO’s (2014) projection of the growth of the 
U.S. economy, decreasing slowly from 2.8% of GDP in 2015 to 2.5% in 2025, and 2.3% in 
2030.  
One outcome of the fiscal pressures has been an increase in defense acquisition 
efforts that are focused on the rapid development and fielding of an integrated system of 
systems (SoS) capability. Many of these SoS leverage mature systems and sub-systems as 
“constituent” systems but do not contract directly with industry to deliver the integrated 
capability. Elements of the DoD acquisition workforce are therefore taking on increasingly 
technical roles and responsibilities as the lead integrators for complex SoS. It should also be 
noted that the acquisition workforce (AWF) has declined by more than 50% since the 1990s, 
while the value of Department of the Navy (DoN) contracting has increased by more than 
50%. With these significant AWF losses and attendant workload increases, the DoN 
recognized the loss in ability to manage the technical-cost tradespace it is responsible to 
execute, including major weapons systems acquisition (DoN, 2010). While the DoN AWF 
has grown by more than 20% (DoN, 2015) since 2010, some program managers are still 
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challenged with staffing and resourcing an acquisition workforce with the technical depth to 
assume the increasingly technical roles associated with the development and fielding of an 
inherently government SoS capability. In many cases, the Naval Warfare Center and 
Systems Center’s engineering workforce is tasked to supplement the acquisition workforce 
with technical subject matter expertise in systems engineering, rapid prototyping, 
development and integration, test and evaluation, operations analysis, and other inherently 
government roles.  
Several novel systems engineering tools and methodologies have been developed to 
support the lead SoS engineer (LSoSE) with assessing system performance, system 
readiness, and risk through incremental development of a complex SoS. This paper will 
review the systems engineering processes and required level of technical rigor to manage 
the development and integration of a complex SoS in a distributed environment. A specific 
implementation of a Kill Chain framework that was designed to provide the PM and LSoSEs 
with comprehensive insight into the technical status and major risks for a complex SoS 
across specific mission threads will be presented. This paper will also review some of the 
systems engineering tools and methodologies developed and implemented by the Littoral 
Combat Ships (LCS) Mission Modules (MM) Program Office (PMS 420) that support the 
LCS MM Kill Chain framework. 
LCS Program Overview and Background  
Acquisition Strategy 
The Flight Zero Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) was approved in April 2004 and established the requirements of the LCS and 
three “focused” missions. Each Mission Package (MP) provides warfighting capability for 
one of three focused mission areas: 
• Mine Countermeasures (MCM)—Detection and neutralization of mine threats 
• Surface Warfare (SUW)—Maritime security missions and fleet protection from 
small boats and other asymmetric threats 
• Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)—Countering shallow water diesel submarine 
threats 
The CDD was updated in 2008 to the current Flight 0+ version which included 
several requirement updates, which were used to drive the design for the full “production” 
versions of the seaframe and MPs. MP specific requirement updates included the Net 
Ready Key Performance Parameter (KPP), Material Availability KPP, and others. 
In 2003, the LCS MM Program Office (PMS 420) was established as part of the 
Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Littoral and Mine Warfare (LMW). PMS 420’s 
responsibilities originally involved end-to-end LCS MP development and lifecycle support. In 
2011, PEO LCS was established to align several program offices into one consolidated PEO 
focused entirely on delivering the LCS Program. This included the establishment of PMS 
505 to assume the responsibility for Fleet Introduction and Sustainment of Mission Modules 
and the seaframes. PMS 420 continues to rely heavily on Participating Acquisition Resource 
Managers (PARMs) to deliver mission systems to meet LCS MP specific requirements and 
is effectively the lead SoS integrator of this complex system of manned and unmanned 
systems. Examples of PARM systems include manned helicopters, sensor systems, 
weapons systems, and unmanned aerial, surface, and sub-surface vehicles. In some cases 
where commercial or government technology solutions cannot be identified, PMS 420 works 
with the naval science and technology (S&T) community to conduct accelerated 
development of non-POR technologies.  
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The LCS MMs are being developed and delivered using a rapid fielding approach 
where initial increments are fielded as the PARM technology matures and is integrated into 
useful elements of capability. Key to enabling this incremental development has been the 
definition and configuration management of standard interfaces between the seaframe and 
the MPs, as defined in the Interface Control Document (ICD) for the LCS. This approach 
allows the seaframes and MMs to mature independent of each other’s development and 
facilitates reconfiguration of the LCS seaframe and incremental upgrade of the modular MPs 
over their life cycle. This independence of interfaces, which are managed by the common 
ICD, allows both programs to develop and test against their unique KPPs, key system 
attributes (KSAs), and milestones. This effectively enables the MP incremental fielding 
approach. Useful increments of capability are fielded, which build upon the initial 
capabilities, ultimately satisfying the full KPP requirements with the final increment. The 
incremental approach to delivering fleet capability also allows continued capability insertion 
throughout the life of the program. Capability Production Documents (CPDs) are developed 
to describe the capabilities required to meet the production baseline for a specific increment 
and also provide a testable requirement for the test community. 
The LCS MM acquisition strategy leverages an organic Navy workforce, which 
provided flexibility to accommodate requirements refinement as the initial MP capability 
matured. This effectively reduced the Navy’s exposure to cost and contract risk with industry 
throughout the early prototyping phases. The various lead SoSEs are aligned to their 
respective chartered mission areas as shown in Figure 1 (i.e., Naval Surface Naval Surface 
Warfare Center [NSWC] Panama City Division is the LSoSE for the MCM MP, NSWC 
Dahlgren Division is the LSoSE for the SUW MP, Naval Undersea Warfare Center [NUWC] 
Newport Division is the LSoSE for the ASW MP, while SPAWAR Systems Center [SSC] 
Pacific provides overarching SoSE support for cross-package requirements and architecture 
activities).  
 
 Figure 1. LCS MM Lead SoS Systems Engineers by Mission Area 
In a departure from the traditional prime integrator role, industry supports the LCS 
MM program as the Mission Package Integrator (MPI) to perform production, packaging, and 
assembly (PP&A) functions. The MPI role is limited and focuses on productionizing systems 
and equipment once a useful capability has been demonstrated. The various Naval Warfare 
and Systems Centers continue to assume primary responsibility of developing and 
integrating the initial MP increments through initial testing, fieldings, and early deployments 
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as the LSoSE. The LCS MM acquisition workforce has also been supplemented significantly 
with functional area subject matter expertise as available from the various Navy Warfare and 
Systems Centers to provide cross MP support in areas which include, but are not limited to 
the following: System Safety, Environmental Safety and Occupational Health, Information 
Assurance/Cybersecurity, Configuration Management, Human Systems Integration, 
Corrosion Control, and so forth. 
LCS Mission Package and Open Architecture 
The LCS MMs program was founded on the principles of incremental acquisition, 
open system architecture, and an open business model. As previously discussed, 
incremental acquisition promotes fielding of needed capabilities as they become available. 
Standard interfaces and an open business model enable more rapid integration of PARM 
and other systems as they mature. The LCS MM reference architecture is shown in Figure 
2. It is a high-level, system-agnostic block diagram that articulates functional as well as 
business dimensions. It is not intended to be the primary design tool, but is used by the lead 
SoSE and Program Manager (PM) to easily communicate SoS boundaries and interfaces 
with internal and external stakeholders, the S&T community, and other stakeholders. 
Additionally, it is used as the basis to establish boundaries for configuration management 
and certification events.  
“Focused” warfare MPs are designed to be installed on an LCS one mission at a time 
with the LCS Combat System providing the MPs with access to the seaframe hosted 
information technology (IT) infrastructure, sensors, weapons, countermeasures, and 
communications reachback through Exterior Communications (EXCOMMS). Functionality 
provided by the MP Combat System includes, but is not limited to computing, 
communications, mission planning, execution, and post-mission analysis. MP manned and 
unmanned vehicles may be augmented with specific weapons, and/or sensors, and/or 
countermeasures to execute a focused mission. The level of detail of the reference 
architecture does not allow for the arrows to depict the specific data path, but implies 
connectivity at the end points. 
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 Figure 2. LCS MMs Reference Architecture 
Requirements, Architecture, and Interface Models  
Orchestrating the development of a complex SoS requires clear communication and 
organization of requirements in ways that clearly derive and allocate requirements as well as 
define boundaries between where responsibility lies and where negotiation may be required 
between program offices, Systems Commands, or other stakeholders. The LCS MM specific 
example is further challenged by the need to manage multiple increments at varying levels 
of maturity and cost targets which drove concerted efforts to identify common services, 
hardware, and systems.  
This requires a robust and disciplined SoSE activity to first decompose the high-level 
requirements communicated in the CDD and CPDs, and to then perform the detailed 
analysis required to support the technical and cost trades needed to ensure that the 
architecture, requirements, and interfaces are developed and maintained at a sufficient level 
of detail to ensure the development of a capable and cost effective SoS capability. A cross-
MP Systems Engineering Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) was established at the working 
level responsible for developing requirements, architectures, and the associated SE tools 
and processes required to support the development of complete, verifiable, and cost 
effective functional and allocated baselines for the MPs which dictate the development of 
the LCS MM SoS. As various increments proceed through the development, PARMs and 
other external stakeholders are engaged as required to ensure that requirements and 
interfaces are understood and managed effectively. A series of Technical Interchange 
Meetings (TIMs) are typically held as a specific increment proceeds toward a formal 
Systems Engineering Technical Review (SETR; i.e., Preliminary Design Review [PDR], 
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Critical Design Review [CDR], etc.). The LCS MM requirements framework was developed 
by the SEIPT and provides a hierarchical framework used to derive and allocate top-level 
requirements, prescribed by the CDD, down to the Mission Module and Mission System 
levels.  
 
 Figure 3. LCS MMs Requirements Framework 
Level 1 requirements are defined as program level requirements provided by 
external sources. Level 1a requirements are developed by the user through the Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. For example, the LCS Flight 
0+ CDD provides the required performance attributes for the initial MP Increments, and the 
Incremental CPDs provide the specific performance attributes in support of the incremental 
production and fielding of the MPs. Level 1b requirements define common external 
interfaces which are typically outside the span of PMS 420 or the LSoSE’s control. Level 2 
requirements are defined as the common requirements developed by the LSoSE. These 
“common” or Level 2 requirements are typically driven by open architecture, cost savings, or 
other acquisition-type objectives. Level 2a captures sets of like functional requirements 
which are common to more than one Mission Package (i.e., Safety, Information Assurance/ 
Cybersecurity, Environmental, Logistics, etc.). Level 2b defines Systems and sub-systems 
which are common to more than one MP (i.e., computing infrastructure, communications, 
sustainment, etc.). The MP requirements are defined at Level 3 and typically include the 
level of detail to understand the incremental nature of the MP under development and/or 
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test. Mission Module requirements and intra-MM interfaces are typically defined at Level 4. 
Capabilities common to more than one MM within a specific MP, such as the MP Application 
Software (MPAS), are implemented at Level 4. Mission System requirements and interfaces 
are defined at Level 5. Interfaces which the LSoSE must retain control over to ensure 
capability or modularity objectives are documented in PMS 420 controlled Interface 
Requirement Specifications (IRSs) or ICDs. 
The respective warfare focused MP technical teams manage the interfaces within an 
MM or MP by defining the details of the interfaces in the requirements and architecture 
products. Internal MP interfaces are documented within the standard section of the 
System/Sub-System Specification (SSS) and flowed down to Sub-system Specification (SS) 
and other documents. To control parallel development among the various MPs or external 
stakeholders, PMS 420 defines and controls common services and interfaces via 
standalone an IRS or an ICD/IDD depending on the level of control required. An IRS 
describes the functional requirements (e.g., data communication requirements) and an IDD 
or ICD describes the design details of the interface.  
Program offices responsible for constituent system development typically contract to 
a prime developer and find it sufficient to decompose the CDD into a System/Sub-System 
Specification (SSS) or an A-Spec, which is then put on contract. Due to the complex nature 
of the LCS MM SoS and the number of organizations involved in development of MMs, 
mission systems, sub-systems, and so forth, PMS 420 has found it necessary to manage its 
specification tree down to the MM level (or Level 4) with a strong understanding of how 
those MM requirements are allocated to individual Mission Systems. PMS 420 has 
historically formalized such technical agreements with its PARMs or other stakeholders 
through System Project Directives (SPDs), which are essentially Memorandums of 
Agreement between government program offices supplemented with SSS, Sub-System 
Specification (SS), ICDs, and architecture products as appropriate. Architecture products 
are typically developed through the MM and mission system Levels 4 and 5 in accordance 
with version 2.0 of the Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF) framework (DoN, 2011). 
Interfaces which require high levels of integration and/or are anticipated to be high risk are 
further detailed using high fidelity interface models using Systems Modeling Language 
(SysML). Interface requirements further derived through the use of DODAF and SysML are 
fed back, or synchronized, into the appropriate requirements specification documents. The 
SPDs appended with SSS, SS, and IRSs at Level 4 or below to inform contract actions with 
PARM contract actions. As most of the mission systems which are constituent to the SoS 
have their own ACAT designation, requirements, and funding lines, it is not until this level of 
analysis is performed that we can begin to understand the gaps between the prescribed 
SoS and mission system requirements. This synchronized requirements and architecture 
development process is depicted in Figure 4.  
The requirements derivation and supporting architecture development process 
requires collaboration across several organizations. PMS 420 utilizes a collaborative 
engineering environment such that its distributed user base can access the LCS MM 
DOORS modules from government and contractor facilities. In 2014, this capability was 
expanded to include access to the LCS MM System Architect encyclopedias. These 
DOORS and system architect instantiations are used mostly by the PMS 420 core SE IPT. 
In 2013, the Navy Systems Engineering Resource Center (NSERC) hosted Systems 
Engineering Integrated Data Environment (SE IDE) was redesigned to ensure internal and 
external users timely access to requirements, architectures, and technical data packages in 
support of formal reviews (i.e., SETRs, certification events, or other events as required).  
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 Figure 4. Requirements and Architecture Approach 
Assessing Technical Performance Measures for a Complex SoS  
Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) are a time-based metric used to compare 
actual performance to projected performance as a system advances through various 
developmental and test events. The specific metrics are typically implemented at the system 
or sub-system level. The TPMs which have the greatest impact on SoS mission 
performance are specified in the SPD and supporting requirements documents. The PARMs 
are responsible to report any scheduled test results back to the LSoSE on a quarterly basis, 
or sooner via the integrated risk management, or other technical management process. The 
LSoSE is then challenged with understanding the impact of any performance shortfalls and 
then assessing the impact to SoS mission performance and presenting the impacts to 
leadership.  
The LCS MM program developed a framework to identify and track the TPMs which 
are critical for LCS mission success. Therefore, thoughtful selection, review, and tracking of 
TPMs are required to allow technical managers to make informed decisions during system 
design and to identify the need for corrective actions when deviations from planned 
technical progress occur. In cases of complex SoS with multiple variables, dependencies 
and/or mission execution paths, multiple TPMs inform a modeling and simulation (M&S) tool 
to project probable performance of the MSs and/or MMs associated with an MP. In some 
cases, the TPMs that PARMS are tracking for other missions are not critical to PMS 420 and 
therefore are not tracked by the LCS MM LSoSE.  
The allocation of KPPs to TPMs for a notional ASW MP is depicted in Figure 5. High 
fidelity, non-linear, complex M&S tools are usually required to predict the performance of the 
integrated MP based on the TPMs’ inputs of the constituent mission systems. For example, 
Detailed Interface Models
SV-10c
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the Naval Mine Warfare Simulation (NMWS) tool is an object-oriented, event-driven 
simulation tool traditionally used by the Navy’s Mine Warfare community. This SoS M&S tool 
is capable of reflecting the complexity of an SoS because it can accommodate multiple 
inputs, such as mission thread information, environmental predictions, mission system 
performance parameters, high-level reliability parameters, and critical task analysis inputs. 
PMS 420 has found the use of a Kill Chain based modeling methodology to provide benefit 
to program management and risk identification, and we will now discuss that process. 
 
 Figure 5. Notional TPM for a Notional ASW MP 
Applying the Kill Chain Methodology to a Complex SoS  
Given a notional SoS with 12 constituent systems, each with six to eight TPMs, over 
100 TPMs can result. The LSoSE cannot always expect to present status on each TPM at 
TIMs, SETRs, certification events, or other decision meetings. To assist in managing this 
challenge, the Kill Chain methodology of a mission-based approach to assessing and 
visualizing how an SoS is expected to perform in the execution of a specific mission thread 
is used. It is intended to provide insight into any risks or issues associated for the individual 
systems, sub-systems, or interfaces in properly executing its allocated functionality. Several 
communities have developed specific implementations for various purposes. Perhaps the 
most pervasive are the operational test community’s Warfare Capability Baseline (WCB) 
process and larger Navy Integration and Interoperability (I&I) implementations (Clawson et 
al., 2015). The WCB approach in particular was developed with a focus on test data in 
preparation for an operational test event. LCS MM LSoSEs have expanded upon and 
tailored a Kill Chain implementation to compensate for the incremental, technical, and 
organizational complexities that can complicate the assessment and presentation for a 
complex SoS.  
As previously described, the LCS MM SoS is made up of various manned and 
unmanned vehicles, sensor systems, communication systems, weapons systems, and 
systems provided by the core LCS seaframe. As MPs are fielded incrementally, mission 
systems and/or capability upgrades are added to the MP baselines. Further, multiple sub-
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mission threads, or “passes,” with various permutations of these vehicles, sensors, and 
systems, can be required to accomplish missions with extended timelines, such as those 
required to clear a minefield. An example Kill Chain for a notional ASW MP is shown in 
Figure 6. The overarching Kill Chain assessment process is depicted in Figure 7. The Kill 
Chain is presented as a matrix of systems and sub-systems, laid against mission phases 
(i.e., Prepare/Configure, Search/Detect/Classify/Localize, Identify, Neutralize, Assess, Post 
Mission Analysis). Each system, sub-system, and integration point is assessed for its 
individual contribution associated and risk of meeting the mission specific requirements set 
using the LCS MM standard risk assessment criteria. In many cases, multiple TPMs are 
tracked and used to quantitatively assess the respective system or sub-system against its 
allocated contributions. Any system which misses a major TPM milestone cues a re-
evaluation of the Kill Chain for impact. If the performance degradation does not force a 
change to the risk rating, then the Kill Chain is not updated. The assessment method is also 
denoted to provide insight into the level of confidence in the assessment (i.e., S = SME 
estimate, M = Modeled result, T = Verified in test, F = Fielded System). A path key with 
varying thickness is used to assist the PM or LSoSE to understand where the specific 
system falls in the multi-pass sequence of events. Notes can be overlaid on the Kill Chain to 
reference the PM or LSoSE to specific risks or issues. In order to not lose the fidelity, Kill 
Chains are typically created for major test configurations, deployed configurations, or 
Increments.  
 
 Figure 6.  Example Kill Chain for a Notional ASW MP 
This image cannot currently be displayed.
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 Figure 7. LCS MM Kill Chain Framework 
Lessons Learned and Opportunities for Future Work 
This paper presented the systems engineering processes and level of technical rigor 
required to manage the development and integration of a complex SoS. A specific Kill Chain 
framework was presented, which is currently used to assess and visualize the impact of 
TPMs on a complex systems of manned and unmanned systems mission threads. As 
currently constructed, the Kill Chains provide the PM with comprehensive insight into the 
technical status and major risks and issues for a complex SoS across specific mission 
threads. Due to the various configurations that the LCS MM PMs and LSoSEs are 
responsible to track, the LCS MM program office has invested significant resources into 
coordinating several of the basic systems engineering methodologies and tools to support 
the Kill Chain process, namely requirements, architectures, and risk management.  
• Requirements were developed to a sufficient level of detail to articulate the 
specific contribution of the system, sub-system, and interface required at 
each phase in the mission thread.  
• Architectures were developed to the sufficient level of detail to ensure that the 
weapons critical path covers the sequence of events critical for mission 
success.  
• Constituent system requirements must be aligned to LCS MM requirements. 
In the cases when constituent systems have their own requirements sets 
This image cannot currently be displayed.
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(CDDs, CPDs, or other), the LSoSE must work with both resource sponsors 
to identify and work to close significant requirements and/or interface 
misalignments.  
• Constituent system program managers must also be responsible to, and have 
a mechanism to report, TPMs to the LSoSE routinely.  
• Risk and issues are flagged at least to the level of detail (i.e., system, sub-
system, interface) presented in the Kill Chain.  
• The team responsible to develop MM requirements is distributed across at 
least four Naval Warfare and Systems centers. PMS 420 has developed a 
common access card (CAC)-enabled collaborative engineering environment 
where a distributed user base can access the LCS MM DOORS modules 
from government and contractor facilities. Change management and control 
processes were also developed. In 2014, this capability was expanded to 
include access to the LCS MM System Architect encyclopedias. 
To date, the Kill Chain framework has been extremely effective as LCS MM prepares 
for several operational test events. Performance issues are captured, assessed, and 
presented in the context of their impact to the overall mission success. In order to expand 
this approach to provide the PM with a more predictive tool that can be used for technology 
insertion planning and to better support the developmental phases of the next increments, 
some of the other technical management and systems engineering methodologies and tools 
must be appropriately configured. Integrating a robust modeling and simulation capability 
would better support analysis of alternative and technology insertion trade-off–type 
analyses. Integrating cost, schedule, and the -ilities, such as reliability, sustainability, and 
other models, would better support understanding the capability from a performance and 
total ownership cost (TOC) perspective. 
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